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IN
PHILOSOPHY, RELIGION AND CULTURE

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World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture

*Essays presented
to
Professor Dharendra Mohan Datta*

Editor

Ram Jee Singh, M A , Ph D.

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*While accepting the Presentation Volume
Dr. D. M. Datta
rededicated the offering to the Eternal*

*“ब्रह्मार्पणम् अस्तु” - धी.मो.दत्त
“May the offering go to the
Eternal”. - D. M. Datta
June 26, 1968*

*स महात्मा सुदुर्लभः
Such a soul is difficult to find*

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P R E F A C E

Bihar has a rich cultural and philosophical heritage. It is the ancient land of Janaka, Gārgi, Yajñavalkya, Gotama, Asoka, Tāttāgata and many other saints, prophets and philosophers. In recent times, late M. M. Ramāvatār Sarmā presented his Parmarthadarsana the study and appraisal of which are sure to yield valuable philosophical results.

The need of a state forum in philosophy was felt as early as 1949. The credit of giving a determinate shape to this idea goes to Professor Dharendra Mohan Datta, who founded the Bihar Darsana Parishad (Bihar State Philosophical Congress) in the form of a study circle with its central office at Patna. It was intended that it would also hold its meetings outside Patna. To make its working simple it was decided at Prof. Datta's suggestion not to have a cadre of 'officials' but only a convener chosen every year according to the alphabetical order of the names of its members. Accordingly, Shree Ashoka Kumar Verma of B. N. College, Patna was the first to shoulder this responsibility. After one year, Shree Rajendra Prasad of Patna College, Patna (now Professor of Philosophy and Head of the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, I.I.T., Kanpur) succeeded Shree Verma. The Parishad was presented to the Indian Philosophical Congress at its Patna session in 1949, and the congress welcomed its affiliation to it. For a few years the Parishad could not remain very active, mainly on account of Professor Datta's stay abroad as visiting professor in Wisconsin and Minnesota Universities and thereupon his retirement from the Patna University service in 1953. In December 1954, at Peradenia (Ceylon), during the session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, the delegates from Bihar had an informal meeting in which they resolved to hold a full-fledged annual conference at Begusarai. Professor Datta very kindly agreed to attend the conference. According to his instructions the conference was held in March 1955 in a very simple and informal way, avoiding all show and unnecessary expenditure. All the delegates were hosted by the local college teachers as their personal guests. The conference was presided over by Shree Ganga Nath Bhattacharya,

a very close associate of Professor Datta at Patna University.

Next year in 1956, it met at Gaya under the presidentship of Sri N. M. Ghosh, a very senior and retired teacher of Philosophy at Patna. This time Prof. Datta, on account of the tragic death of his third son, could not attend the session but he sent a handsome amount of money as donation to the Parishad. At Begusarai, he did not allow the members to pass a resolution to prepare a volume in his honour and this time too he did not let them go ahead. The fourth session of the Parishad was held at Muzaffarpur under the presidentship of Principal (now Vice-Chancellor, Ranchi University) A. F. Markham. On that occasion Professor N. A. Nikam, the then Secretary of the Indian Philosophical Congress in his letter of good wishes wrote : "Those who conduct the Parishad are inspired by Professor Dharendra Mohan Datta. Few pupils have had such a teacher and few teachers have such steadfast pupils." The fifth session of the Parishad was held at Madhubani, in 1958, under the presidentship of Professor Saroj Kumar Das. Prof. Datta, who was fortunately present, took upon himself the pleasant task of extending thanks to the unexpectedly large number of delegates who attended every meeting and participated in the discussions. The sixth session of the Parishad was held at Chapra in 1960. It was here under the presidentship of Professor K. C. Verghese that we adopted a formal resolution to compile a presentation volume honouring Prof. Datta. We could do this solely because Prof. Datta was absent. Had he been present, we could not have adopted the resolution. The rest of the task was left to me and all the members promised to give cooperation and help. An editorial board consisting of Professor G. P. Conger (Minnesota), now unfortunately dead, Professors A. C. Ewing (Cambridge), C. A. Moore (Hawaii) (Unfortunately he is now dead. But I must confess that he was the pivot of this venture.), William P. Frankena (Michigan), G. L. Pestoun (I.I.P. Paris), G. P. Mahalasekhara (Ceylon), G. R. Malkani (Indian Institute of Philosophy, Amalner), A. R. Wadia (M.P., Bombay), N. A. Nikam (Mysore), T. M. P. Mahadevan (Madras), Indra Sen (Shri Aurobindo Ashram) and Rajendra Prasad (I.I.T., Kanpur) was constituted. It is worthwhile to mention the touching words of late Professor G. P. Conger which he wrote while giving his kind consent to serve on the editorial board : "I have always

said that I would not undertake any editorial work but in the case of Datta, I must reconsider." This shows how much Dr. Datta is loved and respected all over the world.

A word about the editing of the volume would not be out of place. Professor Charles A. Moore took great pains in collecting articles from philosophers residing outside India and did the most arduous work of editing them. Professor Rajendra Prasad did the same in respect of articles of Indian scholars. To the other editors I am equally indebted for their constant guidance, help, and advice.

The editorial board is extremely thankful to Shree Mohit Mohan Bose, of Bharati Bhawan, Patna, India, who is publishing this volume out of his sheer love and admiration for Prof. Datta, and, therefore, has solved all our financial worries.

It was only after the volume was sent to the press that I informed Professor Datta of what we had done without his knowledge, so that he might be able to prepare himself for it. He has always frowned upon earthly riches, glories, and public fame. So, we had a natural apprehension that he might disappoint us at the eleventh hour by refusing to let the volume be dedicated to him. Once he had said, "If you can run the Bihar Darsana Parishad for ten years, it would be my best commemoration." Therefore, when I met him, as the Parishad had already been ten years old, and the volume ready to be out, I hoped that he would not decline to accept it. Even this time he took me to task for doing all this which he considered unnecessary, but I left no option to him. He conceded to my request, but did not fail to caution me against the ignominy which goes with bad printing. I, therefore, sent the final proofs to the contributors, though sometimes it delayed the final printing for several months.

We had earlier decided to name the book "Professor D. M. Datta Commemoration Volume". But this name did not meet with his approval and he gave the name "World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture", which the volume bears.

Many friends asked me to include a detailed life-sketch of Prof. Datta, but I could not get his permission to do it. He did not even allow a photo of his being included in the volume.

After all, the book is now ready. I must confess that I received numerous queries from many of the contributors asking what had

happened to its publication. I beg their pardon for the inordinate delay that has occurred. In the end, I thank very gratefully all the contributors and also all those who have directly or indirectly helped me in the preparation of this volume.

April, 1968

RAM JEE SINGH

FOREWORD


This volume of *World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture* has been brought out by the Bihar Darshan Parishad in commemoration of the 70th birthday of Dr. D. M. Datta and as a tribute to one who for so many years and in so many ways has influenced and enriched human thought.

While still a young man, Dr. D. M. Datta put aside his work as a teacher of philosophy to join Mahatma Gandhi's non-cooperation movement as part of India's struggle for freedom. As an inmate of the Ashram at Sabarmati, he applied himself with selfless dedication to the work of village reconstruction. Later he returned to the study and teaching of philosophy in which he has rightly achieved world-wide recognition.

In one of his writings, Dr. Datta details the qualities that in his view most distinguish a philosopher. They are insight to grasp the inner and ultimate nature of things, far-sight to distinguish eternal values from transitory ones and an open mind so that one may form a comprehensive idea of the universe and plan his entire life in the light of this idea. Here indeed is a self portrait of Dr. Datta. Not only does he possess these qualities in full measure, but his whole life has been an affirmation and a vindication of his belief that only by a closer contact with practical life can philosophy regain its ancient prestige.

I am happy to join with Dr. Datta's many friends and admirers in offering him this volume as a token of their deep and affectionate regards.

RASHTRAPATI BHAWAN
New Delhi-4
December 22, 1967

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'Zakir Hussain', with a horizontal line underneath it.

* Dr. Zakir Hussain is the President of the Indian Union.

Dhirendra Mohan Datta

DHIRENDRA MOHAN DATTA

M.A. (University of Calcutta) ; M.A. (*ad eundem*, U. of Dacca) ; Premchand Raychand Scholar and Ph.D. (U. of Calcutta) ; Deshikottama (D.Litt. *honoris causa*, Visva-bharati U., Santiniketan) ; Prachyavidyavaridhi.

Senior Research Fellow, Indian Academy of Philosophy, Amalner, Bombay (1924-25) ; P. C. Basumallik Research Professor, National Council of Education, Jadavpur, Calcutta (1925-28) ; Assistant Professor and then Professor of Philosophy, Patna College, U. of Patna, Bihar (1928-53).

Member, Government of India's Editorial Board for *History of Philosophy, East and West* (Published by G. Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, Vol. I, 1952 and Vol. II, 1953); General President, Indian Philosophical Congress (1952).

Member, East-West Philosophers' Conference (and teacher at the connected Summer School) the U. of Hawaii, Honolulu, U.S.A. (1949 and 1959) ; Kemper Knapp Visiting Professor, the U. of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., U. S. A. (1951-52) ; Visiting Professor, U. of Minnesota, Minneapolis, U.S.A., and Seminar teacher and Convocation speaker at Macalester College, St. Paul, Minn., U.S.A. (1952).

Born at the close of the last century, marked by all-sided Indian renaissance, in a remote East Bengal village in Mymensingh, Dharendra Mohan Datta, the youngest child of an affluent and enlightened family of the rural community, was educated in different places of Bengal and Assam, mostly by his elder brother, a professor of Philosophy, to whom he attributes also his early interest in the subject. Among other opportunities, he gratefully mentions his having as teachers and guides in Calcutta (during 1919-21, and 1925-28) some of the best Indian teachers of Sanskrit philosophical texts, and pioneers of comparative philosophical research; and to three of them he feels particularly indebted for their continued help and guidance : the late Mahamahopadhyaya Yogendranatha Tarkatirtha, the late Professor K. C. Bhattacharya and Professor S. Radhakrishnan.

One-sided academic ambitions faced, he thinks now, a healthy crisis during 1920-21 when Mahatma Gandhi appealed to the youth to join his many-sided movement for the total uplift of the country. Suspending his long-cherished plans for over three years (1921-24), he did some constructive work in and around his native village, after having six months' training requiring strenuous manual work, under strict discipline, in Gandhiji's Satyagraha Ashrama at Sabarmati, Ahmedabad. This kind of training and voluntary social service, even for a short time, is now regarded by him as highly desirable for the Indian university graduates; and in his own case it brought about a sympathetic understanding of the masses, and a new orientation for life.

The study and teaching of philosophy came, thereafter, to acquire for him a triple significance : a *congenial* means of living, serving the country and serving his own spiritual needs. This vocation was discovered, by trial and error, to be the proper one suiting his aptitudes, best,—his *svadharma* as the *Gita* would say.

The Indian Philosophical Congress was started in 1925 in Calcutta by Professor Radhakrishnan and others, and was presided over by the philosopher-poet R. N. Tagore. Since then it had commanded his devotion, stimulated his research work, and won for him, through its sessions in different places of undivided India, a wide circle of friends. He also associated himself with many local philosophical societies in the provinces, particularly in Bihar.

During his long Patna life he had ample scope for both academic and social work. He had to teach different courses in Indian and Western philosophy, at different levels, sometimes over twenty hours a week, in addition to some extra-curricular work. In striving to prove equal to the task he had to read extensively, for which he thinks himself fortunate. The materials for his papers and books were gathered therefrom, as also from discussions in the various classes taught. He built his Patna home at Mahendru which was then a semirural suburban area with a rural community of which he became an intimate member participating in its welfare activities since the early thirties. After independence (1947) he was entrusted by

his college with social service work as a part of which, for several years, he organized, with the help of students, evening classes for adult illiterates in the slums.

While he was looking forward to well-earned rest and retirement on superannuation pension (provided by the British system at the age of 56), there came a pleasant surprise, an invitation for the second ten-yearly East-West Philosophers' Conference in 1949. This unique conference for six weeks organized by the University of Hawaii required presentation of papers as well as teaching, by the selected members, of Summer classes attended by the students and the conference members. It was a highly challenging invitation accepted primarily, in the ancient Indian spirit, as an opportunity for repaying the debt to his teachers by propagating their teachings. But actually it also turned out to be a golden opportunity for him for learning a good deal from the Western, the Chinese and the Japanese colleagues—particularly from the last two groups whose philosophies were neither previously known nor much cared for. This much desirable education and expansion of outlook towards world perspectives was made possible by the members, living together, attending their colleagues' classes, and discussing papers and problems, day and night, for six weeks.

It was chiefly out of this conference that he got later further opportunities for teaching abroad, attending the next (1959) session of this and other conferences, travelling twice round the world, meeting philosophers and making inestimable friendships. Regard for other cultures and systems of thought, and an increasing belief in the evolution of a harmonious world, through the travail of conflicts, are, what he thinks to be, his great personal gains.

He retired from the University of Patna in 1953 as contemplated before. The impelling urge for freedom resisted the temptations of further employment at home and abroad. He has been living since a retired life at Santiniketan, near the campus of Visvabharati (the 'World University') founded by Tagore in a quiet West Bengal village, which has grown into a small international centre. As a life member he can use the University's library, and he has recently been permitted to build a

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house on one of its open sites.

He is fond of saying that he has been fortunate in receiving in life much more than what he deserved or could dream of. Among his good fortunes he counts not only his many worthy friends, teachers and colleagues, but also some excellent pupils he had, in India and America, whose scholarship and character have set examples for him. As life is advancing he regrets, however, that his cherished goal of self-regeneration has been moving farther away.

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■ ■ ■

AT THE FEET OF THE GREAT GURU

HARI MOHAN JHA

It has been my esteemed privilege to be a pupil—and one of the oldest pupils—of such a great philosopher as Dr. Dharendra Mohan Datta, a name commanding universal respect in academic circles. He is the Grand Teacher of the present generation of teachers who are engaged in teaching philosophy in this state of Bihar at present. For more than a quarter of a century, he has been the friend, philosopher and guide of those who have to do anything with philosophy in this country. He is like a liaison officer of Philosophical exchange between India and other parts of the world.

Dr. Datta actually *lives* philosophy. His whole life has been a course of Applied Idealism. He has practised more than what he has preached and professed. He has been a veritable symbol of Plain living and High thinking like the *Rishis* of old. He began his career as a professor after attuning himself to the Gandhian way of life at Sabarmati Ashram, where he imbibed the spirit of divinity. He developed a missionary zeal for the highest spiritual values—with a *Gita* sense of duty and sacrifice, combined with an ideology of simplicity and labour, which became the dominant marks of his personality.

A youngman of slender build with sharp, penetrating eyes and a smiling intelligent face with an ever ready presence of mind, Dr. Datta appeared as a friend to us when we were his students in the post-graduate classes at Patna College in the early thirties. He had drunk deep of the reservoir of ancient Indian erudition and he encouraged us to get into touch with the original Sanskrit texts of Indian Philosophy. He followed the same method in teaching us Western Philosophy too. He insisted on our getting first-hand knowledge of European philosophers by reading their original works. Consequently we had to struggle a long way inch by inch from Plato to Russell. Some of us even felt that Dr. Datta was a hard task-master

who would not allow us an easy short-cut through Thilly or Weber. But the huge amount of labour which seemed so boring then, proved to be a boon as it afforded a broad base for further philosophical studies. Dr. Datta inculcated in us a love for critical and comparative studies in Philosophy, which has now become an established feature of the Datta School.

Dr. Datta was a past-master in the art of evoking an interest in metaphysical problems. He had a wonderful knack of simplifying complexities by a thread-bare analysis of the subject. This love for lucidity and clarity of expression is a characteristic feature of Dr. Datta's writings. That is one reason why his *Introduction to Indian Philosophy* has proved so widely popular in the eastern and western hemispheres. The popularity of his *Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy* is also due to the same type of clear-cut exposition, which leaves no scope for vagueness or ambiguity anywhere.

Dr. Datta seems to be guided by the motto : *Nāmūlam Likhyate kinchit Nānapekshitamuchayate*. He will say nothing that is unauthorised or unwanted. He combines the Naiyayika love for exactitude and precision with the scientific method of analysis, and the result is an affective crisp style which makes a straight appeal to the reader's mind. Read any paragraph from Dr. Datta's works, be it *Six Ways of Knowing* or *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi*, you will feel the stamp of a writer who knows what he wants to say and who says just the thing needed, not a word more or less. Verbosity, pompousness, word-jugglery or poetic exuberance do not fall in the line of Dr. Datta. The beauty of his art lies in its simplicity.

Dr. Datta's house at Ranighat, Patna, which was like a sacred Ashrama soon became a place of intellectual pilgrimage. It attracted visitors from far and wide, who came to learn something or to seek some advice. They were all hypnotised by the charming humility and unassuming manners of the great thinker, who was clad in a *Khadi Dhotie* and wore a napkin and was seated on a mat-covered small *chowkie* and talked like an angel. The whole atmosphere was surcharged with a spirit of neatness, cleanliness, dignity and purity, which transported one to a higher realm

of ideals.

Dr. Datta has been deeply loyal to the cultural heritage of India. He has tried to decipher the inner meaning of Sanskrit texts in the light of historical perspectives. His immense love for Sanskrit is borne out by the fact that he organised a Pandit Sabha on the occasion of the Patna Session of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1949, perhaps for the first (and up till now the last) time in the history of the Congress. Eminent scholars of Sanskrit were invited to participate in philosophical discussions in a right oriental style of *Shāstrārtha*. As I was in charge of the Pandit Camp, I had an opportunity to see what great love and respect Dr. Datta possesses for these Pandits, whom he regards as the custodians of ancient learning.

It may not however be deduced from the above that Dr. Datta has any less respect for Western thinkers. He is well-known for his liberal, cosmopolitan views, which transcend all zonal distinctions. He likes to combine in an eclectic and synthetic spirit all that is best in world philosophy, whether it bears an oriental or occidental label.

Dr. Datta possesses a sincere love for Hindi. About twenty years back, he wrote a Foreword in Hindi to my *Vaisheshika Darshana*. When I translated his well-known Indian Philosophy, he saw the Hindi rendering and gave valuable suggestions at many places. It was he who initiated the idea of Bihar Darshana Parishad and encouraged us to contribute philosophical articles in Hindi. He always writes letters in Hindi to his Hindi-speaking students, whose number is legion. He has a strong faith in the suitability of Hindi as the national language of India. He is, however, in favour of simplifying Hindi with a view to popularising it in non-Hindi areas.

Dr. Datta leads an ascetic life. He likes to cook his own food which often consists of a handful of rice, dal and potatoes, all mixed together. He would even wash his utensils with his own hands. He sleeps in a hard bed, preferably on the floor. He chooses to travel in the third class and refuses to accept a first class fare to which he is entitled. He has a capacity for indefatigable labour and allows no relaxation to his body or mind while he is enga-

ged in serious work.

Although so stern and uncompromising in following his own rigid principles for self-control, Dr. Datta's heart is full of the milk of human kindness. He can be compared to a cocoanut fruit which contains softness inside the stiff exterior. I shall cite just one instance of his sympathy for the poor. A peon was once suspected to have drawn an excess of Rs. 30/- from the post office due to the mistake of a clerk. When the news reached Dr. Datta, he asked the peon to return the money if he had received it. But the latter denied. Dr. Datta could not ascertain what was the real truth. But he decided what to do in the circumstances. He deposited the amount from his own pocket. This had a marvellous effect upon the peon who fell at his feet and confessed his guilt with tears in his eyes.

Another example of the Gandhian way of changing the heart of a man was narrated by Dr. Datta himself. When he was a student at Calcutta he touched the sentiments of a ferocious scoundrel who was a terror to the locality, by means of sympathetic, affectionate moral exhortations and it had a magical effect. The hard-boiled criminal was converted into a peaceful, law-abiding citizen.

Dr. Datta practises Idealism in his everyday life even in small matters. But sometimes, his Idealism seems to be carried to an extreme point (in the eyes of average men). Once we went to the Public Service Commission office as experts. When we came back to Ranighat, Dr. Datta wanted to offer the entire amount of the conveyance allowance admissible for the purpose (something near ten rupees) to the rickshawalla, who was stupefied with wonder and thought it was a joke !

Dr. Datta is more an institution than an individual. He represents that type of persons who live for a cause and dedicate their whole life to it. His life has been a saintly life of Philosophic *Sāadhanā* and humanitarian service. He

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is now leading a retired life (at Shāntiniketana) in between *Vānaprastha* and *Sannyāsa*. He is detaching himself more and more from wordly affairs and is marching ahead on the path of Self-Realization. May God help to fulfil his noble mission ! May he continue to live long to spread the light of wisdom and to illuminate the path of mankind in the present world-crisis !

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DR. D. M. DATTA : AN APPRECIATION

A. R. WADIA

The Indian Philosophical Congress, during its thirty-five years of existence, has done splendid work by way of encouraging philosophical studies. Apart from this, the annual sessions of the Congress have helped to bring teachers of philosophy in India together once a year and form warm friendships. It is only because of the Congress that I have practically come to know the teachers of philosophy in India, and one of them whom I have particularly learnt to admire and to love is Professor Dharendra M. Datta of Patna. So far as my memory goes, it was at the session of the Philosophical Congress held at Waltair in 1933 that my personal friendship with Professor Datta began. Since then till 1955 when I gave up my Chairmanship of the Executive Committee of the Congress, I had the pleasure of meeting him practically every year. It was also my good fortune that both of us were on the Editorial Board of the *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western* under the Chairmanship of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, which was appointed by the revered Maulana Abul Kalam Azad as Minister of Education. We had to work for months together and often had to meet for days at a time. It was then that I began to have first hand knowledge, not merely of the deep erudition of Professor Datta but also of the extreme scrupulous punctiliousness of the man. Neither time nor labour mattered so long as he could attend to every comma and semi-colon. It was in these days that I began to appreciate the genuine human qualities of Professor Datta, and I was particularly struck by his deep and genuine modesty. He never cared for honours; they had to be thrust on him. As a thinker he proved his worth by his arduous work the *Six Ways of Knowing*. Since then he has published a massive volume on contemporary philosophy, which shows the depth and width of his studies in Western philosophy.

It was good for India that he accepted an invitation

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to go to the U. S. A., where his lectures gave an impetus to the study and appreciation not merely of ancient Indian philosophy but also of Gandhian thought. After his retirement from Patna University, opportunities came to him for taking up some administrative jobs of a high order, but with his usual modesty he avoided them and preferred to settle down in the tranquil atmosphere of Santiniketan.

It was with great pleasure that I read that at the last Convocation of the Vishwabharati University he was honoured with the honorary degree of D. Litt. It may well be said that the University in honouring Professor Datta honoured itself.

It has been a particular source of pleasure to me that Professor Ram Jee Singh and other admirers of Professor Datta are bringing out a Commemoration Volume in honour of Dr. D. M. Datta. I owe an apology to them for my inability to write out an article for the Volume. But the least I can do under the circumstances is to write out an appreciation in which I can give vent to my respect, admiration and love for Dr. Datta. His objectivity as shown in his philosophic works is such that it is difficult to label him as belonging to this or that particular school of thought. He is a philosopher in the highest sense of the term, namely that he is a seeker after truth and he is eager to bring out the truth in every system of thought. His is a great contribution to the study of philosophy in India at the present time, and he will be long remembered. Retirement for him merely means retirement from service but not from philosophical studies and this brings out the philosopher in Dr. Dharendra M. Datta.

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World Perspectives
in
Philosophy, Religion and Culture

TRAGEDY WEST AND EAST

VIRGIL C. ALDRICH

First, I want to see what tragedy is in a specific world-famous case. This will provide an earthy sort of ballast for the subsequent, more theoretical considerations of tragedy in Christendom and in India. My fundamental concern here is to do the sort of justice to the subject that a philosopher such as D. M. Datta, with his wonderfully inclusive sympathies, would ask.

I

Hamlet and Tragedy

In a confidence to Horatio, Hamlet said, "There was a fighting in me that would not let me sleep." My aim here is to disclose the combatants in this inner conflict, showing them to be mighty opposites in the ethos of Shakespeare's time. Hamlet was the "objective correlative" of Shakespeare's experience of the conflict. Shakespeare knew exactly what the tragic figure of Hamlet was to express. T. S. Eliot, among others, thinks that he did not, but it can be shown that he is wrong about this. Freud would agree with me that Shakespeare did do something with Hamlet, but what Shakespeare did is not what Freud thought.

Let us look, first, at Shakespeare's circumstances, what I called the ethos of his time. He was born just past the middle of the sixteenth century, the beginning of which accommodated the Copernican revolution. Before the end of the century, the great dualisms of our modern era had emerged, and Shakespeare lived over into the next century when they hardened into the conditions of a sort of schizoid consciousness, giving the human spirit the characteristic cramps of our own modern outlook. The new dualism involved, in general, the growing consciousness that the dramatic view of the world including man is not the true one; or,

that the "objective" view of reality reveals it as not so exciting—not sanctioning or grounding the splendid ideals of heroic human action:

*These our actors . . . were all spirits
And are melted into air, into thin air;
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep.*

But I am not ready yet for Shakespeare, speaking in the person of Prospero. We are talking about the circumstances of his life. Keep in mind that, through the old heroic order of things with its symbols of a high romance, a new earthier or more drab order was appearing as the underlying reality; and that these are the mighty opposites in the ethos of Shakespeare's time, the new order tending to negate the old, and the old to maintain itself against odds. It was this conflict, we shall see, that Shakespeare internalized in the soul of Hamlet, and was the fighting in him that would not let him sleep.

Now for the evidences that this conflict was *generally* prevalent in the period of Shakespeare's heyday. Afterwards, we shall turn to the evidence of its being the source of Hamlet's distraction.

Francis Bacon, Shakespeare's exact contemporary, said that if you want to know the truth, you must submit to the controls of scientific method, and what this reveals about things shows that it is not purpose (final causes) that moves them. He was saying in effect that Aristotle and Dante were wrong. It is not Love that moves the sun and the other stars. They just move, and they move *us* in the same dead-pan way, willy-nilly. Bacon said that it is in poetry that the mind of man dramatically and aggressively reads *its* warmth and color and light into the world, and

makes it *appear* the proper habitat of magnificent heroism. But this is just an appearance, contrary to the nature of things. In science, the mind of man submits to the truth about the world.

Cervantes, who died just when Shakespeare did, as if their souls were linked, dramatized this conflict between appearance and reality in the story of Don Quixote. The old Don rides on Rosinante back into the ancient order of things where Honor and Conquest (with the capitals) meant something, and so he went magnificently mad with a heroism that was no longer grounded in anything; while his squat squire, Sancho Panza, stood stolidly on the ground of the new reality like a sow in the beans, gaping at his master's romances. The story was at once translated into many languages, since this was it. It expressed something most people were feeling if not thinking; the story provided an occasion to laugh off the general hurt of the conflict.

Montaigne, an older contemporary of Shakespeare who is known to have influenced the playwright, eventually lapsed into a suave skepticism in the dry light of which he wondered what he knew, if anything. He became sicklied o'er with a pale cast of what the new thought was revealing, as a plausible alternative to the confident older belief in a divinity that shapes our ends.

Speaking of divinity, it was in this period that the belief that kings rule by divine right was setting like the sun. Thomas Hobbes, Shakespeare's younger contemporary, saw the danger to the coherence of the body politic in the loss of this principle of authority, and sought to maintain the absoluteness of the sovereign on the ground of the new reality which, fundamentally, was matter in motion. The king is just another Tom or Dick or Harry who rules by contract, not by divine right. Without men giving up their natural liberties to the monarch under contract, life in a society of men would be short, nasty, and brutish. That is the new truth about human nature. So now there were sad stories to be told of the death, not so

much of kings, but of kingship itself as the thing of cosmic significance it used to be. John Donne, looking at this atomized, unbrave new world, cried out, "'Tis all in pieces, all coherence gone." Donne was Shakespeare's exact contemporary.

As for the scientists, there was Copernicus, who died a couple of decades before Shakespeare's birth. Then there were the poet's older and younger contemporaries, Tycho Brake, Kepler and Galileo. Galileo, speaking for the rest, said that "the great book of the world," meaning Nature, is written in the language of mathematics. So, if you want the truth about things, do not read poetry.

The impact on the public of this current of scientific discovery was nothing very explicit, but it did contribute in its own way to the fighting in them that would not let the more thoughtful among them sleep. The emerging dualism wounded many with the incensed points of its mighty opposites. It became explicit and classic in Descartes' philosophy, and Descartes was a younger contemporary of Shakespeare. According to Descartes, all the color, glow, and warmth of things is just a subjective appearance, and the external world a mechanical system.

From the side of religion, there was a very old belief that the body, or matter more generally, is a principle of corruption. Before the sixteenth century, it was primarily a moral concept of decay and death. But toward the end of the century and into the next there was a confluence of this current with the naturalistic-scientific one. This was precisely Shakespeare's time. With and after the confluence, the concept of corruption became, even among the theological divines, more a chemical than a moral idea. So, for example, a book by a parson, Godfrey Goodman (later a Bishop), appeared in 1616, the year Shakespeare died. The subtitle was *The Corruption of Nature*. It argued a quite general decay of the whole universe, the picture being primarily one of chemical decomposition. A decade later, an archdeacon, George Hakewill, tried to stem the tide of what I shall call this chemical con-

sciousness in a book entitled *An Apologie for the Power and Providence of God*. There he writes, "The Opinion of the World's Decay is so generally received, not only among the Vulgar, but of the Learned, both Divines and others, that the very commonness of it makes it currant with many, without any further examination." He is speaking of the dead-center, the heart, of Shakespeare's time. Victor Harris, who has written the history—*All Coherence Gone*—of this controversy among the theologians, says that "throughout this period the concept of a decaying universe was reflected in the diverse work of encyclopedists, historians, astrologers, and popularizers of science; most particularly it animated the exhortations of the preachers and provided the poets with a cosmic imagery of profound suggestiveness." Having noticed this much, the wonder is that historian Harris does not even mention Shakespeare anywhere in the book, though a few other Elizabethan poets get some attention.

Now I turn to the evidence in the play *Hamlet* to show that Hamlet's trouble was the malady of Shakespeare's time—in fact, the tragic tension in Shakespeare himself which most of his great plays express.

Notice that the only truly royal thing in the play is a ghost. It once was in the flesh, animating it with the splendor of human dignity and reason, "in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god!" But there has been a poisoning, and what is now left is a haunting apparition of kingship speaking out of the past, trying to incite heroic action in one who is beginning to see the quintessence of all men as dust, dead or alive, kings or groundlings. Indeed, the groundlings compare favorably with the kings, being more obviously the earthy, decomposable things that all men are; that is, if you want the truth about human nature. (We are soon to have quotations showing this.) Hamlet is inwardly tormented by the two opposite conceptions of what a king essentially is. He is not sure which is the true one. Thus, the earthy and the courtly views which in Cervantes' story are apportioned to two different persons are united in the person of Hamlet. This

is his tragedy. Even the blood relationship to a father who was a king and most foully murdered did not, in the new circumstances, give *grounds* for taking heroic action in the now deflated name of honour. Something was rotten in the State of Denmark and Hamlet cursed the spite that had begotten him to set right the times that were so out of joint.

But let us look at the text of the play for evidences of something like the chemical consciousness in opposition to what we might call the royal consciousness. I shall present these in a fairly random pattern, with and without commentary.

Early in the play Shakespeare uses Hamlet to give us a clue, so conspicuous as not seeming at first to belong in its place:

*O ! that this too, too solid flesh would melt,
Thaw and resolve itself into a dew;
 O God ! O God !
How weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable
Seem to me all the uses of this world.
 'tis an unweeded garden
That grows to seed; things rank and gross in nature
Possess it merely.*

This state of mind in Hamlet leaves King Claudius guessing:

*....What it should be
More than his father's death, that thus hath put him
So much from the understanding of himself,
I cannot dream of.*

Indeed, the death of his father, though a foul murder, is not a sufficient reason for Hamlet's condition.

Hamlet concludes his most forthright love-letter to Ophelia with a remark about the too, too solid flesh of his body:

*Thine evermore, most dear lady, whilst this machine is
to him, Hamlet.*

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In another (prevalent) mood, he reminds Ophelia of the chemical composition of the most expressive part of her body, her face:

*I have heard of your paintings too. . . .
Go to, I'll no more on't; it had made me mad.*

To him, it is as if even the face under the paint is a coat of physical stuff. In the graveyard scene he philosophizes over Yorick's skull, saying:

*Now get you to my lady's chamber, and tell her let
her paint an inch thick, to this favor she must come;
make her laugh at that.*

How can one really love anything like that? Hamlet's trouble was that he looked even upon monarchs as just such things; his chemical consciousness put a blight on the courtly demands of honor and love:

*Why may not the imagination trace the noble dust
of Alexander, till he find it stopping a bung-hole?
Imperious Caesar dead and turned to clay
Might stop a hole to keep the wind away.*

One may say that Hamlet loved both Ophelia and his murdered royal father as much as a man could in the new, earthy circumstances. He says:

*I have of late,—but wherefore I know not,—lost
all my mirth. . .indeed it goes so heavily with my
disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to
me a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy. . .
this brave o'erhanging firmament. . .appears to me
but a foul and pestilential congregation of vapors.
What. . .is a man. . .To me, what is this quintessence
of dust? Man delights me not. . .nor woman neither.*

In this drab light, Hamlet shows us . . .how a king
may go a progress through the guts of a beggar,

*who may fish with the worm that hath eat
of a king, and eat of the fish that hath fed on
that worm.*

Such insights yield the new truth about kings and kingship which possessed half of Hamlet, making paralyzing war with the other half still moved by the royal consciousness of human nature. The former was doing violence to the latter by suggesting that beggars are more substantial—closer to the naked truth—than kings. After saying he has dreams, and that dreams are but shadows, Hamlet remarks:

*. . . then are our beggars bodies, and
our monarchs and outstretched heroes the
beggars' shadows.*

A king may be thought of either as bodily substance like any beggar, or as its shadow if you prefer the more epiphenomenal conception.

*This is the very coinage of your brain:
This bodiless creation ecstasy
Is very cunning in,*

says the Queen to Hamlet, referring to his father's "shadow" (ghost) upon its appearance in the palace where, this time, only Hamlet could "see" it. (It was Shakespeare's genius to be able to make his characters say things that ostensibly referred to the events in the action of the play, while at the same time resonant with metaphysical implications about the human predicament in the large—what critic Johnson later mentioned as his gift of "just representations of general nature.") Gertrude's dictum reminds one of Hobbes's metaphysical materialism, and of the curious fact that he had a great fear of ghosts. Presumably, the logic of this case runs as follows: since all the phenomena of human consciousness, including the colorful and dramatic imagery of wakeful sense-perception, are essentially phantasms or apparitions; and some of these are

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dangerous; therefore, why should not the sub-set of apparitions called ghosts also have the power to hurt, though unreal?

To incite himself to the heroic action which such pictures tend to dissuade him from, Hamlet gives himself a number of peptalks, in one of which he says:

*Yet I,
A dull and muddy-mettled rascal, peak
Like John-a-dreams, unpregnant of my cause,
And can say nothing; no, not for a king.*

So much for Hamlet's case. It was not simply that he was made moody and inactive by too much thoughtfulness. It was, rather, that his thinking embraced opposite reasons, one for taking heroic action, the other tending to cancel this out in his tortured dualistic considerations. So, toward the tragic end, he sadly tells Horatio:

*Thou wouldst not think how ill
all's here about my heart.*

The conflict of the courtly consciousness and the earthy or chemical one is the theme also of several other Shakespearean plays, though not as conspicuously as in *Hamlet*. Lear, without his retinue, and howling lunatic at the elements on the heath, exemplifies pomp that has taken physic and made to feel as wretches feel, which is the truer feeling. The truth about a king, whatever else it includes, includes this. And Macbeth finally collapsing into the meditation on life as a shadow on its way to dusty death, signifying nothing; yet strident with the sense of the divinity that hedges a king, a consummation devoutly to be wished. And Prince Hal finding relief and self-realization in the company of Falstaff, who soliloquized so convincingly on honor as just a word and so much air; yet bracing himself for kingship when the time came, as one puts starch into a shirt for the required, artificial stiffness.

But, if it was in *Hamlet* that Shakespeare featured

the ethos of his time, it was in *The Tempest* that, in his final stage, he objectified himself, as Prospero. As the dramatist had long commanded a troupe of actors who embodied the characters of his imagination, their world being his world, never mind the dreary reality beneath the dream, so Prospero lorded it over a troupe of fanciful spirits. But, even here, where Shakespeare deliberately retires into the recesses of human subjectivity, to exploit and enjoy it as a poet, he finally remembers the objective truth about these, his actors, and the floating fabric of the vision. The insubstantial pageant faded, in the melancholy recollection of the stuff that dreams are made on and of which they are the outstretched shadows.

II

Christendom and Tragedy

Next let us notice that the morphology of tragedy in general is like that of Hamlet's, involving mighty opposites that demand opposite allegiances at once, and wounding or killing those unable to satisfy the multiple demand. This is certainly true of most great Greek tragedy. It also holds for tragedy in the Christian view of man and the world. Since there is a significant difference between what I shall arbitrarily call the orthodox Christian and the modern Christian views, they must be mentioned separately.

The *orthodox* Christian view, like the Greek, stirs up feelings of pity and terror because the people in that framework *know* the nature of ultimate reality and the mighty opposites at war in it, and how men are caught in the cross-fire. They *know* in general what is real, less real, and unreal in the scheme of things, and therefore in what general direction lies rectitude and redemption, though men are sometimes not able to move far enough toward that goal, try as they will. Let me call tragedy conceived thus "ontological." In this conception, tragedy is objectively built into the scheme of things, and the problem for a man is how

to by-pass it, knowing that it is there and what it is. This is the *orthodox* Christian view.

The *modern* Christian view has two branches. One of these is optimistic, liberal, and progressive, in the spirit of John Dewey's naturalism but with a little happy humanistic theism mixed in. According to this outlook, tragic things may happen here and there, but in a corrigible sort of way. More intelligence and good faith will eventually serve as a scalpel with which we can remove the cataract from our eyes. Once this obstacle to clearer seeing is removed, human tragedy will go with it—a technological accomplishment with God as a naturalized collaborator.

The other branch of the modern Christian view—sometimes called neo-orthodox—presents a more sombre picture. Here, again, tragedy is real and built in as in the orthodox case, but this time *not* objectively into the nature of things. It is built into human nature as doubt or the inability to know. It is subjective. It is a problem of knowledge, a not knowing what to think or believe with confidence. So I call it "epistemic," distinguishing this kind of tragedy from the older ontological sort.

This conception of the human predicament, like the old one, also generates feelings of pity and terror, but with an important addition, the inner anguish of a man desperately trying to know something ultimate, *needing* to know it, and being left in doubt. The pity and the terror *and* the agony of doubt are all expressed and relieved by Dostoevski's novels and by Kierkegaard's and Paul Tillich's theology. Risk is involved in any high belief, Tillich says, the risk that it may not be adequate to its objects and therefore contain a demonic and destructive element. I believe, O Lord; help Thou mine unbelief.

I venture to say that the reason for the popularity of Tillich and Dostoevski is that modern man's worst problem is knowing what to believe about ultimate matters, worse than what to do about tragedies objectively encountered.

But notice, in retrospect, that precisely this was

Hamlet's predicament. And this is precisely why the modern Christian, with the tragic sense of life stemming from his inner frustrated need to know, turns to reading Hamlet for expression of, and relief from, his spiritual sickness unto death. In this sense, Hamlet was the first essentially modern man. His tragedy has been the tragedy of all thoughtful people ever since.

III

India and Tragedy

Wherever mysticism prevails, the concept of tragedy becomes diffuse to the point of dissolving away in the negating solvent of a reality which is indifferently called either Being or Non-being. This has happened even in the Christian sectors where mystical thinking has done its work. There can be no real tragedy where there is no real multiplicity, or where only unity truly is. Without at least a dualism that accommodates opposites in real conflict, tragedy at most is a systematic illusion.

Since this is the prevailing doctrine in India, and since it is not just a superimposition by intellectuals on the Indian mind but is actually lived in common practice by Indians of many classes, the tragic consciousness is attenuated there. There is, indeed, much suffering, but the over-all consciousness of the human situation is not definitely tragic. Let us see how this is the case, considering it in a way that shows some kinship with the Western pattern sketched above.

According to typical Indian philosophy—this is to overlook differences between Buddhism and the more orthodox school of thought, as well as those between factions under the latter head (*Samkhya*, *Vedanta*)—a man is, in one respect, caught in a historical flux of relativities (*maya*), where he *acts* under conditions imposed by fate (*karma* and its law of *dharma*), and where being ethical in personal relations has a point. In this function, he is an ego or a personality (*satta*, *buddhi*, *asmita*), and he must suffer in that capacity.

Out of his suffering, he loves and longs for the bles-

sedness of liberation (*moksha*, *mukti*) from the conditions of *maya*. He may thus "realize" himself as what he essentially is (his *atman*, *purusa*), in a transfiguration beyond his humanity, thus escaping the sorrowful circumstances of his existence in its commitments to *maya*. He will then perform his temporal duties perfunctorily, detached from ethical consideration of the effects of his sort on himself or others. The *Atman* will be his motive, his categorical imperative. Such action is a sort of tranced non-action, and is above the relative, ethical consciousness. In his absolute exemption from historical conditions, ethical constraints become pointless, as does the whole phantasmal scheme of *maya* with its five sheaths concealing the inner *Atman*.

Now, how does tragedy or the tragic consciousness get accommodated by this theory? Is there any real conflict remaining, objective or subjective, ontological or epistemic?

The answer will be facilitated by bringing my concept of "chemical consciousness" back into the picture, and giving it another application.* The ego with its personality is generally conceived in India as an ethereal sort of matter, a rarefied form of it. Thus its consciousness is "chemical," corrupting reality into images of physical things in space and time, the profane habitat of generation, decay, and death. In this condition, one suffers, yes; but on this count alone the consciousness or experience is not tragic. The tragic sense of life as moved by the Wheel of Things crystallizes only if the chemical consciousness is pitted against the mystical consciousness of (or absorption in) the Absolute (*Atman*). Man is a tragic figure only if these mighty opposites combine in him, in real conflict. It is then as if a man must do what it is beneath him to do—the tragic paradox of duty. In this light, animals, though they suffer like people, are not tragic figures, since in them the chemical consciousness alone prevails.

And it is only in the sensitively mystical tempera-

* A suggestion made by Theodore Kahn, in a conversation.

ment that the conflict becomes appreciable, not in people generally. (The remark about animals and ordinary people is, I realize, not in the spirit of Indian philosophy, which softens and overrules such distinctions.)

The answer to our question is emerging, in a fairly complex form: to the degree that both the ego (*asmita*) and the timeless, trans-human element (*purusa*, *atman*) are felt as real, the tragic consciousness or sense of life is realized. But, as the renunciation of the chemical consciousness with its egoistic motives is achieved, realizing only the absolute presence of *Atman* or Brahman, the circumstances necessary to tragic consciousness are dissolved away. If to this we add the traditional metaphysical postulate of Indian philosophy and religion, that there is *some* important sense in which the ego and its world of fluctuating imagery are unreal, we must also say that the tragic experience or consciousness is not rooted in reality. Through philosophic contemplation (*anandamayakosa*) and the eventual mystical illumination in Brahman, tragedy is annihilated or made to disappear like morning mist in sunlight. (Such a consummation would be comparable to Hamlet's case, if the royal consciousness had prevailed over the chemical.)

The appeal of such a doctrine stems from its power to give a sort of religious consolation in the tragic predicaments into which men are born and in which they die. This is the strength even of mystical Christianity, and the therapeutic Christian Science of Mary Baker Eddy, whose devotees are excited also by the soulful therapeutics latent in the great religious philosophies of the East. (Yet, the exaggerated interest in cures for bodily ailments puts Christian Science at a vast remove from the spirit of Indian Philosophy.)

But, to achieve this result, the reality of evil (matter, the chemical consciousness, *maya*) must be denied. And this is the practical way to solve the problem of evil. Those with a more theoretical concern will be less inclined to accept such a view. Such people will prefer the more rugged sense of a reality that comprises

Tragedy West and East

mighty and very real opposites whose conflict becomes explicit in the soul of man and which defines the tragic consciousness. Tragedy, in this view, will be ultimately real, as it certainly *seems* to be to any sensitive person. (Add to this the uncertainty of one vainly trying to know the truth, and again we have Hamlet's case.) This appearance can be dispelled by various practical and spiritual disciplines, to be sure; but the rugged realists will not accept this as a theoretical solution of the problem of tragedy in human experience. *On the whole*, such a stand is what distinguishes the thought of the West from that of the East on this issue.

A PROBLEM IN COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHY

EDWIN A. BURTT

One of the major enterprises naturally growing out of the mutual understanding already partially achieved between Eastern and Western philosophers is that of the comparative study of philosophy. To date, a few longer as well as many briefer contributions to this enterprise have appeared and more may be confidently expected.

Thus far, to my knowledge, these studies have generally taken the form of comparisons of philosophical ideas or doctrines, which have been proposed in India, China, Japan, or the West as solutions to the same problems. Along with these there have also been some comparisons of contrasting trends and emphases. To concentrate on such comparisons at first is very natural, and much more work of these kinds is needed. But other types of comparative study are also possible, some of which may be equally illuminating as contributions to the world philosophy of the future. One of these might be described in general terms as a comparison of the way philosophical movements in these various cultural backgrounds have developed *in time*—that is, a study of the temporal stages through which they pass and the period required for each to arise, reach maturity, and pass away in favor of its successor. I believe that many instructive correlations and contrasts would emerge from this kind of study which would throw light on the distinctive genius of the philosophical mind as it has evolved in each of these backgrounds.

This general description of what I have in mind must appear rather cryptic, so I shall hasten to give it concrete illustration. However, my purpose in the present paper is not to carry through any such comparative study—the knowledge of Eastern philosophies

at my command is too meagre for that—but simply to provide some illustrative material for it, derived from a survey of the most striking temporal patterns exhibited in the historical evolution of Western philosophy. I shall call attention to three patterns, the first revealing temporal stages of very great duration; the second, quite brief ones; and the third, stages that are of intermediate length. In the case of each of these patterns the law of temporal progress that comes to light—if what is thus disclosed might be so characterized—appears to reflect forces internal to the philosophical enterprise itself; it does not seem to depend in any essential way on the relation between philosophy and contemporary cultural processes.

I

Let us begin with the first pattern, which up to this point in history exhibits two stages. The first of these occupied many centuries, and the second appears still to be far from complete. There is a fairly obvious intrinsic rationale in the temporal relation between the two. In order to apprehend this pattern it is necessary, of course, to view history in the large, catching the outline of the forest without being distracted by the trees. The concept central during the first stage was that of "being"; philosophy was conceived mainly as a theory of the structure of being. The concept central to the second stage is that of "method"; the prevailing conception of philosophy is that it is the quest for a sound cognitive method.

For our purpose, only a brief survey of these two stages is necessary; and we shall engage in it in such a way as to emphasize the internal logic disclosed by their temporal order.

The historian of thought can hardly miss the fact that, by and large, ancient and medieval philosophers in the West were not concerned with problems of method as modern philosophers have been. They either philosophized without asking how they should philosophize or, if they asked, it was in calm assurance

of a simple and convincing answer. To inquire into the nature of things seemed to need no special warrant, no laboriously perfected technique. Reality lay before them to be apprehended. So, they attacked the structure of their universe directly; as they did so, the concept of "being" soon appeared as the key philosophical concept. Everything in the world *is*, i.e., it somehow shares in being. What, then, is it to *be*? Here is the question we are called upon to answer. From this point of view there is no separation between metaphysical philosophy and what we now call science; why should the investigation of particular forms of being be pursued apart from study of the universal nature of being which each must exemplify? And what could be more worthy of a philosopher than to probe the pervasive fabric of this vast universe within which everything happens—to lay bare the grand structure of being according to which the varied events that the sciences study piecemeal hang together in an inclusive whole? This orientation seemed almost self-evident.

In the late medieval period two disquieting problems became insistent. Thinkers began to be haunted by skeptical doubts as to the adequacy of traditional methods for mastering the world around them. Also, an awareness of the embarrassing babel of philosophic disagreements gradually spread among them. Different schools were championing different systems; even Aristotle had evidently failed to gain permanent and undisputed possession of the philosophic throne. As men reflected on these problems, the next step in the logic of philosophical evolution was as natural as the first, and it marked the radical change that appeared in early modern philosophy. Seekers for truth had been driven to realize that the urge to understand the world, in their day at least, was not self-justifying and could not take its procedure for granted. They were unable to achieve demonstrable truth of the kind they sought by the methods already taken for granted. What needs to happen then?

Evidently, the way to proceed is to begin, not with a comprehensive system of being, but with a careful

examination of questions about method. With the nature of a sound method clarified, one could then hope that a theory of the universe embodying its lessons might be written with more assurance. The guiding maxim was simple: When different thinkers reach widely different results about the same subject-matter, can all be following the right method? No, and it may be that none has yet found it. Our pursuit of knowledge is not being advanced by any of them as we want it to be. Here, then, lies the primary problem. So, the greatest minds for a series of generations focused their energies on the question: What is the right way to reach truth? Bacon and Descartes, Leibniz and Locke, Hume and Kant—the story is the same with all. The answers these men offer vary widely, but all are agreed in taking the search for method as their main concern. Thus “being” did not remain the basic concept in philosophy; instead, “knowledge,” and how it can be attained, assumed the center of the stage and continued to occupy this position for several centuries. Indeed, this is still the case today. The search initiated by Bacon and Descartes succeeded in discovering a sound method for science; but this achievement made the lack of a generally accepted method in philosophy even more obvious and challenging. Hence, we find that each of the zealously competing schools early in the present century continued the quest by proposing its own solution of the problem of method; and the distinctive contribution of the new-fangled schools of recent decades—logical empiricism, existentialism, and the ordinary language philosophy—also lies in their answer to the same problem.

We thus observe a significant temporal pattern which embraces almost the whole history of Western philosophy to date. And viewing it in this way leads to the raising of certain questions, such as: How much more time will be needed for intensive concentration on this problem of method? What will presumably be the central concept during the next stage? What are the factors which determine the length of these periods? Thus far, the pattern has been too

meagrely disclosed to enable us to grasp any definite clue which would show how these questions might be answered. But light on them would be thrown, I believe, by a comparison with similar or contrasting patterns revealed in the history of Eastern thought.

II

Look next at an evolutionary pattern which differs sharply from this in the time required for its completion and in the internal rationale which determines its sequence of stages. What has just been clarified might be called a law of long-run philosophical progress requiring many centuries or even millennia; what will now be examined may be called a law of the development of a transitory philosophical school. The pattern here involved clearly needs three stages for its completion, each of which, in the light of recent evidence, takes about a decade. This sequential order seems to be sufficiently regular and dependable, so that, once the pattern has been grasped, one can tell with fair confidence in the case of any school whose course is still incomplete how far at any given time its evolution has gone. He can thus judge in a broad way what still needs to happen before its enduring contribution to philosophy can stand forth unambiguously.

I shall first describe these stages in general terms and then illustrate the pattern from recent philosophical history.

The distinctive characteristic of the first stage is this. The champions of a new school of philosophy, zealously confident of its soundness, toss out bold assertions of their position without awareness of its limitations or of the difficulties in what they are saying. Its opponents, meanwhile, are merely conscious of these difficulties, which assume exaggerated form in their minds because they interpret the new doctrines in terms of their customary presuppositions instead of finding out at what points these presuppositions lead to misunderstanding. The champions pay little attention to criticisms at this stage because they are sure that any

illogicalities charged against them must be merely apparent, capable of a convincing answer once their position is more fully expounded. In the second stage, adherents of the new school begin to be troubled by these hostile criticisms but believe they can be met by drawing a few distinctions. If the terms used were to mean what opponents have taken them to mean, they are disposed now to admit that the difficulties are real and perhaps insoluble, but if they are construed in the light of these distinctions it is hopefully claimed that the novel position can take account of all objections. Continued and more searching attack forces the proponents of the new doctrines, in the third stage, to face the question whether these cautious distinctions and cheerful reinterpretations are consistent with what they had asserted at the beginning, and to reformulate that original teaching so as to reconcile it with them. Only at this stage does the essential viewpoint of the new philosophy become clear, in relatively stable form, and only at this stage do books usually begin to appear which deal systematically, from that viewpoint, with all the main branches and themes of philosophy. Among the important questions that can be answered now, but not before, is the question how far thinkers are confronted by a genuinely novel doctrine and how far it is the reassertion of some traditional position, the likeness being previously more or less hidden by the terminology in which it has been presented. When this stage has been worked through, the atmosphere of philosophical discussion will be freed from the confusion of rash claims on the one side and hostile misinterpretations on the other, and the new contentions will be sufficiently purged of vagueness and ambiguity, so that their constructive virtues can be generally appreciated.

Of course these stages are not sharply separated from each other. While some representatives of the new school continue to write essays characteristic of a given stage, others will be anticipating the stage that follows it. None the less, the line between them is clear enough so that, as intimated above, when one

has grasped the typical features of each, he can tell approximately what stage has been reached at any specified time in the evolution of a new philosophy.

Now to illustrate this three-stage analysis from the history of recent philosophical schools, with special reference to a central doctrine of each. I pick for this purpose the pragmatic theory of truth, the positivist doctrine of meaning, and the philosophy of linguistic analysis in its concept of "ordinary use."

The former of these philosophies opened its offensive in the decade of the 1890s¹ with James's doctrine that the truth of an idea consists in its "successful working" or its leading to "satisfactory consequences". Searching criticism by opponents soon made it evident that these were loose and ambiguous phrases, and that, if certain natural interpretations were given them, ideas must be pronounced true that no one would have supposed to deserve the adjective—ideas, for example, which yield personal comfort but do not square with objective fact. For a time such criticism was not taken seriously, but in the following decade it was, and discussion entered the second stage. Both James and Dewey (who had been somewhat perturbed by James's incautious assertions) drew distinctions that were obviously needed; when these were recognized, they maintained, it was clear that pragmatism did not intend to accept any sort of success or satisfaction as a mark of truth, but only success of a certain kind, reached in a certain way. An idea is true if it is successful in the definite sense of leading to the particular experiences anticipated when the idea was adopted as a candidate for truth.* Now the controversy entered the third stage. Is this qualification really compatible, critics demanded, with the original adoption of "suc-

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1. The important role of Charles S. Peirce in this movement was not generally recognized till later.
 2. James continued to hold that certain ideas—e.g., those involved in religious faith and in the conviction that man is morally free—were insusceptible of this kind of verification but could be justified in a different way.

cess" and "consequences" as essential criteria of truth? It would seem that the natural meaning of these concepts has been changed, so that they no longer imply anything distinctively new. What is left in the pragmatic position that is different in any significant respect from the conception of truth held by nineteenth-century empiricism—namely, that it consists in agreement with experiential evidence, determined by some appropriate process through which a hypothesis is verified? Only in the decade of the 1920s, thirty years after the initial announcement of the pragmatic gospel, had the haze of confusion and misinterpretation sufficiently lifted so that the fruitful contribution it offered toward our understanding in all the main branches of philosophy could achieve the stable influence it deserved.³

Between 1920 and 1950 the positivist theory of meaning was passing through the same three-stage process. At first, in the late 1920s, its basic doctrine was stated by the leaders of the Vienna Circle in essentially this form: The meaning of a proposition consists in the experiences through which it can be verified or disproved. Critics soon pounced upon the crucial phrase at the end of this slogan and found it teeming with ambiguities; certain natural ways of construing it, they pointed out, would make the theory an intolerably limiting doctrine. Can any proposition be verified, in strict accuracy, except one describing a presently observable fact? If so, far too many propositions that concern thinkers are excluded. Hence, in the course of the 1930s its champions were forced to answer these objections, and opponents were regaled with a list of unexpected distinctions. To render the doctrine plausible, positivists saw that they must distinguish between "direct verifiability" and "verifiability in principle," between verifiability in the present and verifiability in the future through techniques not now available, and,

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3. It was not till this decade and that of the 1930s that Dewey systematically applied his instrumentalist principles to such fields as metaphysics, art, religion, and political theory.

finally, between "empirical" and "logical" verifiability.⁴ Toward the end of that decade the controversy seemed to be moving slowly into the third stage. Antagonists asked whether acceptance of the qualifications indicated by these distinctions was really consistent with what had been thus far regarded as essential to the new theory. Indeed, if the positivists had found themselves compelled, under the stress of these probing attacks, to rest their case on "logical" verifiability, it would have been difficult to maintain that anything was left of their original empiricism; would not this interpretation of verifiability lead to a thoroughly rationalistic doctrine of meaning?⁵ For any proposition would be logically verifiable if it does not contradict itself.

As the discussion progressed through the third stage toward the point where the permanent contribution of positivism to an adequate theory of meaning could be distilled and absorbed, it became gradually known that the main inspirer of this philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein, had shifted to a new speculative orientation, and writings in which it was championed began to attract attention, especially among British philosophers. This, as all are aware, is the ordinary language philosophy. As a result of its premature birth, so to say, positivism was jostled off the stage in British and American philosophy and no longer received the general attention it had hitherto been given. The challenging problems still unresolved have been worked out mainly in the setting of the philosophy that has taken its place.

With these illustrative parallels in mind, I believe it can be readily seen that the philosophy of ordinary language is also exemplifying this three-stage sequence

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4. This last distinction was emphasized by M. Schlick. Many other distinctions besides these were suggested, as clarifying what positivists really intended to maintain.
 5. In fact, this issue was explicitly discussed in connection with certain formulations of the positivist position proposed by Carnap, Neurath, and others

and at approximately the same temporal rate. It will be especially instructive to examine it from this standpoint, since in its case the process is not yet complete.

Anticipations of its orientation appear in the decade of the 1930s. More than a hint of its distinctive method is present in Ryle's essay on "Systematically Misleading Expressions" written in 1931,⁶ and its central idea is presupposed by G. A. Paul in 1936 in criticizing the theory of sense data in their supposed relation to physical objects.⁷ The first stage does not clearly get under way, however, until the early 1940s, with Norman Malcolm's papers during those years in *Mind* and his contribution to *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*.⁸ This stage, as in the case of the schools just discussed, was marked by confident attack on various philosophical problems, under the assumption that the appeal to ordinary use to determine the meaning of an expression is unquestionably sound and involves no fundamental difficulties. Also, as with them, it continued for approximately a decade. During this period opponents of the new philosophy, for the most part, contented themselves with hostile charges in general—such as that its approach provides too narrow a base for the work of philosophy and that the ordinary use

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6. In this paper Ryle brings out the fact that expressions which at first sight seem to be of a certain type really fill a distinctive role whose "logic" is different from the logic of that type. The ordinary man who uses these expressions is not misled by the differences because he has formed the appropriate interpretive habit, but the philosopher who analyzes them under the guidance of superficial verbal analogies will be misled.
 7. *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 15. See specially pp. 63 f. Ryle's paper is found in the *Proceedings* for 1931-32.
 8. See in particular "Are Necessary Propositions Really Verbal?" in *Mind* for April, 1940 (Vol. 49), and "Certainty and Empirical Statements," in the same journal for January, 1942 (Vol. 51). *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, Evanston and Chicago, 1942 is Vol. 4 of the *Library of Living Philosophers*, edited by Paul A. Schilpp.

of linguistic expressions cannot possibly be a sound criterion of their meaning. They often showed by these charges that they were misinterpreting what the theory really intends in terms of their own presuppositions, and that their eyes were not open to the constructive possibilities that this approach to philosophy might reveal.

By early 1953 it was clear that discussion had entered the second stage. Just as with pragmatism and positivism, champions of the new viewpoint were now drawing needed distinctions, whose aim was to explain in the face of critical objections what they meant by the key words "ordinary" and "correct" in their slogan: Ordinary language is correct language. In an article in *The Philosophical Review* for that year Gilbert Ryle called attention to the difference between ordinary use as the diction employed by the man in the street and ordinary use as the "normal" or "stock" use in whatever type of situation is relevant; only the latter sense, he maintained, is the one intended by the ordinary language philosophy. Already, discussion had been focused on problems connected with the other key word, and clarifying distinctions were being made. They are illustrated in an article published in *Mind* for July, 1953, by A. D. Woozley. He examined the difference between "correct" as the customary way of referring to a certain kind of fact in current usage, and "correct" as the true description of that fact—pointing out typical cases where the two do not necessarily go together. In popular parlance it has long been acceptable to describe a whale as a large fish, but those who are scientifically sophisticated know that such a description is incorrect; the whale is really a mammal. This is an important difference; when the distinction is applied to philosophically significant terms in situations where the criteria of what constitutes "fact" are not agreed upon, what does the new position mean to stand for? Debates engendered by such articles were frequent during the years in the middle of the decade, and they were obviously filling the same role in the history of the ordinary language philosophy that the

arguments characteristic of the second stage did in the evolution of the earlier schools.

It seems clear to me that the third stage has now (1961) begun, for the marks of that stage that were noted in the evolution of pragmatism and positivism are definitely present, and it would be difficult to show that they have been present very long. But I shall not attempt to justify this assertion, since our main purpose is simply to reveal the unmistakable actuality of this pattern, in the case both of schools that have run their course and of those whose development is still incomplete. In the light of experience thus far, we may anticipate that it will take another decade or so before this last stage is finished, and the significant contribution of the ordinary language philosophy has been distilled and generally accepted. Moreover, remembering the millennial pattern first discussed, we may also anticipate, though with less confidence, that the next influential school will continue to exemplify in its own way the quest for method that has been the characteristic theme of the modern period.

This pattern of a short-lived school is surely likewise significant. It gives rise to its own questions, some of which are similar to and some different from those raised by the first pattern. Such questions are : What are the essential forces at work in each of these three stages ? Why do they require the time that they apparently do ? Is this pattern characteristic only of philosophy in our century and with a certain cultural background, or can it be more widely verified ? In any case, a comparison with what has been happening in Eastern thought could be expected to illumine our answers to these questions and to yield insight into their philosophical implications.

III

Finally, we shall explore briefly a temporal pattern that falls between these two in the time it requires and whose rationale is somewhat different from that of either of them. I shall call the law disclosed in this

case the law of evolution of a philosophical "movement", since the last word in this phrase naturally suggests a somewhat longer period than the life-span of a school. The process we consider here can also be analyzed into three stages, each of which requires about a generation; thus the total cycle runs its course in roughly a hundred years. In a general description of this sequential pattern two points would presumably be emphasized. For one thing, we would distinguish the three stages from each other by noting that the characteristic feature of the first is the formulation of a new approach to major philosophical problems, while the second elaborates in extreme form certain aspects of that approach and the third gives it a more moderate and balanced articulation, synthesizing its essence with ideas derived from earlier philosophies. For the other, we would observe that the first stage is inevitably accomplished by a single philosophical genius; the second can be exemplified by one, two, or a very few philosophers, since the new approach can be pushed to an extreme in several different forms; while the third is typically exhibited in a group of philosophers, each synthesizing that approach with the past in a distinctive way.

The most obvious instances of this pattern appear in the history of modern philosophy.

Consider the evolution of early continental rationalism. Descartes' work clearly constitutes the first stage; Spinoza is the most influential example of the second; while Leibniz, Malebranche, and others belong to the third. Or take the development of transcendental idealism, which began with Kant in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The second stage in this case is revealed in the work of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel and Schopenhauer, and the third would be illustrated by the Neo-Kantians and Neo-Hegelians in the last third of the nineteenth century.⁹ A third instance is found in existentialism. The first stage would consist in the work of Kierkegaard a century ago; the second,

9. A case could be made for placing Hegel himself in the third stage.

in provocatively extreme form, is exemplified in Nietzsche; while the last stage is represented by such existentialist philosophers of our century as Heidegger, Sartre, and Jaspers, and such philosophical theologians as Paul Tillich. A plausible pre-modern case, requiring a somewhat longer time for its completion, appears in the outstanding philosophical and theological movement of the early medieval period. Here, Anselm would illustrate the first stage, Abelard the second, and Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas and others, the third.

This pattern does not appear to be as clear-cut as the other two; more perplexities arise in applying it. One would expect, for example, that English empiricism in the eighteenth century would be an instance of it, and a historian could plausibly contend that Locke constitutes the first stage, while Berkeley and Hume, each in his own way, exemplify the second. But where do we find the third stage? In Kant? Reid? James Mill?

I must repeat that my purpose in this paper is merely to provide suggestive material from the history of Western philosophy which, in expanded form, might serve as the Western basis for the kind of comparative study indicated in the introduction. The intriguing task of comparison itself I am hopefully leaving to others.

Now, my impression is that a natural analysis of the process of temporal development in Indian, Chinese, and Japanese philosophy would reveal nothing closely corresponding to any of these three patterns. But certain temporal patterns would doubtless emerge from such an analysis, some of which must require a lengthy period for their completion and some a shorter one. A comparison of such patterns with these sequences appearing in Western philosophy could hardly fail to be illuminating. Among other things, it would bring out the factors which seem to determine the unfolding of the cycle in each case. Moreover, a careful study of those factors would surely reveal deeper problems, reflection on which could be expected to yield insight

into distinctive qualities of the philosophical genius as it finds expression in different parts of the civilized world. Indeed, the approach here proposed might throw a new and promising light on comparisons of the kinds already engaged in by philosophers who have gained some knowledge of both East and West—that is, comparisons of analogous ideas and contrasting trends. The fact that a new mode of thinking, say in China, grows toward its maturity in a certain way which differs from the corresponding patterns elsewhere may be a significant clue to our interpretation of its meaning.

WANG YANG-MING'S CRITICISM OF BUDDHISM

WING-TSIT CHAN

It is generally agreed that Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) was influenced, perhaps greatly, by Zen Buddhism. It is not generally realized, however, that he was in less contact with Buddhism than is generally suspected, and that he was more critical of Buddhism than he was receptive to it.

That there are Buddhist elements in Wang's philosophy is undeniable. The whole course of Sung (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) Neo-Confucianism is coloured by Buddhist thought. Being the culmination of the idealistic tendency of Neo-Confucianism, Wang's philosophy, as would be expected, possesses a deeper hue. But both his critics and his promoters have grossly exaggerated his affinity with Buddhism and have undermined his attack on it.

Wang had many, many critics, both during his own lifetime and for some 150 years thereafter. The most extreme were Ch'en Chien (1497-1567) and Chang Lich (1622-1685). In his *Hsueh-pu t' ung-pien* (General Critique of the Obscurations of Learning), Ch'en devoted a whole chapter to the attack on Wang. But, like most others, he only exaggerated certain similarities between Wang and Buddhism and ignored or slighted over the differences. A good example is Ch'en's criticism on the following passages of Wang's : "To recognize one's original state at the time of thinking of neither good nor evil¹, is the Buddhist expedient or

1. A quotation from the *Lau-tsu t' an-ching* (Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch), sec. 1, *Taisho shinshu daizokyo* (Taisho Edition of the Buddhist Canon), 48 :349.

convenient way intended for those who do not yet recognize their original state. The original state is what our Confucian school calls innate knowledge."²

Here Wang equates the Confucian "innate knowledge of the good" (*liang-chih*) with what the Buddhists call the original state. But Ch'en not only disapproved of this equation; he said that Wang's doctrine of the innate knowledge of the good is based on the Buddhist doctrine of the original state³ and attacked him on that basis.

Like every Chinese student, Ch'en knew of course, that Wang's doctrine of the innate knowledge of the good was derived from the *Book of Mencius*, where Mencius said, "The ability possessed by men without having been acquired by learning is innate ability, and the knowledge possessed by them without deliberation is innate knowledge."⁴ Wang's contribution to the doctrine is his famous idea of "the extension of the innate knowledge" (*chih liang-chih*), that is, that the innate knowledge of the good must be extended or translated into action. It means that man possesses the innate knowledge of filial piety, for example, and, if his knowledge is sincere, he will naturally extend it to the practice of serving parents filially. This idea of the extension of innate knowledge is one of the key concepts in Wang's teachings. Quite aside from the fact that there is a tremendous difference between his doctrine of innate knowledge and the Buddhist doctrine of the original state, his definitions of the *liang-chih* show very clearly that his equation with the Buddhist original state is purely incidental. He described innate

2. *Ch'uan-hsi lu* (Instructions for Practical Living), sec. 162, in the *Wang Wen-ch'eng-Kung ch'uan-shu* (Complete Works of Wang Yang-ming), *Ssu-pu ts'ung-k'an* (Four Libraries Series) edition (*SPTK*), 2 45a. The section numbered here and those below follow my translation, *Instructions for Practical Living, and other neo-Confucian Writing by Wang Yang-ming*, Columbia University Press, 1963.
3. *Hsueh-pu t'ung-pien*, *Cheng-i-t'ang ch'uan-shu* (Complete Library of the Hall of Rectifying the Way) edition, 9 :3a.
4. *Book of Mencius*, 7A:15.

knowledge as "the original substance of the mind," "the Principle of Nature," "the intelligence and clear consciousness of the mind," the mind that is "always shining" and reflects things as things come without being stirred, "the equilibrium before the feelings are aroused," "the original substance that is absolutely quiet and inactive," "the state of being broad and impartial," "man's root which is intelligent and is grown by Nature," and "the spirit of creation."⁵ Only the terms "pure intelligence" (*hsü-ling*) and "shining" contain any Buddhist flavour—in Zen Buddhism, particularly, the shining and pure (or, rather, vacuous) mind is emphasized. All the rest are orthodox Confucian concepts. The Neo-Confucian concepts of the mind as an embodiment of the Principle of Nature or the Moral Law and as the spirit of creation are totally absent in Buddhism. Ch'en ignored all of this and simply denounced Wang for betraying Confucianism and putting Buddhism in Confucian disguise.

Another well known arch critic of Wang, Chang Lieh, repeated the same tune, although, generally speaking, Chang's criticism are more solid and less reckless.⁶

This tendency to exaggerate Wang's acceptance of Buddhism and minimize his opposition to it is no less strong among his own supporters, especially Japanese scholars. Take, for example, one of the most outstanding modern Japanese scholars on the relation between Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism, Tokiwa Daijō (1870-1945). He, like many others, only pointed out the similarity between Wang's innate knowledge and the Buddhist concept of the original state.⁷ None of the critics or supporters acknowledged the fact that Wang, not only

5. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, sec. 152, 135, 137, 152, 155, 244 and 261; *SPTA*, 2:36b, 9b, 13b, 36b, 38b, 3:19b, and 25a, respectively.

6. *Wang hsüeh chih-i* (Questions on Wang's Doctrines), Cheng-i t'ang *ch'uan-shu* edition, 4:5a.

7. *Shina ni okeru bukkyō to jukyō dokyō* (The Relation of Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism in China) (Tokyo; Toyo Bunko, 1930), p. 463.

continued to say, "If we already understand clearly what innate knowledge is, there is no longer any need of recognizing one's original state at the time of thinking of either good or evil," but also criticized the Buddhist concept as an indication of selfishness. He said, in the same passage, "Now, to wish to think of neither good nor evil and to want the mind of innate knowledge to be clear, tranquil, and at ease means to have the mind of selfishness.... Innate knowledge by its own nature discriminates between good and evil. What good and evil are there for the mind to think about? . . . Innate knowledge naturally brings forth thoughts, and now you want to add the wish that thoughts will not arise." If one reads this whole section, one will readily find that Wang's equation of the Confucian innate knowledge with the Buddhist original state is one step backward but that his criticism of the Buddhist original state is two steps forward.

We have no attention at all to gloss over the fact that Wang was under Buddhist influence. His central theme that principle is inherent in the mind is definitely more Buddhistic than Confucian. This idealistic doctrine is derived from Lu Hsiang-shan (1139-1193), whose identification of the mind with the universe reflects Buddhist influence. In addition, Wang himself was much interested in Buddhism and Taoism when he was young.⁸ He himself said, "From youth I was also earnestly devoted to the two systems (Buddhism and Taoism). I thought I had learned something and thought the Confucian system was not worth studying. Later, while I lived in barbarous territory (Kuei-chou in southwest China to which he was banished) for (nearly) three years, I realized how simple, easy, extensive, and great the doctrines of the Sage (Confucius) are, and then sighed and regretted having wasted my energy for thirty years."⁹ It is unreasonable to expect that there was no impact on him after thirty years of earnest study.

8. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, introduction to pt. 1, *SPTK*, 1: 1a.

9. *Ibid.*, sec. 124, *SPTK*, 1: 61a.

Furthermore, he used many Zen idioms and told a number of Zen stories. He was not unique in this ; many Neo-Confucianists before him had done the same. For example, he described the mind as "vacuous, intelligent, and not beclouded."¹⁰ This is a Buddhistic description. But he was quoting Chu Hsi (1130-1200), who had paraphrased the Buddhist expression.¹¹ In urging alertness and attention, Wang told the Zen story of "a cat trying to catch a rat, with eyes single-mindedly watching and ears single-mindedly listening." This, too, had been told by Chu Hsi.¹² The difference between Wang and other Neo-Confucianists is that he used Zen idioms and stories much more. Altogether, there are about forty such cases.

What is more, he actually practised Zen techniques several times. This is something that few, if any, other Neo-Confucianists had done. According to the *Nien-p'u* (Chronological Biography), when he was thirty-two, he gradually realized the mistakes of Buddhism

10. *Ibid.*, sec. 32, *SPTK*, 1:24b.

11. In his *Ta-hsueh chang-chu* (Commentary in the *Great Learning*), commentary on the text. The phrase is probably derived from the common Buddhist phrase "intelligent, knowing and not beclouded," which was uttered by Zen Masters like Ch'eng-kuan (ca. 762-838). See *Ching-te ch'uan-teng lu* (Records of the Transmission of the Lamp Compiled During the Ching-te Period, 1004-1007., *SPTK*, 30:8a) The terms "intelligent and knowing" and "not beclouded" were also used by Tsung-mi (780-841) in his *Ch'an-juan chu-ch'uan chi tu-hsu* (General Preface to the Collection of Source Material of the Zen School), *Taisho shinshu daizokyo*, 48:404-405.

12. The words quoted are by Zen Master Tsu-hsin (fl. 1060) of Huang-lung Mountain. See *Wu-teng hui-yuan* (Five Lamps Combined), chap. 17, *Zokuzokyo* (Supplement to the Buddhist Canon), 1st collection, pt. 2, B, case 11, p. 335a; also *Lien-teng hui-yao* (Essentials of the Several Lamps Combined), chap. 15, *Zokuzokyo*, 1, 2, B, 9, p. 339b. Chu Hsi used the story in the *Chu Tzu wen-chi* (Collection of Literary Work, of Chu Hsi), *Ss-pu pei-yao* (Essentials of the *Four Libraries*) edition entitled *Chu Tzu Ta-ch'uan* (Complete Literary Works of Chu Hsi), 71:6b.

and Taoism, but the next year, when he happened to see a Zen monk who had been for three years sitting in silence with his eyes closed, he shouted, "What does this monk say so noisily all day, and what does he see with his eyes wide open all day?"¹³ Both to shout and to say the opposite in order to shock people were typical Zen techniques. Once a pupil asked, "It is difficult to overcome one's selfish desires. What can be done about them?" Wang answered, "Give me your selfish desires. I shall overcome them for you."¹⁴ This is not sarcasm but a ridicule of the questioner who passes on a problem to others which is essentially his own. Ridicule in this form was highly popular among Zen Masters and was often employed by them. It is traced to Bodhidharma (fl. 460-534), who is traditionally believed to have been the founder of Zen Buddhism in China. When a pupil told him that his mind was not calm and asked the Master to calm it for him, Bodhidharma replied, "Give me your mind and I shall calm it for you."¹⁵ Another favourite Zen technique used by Wang is indicated by the following story:

When a friend asked about his not being earnest about his task, Wang said, "I have already covered everything about the task of learning in one sentence. How is it that, the more you talk about it, the more you are off the mark, and none of what you say touches the root of the matter?"

The friend replied, "I have heard your instructions on the extension of innate knowledge. But it requires elucidation."

Wang said, "If you clearly know what the extension of innate knowledge is, how can it be elucidated? The extension of innate knowledge is itself clear. The thing to do is to exert effort earnestly and concretely. Otherwise, the more one talks about it, the more muddled it will become."

13. Wang Wen-ch'eng *Kung ch'uan-shu*, 32:10a.

14. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, sec. 122, *SPTK*, 1: 58b.

15. *Chung-te ch'uan-teng lu*, *SPTK*, 3: 7a.

The friend said, "My request is precisely on the elucidation of the effort to extend innate knowledge."

Wang said, "You have to find the way yourself. I have no other method to offer."

Once there was a Zen Master. When someone came to him to ask about the Law of the Buddha, he merely raised a dust whisk. One day, his followers hid his dust whisk to see what other schemes he would resort to. [When someone asked him about the Law,] he looked for the dust whisk but could not find it, and merely raised his empty hand.¹⁶ "This innate knowledge of mine is the dust whisk of my scheme. Aside from it, what can I raise?"

A little later, another friend asked about the task of being earnest. Wang looked to the side and asked, "Where is my dust whisk?" Those present were excited and happy.¹⁷

From the above it may seem that Wang was a Zen Buddhist. As pointed out before, he was attacked as such. What is more, because some Zen Buddhists had become undisciplined and carefree and many of Wang's followers had become "wildcat Zen Buddhists," he was severely attacked as a Zen in disguise. In the 1570s, some four decades after Wang's death and about seven decades before the collapse of the Ming Dynasty, many of his followers took license in sex and drinking to be the free exercise of the innate knowledge. In their eyes, a sinner is also a sage, since in Wang's doctrine "All that fill the street are sages."¹⁸ Wang was re-asserting in a dramatic way the traditional Confucian doctrine that all men can be sages. He would turn in his grave if he knew his doctrine was abused to such an absurd degree. Needless to say, Wang himself and the overwhelming majority of his followers were men of the highest integrity and rigid discipline, and he would not tolerate any libertine looseness. The fact remains that some of his followers were really wild.

16. A common Buddhist story the source of which is unknown.

17. *Ch'uan hsi-lu*, sec. 280, *SPTK*, 3:12 a-b.

18. *Ibid.*, sec. 313, *SPTK*, 3:44b.

Historians have blamed them partly for the fall of the Ming Dynasty. Actually they were symptoms rather than causes for the decline of the Ming. It was the degenerated state of the Ming that produced them instead of vice versa. To some extent, Wang's teaching of the carefree spirit contributed to the rise of the wildcat tendency among his followers. In commenting on the growing attack on him, he said, "Before I went to Nanking, I still harboured a few ideas of the goody-goody villager (who is pleasant but not always honest).¹⁹ Now I believe in innate knowledge. To me, what is right is right and what is wrong is wrong. I act freely without any more effort to hide or to conceal. Only now have I come to have the mind of the restrained. Let all people in the world say that I do not conceal my words or deeds. It is all right with me."²⁰ Of course, what he meant was that he had reached the point of knowing what truth was and would act spontaneously without regard for conventional opinion. But he must be held responsible for having failed to foresee the potential danger of the misinterpretation and misapplication of what he said.

So far as Wang himself is concerned, although he frequently employed Zen idioms and techniques, it is amazing how little actual contact he had with Buddhism. Take his visit to Buddhist temples. Wang was fond of travel, and in his travels he liked to visit Buddhist temples and often wrote poems after the visit. Altogether, he definitely visited some forty Buddhist temples in some eight provinces in various parts of China. He probably visited forty additional temples, although we have no concrete evidence. When he was forty-nine he made thirteen visits. Often he stayed for a week or two.

These frequent visits seem to indicate an intimate

19. Alluding to the Confucian *Analects*, 17:12 and the *Book of Mencius*, 7B:37

20. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, sec. 312, *SPTK*, 3:44a.

relationship between Wang and Buddhism, and Japanese scholars have asserted as much.²¹ But in these visits his interest in Buddhism was purely casual and should not be interpreted to mean that Wang was continuing his pursuit of Buddhism or that Buddhist thought continued to have a hold on him. In virtually all cases, he was either merely passing through and rested there or making a visit for diversion, as was often done by Chinese scholars. It is significant that his longest stay in a Buddhist temple was for about eight months, but that was when he was thirty-two, before he rejected Buddhism and evolved his own Confucian philosophy. Since then, on only three occasions, when he was forty-two, forty-eight, and fifty-four, did he stay for as long as a month. At other times his visits did not last for more than a week or two.

A more revealing fact about his slight relationship with Buddhism is that, unlike the Neo-Confucianists of the Sung Dynasty, he had no intimate Buddhist friends. He did not receive instructions from a Buddhist, as did both outstanding Neo-Confucianists, Chou Tun-i (1017-1073) and Chang Tsai (1020-1077), both from the Buddhist monk Ch'ang-tsung. Nor did he converse with Buddhists in a Buddhist temple, as did Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) for a whole day. Of course, the time were different. In the eleventh century, Buddhism was still flourishing and there were many prominent Buddhist scholars. Many of them were in the national capital, where leading Neo-Confucianists lived. By Wang's time, in spite of the fact that the founder of the dynasty was a monk, and in spite of the support of emperors Hsiao-tsung (reigned 1488-1505) and Wu-tsung (reigned 1506-1521), generally speaking, Buddhism was on the decline during Wang's lifetime. There were no Buddhist scholars of the calibre of Wang. The earlier Neo-Confucians enjoyed the new challenge of Zen Buddhism and the friendship of Zen Masters who were intellec-

21. See Kusumoto Bunō, *Ōyōmei nozenteki shiso kenkyū* (Study of Wang Yang-ming's Zen Ideas) (Nagoya:1958), chap. 5.

tually and spiritually their equal. Wang had none of these.

There is a persistent tradition in Japan that Wang befriended the Japanese priest Keigo Ryōan (1425-1515), who visited China and stayed for about a year and a half. Japanese accounts are not consistent. The date of his entering China is given variously as 1506-1510, and 1512. One account says Wang repeatedly visited him, while another says that Wang met him by chance. It is very probable that they were in Nanking at the same time, from the second to the fifth month of the eighth year of the Ching-te period (1513). Wang was then in Nanking waiting for an appointment to a government position, and Keigo was there preparing to leave for Japan. It is to be noted that in the following year Wang became senior lord of the bureau of state ceremonies, which included diplomatic reception. He may have already had some interest in foreign guests. If he did meet Keigo, however, the contact was extremely brief, most probably casual. The only record of the visit is the essay bidding Keigo farewell, which is dated the fifth month of the eighth year of Ching-te. An examination of the style of the essay shows that it could have come from Wang's own hands, and it definitely says, "I have visited him." But this essay is not included in Wang's complete works, and there is no reference to it anywhere. This is a sure indication that the editors of the work, who were Wang's own followers, did not accept the authenticity of the essay. Even if we accept it as authentic, it does not show any significant interest in Buddhism, much less Buddhist influence, on Wang's part. It mentions the fact that Keigo showed him an essay discussing the similarities and differences between the various philosophical and religious systems and equating the Buddha with Confucius. There is much praise of Keigo's personality but nothing to show any enthusiasm for Buddhist doctrines. . . .²²

22. See *ibid.*, chap. 4.

If Wang's contact with Buddhist thinkers was virtually nil, his contact with Buddhist scriptures was not much greater. Again, Sung Neo-Confucianists were students of Buddhist scriptures, although their seriousness and understanding may not have been profound. All of them referred to Buddhist works and quoted from them. Some, like Chu Hsi, even criticized them specifically. It is amazing that in the entire *Ch'uan-hsin lu* he quotes only once from a Buddhist text.²³ We have noted that he used more Zen idioms and stories than other Neo-Confucianists, but he did not quote from Buddhist scriptures as often as they did. This may be explained, as in the case of friendship with Buddhists, by the fact that Buddhist literature was not as attractive to Neo-Confucians in Wang's time as it was in the Sung Dynasty. But, if this is true, it is also true that Buddhist literature was much less stimulating or influential in Wang's days.

Turning to his criticisms of Buddhism, we find that he was very vigorous, in some respects more so than his Neo-Confucian predecessors. A study of his criticisms reveals a very significant fact, namely, that he concentrated on attacking the Zen doctrine of the mind. This makes him markedly different from other Neo-Confucians. Chu Hsi, for example, attacked Buddhism on all fronts—social, ethical, historical, and philosophical.²⁴ Others, like Ch'eng I, stressed the practical side.²⁵ Wang, however, directed his attention primarily against

23. See 167, *SPTK*, 2:50b, from the *Diamond Scripture*, sec. 10. The earlier quotation (in note 1) from the *Liu-tsu t'an-chung* was not his own. The quotation was in a letter to which he was making a reply.

24. See Galen Eugene Sargent, *Tchou Hsi Contre le Bouddhisme*, (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1955), pp. 10-39. For some philosophical criticism, see Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, translated by Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953) vol. II, pp. 566-571.

25. See *Ibid.*, pp. 508-509. Also Wm. Theodore de Bary, Wing-tsit Chan, and Burton Watson, ed., *Sources of Chinese Tradition* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 532-533.

the Zen concept of the mind and how the Zen Buddhists failed to live up to their own ideal. In other words, Wang attacked the very foundation of Zen Buddhism and rejected its strongest claim. It is natural that he should concentrate his efforts in this direction, for, being an advocate of the mind as ultimate reality, this is where his chief interest lay. But, in attacking the Zen doctrine of the mind and the Zen failure to live up to it, he did more damage to Buddhism than other critics.

Although he also criticized Buddhism in his letters and essays, the important points of his criticisms are found in the *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, which is, after all, the main embodiment of his doctrines. Of 343 conversations that make up the book, seventeen deal with Buddhism either mainly or incidentally. Of these seventeen, only two are devoted to the purely ethical aspect. In section 49 he said that "The Buddhists lure people into their way of life by the promise of escape from the cycle of life and death", and in section 90 he said, "Merely to talk about manifesting the clear character and not to talk about loving the people would be to behave like the Taoists and Buddhists."²⁶ All the rest takes the Buddhist doctrine of the mind to task in one way or another.

Since his points were made in conversations, they are not systematic or thorough. However, they are both clear and definite and can be classified under four headings :

(1) The Zen doctrine of the mind is untenable. One of the chief doctrine of Zen is the absence of thought. It was advocated by Shen-hui (670-762), who expounded the doctrine of sudden enlightenment taught by his teacher, Hui-neng (638-713), founder of the Southern Schools of Zen Buddhism, and thus overthrew the Northern School of Zen Buddhism, which taught gradual enlightenment. Shen-hui taught the doctrine of the absence of thought so that the mind would return to its original stage of tranquillity and be

26. *SPTK*, I : 30a and I : 41b.

free from attachment to the differentiated characters of things. Originally, it was only one of several fundamental methods, but it became a basic tenet of the school. Wang rejected this concept entirely, for to him the absence of thought was inconceivable. When he was asked about Chu Hsi's statement, "When one does not know a thing, his task is to be apprehensive,"²⁷ he said, "To be apprehensive implies that one already knows the situation. If one does not know, who is it that is apprehensive? The view you stated inevitably leads to the Buddhist meditation that cuts off all events.... To be apprehensive is also thought. The thought of apprehension never ceases.... From morning to evening, and from youth to old age, if one wants to be without thought, that is, not to know anything, he cannot do so unless he is sound asleep or dead, like dry wood or dead ashes."²⁸ Actually, Shen-hui taught no cult of unconsciousness. What he meant was for the mind to return to its original state of tranquillity and be free from the differentiated characters of things. There is no doubt, however, that the doctrine logically leads to an indifference to things, and Wang insisted that this was impossible while we are awake.

(2) Zen Buddhists are bound by the very thing from which they have claimed freedom, namely, attachment. According to the *Platform Scripture of the Sixth Patriarch*, by the absence of thought is meant "to see all *dharma*s (elements of existence) but not to be attached to them and (for the mind) to pervade everywhere but not to attach to anything."²⁹

27. Chu Hsi, *Chung-yung chang-chu* (Commentary on the *Doctrine of the Mean*), chap. 1.

28. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, sec. 120, *SPTK*, I 58.

29. *Liu-tsu t'an-ching* sec. 31. This translation is from the version discovered in Tun-huang in 1907, the oldest version, of which the current version referred to in note 1 above, is an elaboration. See my translation of this Tun-huang version into English, *The Platform Scripture*, published by the St. John's University Press, New York, 1963.

The scripture further says, "When all *dharma*s are examined in the light of wisdom, and one is neither attached to nor renounces them, one will see one's nature and attain Buddhahood."³⁰ Thus, Zen Buddhism advocates not only freedom from attachment to external things but also from attachment itself.

To Wang, this is exactly where the Buddhists have failed. He said, "Buddhism claims to be free from the attachment to and affliction by phenomenal things (*dharma*-characters) but actually the opposite is the case The Buddhists are afraid of the burden in the relationship between father and son and therefore escape from it In all cases, because the relationships between ruler and minister, father and son, and husband and wife involve attachment to phenomena, they have to escape from them. We Confucians accept the relationship between father and son and fulfill it with humanity as it deserves."³¹

In Wang's view, to fulfill a moral duty without any personal preference is real non-attachment, whereas to avoid moral responsibility is really attachment to selfishness. He said elsewhere, "The Taoist talk about vacuity is motivated by a desire for nourishing everlasting life, and the Buddhist talk about non-being is motivated by the desire to escape from the sorrowful sea of life and death. In both cases, a certain selfish idea has been added to the original substance (of the mind), thereby losing the true character of vacuity and obstructing the original substance (of the mind). The Confucian sage merely returns to the true condition of innate knowledge of the good and does not attach to it any selfish desire."³²

According to Wang, just as the Buddhists cannot be free from attachment in their idea of non-being, so are they not free from attachment in their concept of the non-distinction of good and evil. When asked what the difference between the Buddhist non-distinction of

30. Sec. 27.

31. *Ch'uan-hai lu* sec. 236 *SPTK*, 3: 15b-16a.

32. *Ibid.*, sec. 269, *SPTK*, 3: 17b-18a.

good and evil and the Confucian non-distinction was, he replied, "The Buddhist are attached to this non-distinction...whereas in his non-distinction of good and evil the (Confucian) sage merely makes no special effort whatsoever to like or to dislike."³³ In commenting on the Zen Buddhist doctrine of "recognizing one's original state at the time when one thinks of neither good nor evil,"³⁴ he said that, while this doctrine is no different from the Confucian doctrine of innate knowledge, "the Buddhists are different from us because they have the mind motivated by selfishness. Now, to wish to think of neither good nor evil and to want the mind of innate knowledge to be clear, tranquil, and at ease means to have the mind of selfishness."³⁵ In short, no matter what the Buddhists may claim, they cannot be free from the very thing from which they have claimed freedom, namely, attachment.

(3) The Zen method of sudden enlightenment cannot bring about the complete functioning of the mind. The peculiar method of Zen Buddhism is to understand the mind, see one's own nature attain calmness and wisdom, and achieve sudden enlightenment. To Wang, this is "to achieve sudden enlightenment out of nothing."³⁶ Instead, he advocated the methods of the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, the sincerity of the will, and the rectification of the mind, all of which are directed to the task of personal examination and actual demonstration of matters concerning one's own mind and daily affairs. In contrast to the Buddhist idea of "constantly bringing your thoughts to the fore" and "always be alert," he taught Mencius' saying, "Always be doing something."³⁷ He understood the task of "constantly bringing thoughts to the fore", not merely as a state of mind, as the Buddhist did, but as

33. *Ibid.*, sec. 101, *SPTK*, 1: 48a.

34. See above, note 1.

35. *Chu'an-hsi lu*, sec. 162, *SPTK*, 2: 45a

36. *Ibid.*, sec. 131, *SPTK*, 2: 3a.

37. *Book of Mencius*, 2A: 2.

"always be doing something."³⁸ In other words, the mind must not only be active at all times; it must always be applied to daily human affairs. As Wang saw it, since the Buddhists desert daily human affairs, they virtually deserted the mind itself.

(4) The Buddhist way of cultivating the mind is useless for the purpose of administering the world. This is clear from the following conversation.

Someone asked, "The Buddhists also devote themselves to the nourishment of the mind, but fundamentally they are incapable of governing the world. Why?"

The Master (Wang) said, "In nourishing the mind, we Confucians have never departed from things and events. By merely following the natural principles of things we accomplish our task. On the other hand, the Buddhists insist on getting away from things and events completely and viewing the mind as an illusion, gradually entering into a life of emptiness and silence, and seem to have nothing to do with the world at all. This is why they are incapable of governing the world."³⁹

Furthermore, since the Buddhists aim at the state of thinking of neither good nor evil, they are attached to this state and neglect everything. For this reason, also, they are incapable of governing the world.⁴⁰

Although the above points are only briefly stated, they are none the less cogent, for they are centrally directed at the most important aspect of Zen Buddhism, namely, the function of the mind. In this, he was different from Chu Hsi, who attached the Buddhist doctrine of the mind from the point of view of the substance of the mind rather than its function. In his special treatise criticizing the Buddhist doctrine, the *Kuan-hsin shuo* (On the Examination of the Mind), he stressed the point that the Buddhists divide the mind into two, so that one examines the other.⁴¹ The point involves both substance and

38. *Ch'uan-hsi lu*, sec. 163, *SPTK*, 2:46b.

39. *Ibid.*, sec. 270, *SPTK*, 3:18ab.

40. *Ibid.*, sec., 101, *SPTK*, 1:48a.

41. *Chu Tzu wen-chi*, chap. 67.

function, but Chu Hsi's emphasis was on the nature of the mind.

Elsewhere, Chu Hsi attacked the Buddhists for identifying the mind with principle and confusing the mind with human nature.⁴² It is interesting to note why Wang preferred to dwell on the function rather than the substance of the mind. Obviously, with respect to the nature of the mind, he was subject to, if not identical with, the Buddhists, and was subject to all the criticisms Chu made against the Buddhists. In effect, while attacking Buddhism, Chu was also attacking the idealistic tendency of Neo-Confucianism itself. In concentrating on the function of the mind, Wang could criticize Buddhism without endangering Neo-Confucianism. In this way, Wang's criticism of Buddhism was more effective.

42. *Chu Tzu ch'uan-shu* (Complete Works of Chu Hsi), 1713 edition, chap. 60, pp. 14-15.

THERMODYNAMICS, QUANTUM PHYSICS AND INFORMATIONAL ENTROPY

C. T. K. CHARI

In my Principal Miller Lectures (7) delivered under the auspices of the Madras University in 1958, I have discussed the general problem of temporal irreversibility in modern physics. Philosophers of the stature of Bergson, Broad, Alexander and Whitehead have urged, from widely different standpoints, that "uni-directionality" is intrinsic to our notions of "passage" or "becoming". Absolutists like F.H. Bradley, on the other hand, dismissed the uniqueness of the "direction of time" as a psychological triviality. We think forward, according to Bradley, just as fishes feed with their heads pointing up the stream. In a recent volume dedicated to Broad, C. J. Ducasse of the Brown University, U.S.A., has suggested that the *physical* time-series may not be characterized by a unique or privileged direction. It may be describable rather in terms of a partly symmetrical relation of "betweenness" holding its terms together. It will not be inappropriate in this volume commemorating the services of an outstanding Indian philosopher if I discuss some technical issues about irreversibility in thermodynamics, quantum field theory and information theory.

I

Roughly speaking, entropy signifies the "disorder" resulting from the dissipation of energy in the universe though the anthropomorphic associations of the world "disorder" are questionable. The second law of thermodynamics tells us that the dissipation of energy takes place irreversibly. We must distinguish the phenomenological interpretation of the law from its statistical

interpretation. The phenomenological statement is based syntactically on what is called the Pfaffian equation in three variables and semantically on what is known as Caratheodory principle. The law may be summed up briefly in the statement that the entropy of a closed system never decreases. Statistical mechanics, which deals with crowds of particles, interprets the statement as signifying the overwhelming probability of the increase of entropy. Systems of statistical mechanics were constructed by Maxwell, Gibbs and Boltzmann. Boltzmann's techniques were greatly improved by the British physicists, Darwin and Fowler. R.C. Tolman generalized Boltzmann's H -function by utilizing the methods of statistical mechanics for dealing with mechanical systems whose conditions are specified in a non-precise state.

Boltzmann and Maxwell, in formulating their statistics, made use of the ergodic hypothesis, which may be summed up in the crude statement that in an isolated, closed system every elementary state is as likely to occur as every other, consistently, of course, with the total energy of the system. The reconciliation of the ergodic hypothesis with classical physics poses a crucial problem. Von Neumann proposed a weaker form of the hypothesis known as the quasi-ergodic hypothesis and Von Mises a still weaker form of the hypothesis known as the pseudo-ergodic hypothesis. Onsager, in his celebrated study of the collision of particles, formulated various "reciprocity relations" and "balance theorems" arising from a microscopic reversibility among elementary phenomena. In *Nuovo Cimento* not long ago, S. De Groot has attempted to remove some difficulties involved in the usual applications of Onsager's "reciprocity relations" by utilizing a method due to Casimir; and H. Ziegler has attempted to generalize Onsager's relations leading to the result that microscopic fluctuations about a state of equilibrium in effect obey the same law as macroscopic processes.

Can we use thermodynamic entropy for characterizing the "uni-directionality" of past-present-future? Reichenbach argued that the entropic behaviour of a

single permanently closed system does not suffice to define a "time-direction". Availing himself of the suggestion and also of certain fruitful ideas thrown out by Schrödinger, Adolf Grünbaum has urged, in a volume dedicated to Carnap, that "Time's Arrow" is defined not by the entropic behaviour of the entire universe, but rather by the direction of entropic increase of a majority of quasi-closed "branch systems" in the space ensemble of such systems. The objections to a supposed inevitable increase of entropy, in closed systems during very long time-intervals, or in the "whole universe" consisting perhaps of a denumerably infinite number of particles, the classical objections raised by Loschmidt, Poincaré and Zermelo, and the newer objections put forward by E.A. Milne, Bondi, Gold, Hoyle and K. P. Stanyukovic, do not seriously affect a *limited* use of entropy for characterizing the temporal asymmetry, in a privileged direction, of macro-systems. (See also 15 and 29)

We must distinguish carefully the question whether thermodynamic irreversibility and macroscopic "unidirectionality" of time are *translatable* into microphysics from the question whether they are *reducible* to the basic terms of microphysics. A theory T_1 is reducible to a theory T_2 only if all the primitive functors of T_2 are also functors of T_1 though T_1 may contain primitive functors which do not occur in T_2 . For any primitive functor F of T_1 which does not occur in T_2 , it should be possible to construct a biconditional

$$X \equiv Y$$

where X consists of a matrix constructed with the help of F alone and Y consists of matrices constructed with the help of primitive functors of T_2 , but containing none characterizing T_1 alone. The biconditionals are theorems and tested statements of T_1 .

Turning to translatability, the axioms of a system of second order S can be translated into those of first order S' provided axioms are given for S' assuring us of the existence of a property or relation corresponding to each definite predicate of S . A translation of a com-

plete axiom system S into another S' based on another set of primitives is possible only if all the definitions of S are provable in the axioms of S' . Speaking generally, a sentence S in the predicate calculus implies a sentence T whenever T holds in every model for which S holds.

Nothing prevents our treating the thermodynamic irreversibility for a large class of macro-systems as an *irreducible* if not an untranslatable concept. Zemansky (40) practically admits the validity of this standpoint. He remarks that although the microphysical and macrophysical points of view seem "hopelessly different and incompatible, there is nevertheless a relation between them; and when both points of view are applied to the same system, they must agree in the end." This is at best translatability and not reducibility of the entropic concept. Prigogine and Defay (23) declare that "molecular fluctuations lead inevitably to small variations of the macroscopic quantities from their equilibrium values. There is, in fact, a relation between the probability of a fluctuation and the production of the entropy which accompanies it." Translatability again perhaps but not reducibility. Schmidt (27) states that "when applied to systems with moderate number of molecules and micro-states, all thermodynamic arguments become devoid of meaning. We cannot, for example, speak of the temperature or entropy of one or a small number of molecules."

The approach which I am unfolding finds more explicit support in some of the more recent books on theoretical thermodynamics. E. A. Guggenheim (14), for instance, thinks that it is no longer justifiable to regard temperature, the measure of hotness, as a "natural brick" for constructing thermo-physics (he points out, *inter alia*, that thermodynamics savours too much of a provincialism) and entropy, the measure of the direction of the change, as an "unnatural brick". "The usual introduction to entropy is unsatisfactory. For it is made dependent on the absolute temperature, a definition of which, independent of the postulate that certain substances make more perfect thermometers than

others, involves conceptions, such as those of a Carnot's cycle, which are at least as complex as the conception of entropy itself." Guggenheim is inclined to regard absolute temperature and entropy as two fundamental quantities in thermo-physics. "We therefore do not attempt to define them in terms of other quantities regarded as simpler, for we do not admit the existence of simpler thermodynamic quantities." A *process* has occurred if from two observations of a thermodynamic system we can infer a difference in the macro-properties of the system.

II

It may be doubted whether thermodynamic irreversibility follows *directly* from the *fundamental* equations of quantum mechanics. R. C. Tolman (35) and Reichenbach (25) showed that the Schrödinger equation governing change of an isolated (conservative) quantum-mechanical system satisfies the requirement of formal reversibility. In determining the probability amplitude and its complex conjugate, we can choose an equation with $+t$ or one with $-t$ values. We have a formal two-wayness of transitions between two sets of probability distribution of measurable quantities.

Two ways of defining time-reversal in quantum mechanics are available. Kramers and Wigner in the thirties changed the time-coordinate $+t$ into $-t$. Much later Schwinger in the *Physical Review* for 1951 introduced a method of changing electron charge $+e$ into $-e$. In classical field theory, invariance under time-reversal in the Schwinger sense may be deduced from proper isochronous Lorentz-invariance and from invariance under space inversion. J. S. Bell (3), using the canonical formalism, has extended the Schwinger invariance under time-reversal to the Bose, Dirac and Majorana fields. He claims that the Schwinger invariance arises "naturally" from a field-theoretical approach.

S. Watanabe (37), a few years ago, carried out a sustained mathematical investigation of the "symmetry of physical laws in space-time" and various "balance

theorems". He showed that the time-average of transition probabilities from S_i to S_j is equal to the time-average of transition probabilities from S_j to S_i . This is also equal to the time-average of the probability of return to the original state. Watanabe explored the symmetry of physical laws with respect to space inversion, time inversion and charge conjugation. In most cases the requirements of invariance for the transformations are automatically satisfied. In a few cases they impose conditions on the way in which different types of interaction take place. Some of Watanabe's theorems follow from the ergodicity of Markov chains. From considerations advanced by J. L. Doob (11), it can be shown that any Markov process reversed in time is a Markov process still.

G. Morpurgo, B.F. Touschek and L.A. Radicati (22) argued that, in a system specified by a time-dependent Hermitian Hamiltonian H , the reversibility of the scattering matrix can be derived. For any such H , there exists a matrix K such that

$$K H^* K^+ = H;$$

and the time-reversal of any Hermitian operator Q and of state w are given respectively by

$$\hat{Q} = K Q^* K^+ \text{ and } \psi = K \psi^*$$

The scattering matrix is reversible in the sense that

$$\phi^* S \phi = \hat{\phi}^* S \hat{\phi}$$

F. Coester (8) has observed that the invariance and symmetry of the S-matrix are implied by invariance under time-reversal with suitable assumptions (e.g., appropriate choice of arbitrary phases in the wave function in a representation where the square and one component of the total angular momentum are diagonal.)

The overthrow of parity has cast some doubt on laws of invariance under charge conjugation and time-reversal. On more general grounds, E. L. Hill (16) has

said that the use of wave functions which are not quadratically integrable leads to difficulties in the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics. The S -matrix can be unitary if the assumption of microscopic causality is suitably qualified. With an indefinite metric, however, of the kind introduced by Heisenberg, carrying "ghost states" with "negative transition probabilities", the assumption of microscopic causality becomes more dubious. Segal has recently questioned the wisdom of regarding the Jordan algebra of all bounded observables as isomorphic to the algebra of all self-adjoint operators in the ring of all bounded operators in some Hilbert space. He thinks that a weaker assumption will do. Some quantum divergences, according to him, may be rooted in the assumption that certain automorphisms are implementable by unitary operators.

It will be instructive to glance at some attempts made to deduce thermodynamics from quantum-mechanical premises. A. Landé (18, 19) derives macroscopic thermodynamic continuity from the quantum transitions for particles which conform to odds regulated by probabilities. The Gibbs paradox in thermodynamics may be reduced to the statement that the diffusional mixing of two volumes of gases produces an increase of entropy if the gases are composed of atoms of different species while there is no increase of entropy if the atoms are alike. The paradox, according to Landé (17), appears because in classical physics one can imagine the atoms being made "gradually more and more alike". The paradox is resolved in quantum mechanics in which the "likeness" is a yes-or-no question. Landé uses some perhaps not very rigorous arguments in deriving quantum mechanics from the non-existence of the Gibbs paradox.

M. Schøenberg applies a complex-valued wave formalism to the Liouville equations of classical mechanics which describe the time variations of probability distributions in phase space for a N -particle system. The probability distribution is defined as the absolute square (assumed to be symmetric or anti-symmetric) of the

wave function. The formalism is used to derive the ensembles of statistical mechanics and Boltzmann's equation with a rather trivial avoidance of the Gibbs paradox.

H. S. Green (13) avails himself of a quantum-mechanical cross-section in the collision integral. All but binary encounters are neglected. Before a two-particle collision, the two particles are statistically independent. The last assumption introduces irreversibility. Van Kampen (36) offered a proof by starting with collections of states in a Hilbert space which are macroscopically indistinguishable and deriving irreversibility by throwing away certain terms with complicated and uncertain phase factors. Transition probabilities between macroscopic states are thus deduced. J. Seiden (30) utilized the suggestions of Van Hove in arguing that irreversibility may be deduced quantum mechanically for a spin lattice system without repeated use of the assumption of random process.

Costa de Beauregard (10) tries to establish an equivalence between the principle of retarded action or retarded wave, on the one hand, and the principle of increasing entropy on the other. The principle of retarded action is simply the rule of solving electromagnetic and quantum-mechanical wave problems with the "outgoing wave condition", i.e., the rule that all perturbed waves produced by interaction are outgoing ones or that initial value problems must be solved rather than final ones.

In a highly technical and controversial field, one must be content to register an overall impression. Watanabe (37), Rosenfield (26), Glasstone (12) and Costa de Beauregard (10) show in effect that quantum mechanics like Newton's mechanics can yield an irreversible thermodynamics only by the incorporation of statistical principles of interpretation as ancillaries to its primary dynamic laws. Thermodynamic arguments have significance only when the system includes a large number of micro-states or particles. The Feynman-Stückelberg model in which a positron is described as a particle "going backwards in time" is of special in-

terest in this context. W.C. Davidon (9) develops a "proper time formalism" for this model. The sign of the time-like vector determines whether the particle observed is an electron or a positron. Reichenbach (25), in his comments on the Feynman model, remarks that the symbol T in quantum mechanics acquires its usual sign and interpretation only when statistical considerations have been imported.

It is well known that, when a quantum-mechanical system is coupled indivisibly to a classically describable system undergoing irreversible changes in the process of securing information, it behaves asymmetrically with respect to past and future. Schrödinger (28), Ludwig (20) and Blatt (4) have objected to the use of this metrogenic quantum asymmetry as a basis for *explaining* the phenomenal macro-irreversibility. Ludwig shows that, if a physical system B is used for measuring a physical system A, the conflict between the thermodynamic irreversibility and the unitary, reversible forms of motion in quantum mechanics can be resolved with reference to the special features of the Hamiltonian operators in a Hilbert space. So far as the macro-properties of the quantum system have to be dealt with, a classical description is possible. As H. S. Green has remarked, an act of observation in quantum mechanics is irreversible, because the macroscopic apparatus needed for making the observation undergoes a thermodynamically irreversible transformation during the experiment. The epistemological result is in agreement with that reached in the first section of the paper.

III

R. A. Fisher in 1925 introduced the technical term "information" in expounding the statistics of sampling and the determination of the parametric dependence of the corresponding probability distribution. Wiener and Shannon (31, 32) adapted Boltzmann's expression in the form

$$H = \sum p_i \log p_i$$

for designating the average information per symbol in a communication. p_i is the relative frequency of the i th signal. The two meanings attached to "information" are distinct but related (24). Schützenberger pointed out that an informational functional satisfying the weakest condition takes the form

$$H = \sum p_i T \log p_i$$

where p_i is the probability distribution and T is any suitable linear operator.

Shannon's expression for informational entropy:

$$H(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = -c \sum x_i \log x_i$$

can be derived from the following axioms: (i) H is defined for any set of non-negative arguments with sum = 1 and it is symmetric in all arguments; (ii)

$$H(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{n-1}, u, v) =$$

$$H(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) + x_n H\left(\frac{u}{x_n}, \frac{v}{x_n}\right)$$

whenever all the terms of the argument have meaning; (iii) $H(x, 1-x)$ is integrable in the sense of Lebesgue in the interval: $0 \leq x \leq 1$.

Shannon used informational entropy without a negative sign as a measure of "average unexpectedness" over a long sequence of signals. Important and illuminating coding theorems, set forth by Shannon and Fano, followed the quantification of "unexpectedness" as the additive measure which has operational significance for the code-designer. Brillouin (6) has carried out an extended research into the relation between Shannon's "average unexpectedness" and physical entropy. He is led to define "information" as the negative of entropy, coining the word "negentropy". He shows that the informational content of any wave form or collection of code symbols or any other *pattern* can be assessed mathematically by the methods used to define entropy of a physical system. In a series of papers in the *Journal of Applied Physics*, he posited a system satisfying a generalized Fermi-Dirac statistics

and consisting of $N = N_1 + N_2 + \dots + N_n$ states. Each state contains one and only one particle of a set of N particles, where the N particles consist of N_1 particles of the first kind, N_2 of the second kind, \dots N_n of the n -th kind. The entropy for such a system is the negative of the logarithm of the probability of any particular equally probable arrangement. When the number of particles becomes large, Brillouin states as one of his basic results that there is an asymptotic correspondence between the entropy per particle and the entropic function of Shannon.

Brillouin shows that a decrease of entropy is related to an increase of information and that the act which increases the entropy also destroys information. He states that "in a closed system the sum of the entropy and the negative of the information always tends to increase." Ignoring the human value or importance of information, we can replace it by a measurable quantity. The acquisition of information about a physical system corresponds to a lower state of entropy for that system. Low entropy implies an unstable situation that will sooner or later wend its way to stability and high entropy. A system capable of retaining information for some time can be used as a memory device in a computer. Recording and storing information corresponds to a decrease in entropy. But the local decrease in entropy must be compensated for by an increase in the environment. Any information resulting from observation must be paid off by an increase of entropy in the laboratory where the observation is made. Brillouin shows that, on the average, the entropy increase is higher than the information obtained when both quantities are measured in the same system of units.

Negentropy is introduced by Brillouin as a new principle not reducible to quantum-mechanical indeterminacy. For information theory, observation is essentially an irreversible process. From a purely thermodynamic point of view, there can be no observation without a corresponding increase of entropy in the physical system itself or the equipment used for the

experiment and coupled with the system during observation: $\Delta (S-I) \geq 0$.

Brillouin maintains that an increase of entropy implies irreversibility and that irreversibility is an intrinsic feature of every act of observation. Watanabe, in his discussion of observation in the context of quantum mechanics, interprets the irreversibility of observation as the decrease of Shannon's "unexpectedness" in the positive direction of the inference parameter. In the language recommended by Brillouin, high predictability means a prior information content; that is, a large negentropy compensated for by a corresponding increase of entropy in the equipment used in making the inference. Prigogine and Defay (23) interpret living beings as open systems which are continually exchanging matter with the outer world. A psycho-physiological act of observation (perceptual process) resulting in the production of a memory trace (observational record) can be readily interpreted in the language of Brillouin's theory.

IV

What precise epistemological construction may we put on the relation between "information" and "entropy" as defined in physics? We can adopt one of three approaches which are by no means mutually exclusive.

(A) Entropy may be treated as a primitive term of information theory. Through the introduction of a factor such as temperature it can be related to physical energy. Entropy, on this view, is a pure abstraction or mathematical construct for elucidating the nature of information. This bio-psychological standpoint tying up irreversibility and increase of entropy with observation is not a gratuitous construction put on statistical mechanics. In the statistics of Gibbs, temperature appears as the quantity θ in the expression for the canonical distribution:

$$P = e^{(\varphi - E)/\theta}$$

The "partition function", in the statistics of Darwin and Fowler, can for some purposes be regarded as a formal generalization of the phase integral of Gibbs to include quantized systems.

(B) A second approach is hinted at by Brillouin. We may regard entropy as inherently associated with energy and temperature, treating it, in the fashion of Guggenheim, as one of the primitives of statistical thermodynamics. Observation in the psycho-biological sense finds its context in statistical thermodynamics. Information is necessarily connected with an expenditure of energy. In the communication of information, the signalling power must override the noise power. In recorded information, whether represented by ink or paper or magnetization of a ferro-magnetic medium, the ordered array must withstand the tendencies of thermal agitation towards disorganization. In fact, disruptive influences far more potent than thermal agitation may play round records. Brillouin's statement about the tendency for the sum of entropy and the negative of the information to increase is illuminating when we consider in detail the processes of recording, preserving and recovering information.

(C) A third approach which is a generalization of the first two seems possible. From an epistemological standpoint subsuming both physics and psychology, we may regard entropy as a pattern abstracted from physical processes and informational procedures alike. From physical entropy we abstract a dimensionless factor which can be extracted from information theory as well. One of the desiderata of an axiomatic system is the ascription of structure. To regard entropy as a *pattern* satisfies the demands of axiomatization. The *interpretation* of the pattern in the particular contexts of thermodynamics and information theory has an empirical justification.

Does "informational entropy" fix the unique "direction" of conscious time? In Wiener's discussion (39) of feed-back mechanisms, there is considerable emphasis on irreversibility; he elevates thermodynamics to a fundamental status. Contrasting sharply Newtonian

time with the time of thermodynamics, he finds in the latter a privileged direction. In his book *I am a Mathematician*, he holds on cybernetic grounds that "becoming" is a real feature of the universe and no illusion. Similarly Ashby (1), after writing down his canonical equations for his homeostat, claims that his "absolute system", whatever the machine providing it, is "essentially irreversible". In a subsequent discussion (2), he maintains that the "truths of cybernetics are not conditional on their being derived from some other branch of science." I suggest that the claim to *basic* irreversibility in the laws of physics is dubious. No statistical interpretation of modern physics has eliminated convincingly and completely the reversibility inherent in the basic laws. The attempts of E. A. Milne (21) and Whyte (38) to interpret time as "trend" or "one-wayness" in the universe *as a whole* have not met with unanimous assent. But I would add that it is equally open to doubt whether the macroscopic laws of biology and psychology can be unambiguously *reduced* to the language of micro-physics. So long as the question about the privileged direction of time concerns the macro-laws of biology and psychology, the claim to an *irreducible*, if not an untranslatable, irreversibility deserves serious consideration. Alexis Carrel and Lecomte du Nouy argued for a "biological time" which is bound up with the continuity of structural, physiological, and mental states of living beings and which is different from the "clock-time" (i.e., Newtonian time with an inherent reversibility) of physics. In a symposium on the relevance of information theory to biology, H.R. Branson (5) had adduced arguments to show that the "biological time" of du Nouy is closely akin to the thermodynamics time of Prigogine. "Informational entropy" is an important contribution to our understanding of our awareness of "uni-directional" time if not its complete solution. A psychological contributor to a symposium on information theory in *Nuovo Cimento* said: "The only trouble I have is in knowing what information theory is—is it mathematics or physics or game theory or perhaps philosophy?" The obvious

answer is that it is all these but cannot be simply identified with any one of them.

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THE VEDĀNTIC WAY OF LIFE

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Vedānta is both a philosophy and a religion. As a philosophy, it is a way of thought, and as a religion, it is a way of life. Generally speaking, philosophy is a way of thinking and religion is a way of living. In philosophy we think of the world in a particular way and form a general conception of it as a whole. In religion, on the other hand, we try to live a particular mode of life and perfect it by all means. Vedānta is both a speculative system of thought about God, man and the world, and a practical guide to man's life to help him realize the philosophic truths and live a perfected life accordingly. Thus Vedānta may very well be described as both a way of thought and way of life. We are here especially concerned with the Vedāntic way of life, although it is based on and has a necessary reference to Vedāntic thought.

In the Vedāntic way of life we may distinguish four stages. These are the stages of (I) preparation, (II) initiation and cultivation, (III) realization, and (IV) perfection and fruition. We shall here briefly describe these four stages one after another.

I. Preparation

The Vedāntic life usually requires some acquaintance with and study of the Vedānta as contained in the Upanisads, the *Vedānta-sūtra* and the commentaries thereon. But all persons are not benefited by the study of the Vedānta and enabled to live the Vedāntic life. Many people read the Vedānta, but, unfortunately, they live the most un-Vedāntic life. If the study of

Vedānta is to bear fruit, there must be adequate preparation for it on the part of the student. Such preparation seems to extend behind the present life and reach back to the past lives of an individual. The Vedāntins generally agree in holding that a fruitful study of the Vedānta requires purification of mind through the performance of religious works (chitta-śuddhi), discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal values of life (viveka), renunciation of all desires for enjoyment of objects here and hereafter (virāg ī), acquisition of qualities like detachment, patience, concentration (s'ama-damādi), and an ardent desire for liberation (mumukṣutva). But while religious works more or less purify the minds of the individuals who perform them, the other requisites for the study of Vedānta, especially discrimination, renunciation and desire for liberation, are not acquired by all of them. It seems that a clear realization of the impermanence of all worldly objects, a true appreciation of the eternal spiritual values, freedom from attachment to objects of enjoyment and a sincere desire for liberation are attained only by those individuals who are born with certain good dispositions and a virtuous nature which are the unconscious effects and products of their good deeds (karma) in the past life or lives. It is not true to say that all men have the same nature and character at birth and that they come later to differ from one another on account of their different heredities and environments. Heredity and environment are not sufficient grounds for the constitution of an individual's personality. Over and above these two factors, we must admit the impressions (saṁskāras) which the soul of a man carries from its past lives and with which he is born in this life, if we are to explain satisfactorily the different types of personality. Similarly, in the attainment of Vedāntic life the innate tendencies and dispositions (saṁskāras) of a man count more than the usual preparations for the study of the Vedānta. A man born with a good nature and a good disposition (sukṛti) naturally acquires the qualities and virtues which are the necessary preparations for the Vedāntic life.

II. Initiation and Cultivation

The next stage is that of initiation and cultivation. This stage has both a theoretical and a practical side. On the theoretical side, one who has the necessary preparation for it, should begin the study of the Vedānta and learn its truths under the guidance of a wise teacher who has himself realized them. This study consists of the three fold process, namely, listening to the teacher's instructions (śravaṇa), understanding the instructions through reflection and reasoning until all doubts are removed and conviction is generated (manana), and repeated meditation on the truths thus accepted (nididhyāsana). The fundamental Vedāntic truths which one learns by this process are as follows. God as infinite and eternal existence, consciousness and bliss (sat-chit-ānanda) is the ultimate reality. He pervades the world and exists beyond it, i.e. He is both immanent in and transcendent to the world. Therefore, all is God, though God is more than all. Individual souls and the world of nature have no existence independent of God. They are all grounded in the same God and are either non-different from God or essentially related to God as parts to the whole. The individual soul is different from the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect. It is mere ignorance to think that the soul is the body, the senses, the mind or the intellect. But when through such ignorance one identifies his self with any one of these things, he becomes subject to bondage to the world and suffers in life. It is through right knowledge of God, soul and the world that a man becomes free from bondages and attains liberation as a state of infinite bliss and peace.

Although the Vedāntic truths may be learned in this way, yet the forces of deep-rooted wrong beliefs may continue to operate and sway the life of a man. In order to root out these wrong beliefs and clearly realize the Vedāntic truths, one should supplement his theoretical or intellectual understanding of them by a course of arduous and strenuous spiritual training and discipline (sādhana). In fact, the true meaning and

significance of the Vedāntic texts can hardly be grasped and realized without proper spiritual disciplines and practices. Hence on the practical side of it, the cultivation of Vedāntic life should include certain spiritual disciplines and practices. Here one should continue and intensify the processes meant for purification of the mind. He should abstain from injury to any life in thought, deed and word, and be kind and compassionate towards all living beings. He should always speak what is true and good, control his senses, passions and impulses, and give up self-indulgence in any form and also all attachment for the objects of the world. He should remain content with what comes of itself and maintain equanimity in the midst of the trials and tribulations of life. Above all, he should constantly meditate on and worship and serve God by all means. Such devotional practices are not foreign to the life of a Vedāntin. They are to be found not only in the lives of the followers of the devotional schools of the Vedānta, but also in the Advaita Vedāntins like S'aṅkara and others. Far from being hindrances, these devotional practices are of great help and efficacy in bringing about that enlightenment of the intellect and training of the will and emotions in which one realizes the spiritual truths as taught in the Vedānta. It may even be said that spiritual disciplines and practices have a greater value for spiritual enlightenment than mere intellectual understanding of the Vedānta treatises. Some rare individuals with little or no educational background are found to realize God, not through intellectual study of the Vedānta, but through an intense life of spiritual discipline and training (sādhana).

III. Realization

The twofold cultivation of Vedāntic life, as explained before, for a sufficiently long time leads to the realization of the Vedāntic truths and to a life lived accordingly, i.e. to the Vedāntic life. Here a man feels convinced that God as infinite, self-conscious spirit is present in everything of the world and dwells in the

hearts of all living beings. He is also convinced that his real self is not the body, the senses, the mind or the intellect. On the other hand, the self of man is either the Divine self itself living in a human body or a spark from the Divine light living in a human body in close communion with the Divine. Thus convinced, the Vedāntin is no longer swayed by the wrong conception of separation between man and man, or between man and nature. Rather, he finds his self in all other selves and other selves in his self. He becomes free from all passions and prejudices, jealousies and hatreds for his fellow beings, and serves them by all means. He becomes also free from the natural passions and impulses of life, which bind him to the body and the world. As such, he stands free and liberated, and enjoys in this life the peace and bliss which the self intrinsically is.

IV. Perfection and Fruition

From what has been said above it will appear that the Vedāntic life is not a barren life of inactivity and isolation from society. Some people think that the Vedāntin who has realized God should always remain absorbed in study and meditation in some lonely corner of the world far removed from the noisy life of society. They think also that the liberated soul rises above good and evil, and is under no obligation to do his duties to society or to his fellowmen. But such a conception of the Vedāntic life is rather poor and perverted. The perfection and fruition of the Vedāntic life consist in renunciation of desires and services to humanity. Of course, for the attainment of this life one has at first to withdraw all his attention from the world outside and concentrate it wholly on study, reasoning and meditation. But once enlightenment has been permanently obtained and God steadfastly realized, the Vedāntin should neither always remain rapt in meditation nor wholly withdraw from active life. Rather, being convinced that all living beings are either God or the manifestations and embodiments of his

beloved God, he should renounce all desires for his own enjoyment and devote himself to the service of ignorant and suffering humanity, and work for the liberation of those who are still in bondage. He is free from attachment, hatred and infatuation, from greed, pride and conceit. He is neither elated by the joys nor depressed by the sorrows of life. He lives a simple, unostentatious life in partial solitude, but is solicitous of the good of others. He is firmly established in the truth and reality of spirit and spends his life partly in the study and dissemination of spiritual philosophy and partly in meditation on and devotion to God. But, above all, his heart is full of love and sympathy for all living beings and he feels their joys and sorrows as his own. This persuades him to work for their physical well-being and mental and moral uplift. Such is the ideal of the Vedāntic life and, to a large extent, such is the life of Dr. D. M. Datta, to honour whom we have this commemoration volume.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH

J. N. CHUBB

In this paper I wish to point out a rather curious consequence of the main drift of contemporary thought in so far as it affects the problem of truth. It is becoming increasingly clear that philosophy is something very different from science, though what exactly philosophy is and what is it that we do when we pass philosophical judgments are questions which have not as yet received satisfactory answers.

Science has freed itself from the false apriorism of philosophy and has pursued its task of organizing experience by the use of the experimental method. But because for centuries philosophy and science have lived in close and intimate union and have even for a long period been indistinguishable from each other, it is but natural that philosophy should be regarded as a kind of science in its own right having a subject matter of its own, and that philosophical reasoning should be regarded as a way of discovering and establishing truths about this subject matter. Philosophy, which began as universal knowledge, retreated into metaphysics and theology after the special sciences separated themselves and became independent intellectual disciplines. It came to look upon itself as a super science of the supersensible, using either the methods of its own or adopting the methods of the empirical and deductive sciences. The two great philosophical traditions and methods of enquiry, rationalism and empiricism, are in a large measure the result of the uncritical confusion of philosophy with science.

"Proof, refutation—these are dying words in philosophy," though they should now be dead. The

1. F. Waismann *Contemporary British Philosophy*, Third Series.

recognition of this is a consequence of becoming aware that philosophy is something very different from science. But the full implication of this important change in standpoint has not been realized. If it were, there would be no attempt to 'eliminate' metaphysics, for a successful elimination depends on 'proof', and where the latter is not possible the former cannot be achieved.

One implication that requires to be clearly drawn is that philosophical arguments do not *fall short* of proof. This would imply a partial or complete failure to carry out an intended purpose. If I do not aim at an object at all I cannot be said to miss it. It is not or should not be the aim of a philosophical argument to prove or even to approximate to a proof of any proposition. If so, the argument cannot be regarded as a means of arriving at a conclusion. What then does a philosophical 'argument' do?

If we examine philosophical reasoning we shall see that what the philosopher is doing, though he may not be conscious of it, is to develop or mature a point of view, a way of looking at things, in short, a philosophical perspective. He is not reaching out to anything new, as the empirical scientist does, nor does he draw out implications from self-evident or arbitrarily selected premises, as the mathematician does. What he does is to cultivate his insight, to bring to greater clarity and focus the point of view with which he starts. And what about this point of view? Obviously it is not arrived at as a conclusion by a process of reasoning. To ask, by what arguments do we arrive at it or how do we justify it, is still to cling to the confusion that philosophy is a kind of science. The only answer is that the starting point is *chosen*. Shall we say it is chosen arbitrarily? As the choice does not rest on logical grounds it would in a sense be wrong to say that the choice is either arbitrary or necessary. The choice is no doubt determined, but we need not here go into the question of the nature and value of the psychological antecedents of the philosopher's choice of his point of orientation for constructing his philosophical system. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that

all philosophical theories about the nature of experience express a bias and that the bias is alogical. This statement applies also to theories the aim of which is 'clarification' and which claim to do nothing more than discover the 'logical behaviour' of words and concepts. A definite point of view operates in this process of 'clarification'; it works with a particular notion of clarity and rejects other attempts at clarification which are based on metaphysical considerations. It is impossible to escape bias in philosophical thinking except when we are merely engaged in examining philosophical thinking and attempting to answer the question, what precisely are we doing when we are producing philosophical 'arguments' to support particular philosophical 'conclusions'?

I shall illustrate this point with an example. Take the so-called problem of Universals. There are broadly two theories to account for our experience of resembling qualities and relations and our ability to use general words and make general propositions. One is the Platonic theory which says that there are universal as distinct from resembling particulars, which underlie and explain their resemblance. Whether these universals are regarded as *ante rem* or *in re* are, for purposes of my present argument, not relevant. The other is the nominalist theory which says that there are only particulars which resemble each other in varying degrees and in various ways; and that the relation of resemblance is something we understand directly and is not further analysable. It neither presupposes universals, nor is it itself a universal. The 'arguments' used by the two rival theories are not really meant to show how we arrive at a particular conclusion (though those who use the arguments are perhaps deluded into thinking that they are), but they are ways in which foregone conclusions or antecedent biases are exhibited or dressed up in logical form. The former theory is the expression of a metaphysical bias, the latter that of an empiricist one. Their opposition, which cannot be resolved by further argument and dispute, illustrates the view that philosophy is not a science and that the

philosopher is not impartially carried by the wind of argument to an inevitable conclusion.

To come now to the problem of truth. I think it is clear that if we do not accept the view that philosophical propositions can be either proved or disproved then the question, how is the truth of a philosophical proposition to be determined, faces all system of philosophy. It is sometimes naively assumed by positivistic-minded thinkers that on this question metaphysical propositions are in a peculiar case. They argue that since metaphysical propositions cannot be verified in sense experience and since their truth, if any, cannot be known by a direct intellectual intuition, we do not know what grounds we could have either for accepting or rejecting any metaphysical proposition. And this being so no sense could be given to saying that it is either true or false. This criticism is, of course, in conformity with the positivist's thesis that metaphysical propositions, regarded as factual assertions, are literally nonsensical.

It would be interesting to know how a positivist himself would answer the question, what grounds could we have for accepting or rejecting the main thesis of the positivist? The Verification Principle is not, and in the very nature of the case cannot be *shown* to be, true. In fact, it indirectly involves taking a stand on a metaphysical issue, *i.e.* at the level of presuppositions. But even apart from this it is clear that the Verification Principle is not self-evident. And if it is put forward as a definition it is clearly arbitrary and it can never be shown that it is not so. Any attempt to show that it is not arbitrary will be found hopelessly to beg the question. The positivist reasons, argues, discusses and disputes. What criterion does he himself use to determine that his reasoning is correct and that the conclusions he reaches are true? And what if the truth of the criterion is itself questioned? Will he argue like the absolute idealist that the criterion is a postulate of thought and must be accepted, otherwise thought falls into ruins? Or are we to believe that all the ardour and fury of the positivist's writing and

thinking are expended only in elaborating tautologies and decoding definitions ?

The sad fact is that the positivist like the previous philosophers he criticises, has confused philosophy with science. Philosophical propositions are taken as 'conclusions' and so like scientific conclusions they must be either true or false. That is, our philosophical beliefs must be grounded either in experience or in some way in reason. It would be unkind and perhaps going too far to say that the anti-metaphysical attitude of the positivist rests on the grand foundation of human stupidity, but certainly it has no better foundation than naivety and logical incoherence. The positivists have never shown satisfactorily what the logical status of their Verification Principles is, and now I believe they have decided that it is best to hush up this lacuna in their thought and go ahead with their analysis of language on the assumption that all is well with the foundation of their philosophical theories. They have not the inclination and perhaps, not the capacity for critical reflection which demands a new poise of consciousness, a detached contemplation of, without participation in, or identification with, the fever and flurry of constructive thinking.

We must now look at the problem of truth free of the uncritical assumption that philosophy is a kind of science. Our basic beliefs in philosophy rest on alogical acts of choice and, though rational, are not grounded in reason. What is chosen may be shown to be reasonable, but it is not accepted *because* we see that there are good and incontrovertible reasons for doing so. Hence we cannot, without begging the question, set out to show, on logical grounds, that our beliefs are true. No doubt, our beliefs can be developed and expressed in a coherent system, but since logical coherence is not the prerogative of any one system of philosophy, the test of coherence cannot be used to determine the truth or falsity of a philosophical system. If philosophical system cannot be demonstrated to be true and if logical coherence does not serve to distinguish one system from rival systems, is there any test we can

apply to determine which system of all the divergent systems, is acceptable or most acceptable? It might be suggested that that system is most satisfactory which is most comprehensive and which accounts for all types of fact or experience. But again, like the test of internal coherence, the test of comprehensiveness is one which each one of the rival systems would claim to satisfy. No system pleads guilty to making any omissions and even those systems which appear to explain away rather than explain certain facts could defend themselves by saying that they are merely dispelling false notions concerning these alleged facts, or by showing that we cannot talk significantly about them. A distinction is sometimes made between synoptic and analytical philosophies, but this distinction, however we may interpret it, cannot be equated with the distinction between complete and partial systems of philosophies. We cannot say, in an attitude of philosophical neutrality, that the analytic philosopher tries to give us a consistent way of viewing only a limited group of facts or experiences. This is an adverse judgment on the analytic philosopher, made from a philosophically biased point of view, and the latter will see no reason for accepting it. He is not conscious of limiting his attention to a selected group of facts, but would claim to account for all facts and experiences (or at least for our way of talking about them). That he has not done justice to large areas of experience may be true, but there is no way of establishing this truth by logic and argument. Thus our giving more marks, as it were, to the synoptic philosopher presupposes a point of view which, in the last resort, rests on an act of choice which is alogical. The test of comprehensiveness cannot therefore be 'objectively' applied.

We have to face the conclusion that at the level of thought there is no decisive test for singling out one system as true or as more acceptable than others. And if this were all, we would be forced to the further conclusion that philosophical propositions have no truth value. We could say at most that a particular philosophical outlook was aesthetically satisfying or that it

answered our emotional needs, but it would make no sense to say that it was either true or false. We would then be driven finally to the disconcerting conclusion that philosophical theories have no cognitive significance and that all philosophical propositions, including those made by the positivists, are as meaningless as metaphysical propositions are asserted by them to be. We cannot stop with "the elimination of Metaphysics"; we must go on to eliminate all philosophy, or, what amounts to the same thinking, show that all philosophy is metaphysics of one kind or another. Or perhaps we would have to say that the divergent systems of philosophy are not inconsistent with one another (since we cannot decide impartially among them), but are merely alternative ways of seeing and feeling and speaking about things. Philosophy would then in one respect be like geometry. It would give us alternative deductive system of implications. The difference would be that while in geometry we start with arbitrary axioms and definitions, in philosophy we start with points of view which are expressions of alogical acts of choice.

It is for the positivist and the metaphysician of the Western tradition to show how these distressing conclusions can be avoided. I personally think that on any view which regards thought as the highest form of cognitive experience they cannot be avoided. I shall now attempt to show how on the Indian view of the nature and value of philosophical thinking it would make sense to attribute truth-value to philosophical propositions.

Philosophy or rather Metaphysics, according to the Indian tradition, is a transitional stage in our search for the Real. It is not the highest knowledge but merely a formulation in intellectual terms of what is to be known in a direct experience. Philosophy is not itself knowledge, but an anticipation of knowledge. Metaphysical propositions are significant at the level of thought, but their significance is incomplete. They have to be verified at a level above thought where the distinction

of the knower, knowledge and the object known disappears, for knowledge there is self-knowledge or knowledge by identity. It is not that metaphysical propositions acquire greater meaning in the direct suprarational experience. "Meaning" itself is a transitional phase of experience; it is a tension in consciousness and in the direct experience it is both completed and transcended. Now if we accept this view we can say that a metaphysical system is true not only in the sense that it is logically coherent and comprehensive but in the more important sense that it can be *verified* in direct experience.

There is one final objection to this way of restoring truth-value to philosophical propositions. Statements about Reality, it is said, are inconsistent with one another and the direct experiences which claim to verify them are also divergent and in need of mutual reconciliation. The Real is described and also experienced as personal as well as impersonal. It is said to be static and immobile above all manifestations and at the same time it is regarded as a dynamic creative power in the universe in which we live, move and have our being. Since these divergent experiences cancel each other out we must say either that all metaphysical theories are equally valueless or if we select one and reject the others we will once again be faced with the question, what sense does it make to say that the selected theory is true (or false) ?

It would be a superficial answer to this puzzle created by divergent spiritual experiences to suggest that all these experiences are of the same Reality which is ineffable and that the differences are not in what is experienced but in the intellectual formulation of the experience of that which is beyond all speech and thought. The doctrine of the ineffability of Reality has been grossly misunderstood and is resorted to as a lazy way out of a genuine perplexity. It is sufficient to point out that the intellectual formulations of spiritual experiences differ precisely because the experiences

themselves are different. There is both an experience of a non-relational identity with the Supreme and an experience of a relationship of union with it. Reality is experienced as the impersonal transcendent as well as the Supreme Person who is the object of our love and worship.

I believe it is only in the philosophy of Sri Aurobindo that we have a true understanding of this problem and a final reconciliation of the divergent system of spiritual philosophy. Sri Aurobindo rejects the premiss which turns the fact of diversity of experiences into a problem for logic. He points out that when we attempt to understand the nature of the Infinite our thought must not be hampered by the presuppositions which are appropriate only to our way of thinking about finite things. The problem then is not one of reconciling theories which are inconsistent with one another, for they are taken as inconsistent only within the framework of a logic which is inadequate when applied to the concept of the Infinite; the problem is one of showing how they can be all fitted into a scheme of integral philosophy which accounts for the totality of experience and which comprehends the extreme terms of existence—Spirit and Matter, the Eternal on the one hand and change, evolution and history on the other—in a synthetic vision and in which finally each thing is considered not only in terms of a general relationship with the Ultimate, but in its own unique, individual value.

“Spiritual truth”, says Sri Aurobindo, “is a.... truth of the Infinite, one in an infinite diversity, and it can assume an infinite variety of aspects and formations.... The hard logical and intellectual notion of truth as a single idea which all must accept, one idea or system of ideas defeating all other ideas or systems, ...is an illegitimate transference from the limited truth of the physical field to the much more complex and plastic field of life and mind and spirit. This transference has been responsible for much harm; it

brings into thought narrowness, limitation, an intolerance of the necessary variation and multiplicity of viewpoints without which there can be no totality of truth-finding, and by the narrowness and limitation much obstinacy in error.”²

2. Sri Aurobindo *The Life Divine*, p. 790. (Published by The Sri Aurobindo Library, New York City).

MY GOD AND MY RELIGION

R. DAS

The other day an intelligent girl student of mine, on finding a copy of *Gitanjali* on my table, asked me seriously whether I could really enjoy such poetry. I replied at once, 'Why not ?' But she argued, 'Since most of it is addressed to God, and you do not believe in God so you cannot possibly take it all very seriously.' The idea seems to be widespread among my students that I am a confirmed atheist—a position which I have never affirmed or denied. Then came a letter from a student of Dr. D. M. Datta (whose unfailing friendship, since our university days, has been a source of inner strength and mental comfort to me), from which I was glad to learn that they were thinking of presenting Dr. Datta with a *Festschrift*. Naturally I began to think of my old friend and my thoughts turned to the happy days we spent together in our early philosophical career, and I particularly remembered one remark which he once made about me, somewhat in a prophetic vein. The remark was to the effect that I would spend the last years of my life at Brindaban. He was probably prompted to make this remark as a possible corrective to my open scepticism, to my apparent lack of any religious faith. It may be that in making this remark, he was aided by his knowledge of my mother's religious faith which was Vaishnavism, and I should not be surprised if it coincided with the traditional faith of Dr. Datta's family.

I am now nearing the end of the span of life sanctioned in the Bible, and I have not yet gone to Brindaban. Physically, of course, I am not there, but who knows whether mentally or spiritually, I am not somewhere near about the holy land.

So I have thought it worthwhile to try to define my position in regard to God and religion. This would no doubt be valuable in itself for me, as it would help me to clarify my own ideas on these important subjects, and it should also serve a useful purpose in that it may allay the anxiety of my friends, who feel concerned about the welfare of my soul, and at the same time, it may satisfy the curiosity of those who are merely curious about my views on such weighty matters. And incidentally, should my essay happen to meet the eyes of my friend Dr. Datta, he may see for himself whether, and how far, I have moved towards or away from Brindaban—the sacred land designed for the habitation of God's chosen companions.

To begin with God, it is not at all surprising to me that some of those who have come into any near contact with me should think that I am no believer in God. For have I not said sometimes, when I heard people praying to God for help, that it is no use doing so, because God has gone to sleep? I may not have asked them, after Nietzsche, 'Have you never heard that God is dead?', but for men, crying for divine help, there is hardly any difference between a sleeping God and a dead one. In sober language, I have said that our prayers to God for any change in the course of the physical world are quite fruitless, otherwise no mother would lose her child and nobody would be shipwrecked on high seas. I have heard people give sincere thanks to God for the dangers they escaped while others perished, but I have never felt any enthusiasm for such selective divine mercy. When people have wondered why there should be such iniquities, hideous crimes and senseless sufferings in God's world, I have suggested almost in a bantering tone, 'The poor man (Yes, man, because we think of God after our own image) having gone into the business of creating the world is perhaps finding the job of maintaining it in order too much for his slender resources.' I have never concealed my great mental irritation whenever I have heard people in extreme misery—old and infirm, homeless and penniless—declare in simple faith that they were in such plight

through God's will. If I asked how they could have any regard for a God who willed and wrought such miseries for them, and if they replied, as they often did, by saying that it was after all not God but their own sins committed in past lives that were responsible for their present lot, I generally had the wickedness to suggest that God was the worst sinner in that he created such defective vessels as ourselves, so prone to sinning, and was thus the ultimate cause of our sins and sufferings.

Whenever anybody has asked me in a simple way whether I believe in God's existence, I have never given a straightforward answer. I always ask my questioner to tell me first what he exactly means by God before I can tell him whether or not I believe in His existence. Rarely has anybody succeeded in giving me a clear and intelligible idea of God which does not lead to some absurdity or other. Since the idea of God, as popularly held, did not appear to be quite clear and intelligible I have never felt it necessary either to affirm or deny God's existence. Perhaps I could truthfully say that I did not know whether God, as popularly conceived, really existed; at least I did not know any definite and sufficient proof of His existence. But I do not think I have ever asserted that I know that God does not exist, whatever the term may mean.

About religion, too, I have allowed myself all sorts of negative criticism. I have said that religion, as we find it in history, has always worked as a divisive force, setting men against men, and bringing untold miseries on them. It is because of the religious feuds between Hindus and Moslems that many of us are homeless now. Religion has no doubt brought many people together, but it has set too many more far apart. I have freely admitted the services which religion at one time rendered to mankind, when philosophy and science, morality and art, music and painting, were all taught and practised in close association with religion. In fact religion gave inspiration to them all. But in course of the evolution of human culture, nearly all higher activities of the mind, science and philosophy, art and morality,

have separated themselves from religion and are growing independently. Thus religion has now lost much of its cultural content, and I have sometimes felt that it would be a merciful riddance for mankind, if religion, the root cause of so much hatred and strife, was allowed to disappear from the world.

One can easily make out for oneself how religion necessarily leads to discord and strife. Religion, as it is commonly understood, comes to our view only in some specialised form. We do not find religious man, merely as such, but only as Hindus or Moslems or Christians or something else. On account of religion people are organised into certain groups, each committed to certain dogmas or articles of faith. Some of these at least are mutually exclusive or contradictory, so that all of them cannot be equally true, but some true and others, at least partially, false. Now, a person belonging to a particular faith cannot but think his articles of faith to be the truest and best (otherwise, why should he accept them ?) and supposes all persons professing other faiths, to be, at least partially, in error and on the wrong path. He takes pride in his own religion and has scant regard for other religions, inasmuch as he has been conditioned to look upon them as deviations from the correct path. This attitude, which finds expression in the use of derogatory terms like *Melechchhas*, *Kafirs*, *Heathens* etc. in regard to persons of other faiths, inevitably leads to mutual hatred.

There are certain proselytising religions which enjoin on their followers the duty of spreading their faiths among non-believers and of bringing them round to their own faiths. This task of conversion is never very easy; often it involves some pressure, sometimes even the threat of physical violence or death. But a zealot would not mind such atrocities, because he would think he was thereby saving the soul of his victim.

Most religions require their followers to accept certain propositions as revealed truths, e.g. propositions about God, soul and life after death. We know how difficult it is to establish the truth of even empirical propositions, for which there is some basis in experience. It is therefore

difficult to conceive how a person, with a modicum of critical intelligence, can accept without question propositions about such doubtful and supersensible matters as absolute truths.

Such being my reading of religion, as I find it prevalent in the world, based on dogmatic beliefs, leading to mutual hatred and intolerance and inhibiting critical enquiry, I have found it difficult to be favourably inclined towards it. In fact I have long ceased to identify myself with any particular religious group, because I have not yet found any organised group whose beliefs I could completely share. It is therefore not surprising that I have sometimes said, and have felt no shame to admit, that I have no religion.

But have I really no religion at all ? While all, or nearly all of my fellow human beings, some of whom are, in their intelligence and wisdom, far, far above me, have found it necessary and possible to profess some religion or other, am I so singular, peculiar or perverse, as to have no religion at all ? Have not the wise men of our country confidently declared—'Eating and mating, sleep and fear are common to men and beasts; *dharma* (which may be translated as religion) alone is the distinguishing attribute of men and without it men are no better than beasts.'

आहारनिद्राभयमैशुनच
सामान्यमेतत् पशुभिः नराणाम्
धर्मैहि तेषामधिको विशेषः
धर्मेण होनाः पशुभिः समानाः

So I reflected; and I have found that I, too, have a religion--a religion of my own which may or may not be shared by others. Also I would gladly grant that religion in my sense is an essential attribute of men, and without it we do not realise our human dignity or worth. When I said I had no religion, I merely meant that I could not be identified with any recognised religious group and not that I had no religion at all or religion in any sense.

Now, what do I mean by religion ? Religion, to me, primarily means an apprehension of some spiritual ideal, which touches my feeling and will and which I endeavour constantly to realise in life, in my thought and conduct as well as in the world outside, so far as it is possible and necessary.

There are two or three things to be noted in this connexion. First, there must be an ideal, some high end which one may set before oneself and try to realise in life, considering it most worthy of man to do so. I do not think animals have any ideals. They fulfil no doubt certain ends, but these are all natural ends, which are fulfilled by nature or natural forces, working through or upon the animals. No animals have ever set them up as ideals to be consciously pursued by them.

Secondly, the ideal which forms part of our religious consciousness must be a spiritual ideal. By spiritual I mean, in the present context, what is concerned with our non-bodily self. Primarily we become acquainted with spirit in our subjective self-consciousness. We find ourselves somehow as embodied, as identified with a body which may be short or tall, dark or fair. But inwardly we find ourselves as a thinking, feeling and willing being, as having a sense of true and false, good and bad, beautiful and ugly. This sense, which can never be equated completely with any bodily sensation, discloses some aspects of our spiritual nature. A spiritual ideal would thus be, for a rational being, an ideal of knowledge and wisdom, as well as of moral and aesthetic excellence. If it be the ideal of a man to attain to a height of six or seven feet or to a weight of ten or twelve stones, he cannot be said to have a spiritual ideal. On the other hand, if he aims at being a very kind and selfless person or at attaining an unerring vision of truth, he may well be regarded as having a spiritual ideal.

The third point, which is perhaps implied in the very notion of an ideal, is that one must have respect for the ideal. In fact, my apprehension of the ideal and endeavour to realise it in life would amount to religion only when I have the highest regard for it.

Perhaps it was not necessary to describe the religious ideal as spiritual. If a person has great respect for an ideal, then, whatever it be, his apprehension and pursuit of it in life would amount to his practical religion. Many people run after money, not necessarily for meeting their economic needs, but simply as something good in itself. They may be said to have made money-making their religion. In my view, a man's religion is wholly determined by the kind of ideal he follows in life. And so I should be ready to admit that even money-making or the pursuit of some other unspiritual ideal could be a religion with some people, but that would be such a low kind of religion that it would be hardly proper to call it religion. It is a sad fact that many of us, in spite of our visits to churches, temples and mosques, do not rise, in actual life, far above such low kind of religion. We waste the substance of our life in the pursuit of some unspiritual ideal. So I think we cannot have religion in the proper sense of the word unless our life is inspired by some spiritual ideal, unless we deeply conceive a truly spiritual ideal and earnestly endeavour to realise it in our life.

In my conception of religion all the three elements of our consciousness, thinking, feeling and willing—are involved. We have to conceive the ideal in thought or, at least, have some apprehension of it and feel great respect or reverence for it, and then endeavour earnestly to realise it in life. It is not likely that one has a clear view of the ideal right from the beginning. Probably one starts with a vague apprehension of something very valuable, eminently real or supremely good. There is always the need to make the apprehension deeper and clearer, as also to strengthen and deepen our respect for it. We have to make the ideal more and more dominant and all-pervasive in all our thoughts and activities.

I certainly believe in some spiritual values, such as knowledge or truth, love or kindness, innocent joy or aesthetic enjoyment, as good in themselves, worthy of

being pursued and possessed by a rational being. In conceiving and pursuing this ideal, I realise the dignity of my human being. This is my religion.

Most people, I suppose, take to religion with a view to ensuring their welfare in the next life. I do not think I can hope to derive any *post-mortem* benefit from my religion. Whatever religion I have and am able to practise, has been to me its own reward. I do not wish to derive any earthly or unearthly benefit from it except the satisfaction that I have honestly tried to follow my ideal. But, being weak and human in a bad sense, I do not often get the satisfaction and often fail to live up to my ideal.

Fortunately, I have no worry about the next world, about which I am absolutely in the dark. All my concern is with my present life and it will be enough if I can honestly try to live it worthily. Very possibly when one dies, one dies completely and does not merely remain half dead for a time to rise again into some other form of existence. At least, I hope, I shall be content, at death, to die out completely.

By God I understand nothing but the highest ideal conceivable, the substance of all spiritual values. My God is what has revealed itself to me, through the imperfect media of my thought and feeling, as my ideal. This God I cannot deny, and I have no eye for other gods.

Is my God a real God or a mere idea? Of course I have to conceive it in idea. But what I conceive is not again an *idea*, but the *ideal* which I seek to realise in my thought and action. An idea in my mind (or in anybody else's mind), which is already real as idea can never have the characteristic of an *ideal* which demands *realisation* only through our efforts. Nevertheless, the ideal is real in an important sense: it is real as a law of nature or a universal real, over and above the particular instances in which we may find it actualised.

How do we judge the reality of a thing? Its appearance is not always a guarantee of its reality; the appearance may be deceptive. Normally we become

sure of its reality through its action or effectiveness (बोधक्रियाकारित्व). When we perceive a thing, we take it to be real, because it has been effective in causing a sensation in us, which is implied in perception. In so far as I find my ideal to be effective in me, in determining my judgment and conduct, in moving me in certain lines of action, I cannot deny its reality. It is of course not real in the sense in which a chair or a table before me is taken to be real. A chair or a table is nothing but a passing phenomenon, but the ideal, by its very nature, is conceived as an abiding phenomenon, whose manifestation, however, in characteristic phenomena, is not denied.

I have already indicated that I conceive my ideal or God roughly as love, as knowledge and as innocent joy. Wherever I find these, I like to feel the presence of my God there. To find God, I need not retire into mountain caves or climb up to hill-tops, or travel far to well-known holy places or even visit temples, churches or mosques nearby. In every act of genuine selfless love, my God seems to reveal Himself clearly; in every shimmer of truth, recognised as such through the foggy speculations of philosophers, we seem to catch a glimpse of God's glorious beings; in the joyful mirth of innocent happy children as well as in the peace and calm of a meditative saint, the presence of God seems to be writ large for any discerning eye. My God thus is not a loving and knowing God, far less all-loving and all-knowing. He is love or knowledge itself. In the same way he is not joyful, but joy itself. This is no mere rhetorical hyperbole but is meant to be taken as sober truth.

Materialistically inclined as we naturally are, and depending heavily on our senses, the image of a material substance seems to have set for us the very standard of reality. It is clear that such an image will not fit my notion of God,—God Who has been equated by sages with love and truth. Nobody can discover these in any material substance however fine.

How do I exist as spirit? Embodied though I am, the flesh and bone, which compose my body, do not in themselves disclose my spiritual being. I exist as a

spiritual being in thinking, feeling and willing. My spiritual nature or my being as spirit is manifested in my thoughts, feelings and volitions. In the same way God's being may be disclosed in every act of genuine love or knowledge or innocent enjoyment. Just as I need not be equated with a passing thought, even though I realise my spiritual being in my thoughts, so God is not just an act of love, but the principle of love which shows itself unmistakably in every genuine instance of love. I find no absurdity in this view of God.

Although I am sincerely opposed to all current religious faiths, because of their dogmatic and sectarian outlook, I have never refrained from learning from the scriptures of various religions as well as from the founders of different faiths. From the Upanishads I have learnt that God is truth, knowledge and infinite (सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्ते ब्रह्मः), that he is the zest or joy of life (रसो वै सः). I cannot literally say in accordance with the Upanishads that I am God, (अहं ब्रह्मास्मि) because I feel I am really far from my ideal. I can however well understand the Upanishadic saying to mean that I am in intention, though not in fact, one with my ideal. I have taken the Biblical exhortation 'Be ye perfect even as your Father in heaven is perfect' clearly to mean that I should try to shape myself after my ideal. I try to follow, as far as I can, Buddha's teachings of desirelessness (वासनाविलिय) and friendliness to all creatures, (सर्वभूते मैत्री). I do not, however, think that the extinction of desire is possible in our earthly state or that I should have no desires at all. But I would certainly like to make them as mild and as little self-regarding as possible. Even though I cannot share the religious beliefs of many saints, I have nothing but admiration and respect for saints of all religions for their great devotion to other-worldly interests and renunciation of worldly goods.

My trouble is that rightly or wrongly, I was early launched on a philosophical career with perhaps no proper qualification for it. But I took my job rather seriously. Being in this line, it has been my duty to pursue truth with understanding and reason. I had,

therefore, to disabuse my mind of all assumptions and prejudices as far as possible, and to try to see things for myself with the eye of reason. In consequence I could not uncritically accept the mythological and unhistorical beliefs which form part of many religions.

A philosopher, I understand, is a lover of wisdom or truth, who is not already in possession of it, but only seeks it in the spirit of a lover. If the pursuit is to be genuine, one has to admit that one has not yet reached the goal. The philosopher is thus bound to be both agnostic and sceptic. So I am an agnostic, not in the sense that I believe knowledge is impossible, but in the sense that complete knowledge is not in my possession, nor is it likely to be mine in the near future.

Naturally, I am a sceptic too. Unless I have a genuine doubt I cannot enquire earnestly. I am not certainly at the end of my enquiries. Being thus an unbelieving sceptic, I cannot honestly accept any religious creed which makes a heavy demand on our faith. Let any philosopher, truly so called, declare, if he dare, that he has come to the end of his quest, and has fully fathomed the depth of reality. I cannot, and have, therefore, remained an agnostic and sceptic, unable to align myself with any religious group of men who are bound together by a common faith.

But I have not merely moved in the company of philosophers, but have lived in society in close association with men, women and children. I have also listened to poets and prophets, saints and seers. And I think my eyes have been opened to other values than truth, to love and friendship, to beauty and goodness of various kinds. I may be doubtful whether any particular statement about reality is true or false, but I am not doubtful whether truth is desirable. Along with truth, I recognise love and friendship, beauty and joy, kindness and honesty, as valuable in themselves, without recourse to any theory or utilitarian consideration. I am doubtful about so-called facts, but I am not

doubtful about ends. Hence, I can be a practical idealist in spite of my theoretical scepticism.

I am quite conscious that the views I am presenting here will be found very unsatisfactory, not only by the adherents of various current religions, but even by many others who are not particularly attached to any religion. They will, moreover, give rise, in an enquiring mind, to many serious questions, for which I have no ready and satisfactory answers.

Religious people may like to know whether there is any place for prayer and worship in the ordinary sense in my religion, and whether my God is likely to come on appeal to men's help in their troubles and tribulations. Honestly speaking, to such questions, I have to return mostly negative answers (may be, with some qualification). Philosophers may ask how my ideal of love and truth is related to the real world, in which hatred and cruelty, deception and fraud, are so rampant; what are the chief values that enter into the making of my ideal; whether there is a gradation among them and whether they form a unity or are all separate and discrete; etc. etc. I have to confess that I do not yet clearly know the exact answers to most of these questions. I may have some halting answers for them, but I do not wish to increase the bulk of my essay by stating them here.

After all, I am not writing an essay in metaphysics or axiology, in which one may try to solve these difficulties. My object in this essay has been merely to state roughly my views about God and religion and in the process, to clarify some of my ideas as far as I can. It is no shame for me to admit that I am largely an ignorant man, the keys to the mysteries of the universe are not certainly in my hands. I am somehow gropingly finding my way through life. Fortunately, I have been granted, as I believe, some clear light in my sense of certain ultimate values, as I conceive them, which I have described as love, truth or knowledge, beauty and joy, and I try to shape my humble life in view of this light. It will need some further discussion to determine exactly what these values mean for me. But I believe

each of them has a straightforward sense for unsophisticated minds, and that is for the present enough for me. These values describe the ideal for me, and I have ventured to call this ideal, not irreverently, my God; and my entire religion, if I may call it such would consist in my sincere appreciation and honest pursuit of this ideal.

THE CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

A. C. EWING

Philosophy is largely an analysis of concepts, and there are few concepts more important than that of "democracy". It is to-day commonly understood as including two ideas which do not necessarily go together, though they have a considerable affinity, that of individual rights and that of political self-government. They are connected because (1) individual rights are more likely to be respected if all individuals are represented. This will not necessarily happen: a man will hardly oppress himself deliberately, but he may join in being unjust to a minority, and he may even support measures prejudicial to his own rights because he does not value e.g. the right of free speech sufficiently. But it cannot be denied that the possession of a vote is an important safeguard of other rights in that it makes it more probable that they will be respected. (2) If the right of free speech at any rate is not respected, effective self-government is impossible. For if the different sides are not allowed to state their points of view, the elector is in no position to judge between them and in the absence of criticism of the government its actions cannot be democratically controlled. I shall be concerned primarily with the right to political self-government in this article, but I regard the value of this as very largely due to its bearing on other rights, rights of the individual as distinct from purely political rights.

However it may be said that, in so far as democracy means self-government, no real democracy exists or is possible to-day. A pure democracy existed for the adult free male population of certain cities of classical Greece e.g. Athens. All the citizens, that is, had the right to attend the public assembly which decided all questions of policy, including many which even Parlia-

ment would leave to the Cabinet to-day such as how many troops should be sent to a given theatre of war. But the mere size of modern states tenders such a democracy impracticable to-day. "Democracy" to-day means not governing oneself but rather appointing the people to govern one, though it must be remembered that this involves indirectly deciding the main lines on which we shall be governed and preventing very unpopular measures by the threat of defeat in the next elections for the government.

The strongest objection to democracy is that it means government by the unskilled. It was pointed out by Plato already that it would be ridiculous to determine the treatment for a disease by a popular vote and contended that a state is an even more complex organism than a man's body, so that it is even more absurd to try to decide by popular vote what is best for it. This argument was used by Plato against the Athenian democracy, and I think indeed it is a fatal argument against full democracy. But it does not follow that it is a fatal argument against what we regard as democracy in modern times. For this consists not in governing ourselves so much as in electing supposedly skilled people (members of Parliament etc. and indirectly a cabinet) to govern us with the help of other more specialised experts (civil servants). I do not think indeed that popular election is the best way of settling what individuals are the best qualified by character and skill to govern, and in fact this is done less by the individual electors than by the party. But what the voter really votes and I think should vote on is the general spirit in which he wishes the government to be conducted. Is a man so impressed by existing economic evils and social inequalities that he wants drastic changes, though not to the point of wishing for an actual revolution? Then he will probably vote socialist rather than conservative or communist. Is he pessimistic about doing much to improve the lot of people by state action? Does he value above all order and stability, and fear that, if we tamper much or rapidly with existing institutions, something very precious which

is contained in the continuity of the life of the people and the traditions of their ancestors will be lost ? Then he will vote for the more conservative party. It is not the function of the voters to decide detailed means, but the kind of general ends of policy they prefer.

It might be said, however, that my reply only shows that the evil—government by the unskilled—is present in a lesser degree than might be supposed,—but not that it is not an evil. Granted that the evil is not as prominent as it was in ancient Athens, is it not still an evil, and so had it not better be eliminated altogether or at least reduced to the minimum which it must assume even under an autocratic state, since even there the government cannot go completely against the wishes of its subjects ?

Various objections may be made in reply. First, there is the difficulty of selecting the experts. If they are elected or appointed by an elected president, there is still the democracy element; if appointed by a hereditary monarch, there is no guarantee that he will himself always be an expert at appointments; if they are to be appointed by other experts, who is to select these experts ? The fascist and nazi governments were not good at selecting experts. Also the ordinary voter, though not himself an expert, may to some extent judge the government by results. In order to judge whether a cook is good it is not necessary to be an expert in cookery, it is sufficient to taste her dinners. The analogy does not altogether hold because except under conditions of acute food shortage it is known that it is possible to cook good dinners, whereas it is always possible for a government to defend itself by saying that, although things have gone badly, they would have gone still worse if any alternative policy had been adopted; e.g., no policy that the government of Britain could have pursued in the late thirties would have had really satisfactory results once Hitler had rearmed Germany, for none would have prevented a war without surrender. But there is certainly some force in the argument. I do not think it would take much expertise to recognise the badness of most governments which

have really been very bad, e.g. the German people at the time favoured the Nazis not because of their own lack of expertness but because they let themselves be swept away by their desires and prejudices. Again there is the argument that irresponsible power corrupts. This does not apply to the electorate because their power is divided between millions of individuals. The danger is rather the opposite one that the elector will feel so impotent that he will not think it worthwhile voting or trying to vote intelligently if he does vote.

But there is a more fundamental point of principle. The analogy between doctors or other people commonly called experts and statesmen breaks down because these are experts as to means. We do not consult the doctor as to ends in themselves, as to whether it is really desirable to be healthy, or the plumber as to whether it would not be better to have burst pipes. We consult them as to the *means* for removing the evils of illness and burst pipes. But political decisions concern not only means but questions of ends, at least questions as to which of two conflicting ends, both good, is to be preferred to the other. Now, the people usually referred to as experts have no special expertness in regard to *ends*. If any class of people are to be regarded as experts in ends, they would have to be either moral philosophers (cf. Plato's philosopher-king) or saints, but nobody seriously considers government by either of these to-day. I certainly do not wish to put in a claim on behalf of the philosophers. However, the most fundamental objection to trusting to experts' decisions as to ends and not only as to means is that, if you choose for a person the ends he shall pursue, you are degrading him below the level of free personality. To have our means determined by experts increases our liberty, but to have our ends determined by experts is slavery. A slave may be happy, and his master may consider his interests and order him to pursue good ends, but he will still be a slave for all that. Yet, if we once admit the argument that our ends ought to be settled by the judgement of experts, there is no point at which

we can draw the line short of slavery. These considerations support both the view that the government should, as far as possible, see to the distribution of means rather than to the compulsory pursuit of ends, except in so far as this is necessary to prevent direct interference with the ends of others, and the view that, in so far as the question of ends has to be decided, it should be decided by reference to the views of all citizens. They are thus arguments both for individual rights and for democratic control of government.

The question of nationalism presents a good example of the difficulty of deciding ends for other people. There is no reason that experts can see why one set of people ought to have or in fact do have the natural feelings that make a common nationality and others not, or why these feelings should be felt so strongly as to make it a very important matter that they should be satisfied. Yet how much of modern history testifies to the importance of respecting these feelings?

The difficulties of politics arise largely through the curious intermixture required of expert factual knowledge and value judgements. Difficult questions about individual, as opposed to political, action usually fall into one of 2 classes. (1) It may be the case that the end which ought to be pursued can be taken for granted without serious discussions, but that knowledge of means requires real experts e.g. a doctor. (2) The question calls for little or no scientific knowledge but has difficulties because of a clash of values or obligations. Even in such cases we must have some knowledge of the effects, but this may be merely commonsense knowledge which everybody has. But with political controversies, owing to the greater range of the effects of any political measure, the separation of the two questions is generally harder and this is responsible for some of the chief difficulties of politics. It is beyond the powers of the individual to make a really adequate judgement in most cases without the help of the expert, and yet it is, because of the intermixture of questions of value and of fact, dangerous to leave most political questions wholly to experts. Representative government

can go far towards the solution of the difficulty, because it combines the popular vote with the use of the services of people who are at least likely to be, relatively speaking experts in government, and in their turn will be influenced by the advice of scientific experts.

But when you have voted and selected your members of Parliament, there remains this further difficulty. Not only are questions of value and questions of fact likely to be mixed, but there is apt to be a clash between different values; it is not only that expert factual opinions and valuations are both needed, but also that there is likely to be a clash between experts in different spheres and a need for a balancing against each other of the values belonging to either. Such clashes arise wherever it is a question whether more or less money should be spent on one end or on another, and all such disputes cannot be referred to the electorate. For government we need experts because the effects of the large-scale actions of politics are so complicated; but also just because the problems are so complicated they are likely to affect a number of different departments of life and can rarely be left to any single class of experts; while, if experts in different subjects are employed, there must be somebody to correlate the advice of the different experts and in a clash to decide which interest is the more important. For this reason I do not think that the small body of statesmen who make the final decision, the Cabinet, should consist of specialised scientific experts, though this is not to say they should not be experts in the sense of being specially qualified by innate abilities, training and experience to handle political questions. *Scientific* experts should be advisers rather than rulers.

The other major argument against parliamentary democracy in use is that of the communists. They profess to be democratic at least in the sense of giving the people what they really want, whether they know it or not, but they object to the western parliamentary forms. They say that in "capitalist" lands the rule of the people is a sham, not a reality, and that the real rulers are always the capitalists. They contend that the

economic changes which are a prime necessity and will contribute more than anything else to the welfare of the people cannot be achieved democratically. I cannot here discuss in detail the extent of capitalist influence on policy. That it is considerable is pretty clear, that it is so powerful as to destroy popular control of policy altogether is unproved and unprovable. There are a vast number of changes of policy from the Reformation to modern nationalist movements which cannot possibly be explained adequately in this way. No doubt economic factors had some effects, but the course which events took depended on a vast number of common men who determine or in a free country would determine election results much preferring other things, in the first case, religious liberty, in the second, nationalism to economic gain, and this cannot be explained entirely as a result of capitalist propaganda. Still less is there any intrinsic reason why governments and parliaments should necessarily be swayed by the influence of capitalists whose machinations they can, after all, restrain by law if required. If the bulk of the electorate were convinced of the superiority of communism they would soon see to it that a government came into power which didn't allow itself to be bribed or sabotaged by capitalists in their attempts to set up communism. It could make attempts at the latter impossible except by general defiance of the law, which could then be quite constitutionally and legally treated as rebellion. It is because most people have not made up their minds that they wanted them, not because capitalists have prevented them, that more drastic socialist changes in the economic system have not been carried out in most countries with parliamentary government, and very important changes in very many countries have taken place for the better in the condition of the working-class in spite of the capitalists. If the acquiescence in the existing economic system is attributed to capitalist propaganda, the answer an opponent of it should find is counter-propaganda. It is one of the great advantages of allowing the right of free speech that it removes the need for violent revolution. Capitalist

influence has no doubt often done harm, but I am trying to maintain only that democracy is a good thing, not that existing states are adequately democratic, and it is certain that, however far capitalist influence goes, it is very far from totally eliminating the democratic element in government.

It is urged that a fundamental economic change cannot be made under parliamentary forms. I should reply that it has been in my own country. The very rich have been made to pay up to 90% of their income in taxation, a number of industries have been nationalized by Parliament, and why could not they all be if thought desirable? Certainly anybody who realises the horrible evils of civil war, even if he thinks of socialism as a very good thing, should surely feel it his duty to take gentler legal methods first. If there are difficulties and dangers involved in the extension of socialism by parliamentary means, there are not lacking also difficulties and dangers in the alternative, setting up a dictatorial government by civil war. No side can hope to win a civil war under modern conditions unless it has strong support from the armed forces. Now the proportion of the latter who are in favour of socialism to the extent of being ready to violate their military duties for its sake is always likely to be much smaller than the proportion of the general population who would be willing to vote for it in an election. You require more enthusiasm to fight than to vote for something, and the professional soldier is likely to be more conservative or at least more loyal to the government in face of a left-wing threat than is the general population. So a situation in which revolutionaries could hope to have half the armed forces on their side is very unlikely unless it were also a situation in which they could command a majority in the electorate as a whole, and in that case why should not socialism be established by parliamentary methods? So we ought not to take the line of violent revolutionaries, even if we should come to the conclusion that a socialist economic system is very desirable. I am not discussing whether it is or is not desirable.

I have dealt so far with the objections to democracy, meaning by this "democracy" in the modern sense and not democracy as practised in ancient Greece, but what are the positive arguments for it? Perhaps it must be admitted that the strongest is that its alternatives are all less satisfactory. History, especially recent, can easily instruct us on this point. Of more positive arguments three may be mentioned which have all very considerable force, though they may be carried too far. (1) The need for consent. It is insulting to a man to say that he should have no share at all in deciding how his life is to be controlled in so far as it is controlled by law. The argument is seen at its strongest when we reflect that a government may at any time ask its subjects to risk their lives and undergo the horrors of war and that even in peace its economic policy, if ill-judged, may destroy the livelihood and happiness of millions. Surely it is a denial of human rights to ask men to face these perils without giving them the opportunity of expressing agreement or disagreement with the policy on which their whole welfare depends. Again, government by consent increases the scope for government by discussion as opposed to government by force, and men are more apt readily to obey laws on which they have had some say. It would however be hard to maintain that it was self-evident that nobody ought to be governed except by his own consent, or that this principle ought to override all considerations of utility. Indeed, if carried to its extreme, the principle would be incompatible with any government at all. It is implicit in the nature of government that an individual is not free to go against the laws. It may be replied that, though the dissentients object to a particular law, they at least consent implicitly in general to obey the decision of the majority. But suppose a minority who disagree with majority rule on principle or consider that the prevailing electoral system does not represent them fairly. I do not think they therefore necessarily have a right to disobey the laws.

A second argument for democracy is the argument specially associated with Rousseau that, if everyone has

a vote, all points of view and all particular interests will be represented, and consequently the different sectional interests will cancel each other out and the different points of view supplement each other, thus giving a policy which really suits the community as a whole. Even this does not of course eliminate all possibility of misrule. A man will not deliberately oppress himself, but he may, even apart from mistakes as to means, deny himself rights which he ought to have but does not appreciate, e.g. the right of free speech, and a majority may be unfair to a minority, though this is less likely in a democracy because the minority have votes after all. It does remain one of the strongest arguments for some form of democracy or representative government that under such a constitution all points of views (of any influence) and all different interests are represented in some degree. Any other form of government is government of the whole by a class (whether that class has grown up in the natural economic development of the country or has been artificially organized by politicians as with nazi, fascist and communist states); and history gives the most impressive evidence that we cannot trust any class adequately to look after the interests of other classes who have no share in the government. It is not only, or chiefly, that they will deliberately and consciously further their own interests at the expenses of those who have no voice in the matter, but rather that they will unconsciously forget the interests of these other classes or will fail to see where their interests lie through want of experience of their point of view. Recent psychology in its insistence on the unconscious influence exercised by desire on judgment and on action even against reasoned conscious effort thus strongly supports history in pointing to the dangers of class government. As long as the government of countries was under the control of an exclusive aristocracy and the working class neither had votes nor seemed to be within a reasonable distance of having them, there was little talk in government circles of "social reform". If a class cannot express its view, that point of view will be overlooked and attention

engrossed by the claims of those who can express theirs, and on whose support the government depends. And if all classes and all points of view are represented, there is much more chance that as a result of discussion and interplay between them there will be evolved a better policy than any single class could by itself have produced. It may be objected that in effect democracy means government by the majority, but it is not true that the minority in opposition have no share. Government measures are constantly being amended to meet partially the criticism of minorities and so gain more support.

The third line of argument for a democracy is based on its educative value. Mill argued that, even if we suppose an autocracy or oligarchy in which the rulers are ideal men and set it against a democracy composed of ordinary fallible men, as they are to-day, the autocracy or oligarchy will still be the worse form of government. For by preventing the people from exercising their liberty despotism must sap their self-reliance, their energy, their character. No man can develop his character, no man can be really a man unless he has liberty, and if this is taken away from him or never bestowed on him in such important matters as those with which political government deals, the results for his development must be very serious. It is the active, not the passive, type of mind which can alone improve conditions and make the best of life, he argues and the type can be fostered only by freedom. A people may misgovern themselves, but it is better that they should do this than that they should be well governed by somebody else. For just as a child would never learn to walk if it were never allowed to try for fear it should fall, so a people can learn to govern themselves only if given a chance of trying, a chance which they are sure to abuse at first in some respects. "It is not the executions and orgies of a Nero", Mill says, "it is not the excesses of the tyrant of old-fashioned history books and childrens' stories that constitute the main argument against despotism. When these do occur, they only

affect a few individuals.¹ It is the subtle but inevitable sapping effect on the virility of spirit, intellect and moral energy of those ruled by it that affects the whole people." Mill goes so far as to declare that in a country at all advanced in civilisation—a good despotism, unless strictly temporary, is really worse for the people governed by it than a bad one because it deludes them into thinking that all is well and so passively submitting, while a bad one goads them into revolt. The only good despotism would have to be a despotism which by increasing the political liberty of the citizens governed by it prepared the way for its own extinction as quickly as possible.

Undoubtedly this argument would be conclusive if democracy meant liberty in all spheres of life, but it may only mean liberty in one sphere, politics. The importance of that particular liberty must not indeed be underrated. Apart from its effects in the direction of good or bad government it is certainly true that political activity for the individual himself who engages in it in even a moderately unselfish spirit serves a very valuable purpose by bringing him into touch with wider interests and issues than those of his personal affairs, if only briefly and occasionally. But, while for some men interest in politics may provide almost the only opportunity they take of doing this, almost their only intellectual interest, perhaps their only occupation beyond their daily work which has a value beyond that of mere relaxation, it need not be so. There are other ways in which a man may transcend his private interests, if his education has not been grossly neglected. A non-democratic form of government that encouraged education and liberty in every sphere of life except politics would be better than a democracy that encouraged them only in politics. However we may grant that loss of liberty in the political sphere is apt to infect all other spheres of life and make all other liberties insecure. We may grant that freedom of speech

1. I am afraid this was not true in the case of Hitler. His abominations succeeded Mill's imagination.

and the other civic rights essential for individual development are more likely to be respected in a relatively democratic than in an undemocratic state. We may further grant that a community the members of which habitually think of themselves as under the control of a government over which they have no power and for whose actions they have no responsibility is a community much less likely to display freedom, initiative and intelligence in any sphere of life, even where this is legally permissible and even where civil rights are respected by the government.

The various considerations I have advanced make it likely that a government in which the democratic element is strong will be rendered hereby a more efficient means for furthering the happiness of the community. All interests are more likely to be considered and all important opinions heard, the risk of violence and revolution is less; individual rights are more likely to be respected and individuals will be more likely to feel free and contented. The government may still use the advice of experts as much as any authoritarian government is likely to do, while the mere fact that it will have to justify publicly what it does is a valuable check on misgovernment. Whether we can take deeper ground depends on our ethical and perhaps our religious outlook. Kant laid down the ethical principle that man must always be treated as an end-in-himself and not as a mere means; and certainly this principle cannot be carried out in the political sphere without strong democratic elements in the constitution. It is not treating the individual as an end-in-himself to refuse him the right of a voice in matters which concern the ends he is to be at liberty to pursue. And surely in any community where the members are encouraged and brought up in other matters to be free, self-respecting individuals, they will ultimately turn out to be the sort of people who are not satisfied without political freedom (except in a very temporary crisis). Democracy is the form of government which as far as possible proceeds by argument and not by coercion, and surely that is a very great advantage both as making

for happiness and on moral grounds; and I should think must be the aim of any civilisation that can claim to be inspired by the ideas of any of the world's great religions or is even for that matter only decently reasonable, though it must be admitted that this aim is not capable of anything like complete attainment. Perhaps in the last resort the strongest argument for democracy as we know it is indeed only that it is impossible to find a less unsatisfactory alternative; but modern democracy is still an attempt, if a somewhat inadequate one, to realise a deeper principle that is of supreme importance and the violation of which will like a subtle poison carry with it all sorts of unanticipated evil consequences and strike at the roots of civilization itself, I mean the principle that we should treat the individual as an end-in-himself.

I have so far spoken of democracy in general as if it were something for all countries, but I suppose nobody would hold that every people are at the present day fitted for it, however invidious it may be to decide which are and which are not so fitted. Since I have founded my case on argument based on the likely effects of democratic institutions as opposed to the effects of others, I certainly cannot defend the notion of an absolute right to self-government inherent in everybody irrespective of the degree of badness of the government which might result. But where the argument that they are not fit for democracy is used of a given people I have the following comments to make. (1) If, as not often, the remarks is made by a person of the Right Wing in politics and he is speaking of his own country, he has inflicted on it an insult which does not go well with the patriotism and national pride of which parties of the extreme Right have so often claimed the monopoly. (2) If a nation is not yet ripe for democracy, it is surely incumbent on its rulers to make it ripe as soon as possible by suitable education. (3) There is no ground which will bear inspection for saying that certain races or nations are innately unfitted for democratic institutions—no definite innate mental characteristics can be traced to race, that is a biological

fact—and if the unfitness some nations have shown is not innate but due to circumstances in their history, institutions, education or its lack, we may remark that what circumstances, institutions, education brought about, circumstances, institutions, education may change. We need not despair of making the whole human race within a generation or two as fit for democracy as the most politically advanced nations are now if we really try and do not destroy them first by war. At the same time it would be quite unreasonable to demand that democracy should be realised for all nations in just the British or just the North American way. Other peoples may well evolve ways of realising it which are fundamentally different from either and yet none the less democratic.

ETHICS IN AN AGE OF SCIENCE

WILLIAM K. FRANKENA

The age in which we live is a dome of many-coloured glass, and has been characterized in various and conflicting ways. Among other things, it has been called an age of science. With this description in mind, I propose to give a brief account of ethics in our day to see how it has fared in relation to science. I do not mean, however, to give an account of morals in recent times. That would be a very interesting subject—much more interesting than mine—but it is not one about which I am equipped to write. What I shall write about is not morality but moral philosophy in an age of science. Moreover, since it is in America especially that ethics has come face to face with science, I shall limit my story, to this country except for a few brief references to other parts of the world. Now that the scientific era has begun to come to the East, it may be that thinkers there will find some lessons about lines to follow or to avoid in what has been written by thinkers here.

For the most part, moral philosophy in our period has taken the form of what is called metaethics, rather than that of normative ethics. That is, it has been mainly concerned with question like "X is good" or "Y is wrong", and about the methods by which they may be justified, if any. It has not been so much concerned to propound any normative principles or to specify goals for action, individual or social. This has seemed disturbing to many readers, but it has an explanation. The chief intellectual problem of any age in which the foundations have been shaken, as they have in ours, is bound to be the question whether there are any objective or rational grounds on which we can rest our basic moral principles and value-judgments,

and, if so, what they are. In such an era, this rather theoretical problem must willy-nilly assume a certain priority over the more practical question of what these principles or values are to be.

Now, in other periods this question was expressed by asking whether such principles and judgments rest on *reason* (not limited to science in our sense) or on something else—authority, faith, revelation, sentiment, or tradition. But today, when for many people reason has come to be identified with science (except for the analytic truths of logic and mathematics), the problem centers about the question whether normative ethics can be wholly based on *science* or not. "The deepest problem of modern life," says Dewey, in a famous sentence in *The Quest for Certainty*, is "the problem of restoring integration and cooperation between man's beliefs about the world in which he lives (which Dewey holds must be based on science) and his beliefs about the values and purposes that should direct his conduct."¹

Notice, I said the question is whether ethics can be based *wholly* on science. Anyone may admit that ethics can be partly based on science, even if some seem reluctant to use science in ethics at all (though showing no reluctance to doing so in industry). That is, anyone may admit that, given a basic principle or goal, science can tell us what to do in order to bring about the required state of affairs. In fact, everyone could even insist that we do not make enough use of science in ethics in this sense, and that we ought to make more. But this would still be saying only that we should enlighten the application of our moral principles or the realization of our moral goals as much as possible by science. The question, however, is whether science can somehow establish those very goals or principles. That is, the main question of recent ethical theory has been whether or not normative ethics can be put entirely on a scientific basis—or, if you will, whether normative ethics is a science or a humanity.

1. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty* (New York: Minton Balch and Co., 1929), p. 255.

What sorts of answers to this question have we had in our so-called age of science? It is sometimes alleged that this is an age, not only of science, but of *scientism*. Scientism is the view that science suffices as a basis for action and belief, and hence that the answer to our question is "Yes." It is simply not true, however, that our age is an age of scientism in this sense. This characterization comes from those who believe that such a faith in the "omnicompetence" of science is a mistake and, in particular, that science cannot establish an ethics—for example, Hans Morgenthau and Will Herberg. Those, like John Dewey, who hold that faith, know better; they would not have to fight for its adoption if it were already prevalent. Some recent thinkers have held this "scientistic" position, perhaps more than ever before, but most people today would reject it. Anti-naturalism, anti-empiricism, romanticism, irrationalism, existentialism, tradition, ignorance, and obscurantism are much too strong for it to dominate our age.

Let us now take a look at the relations of ethics and science as these have been conceived of lately.

II

In the world which we say fell apart in World War I and went out of existence in the thirties and forties, ethics was frequently called a science—a "moral science". Any rational discipline was a science then, and ethics was thought of as rational, at least in part (the other part, if any, being "revealed"). "Science" did not mean an empirical discipline, as it does today. In those good old days, philosophy was the queen of the sciences, and the "two cultures" problem, recently advertised by C. P. Snow, did not exist.¹ But gradually since then "science" has come to have its present meaning, and ethics, remaining relatively unchanged, came to be regarded as no longer a science. For a time, it was classified as a social science in some universities for

1. See his *The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1959.

academic purposes such as distribution requirements, but such purposes tend to be unrealistic, and now, by and large, ethics is taken to be a humanity. Some would even say that it is the queen of the humanities.

Thus ethics became "unscientific." At the same time, science was becoming "unethical" or "inhumane." For in becoming more empirical and more mathematical (and, roughly speaking, it did both) it came consciously to insist on its own ethical neutrality or *wertfreiheit*. This development has recently been portrayed and insisted on by E. W. Hall and C. C. Gillispie in their histories of modern science, and by Arnold Brecht in his *Political Theory*.¹ A distinction between the Ought and the Is, between value and fact, became almost commonplace. Even the social sciences claimed to be *wertfrei*. People became so pursuited about science that others began to feel that science was impoverishing the world of its values and repopulating it with devils and monsters, exclaiming with E. B. White.

Oh Christ,
Make us an end of light of this be light
—If darkness comes, let the dark be
Velvet and cool—kind to the eyes
—and to the heart pressed
To the rediscovered earth . . .

Of course, some people came to doubt that any of the sciences are immaculately conceived, or that they rest, in Emily Dickinson's words,

*Safe in their alabaster chambers, untouched by morning and
untouched by noon.*

But even this conclusion did not lead them to think of ethics as a science again. Thus ethics and science pulled apart in our culture. Science went on, partly

1. Everett W. Hall, *Modern Science and Human Values* (Princeton, D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956); Charles C. Gillispie, *The Edge of Objectivity* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959); Arnold Brecht, *Political Theory* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1959).

as a result, to greater and greater successes, and is just now literally finding new worlds to conquer. It also went on to try to bring into its empire the whole proper study of mankind—Man. Anthropology, political science, psychology, and sociology began to try to reap the human field with what Gillispie calls “the edge of objectivity.” And then something interesting happened. When psychology and the social sciences seemed to be getting well-started, some observers began to dream of a scientific ethics again, just as they had decades earlier when biology became a science with Darwin. Yet, this could hardly be surprising. Nothing succeeds like success, as someone once said, and the success of empirical science, actual or promised, was certain to suggest the possibility of resting ethics on science instead of on religion, authority, tradition, emotion, or on nothing at all. Moreover, it was precisely because they thought of science as objective that they wished to use it as a foundation for ethics and value-judgments. And the fact that it had extended its empire to man and society made it seem relevant as well as secure, since ethics is interested in human conduct, not, except indirectly, in that of stars, acids, amoebae, atoms, rats, or cauliflower.

The chief names here are John Dewey and R. B. Perry.¹ Both think of their proposals for making ethics scientific as the culminating phase of the modern empirical movement. Though Perry has been less influential than Dewey, it will be easier to begin with him. One way of carrying out the program of making ethics scientific is to define the basic terms of ethics, “good” “right,” “ought,” etc., by reference to the terms of psychology, sociology, or some other science. By this move, the dread distinction between Ought and Is, Value and Fact, gets broken down, and ethics is

1. See specially Ralph Barton Perry, *Realms of Value* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954), Dewey, *op. cit.*, and ‘Theory of Valuation’ in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, Vol. II No. 4 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1939).

assimilated to the science in question. This is the way Perry tries to do the job, and he tries to do it, not just for ethics, but for all of what he calls "criticism," that is, for all kinds of value-judgments. To do this, he first defines a generic concept of value which will apply in all fields of "criticism," and then proceeds to define more specific value-concepts. Thus he arrives at his "general theory of value."

In the most generic sense, Perry suggests, "having value" means "being an object of interest to someone." Accordingly, "being good" means "being an object of someone's favourable interest." "X is better than Y" means "X is the object of more interest than Y". The moral good is the object of interests harmoniously organized by reflective agreement. Morally right action is action which is required by or at least conducive to the moral good. And so on. Perry does not think that these definitions simply transcribe what we ordinarily mean, though he appeals to actual usage when he can; rather, he thinks of them as proposals about what we should mean. We cannot try to evaluate them now, but it must be noticed that, if these definitions are satisfactory, then all statements like "X is good" and "Y is wrong" will be factual assertions which can be empirically verified, and so ethics and "criticism" will have been put on a scientific basis.

Naturally, everything hangs in such a proposal on the status of the definitions proposed, and Perry's definitions have been criticized, though never as carefully as they deserve. In fact, it has been argued that *no* such definitions as his or other's *can* possibly be satisfactory, or, alternatively, that the definitions themselves necessarily presuppose a moral principle or value-judgment which cannot be verified empirically. Such blanket disposals of all proposals like Perry's seem to me mistaken, but in any case they point us to a different kind of theory, and we must look at Dewey first.

Dewey, more than anyone else, exemplifies the scientism which is said to be characteristic of our age. His "experimentalism" consists in saying that we should

consider all our ethical and value-judgments as hypotheses subject to experimental verification, or at least as judgments about what is to be done which are based on knowledge of a scientific kind and revisable in the light of such knowledge. That is, he believes, not only that science (including social as well as natural science) can solve our problems, but that we should try to solve them on the basis of science alone. For Dewey, this does not mean merely what G. A. Lundberg (who also believes that science can save us) says in the following passage :

My point is that no science tells us what to do with the knowledge that constitutes the science. Science only provides a car and a chauffeur for us. It does not directly, as science, tell us where to drive.—Science is the most efficacious means so far discovered by man, for whatever ends he chooses to pursue.—Can science tell man what direction he should go ? Yes, if man will tell scientists where he wants to go.¹

Dewey goes much farther. He claims that even our most basic ends, norms, principles, or values can and should be generated by experience, warranted by and tested in experience, meaning by "experience" scientifically organized observation : "—it [science] is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuations in all aspects of human and social life."² Absolutely all normative judgments and valuations are to be tested by their consequences, by the consequences in terms of reflective human satisfaction of acting on them.

To make this out, Dewey might offer us definitions, as Perry did. However, he does not do so, at least not in any very clear manner ; he does not seem to think in terms of definitions very much. In fact, his view about the meaning or nature of valuations remains ambiguous to the end. All that he is clearly insisting

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1. George A. Lundberg, *Can Science Save Us ?* (New York : Longmans Green and Co., 1947), pp. 31, 87, 101.
 2. *Theory of Valuation*, p. 66.

on is that we are to take a scientific view of their ground or justification. He may be an ethical naturalist like Perry, or he may be holding a view more like that of C. L. Stevenson, to whom we shall come, but in any case he is an ethical empiricist in his view of the proper basis of moral and other judgments.

For Dewey, unlike Perry and many other empiricists, a thing is not good merely because it is an object of an actual interest. And saying that you ought to do A is not saying "If you want so and so, do A" or "(Since you want such and such), do A." What is good or right is for him not simply a function of existing wants. Saying that something is good or right is more like saying, "You will or would want this if you have or were to have intelligent experience of it" or "You will or would be satisfied with this if you come or were to come to know all about its conditions and consequences." Saying that something is good or right may not mean just what such sentences say, but it can be tested by looking to see if such sentences are true---in short, by scientific investigation.

Since many writers have admitted that statements about means or extrinsic values are empirically verifiable, but insisted that statements about ends or intrinsic values are not, Dewey has constantly attacked the distinction between means and ends, extrinsic and intrinsic values. In this he is partly right and partly wrong. He is right at least in holding that any final or total judgment on any state of affairs we may bring about must rest on an experience of its consequences. But anyone can admit this. The question is by what criterion the value of the consequences is to be judged. Dewey's answer is that the criterion to be used is satisfaction experienced upon reflection, not anything non-empirical. There is still a question, however. Dewey thinks that one ought to do what is conducive to the best consequences, not just for oneself, but for everyone involved. If we accept this principle, we can go on to verify lesser judgments such as "We ought to keep promises" empirically. But what about *it*? How can it be tested in experience? This has been regarded as a fatal

difficulty in Dewey, and certainly his answer to it is not very clear. What he seems to have to say is this: the principle in question can be verified in the same way that any judgment of the form "You ought" can be, namely, by looking to see if on being fully informed about such actions you will be satisfied to have done them. This means that Dewey is assuming a kind of coincidence between individual and general welfare, or at least between what a fully informed person will be satisfied to have done and what is for the welfare of all concerned, and one may regard this as a "touching faith", as Niebuhr does.¹ But whether Dewey is right or wrong in making this assumption, with it he can top the last hurdle in his program for putting ethics on a scientific footing.

III

Such attempts as those of Perry and Dewey were to be expected in an age of science. The surprising thing really is that they have had such hard going. In Britain and on the Continent they have hardly been given a serious hearing. Even in America, where philosophers take science more seriously and where such proposals have been very influential, it must be said, nevertheless, that they are now on the defensive, being rejected by most younger philosophers, by many scientists, and, I suppose, by all theologians.

For the scientists, the rejection of such "scientistic" proposals, when it does not rest on religious conviction, seems to be based on an uncritical combination of two dogmas, that of the neutrality and objectivity of science and that of the subjectivity and irrationality of value-judgments. For the philosophers, the story is somewhat complicated, since they belong to more than one school. Before the last war, especially in Britain and Germany, there were the intuitionists, for example, G. E. Moore, W. D. Ross, and Nicolai Hartmann; they held that

1. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), Vol. I, pp. 110-111.

ethical terms like "right" and "good" stand for indefinable non-natural properties known by some kind of "non-perceptual intuition", which also provides us with self-evident truths about what kinds of things and actions have these properties. This point of view, however, has not been strong in this country in our century, and has been largely given up abroad also, partly because of the impact of science and empiricism, partly because of existentialism and Neo-Protestantism. Since the war, it has been important mainly as the source of certain arguments against ethical naturalisms like that of Perry.

Most interesting in the present connection are the empiricists, positivists, and analytical philosophers. Many of them are oriented to mathematics and science, and Dewey and Perry might well have looked to them for allies, yet most of them have rejected the view that ethics can be assimilated to the sciences. In this they have been moved by a number of considerations. One is the discovery that language has other uses besides that of asserting facts, describing, or communicating information. This, together with Moore's famous arguments against naturalistic or scientistic attempts to define terms like "good" and "right", suggested that ethical language is characteristically employed for certain of these other uses. Another consideration is a belief that such a view of ethical language fits in best with all the facts of moral discourse and experience. A third is the empiricist doctrine that all knowledge is either empirical or analytic, so that there is no third kind of knowledge for ethical judgments to belong to. The final consideration is the Humean argument that ethical judgments cannot be pieces of knowledge, since they are "practical" and capable in themselves of moving us to action, which would not be true if they were purely cognitive.

The result has been a variety of non-cognitive theories, all agreeing that ethical judgments are not assertions, empirical or non-empirical, and that ethics is not a body of knowledge, scientific or non-scientific. According to one, ethical judgments are expressions of emotion,

according to another, they are commands or imperatives, according to a third, they are or are based on "postulates" or "commitments" arbitrarily adopted by the individual. In America, the best known and most fully worked out of these positions is that of C. L. Stevenson in *Ethics and Language*.¹ Stevenson holds that ethical judgments are primarily emotive in meaning, not scientific; they are essentially expressions of the speaker's attitudes and attempts to persuade others to share them. An ethical disagreement is basically a disagreement in attitude, and is resolved when the two parties come to share the same attitude. The typical way of bringing this about is by the giving of reasons, reasons based on empirical knowledge of actions, objects, and their consequences in terms of human interests. This is the place of science in ethics. But there are other ways of bringing about agreement besides that of giving reasons, and, in any case, the use of reasons, and hence of science, has a crucial limitation. It is possible only in so far as our attitudes are rooted in belief and therefore amenable to revision by further knowledge. It may be, however, that our basic attitudes are not wholly rational in this way, and, insofar as this is the case, ethics cannot be made scientific.

Attempts to work out more adequate views of the same general kind have been made at Oxford by S. E. Toulmin, R. M. Hare, P. H. Nowell-Smith, and H. L. A. Hart, and in this country by H. D. Aiken, A. I. Melden, and others. These people deny that ethical judgments are mere expressions of emotion or attitude, or even commands, and they insist that such judgments have all the rationality that is appropriate to them; but they agree that ethics is not and cannot be a science. As Aiken puts it,

Morality could not become a science without a radical re-constitution of the very uses of such terms as 'good' and

1. Charles L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944.)

'ought'; but such a reconstitution would no longer enable us to say (or do) 'the ethical thing'.¹

For we could then no longer use "good" and "ought" to make normative judgments. This movement is the liveliest and most interesting thing in moral philosophy today, but it is impossible to summarize it in a few sentences, and we must move on.

Skipping the Neo-Thomists, whose position is so old that we may assume it to be familiar, we come at last to the Protestant theologians. It is unfortunate that we must be brief, for, as always, they and their followers are doing much of our ethical thinking, partly, no doubt, because philosophers have been neglecting normative ethics. In this country, the work of Reinhold Niebuhr has been particularly important.² At the cost of seeming to be superficial and unfair, I must say that the views of our theologians about the status of basic ethical ideals and norms such as love and justice are not very clear. It is clear, however, that they would deny that these ideals and norms can be established by science of an empirical kind. Certainly this is true insofar as they appeal to "revelation" as a basis for ethics, as all of them do for at least part of it. But some of them believe that there is a "natural law" or "natural morality" which is discoverable by reason apart from revelation, or at least has some "natural" basis, and such thinkers could consistently allow that this part of ethics rests or should rest on science. Thomism, it seems to me, comes close to allowing this. Niebuhr's own views about the existence of such a natural morality seem ambivalent, but it looks as if he would deny that it can be based on science, even if it exists. In any case,

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- 1 Henry D. Aiken, "Moral Philosophy and Education," *Harvard Educational Review*, XXV (1955), 52
 - 2 Here, besides the work referred to above, see *Moral Man and Immoral Society* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1932), *An Interpretation of Christian Ethics* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1935).

religious spokesmen are generally arguing that our Western democratic, political and social ideals cannot be justified on a purely secular or scientific basis—that, apart from their religious roots, “freedom, brotherhood, justice and personal dignity” are like “cut flowers”, which soon must wither and die.

It has been characteristic of Protestant theologians, especially Niebuhr, to raise a somewhat different question about the Dewey-Perry program—a question which philosophers have not discussed very much. They believe that any program for putting ethics on a scientific basis must assume a naively optimistic view about the goodness of man; it must assume, they think, that empirical knowledge is the one thing needful to keep man on the strait and narrow path of morality. This assumption, they go on to claim, is not true; in fact, it has been refuted by our experience of the twentieth century and by depth psychology as well. Man has something “demonic” in his nature; he sins “inevitably” (though not “necessarily”) that is, he inevitably displays pride and sensuality, either asserting himself in egoism or losing himself in pleasure. Even his best actions are infected by this tendency, according to Niebuhr; others go still farther and hold that man can do no good whatsoever without divine aid and grace.

The claim is, then, that a “realistic” (not to say Scriptural) look at human nature shows that a purely scientific ethics cannot get off the ground. Knowledge by itself is impotent to combat the demonic in man; even when it is supported by his good tendencies, if indeed he has any such, it does not suffice. To quote Niebuhr, “The world of history, particularly in man’s collective behaviour, will never be conquered by reason, unless reason uses tools; and is itself driven by forces which are not rational.”¹ Rational resources must be supplemented by religious ones, he insists, but even these have their limitations: “. . . the limitations of the human imagination, the easy subservience of reason to prejudice and passion, and the consequent persistence

1. *Moral Man and Immoral Society*, pp. xxi, xx.

of irrational egoism, particularly in group behaviour, make social conflict an inevitability in human history, probably to its very end." With such sour words, and, of course, with little if any scientific use of empirical evidence to back them up, Niebuhr dismisses Dewey's "naturalistic rationalism" as both ineffective and "incredibly naive." Possibly he would dispose of the views of Aiken and Stevenson on somewhat similar grounds, but he agrees with them at least in thinking that ethics cannot be made a science.

IV

To conclude--we began by seeing how ethics and science pulled apart, ethics becoming "unscientific" and science becoming "unethical." Next we saw how some philosophers tried to bring them together by making ethics scientific. And finally we found that more recently ethics and science have been pulling apart again, both philosophers and theologians, as well as scientists themselves, arguing that ethics cannot be a science or put on a purely scientific basis, though they argue this on different grounds. This picture is oversimplified, of course, and we cannot try to decide here who is right, but it is clear at any rate that the problem of the relation of science to our value-judgments and ethical beliefs has been a crucial one, and has not yet been settled. In broad cultural terms, it is this. On the one hand, we have religion, art, play, etc., together with their more scholarly appendages, the humanities. On the other, we have the "inhumanities," science and technology. Roughly in between is the domain of action, of ethics and politics. The question is whether the basic guidelines for this domain are to come from one side or the other, or possibly from both.

This is a question on which we shall always have debate and be divided as long as we have freedom of thought and expression, as I hope we always shall. One of us will propose one solution and one, another. I might

propose one now, but I could hardly expect it to prevail. Thus we come to another question. Is there some *modus vivendi* for ethics and science that we can all agree on as our "public" position, much as Catholics, Protestants, and Jews can agree on a working relation of church and state while keeping their own different views of life and the world? Each of us must have some ideal view of their relation, and it is not likely that we will all have the same view; but it is of the utmost importance, if it is possible, for the West, and indeed the whole world, to find a way of accommodating ethics and science to one another. If we do, we may achieve a new golden age; if we do not, we may be ruined.

I believe there is such a *modus vivendi* which we can all accept if we think clearly and with goodwill. To work out the details one would have to go through all the relevant discussions of the past fifty years or more, sorting out the positions taken and the arguments used, to see just what can be maintained and what cannot. Here I can end only by stating six points, without explanation or defence.

(1) We can all agree that the actions of scientists and technologists are subject to moral judgment, i.e., their decision whether to be scientists or not, their choice of topics to work on, and the actions done by them in the pursuit of knowledge. In this sense we may agree that science must be ethical.

(2) We can all agree that all actions and policies in which scientific knowledge is applied or used are subject to moral scrutiny and should be compatible with ethical requirements. In this sense, too, we may agree, science must be ethical.

(3) We can all agree that there are other values besides the cognitive values of science, other values besides those experienced by the scientist as such, that there may even be values whose incidence does not depend on scientific knowledge but some other dimension of human nature, and that such values are or may be important for the guidance of life. In Matthew Arnold's terms, we might even say that science is less than one-

fourth of life. In the sense of recognizing this, ethics must be "unscientific" or, rather, more than scientific.

(4) We can all agree that, while scientific conclusions are sometimes affected by value-judgments and attitudes other than the desire for knowledge, they ought not to be—that is, no value judgment may appear among the premises, explicit or hidden, which serve as the basis for scientific conclusions. In this sense, we may insist, science must be "unethical" or neutral.

(5) Even if we do not go so far as Dewey and Perry, we can all agree that our value and ethical judgments should, wherever possible, be based more and more fully on scientific knowledge. Whatever view we hold, we must admit that science remains, in a philosophically and religiously pluralistic society, such as America or India, the only publicly available basis for action, and must be relied on, especially in matters of public policy. In this sense at least, ethics must be scientific.

(6) We can all agree, finally, that scientific knowledge may not be enough to make men virtuous. Even Bertrand Russell, who is no Niebuhr since he has almost as much faith in science as Dewey, believes that love is necessary as well as knowledge. The good life, he says, is a life inspired by love and guided by scientific knowledge. In this sense, again, ethics may be more than scientific.

I have always wanted an occasion to use a quotation from Longfellow's *Hiawatha* which I was forced to memorize a long time ago. Telling about Hiawatha's marriage to Minnehaha, Longfellow says,

*As unto the bow the cord is,
So unto the man is woman.
Though she bends him she obeys him,
Though she leads him, yet she follows.*

This sounds somewhat idyllic now, and it may not be an accurate description of twentieth-century marriages, but perhaps it will do as an account of the working relations of ethics and science.

CREATIVITY AND VALUE

A. C. GARNETT

Indian philosophy in general has been deeply concerned with the task of understanding the human spirit and its values. As this is also for me, as well as for my friend Professor Datta, the major theme of philosophical interest, it is to these problems that I choose to direct attention in this paper for the volume to be produced in his honor.

The thesis of this paper is the identity, at the level of consciousness, of creativity and value—that conscious creative process, and conscious creative process alone, is intrinsically good. The defence of this thesis will require a preliminary clarification of the terms involved. I shall use the term “value” (as a noun) for “that which is intrinsically good,” and the plural “values” for “particular entities or processes which are intrinsically good.” by “*intrinsically* good,” as distinct from “good of its kind” or “instrumentally good,” I mean that the entity or process is judged good by reason of its nature as immediate content of experience rather than by reason of its possession of a certain form or its having certain desirable consequences. It is only the immediate contents of experience that can be judged good in this sense.

The term “good” I understand as expressing a favorable attitude, an attitude of approval or a *pro* attitude, but as also doing something more. It claims that there are good reasons for this attitude, that it is not based on mistaken judgments, that the attitude is such that further knowledge relevant to it would confirm it, that the attitude is in this sense “reasonable.” When used with specific reference to the self it may mean merely “good for me,” but without such specific reference to the speaker it *commends* the object to the hearer by implying that it has such properties as justify a favorable

attitude on his part also; it claims that intelligent understanding of the object and of other facts relevant to the formation of attitudes have a general tendency to induce a favorable attitude toward it. Nothing less than this, it should be noted, is involved in the statement of the *Oxford English Dictionary* that "good" is "the most general adjective of commendation, implying the existence of a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are either admirable in themselves, or useful for some purpose." The use of "good" must therefore be understood as making a very significant assertion, not merely as emotionally expressive or directive. Sidgwick was essentially right in interpreting "good" as meaning "reasonably desired." More strictly, "X is good" means "X is an object toward which intelligent understanding tends to develop a favorable attitude."¹

This brings us to the term "creativity." By this term I refer to that type of movement or change which is manifest only in living things but is characteristic of them. At the conscious level it is interest process, but it is manifest in all the processes of life, some of which are far below the level of consciousness. In consciousness it has developed a reflective capacity whereby it is aware of its own immediate past in the so-called "specious present," and by association, this awareness gives explicit content, to its forward look, or anticipation. It may be that in all creative process there is differentiation of feeling and conative response, together with a minimum of anticipation of change. If so, it is merely the development of primary memory (awareness of the immediate past, as past) that marks the emergence of consciousness; and it is the development of the capacity for explicit recall of the distant past that provides the basis for its higher development. But, however this may be, the distinctive characteristics of creativity are manifest below the level of consciousness, and interest process is creative process utilizing some more or

1. A. C. Garnett, *The Moral Nature of Man* (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), p. 120.

less explicit awareness of the past to inform and direct its conative attitude to the future.

This identification of interest process with conscious creative process, and of the latter with value, implies the conclusion that all interest process is intrinsically good, that values are to be identified with interest fulfilments. At first thought, this proposition seems to be contradicted by many exceptions to the rule, but these are only apparent. Creative process, conscious and unconscious, is that process in nature in which we find the law of entropy temporarily and locally reversed. It is the characteristic feature of living organisms and of the evolutionary process, in which life constantly develops new forms, manifesting new capacities, and exercising a wider range of activities, and these organize themselves, with increasing efficiency, in new and more complex forms of order. The distinctive features of creative process are its preference for variety with harmony and increasing order and efficiency.

It is true, of course, that not all evolutionary developments and not all the activities of living organisms are of this character in all their consequences. Some developments lead eventually to the elimination of the species or the stultification of its further development. And living organisms feed on each other, are sometimes parasitical, and often destroy organisms of higher development than themselves. Nevertheless, the distinctive features of creativity are characteristic of the life process in general; and every process of life, even the growth of a cancer cell, is, in itself, apart from its further consequences, creative. Such a growth will be a process that is "good of its kind" if it is a process of healthy growth of that particular cell, but it will not be an instrumental good on account of its effect on the host organism; neither can it be an intrinsic good, even to the cancer cell itself, unless, as is almost certainly not the case, the cancer cell is possessed of consciousness, for only that can be judged intrinsically good which, as immediately experienced, can be reasonably favored.¹

1. For further exposition of these distinctions see the present writer's

What, then, of conscious creative process, and of interest process in general? These are certainly not always instrumentally good or good of their kind, but can we maintain that they are always intrinsically good i.e., that, considered for what they are in themselves, apart from their antecedents and consequences, they are objects toward which intelligent understanding tends to develop a favorable attitude?

Consider, first, the identification of interest and value. This thesis is a familiar one in twentieth-century writing on the theory of value. Its classical treatment is in R. B. Perry's *General Theory of Value*. His statement of the thesis "Value is any object of any interest" was unfortunate, for it suggested that what is of intrinsic value is the external object and, since this may be an object of positive and negative interest at the same time, such an object had to be recognized as both intrinsically valuable and the reverse at the same time. This is confusing.

A better formulation of the thesis was proposed by DeWitt Parker: "A value is any interest in any object"¹ More briefly, values are processes of interest fulfilment. This is obvious so far as the individual's own interest processes are concerned. When he intelligently reflects upon them, they each and all of them tend to develop in him a favorable attitude toward their fulfilment. His question is not whether they have value but what is their relative value? In answering this he has to consider his interests as a whole, including those of his whole future life, and he has to weigh the significance of ethical values against others. In the light of such reflection some interests fade and others come into prominence. The fulfilment of some interests is seen as the violation of others that are more important, and the act that would fulfil the former is therefore judged

Ethics: A Critical Introduction (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1952), pp. 350-355.

1. "On the Notion of Value," in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, 1929.

bad rather than good. But it still remains the case that it is interest fulfilment and interest fulfilment alone that is judged intrinsically good and the frustration of interest that is judged intrinsically bad.

What of the interest fulfilments of other persons and of animals? Are they also intrinsically good, i.e., are they objects toward which, considered for what they are in themselves, apart from their antecedents and consequences, intelligent understanding tends to develop a favorable attitude? The answer is in the affirmative. An intelligent human being cannot, without some reason, adopt a different attitude toward another case of the same thing. Since he has a favorable attitude toward an interest fulfilment in his own experience, it must follow that when he believes a case of the same thing, interest fulfilment, has occurred or may occur in the experience of another his attitude will also be favorable to that unless he believes there is reason to the contrary, or unless he is moved to make the frustration of the other person's interest fulfilment a means to the fulfilment of some other interest of his own. This general positive interest in the life and growth, the progression of interest fulfilments, of other persons is manifest in the common and normal forms of human behavior. Human beings respond naturally and habitually to each other's needs. They admire manifestations of health, strength, success, and physical and intellectual prowess in others, and are pleased to develop them in themselves. These are the normal forms of human behavior. Any departure from them is due to some specific reasons; and these reasons are always to be found in a belief that the destruction or frustration of certain interests of others is instrumental to the fulfilment of some other interests held to be more important. The destructiveness of human beings in many of their relations with each other, therefore, is not in conflict with the contention that, by a common consensus of human judgment, interest fulfilments, as such, are recognized as intrinsically good.

The justification of our thesis, therefore, requires us only to show, further, that interest processes are primarily creative. Here the emphasis is on the word *primarily*, and we may add that interests are not only primarily creative but primarily objective. This point should be stressed first. It is obvious, though often forgotten, that our earliest interests cannot be in states of the self, as such, because the idea of the self, the distinction between self and not self, is only gradually formed. If it be argued that, nevertheless, the interest is primarily in sensations and feeling states which are actually states of the self, the reply must be made that, while it is true that we give our attention directly to these, we attend to them as in some way revealing and determined by something else. The cognitive process reaches beyond the immediate present datum to what it means. Our interest is in what the data reveal beyond themselves. The mere *having* of sensations, or simple awareness of distinctions of quality, is an abstraction of philosophical thinking. As it occurs it is always part of a cognitive process in which the datum is grasped as signifying something. Cognition, except in introspective reflection, is always of *objects* over against the cognizing subject. The subject finds itself in a world of objects, and its interest processes are concerned to learn more about these objects and to control them.

Among the objects are the parts of the subject's own body, and the child's earliest interests are certainly largely concerned with learning about these and learning to control them. Other persons may describe this as the child showing interest in himself, but to the child who has not yet learned the distinction of self and not-self his fingers and toes and other parts of his body are just familiar objects over which he has a large measure of control. As he acquires more complete control of them, he uses them to control other objects, and his predominant interest passes at times to objects beyond his body. He begins to "take notice" of things and of other persons. Gradually he learns to distinguish between self and not-self, between the embodied self as "me" and

other things and other selves. At this level, interest fluctuates between "myself" and "things" and "other people." The extent and form of interest in other people and things are determined largely by the relations he finds between them and his interest in himself, but normally his attention is, nevertheless, held predominantly, and to an increasing extent, by objects within the not-self rather than by those he recognizes as parts or phases of himself.

Finally, it remains to point out that this interest in objects, whether part of the self or of the not-self, is predominantly creative rather than destructive in intention. This will readily be conceded with regard to interests in the self, and almost as readily with regard to interests in things. Man is a creator. He is necessarily active. To have nothing to do is a condition hard to bear. And his activity seeks to increase, not diminish, the variety, order, harmony, and efficiency of the things of his environment. He finds no satisfaction in destruction except as a means to some further creation. His interest in living things is to breed or grow finer and more perfect specimens, or by training to develop some special feature or capacity of them, or to adapt or develop them to some use of his own. When he destroys, it is in order that he may remove obstacles or dangers to the development or maintenance of something else in which he is more interested, or to use what he destroys as materials or means to these further purposes. But his further purposes are always ultimately creative, even though he may, thoughtlessly or unintentionally or angrily, destroy things more important than he creates.

These cases in which his activities are, in effect, more destructive than creative, even though the ultimate intention is in some way creative, are, for the most part, those in which the creative intention is turned inward upon the self. The motive is self-promotion or self-preservation, pride or fear. At other times, usually, it is the motives of concern for, or pride in, some parti-

cular group or individual closely related to the self, or promotion of some special objective involved in some particular habit of interest. Narrow interests, though creative in intent, blind the individual to the destructiveness of his means, or make him careless of it. Further, opposition to efforts to promote or preserve the self, or some other favored objective, may arouse anger and cultivate malice. Here the motive or interest does become definitely destructive in intention, and perhaps in ultimate intention, without even seeing the destruction as a means to some further construction, e.g., self-promotion, beyond it. But this, we should note, occurs only as a reaction to the frustration of other efforts which are, in their intention, creative, even though that which they are concerned to promote is merely the prestige of the self. Personal and group pride, in which creativity is turned inward upon the self or directed to a group in which the self participates, are the prime sources of destructiveness, sometimes destroying the product of superior creativity of others merely to remove its rivalry with the less successful self or group-promotion which is the primary object of interest.

It must not be concluded from this analysis that destructiveness or evil is always due merely to lack of knowledge, though much of it undoubtedly is. What has here been argued is (1) that every interest process is ultimately creative in intent except for those cases in which continuous frustrations of effort (real or imagined) has brought on a reaction of anger, malice or hate aimed at the destruction of the source of frustration and this has become so intense or continuous that the destruction of this object has become the object of a fixed interest independent of the goal at which interest was first aimed, i.e. mere removal of the source of frustration so that creativity could go on; (2) that creative interest may be directed upon features of the self, or features of a group with which the self is more or less identified, or upon persons, animals, or things conceived as quite independent of the self, and any of these may become objects of fixed interest which may blind the

individual to needs and opportunities of creative activity in other directions; (3) that, when fixed interests are held in abeyance or in balance and time is taken for reflective choice among alternatives, then the drive of the life process is to choose that alternative which appears most creative.

If these three points are correct, then destructiveness arises from two sources. One is the failure to hold fixed interests in abeyance or balance sufficiently to allow for reflection and creative choice to operate. The other is sheer error in the operation of a choice which is creative in intent. The latter is not in any sense morally culpable so far as the present choice is concerned, although the error may be due to failure to have made certain right choices in the past, and for these the chooser may be held to blame. Where moral fault lies is in the other source of destructiveness, the failure to hold fixed interests in abeyance sufficiently to allow for reflection and creative choice to operate. Moral failure is a failure to exercise rational self-control over spontaneous impulses and fixed habits of interest. This control requires effort, and it is in his capacity to exercise these efforts that man's freedom and responsibility lie.¹ This effort is itself creative, expressing the preference for freedom and variety, order, harmony and efficiency within the self, and making way for its free, creative expression in the realm of objects, both human and non-human.

Thus all values are forms of creative effort or interest process. There is a unique moral value in the creative effort of rational self-control that makes way for free creative choice in dealing with the objective world and in reflective concern with the states of the self. There is value in every form of creative activity in which the self can engage. Each of the forms of human enterprise in which value is traditionally recognized is a form of creative activity and is differentiated chiefly by the

1. Cf "Freedom and Creativity," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association*, October, 1961.

medium in which it operates. Art is creative activity in a material medium. In the useful arts, creative activity is specially directed to production of objects of utility. In the fine arts, it is more or less released from these restrictions and thus finds opportunity for creativity with greater freedom. Literature is creativity in the medium of language, science in the medium of knowledge. Play is creativity in mental and physical action, freed from considerations of utility (thus resembling art) and usually given special meaning and direction by a set of rules. In the moral life we find a double set of values. There is the unique value of the creative act of self-control, and there is the value of the creative activity which then finds opportunity to flow forth. This becomes not only directed upon the material and intellectual media already referred to, but also finds its greatest scope, and has its greatest need of self-control, in expressing itself in the social medium. Creative activity in the social medium is the virtue of brotherly love, the *agape* of the New Testament, or *ahimsā* in its fullest sense.

This kind of creative activity, when operating intelligently, does not seek to direct, mold or force a pattern of behavior upon other people, for that would be to treat them as things or creatures incapable themselves of intelligent creativity. It seeks, rather, to create for them the conditions and the stimuli for their own free and intelligent creative activity. And, in the moral life thus intelligently operating, the objectives of love become the supreme objectives, for we see that in creating the conditions for the creativity of others we can be most creative, for here our creativity does not end in our own act but multiplies itself indefinitely in what it does to further the creativity of others. Thus the moral life at its fullest and best is seen to consist in that exercise of rational self-control and intelligent direction of our creative interests which frees those interests to express themselves spontaneously in acts of love, designed to create in our world the conditions of most creative existence for all.

Creativity and Value

Our argument thus far has sought to justify our thesis affirming the identity of conscious creativity and value. In what follows I wish to point to certain conclusions or implications to be drawn from this thesis.

The first conclusion concerns the importance of freedom. Because life is essentially creative, and conscious creativity is intrinsically good, conscious individuals should be given the fullest possible opportunity to express themselves in creative action. Some restrictions there must be, of course, to guard against the effects of ignorance and the tendency of canalized creativity to become destructive and blind to some of its consequences. But the purpose of laws which make specific restrictions on freedom must be to enlarge the real freedom of all concerned. Further, it must be remembered that real freedom requires, not merely the absence of legal and political restrictions, but the possession of real physical opportunity. Without the means for creative activity, with the means and time for nothing more than production of the necessities of life, the mere absence of political and legal restrictions avails nothing. The promotion of real freedom therefore requires both the maintenance of good laws in a politically free society and the multiplication of the physical means for the living of a fuller life by every member of society.

A second conclusion points to the importance of knowledge. Knowledge is required, not only to develop and use the instruments of creative activity, but also to avoid the danger of creativity's becoming destructive through blindness to human needs and ignorance of the consequences of its action. It is not true that ignorance alone is the source of evil and that man's salvation is by knowledge alone, even though that knowledge be philosophical as well as scientific and practical. But it is true that the increase of knowledge usually and on the whole prevents destructiveness, releases creative energy, and directs it into the channels that are most creative.

The opposite side of the coin, however, needs emphasis as a third conclusion. Knowledge is not enough.

There is also need for the effort of self-control. Though all life is creative, its expression becomes canalized in specific forms most of which can at times be more destructive of values than productive. As has already been pointed out, a unique creative effort is required to assert the potentialities of the self as a whole in a way that overcomes the inertia or force of these canalized drives and frees the intelligently directed creative impulse to express itself in accord with its own immanent preferences for variety with harmony, order and efficiency. Further, this creative expression at all times meets obstacles. The material in which it works is never entirely malleable. And creativity cannot be maintained without effort in face of failure and frustration due to intractable materials and the opposition of semi-blind impulsive activity of others. Creativity is a *striving* process. Activity involves effort. And the failure of effort where effort is needed and possible is the failure of man to be as creative as he can. This failure, together with ignorance, constitutes the twin sources of evil. It is for the efforts that can overcome these failures that man must hold himself morally responsible.

Finally, we may draw some conclusions regarding the place of religion in the life of man. Religious ideas constitute a view of that whole reality of which man finds himself a part, a view of the source of his own being as creative agent, of his relation to that source, of whether in relation to it his life has a meaning and purpose, and of what that meaning and purpose is; and religious ideas must include also a view of the objective world, of its nature and relation to the finite creative agent and to its ultimate source. In the life of man, the function of such ideas, of a religious vision, is to stimulate and direct the creative response. The vision of God as conscious creative love calls forth the response of creative love in the desire to serve God, to fulfil his purposes, and, when his purposes are viewed as those of creative love, this directs the response of the believer into those channels that serve this purpose. With the stimulus and the direction given by this vision of the

ultimate reality held by faith, it becomes possible for the individual to maintain his own life of creative love at a level high enough to save him from settling down at some easily attained level of creative achievement, stagnating in contented self-satisfaction below his full creative capacity or despairing of the possibility of rising to anything higher.

It is for his salvation from this spiritual stagnation and despair that man needs religious faith. Without it, fine character may be developed by processes of conditioning in childhood and youth, and this has falsely persuaded many that man has no real need of religious faith. But the forces that provide such conditioning are themselves the product of the faith of an earlier generation. And without the stimulus of a vital faith no community resists long the growth of the inertia of self-satisfaction and pride which turns into spiritual stagnation or worse. Thus the realization of man's potentialities for conscious creativity requires his acceptance by faith of that vision by which he sees himself as part of a universe that is itself, as a whole, consciously and supremely creative or the expression of a supreme conscious creativity.

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ETHICAL DISAGREEMENT

N. K. DEVARAJA

In this paper I want to give reasons for the rejection of a widely current view concerning ethical disagreement, and to offer a new analysis and suggest a new explanation of the phenomena of disagreement in ethics. The view that I want to be rejected consists in the belief, widely supported by common sense, that it is possible for two or more persons to have different moral feelings and/or opinions about the same moral situation. The belief is expressed by G. E. Moore in the following words : 'This fact, on which I have been insisting that different men do feel differently towards the same action, and that even the same man may feel differently towards it at different times, is, of course, a mere commonplace.'¹ The same belief is implied by Stevenson's assertion that ethical disagreement involves not only disagreement in belief but also disagreement in attitude. Occasionally, indeed, Stevenson declares that 'beliefs and attitudes stand in close causal dependence'² and that, in the case of an ethical disagreement, 'there is almost inevitably disagreement in belief' (p. 11); but, at the same time, he clearly holds the view that 'there may be disagreement in attitude without disagreement in belief.' (p. 6) This conclusion is implicit in the very definition of "disagreement in attitude" given by Stevenson : 'Two men', he states 'will be said to disagree in attitude when they have opposed attitudes to the same object.' (p. 3.) In fact, Stevenson's entire analysis of ethical disagreement is intended to emphasize this aspect of that disagreement. The conclusion that there may be disagreement in attitude without a parallel disagreement in

1. G. E. Moore, *Ethics* (Home University Library, 1945), p. 97.

2. C. L. Stevenson, *Ethics and Language* (Yale Paperbound, 1960), p. 14, see also p. 28. In all subsequent references to this work only page numbers will be indicated within brackets.

belief is reinforced by Stevenson by his analysis of meaning, which leads him to the discovery that words have not only descriptive or cognitive meanings but also emotive meanings.

The above view of the relationship between moral attitudes and moral situations has affinity with some forms of scepticism, and enters as an element into various forms of ethical subjectivism and relativism. It is surprising that the view in question should find support in G. E. Moore, a writer committed to intuitionism and ethical objectivism. The thesis concerning disagreement in attitude propounded by Stevenson involves a deeper sort of scepticism, and raises questions concerning the validity of some fundamental postulates of scientific inquiry. That inquiry, as is well known, is based on the assumption of a large measure of uniformity in the behaviour of nature. Stevenson's thesis raises the following two questions : first, can the *same* man react differently to the *same* situation on two different occasions ? Secondly, can different persons feel different kinds of feeling or emotion when confronted with an identical object ? Both these questions, it will be seen, are interrelated. We all know that different specimens of oxygen react in identical manner in the presence of different samples of another element like hydrogen under similar conditions of pressure, temperature, etc. Has this principle of uniformity absolutely no meaning with reference to the realm of man's moral behaviour ? The supporters of subjectivism, emotivism and other forms of ethical and metaphysical scepticism seem to answer this question in the negative. In its application to the problem of ethical knowledge the denial of uniformity leads to the conclusion that disagreements in regard to moral matters are, in principle, neither understandable nor resolvable.

A similar issue arises in connection with the reactions of the connoisseurs of art towards art works. There can be no agreed judgments about the works of art, it may be maintained, because the persons judging are likely to be different from one another in their tastes, and also because the same work of art may appear differently to different persons, and even to the same person on different occasions.

In this connection, however, the following observations may be recorded. If in different situations involving judgments about a work of art, the persons judging are different, and the work judged is also different, then disagreement in judgment would not constitute a violation of the principle of uniformity, for the disagreements would, in principle, be understandable; they would also be resolvable to the extent to which differences in tastes could be eliminated and the work of art made to bear the same appearance to different observers. Here another pertinent observation may be made : differences among observers are likely to be present in situations involving perception and interpretation of the scientific data as well. The upholders of sensationalistic scepticism in ancient Greece argued that, since there were differences in the organisation of sensible beings, different and even contradictory impressions could be produced on different minds by the same object. Biologists tell us that different organisms experience different colour-sensations in the presence of the same object; and it is well known that to a person suffering from fever certain articles of food may taste bitter which are not so to the normal people. How, then, are the scientists able to achieve unanimity of reports and interpretations concerning the experimental data ? The question raises, among others, the problem how communication regarding sense-experience can occur at all among different people. Granting, however, that the scientists succeed in achieving both communication and unanimity in respect of the data studied by them, the problem remains : how can their success be explained ? An adequate explanation of this success of the scientists may be able to throw some light on the more complicated issue of the alleged lack of agreement, or lesser degree of agreement, prevailing in the spheres of aesthetic and moral judgments. In this connection an important circumstance should be noted. The supporters of sceptical view concerning aesthetic and ethical judgments tend to overlook the fact that a measure of agreement prevails even in those fields. The fact of agreement requires explanations as much as the phenomena of disagreement. It is possible for a consistent sceptic to argue that the physical scientists, in talking about

the experimental data, do not, after all, refer to identical entities; and that scientific discourse need not be taken as conveying the same meanings to different persons. Nor can the sceptic be persuaded to accept single, universal significance of scientific discourse on the basis of the practical successes to which it leads; for, in the last analysis, the test of practical success is indistinguishable from the *argumentum ad baculum*. The argument lacks all the graces and subtleties of logic. Further, who can guarantee that in a particular case the persons involved are experiencing and reporting the same success or successes? If it is hard to achieve communication in regard to sense experience, it cannot be easier to communicate about the experience of practical successes.

In case, however, practical success be regarded as the ultimate guarantee of the universality of scientific discourse and the unanimity of scientific outlook, then those virtues cannot wholly be denied either to aesthetic or to moral discourse and outlook. It may be argued that the success, in the form of the unanimity of response and outlook, achieved by critics and moralists is not as accurately measurable as the successes of the scientists. However, there is a sense in which success of any type can be expressed, ultimately, only in terms of the satisfactions (or dissatisfactions) experienced by human beings; and these satisfactions (or dissatisfactions) are not less vague when produced through scientific activity than when they are produced through art or through the resolution of moral perplexity.

I shall now proceed to state dogmatically the reasons for the success of scientific discourse. This will prepare the ground for exploring the factors which make for the similar success of aesthetic and moral discourses in some cases, and their failure in others. Any type of discourse, if it is to achieve complete communication and unanimity of response, should accomplish two things. First, it should succeed in placing before the contemplating mind an identical complex of meanings; secondly, it should so determine those minds that, during the time when they are reading or listening to the discourse, they would attend

only to those meanings, and behave as pure contemplators, i.e. as beings with no interest other than the interest in contemplation.

Scientific discourse does not achieve complete communication in virtue of the sameness or the similarity of man's sensory constitution. It is most likely that we do not see the same shades of colour and the same forms. The success of the scientific discourse is due, as is well known, to the use of mathematical symbolism. That symbolism is able to achieve unambiguous communication because of the completeness with which it is able to practise abstraction. This means that mathematical symbols enable us to isolate completely the formal relationships to which they refer, without any possibility of our mixing those relationships with any other type of qualities. How, it may be asked, do I ever come to have the surty that the statement 'two + two equals four' is true? The prevalent reply to the question is: Well, the proposition is analytic, and so self-evidently true to all persons who contemplate its meaning. The reply is irrelevant inasmuch as it fails to tell us why an analytical proposition should convey the same meaning to all persons. Indeed, it may be doubted if all analytical propositions are as unequivocal in their signification as mathematical statements. The reason seems to be this, that, in the case of a mathematical statement, I cannot imagine myself being inclined to give it more than one interpretation. Where I can imagine the possibility of my own self being led to attach alternative meanings to a statement in a different context, I am inclined to agree that the statement in question is not univocal. The fact that mathematical symbols are unambiguous is due, not to any virtue attaching to those symbols, but to the fact that the qualities or relationships indicated by them admit of being completely isolated and uniquely specified. It follows from this that a complex of meanings, symbolised by a set of symbols, would achieve specificity of signification and unanimity of cognitive response to the extent to which it is able to control the imaginative activity of the contemplating minds in a single direction. In the field of art the greater the artist, the more thorough

is the control exercised by him on the minds of the connoisseurs. As Stephen C. Pepper remarks : 'A masterpiece can control the beholder's experience better than an inferior work of art. . . . (it) compels the beholder's perception and imagination to follow an antecedently prescribed course.'³ The superiority of the masterpiece, he goes on to explain 'comes from its imaginative control', and 'its objectivity through contextual relevancy or the principle of the organic whole'. In a work of art, such as a novel, it is the context of the story or the character that endows a discourse with a determinate meaning. This, however, is only one side of the story. On the other side, it is necessary that the plurality of the contemplating minds of the connoisseurs be made to achieve a fundamental similarity if their responses to the work of art in question are to be reasonably similar. This is achieved, in every case, by the detaching of the contemplating minds from the contexts of their individual lives, so that those minds are made to approximate to the ideal of the pure contemplative activity. However, even this is not enough. The contemplating minds are to be detached only from those parts of their individual psychical lives which are unrelated to the work of art or thought being contemplated. This reservation in regard to the process of detachment is made necessary by the fact that a measure of *expertness* or *competence* is a necessary qualification for the person who wants to enjoy or examine a work of art. Such expertness or competence is also demanded of those who would examine or contemplate complex mathematical objects. This expertness would seem, on examination, to consist of the consciousness of comparable objects (in the case of a work of art) and related materials, theorems, views, etc. Needless to say a measure of moral sensitiveness corresponding to aesthetic and intellectual sensitiveness in above examples, would be required also of those who would contemplate and examine moral situations.

Writers like Moore and Stevenson, who have observed the possibility of the stimulation of different attitudes

3. *The Work of Art* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1955), p. 74.

in different spectators vis-a-vis the same moral situation have not cared to analyse seriously the meaning either of the expression 'the same situation', or of 'the same attitude'. The question may be asked : Is it at all possible for two observers to have different attitudes towards an identical situation ? Let us split up this question into several more specific questions, each relating to a different field. Is it possible, we may ask, for two competent mathematicians to have different attitudes towards the same mathematical equation ? If not, why ? Here another important question may be posed : Can an attitude be at all defined or specified without reference to the nature or quality of the situation which evokes that attitude ? It was observed above that the reason why I felt certain that a mathematical statement would convey the same meaning to all persons was my felt inability to imagine myself giving different meanings to it on different occasions. I now ask : Can I imagine myself having different attitudes towards the same situation on different occasions ? Unless I can imagine such a possibility for myself, I cannot possibly allow myself to think that different persons could have different attitudes towards the same object or situation. As regards myself I am inclined to think as follows. Unless I undergo a significant change in the meanwhile, I should continue to have the same attitude towards an object which I had before. Further, the change in me should be such as would have relevance with respect to the object or the situation. In other words, the change in me can alter my attitude towards an object only when that change alters that part of myself which is active in the contemplation of the object in question. It was pointed out above that contemplating minds could be made to achieve similarity through their enforced detachment from their individual lives not relevant for the objects under contemplation. When I assert that I could not imagine a change in my attitude towards the same moral situation, I imply, first, that I would continue to be as detached from irrelevant personal considerations in future as now, and second, that my moral views would presumably remain unchanged during the interval. Similarly, when I assert that all reasonable persons should have *this* attitude

towards a given moral situation, I assume, in addition to their capacity to detach themselves from irrelevant personal considerations, their power to share what I consider to be a reasonable outlook on moral matters. However, in so far as I am liable to be mistaken in the prediction of my future behaviour, I may agree to the suggestion that my attitude towards the given moral situation may change as a consequence of a change (a) in my moral outlook, or (b) in my capacity for detachment from irrelevant considerations. I may agree to a similar suggestion in regard to another person. In case, however, the possibility of the above changes is discounted, I would find it difficult, indeed, to believe that my attitude towards the same moral situation could be different on different occasions. Similar remarks would apply to changes in my attitude towards a given aesthetic object.

It may be noted here that, given the possibility of certain changes in the inquiring or contemplating minds, the possibility of change in their attitude towards the same mathematical or scientific object cannot be ruled out. This could be denied only by those who used the word attitude with an arbitrarily narrowed connotation. Hence onwards let us agree to refer to the contemplating mind free from irrelevant considerations and equipped with relevant knowledge as an expert observer and to the person whose observations are completely objective and sharable as an ideal observer. There is a sense in which a mathematical equation conveys the same meaning to all observers; however, it is possible for expert observers to differ in regard to its interpretation, according as they view it severally in relation to one set of theoretical possibilities or another. A given equation, for instance, may suggest different theoretical implications and applications to specialists in different and even allied fields.

The expert observer in physics is the person conversant with the latest theoretical and experimental developments in the relevant fields of that science. His expertness consists in the capacity to see the significant relationships in which the given datum stands with respect to other data and their interpretations. In the sphere of art,

however, the expert observer in relation to given work of art is one who has wide acquaintance with great works of the same *genre*, and is equipped with analytical awareness of the ways in which art works attain greatness and are appreciated. As regards the field of morality or moral judgments, an expert observer may be defined as the person who can pronounce on the moral quality of an act or situation in the light of the ideals of conduct cherished by the enlightened men and women in his community or society.

Here an obvious sceptical problem presents itself. In the field of physics and other experimental sciences the expert observer has the capacity to raise himself to the status of an ideal observer, whose observations are universally sharable. An observer in the spheres of art and morality, on the contrary, can never aspire to rise to the status of an ideal observer, in the sense defined above.

In regard to this problem the following observations will be found pertinent. First, it is not true that the expert observer in physics is always, and even generally, an ideal observer, in the sense that his observations would be sharable by all inquirers past, present and future. The history of science, it may be confidently asserted, has not so far succeeded in producing such an observer. Surely, the universe of modern physics, so very different from the universe of Newton, could not have been revealed by the same or similar acts of ideal observation. Even the records of experimental data made by expert observers tend to assume divergent forms when contemplated in the light of different hypotheses or theories. Max Planck observes: 'Every observational or experimental measurement first acquires its meaning through the significance which a theory gives it the finest and most direct measurements . . . have to be corrected again and again before they can be employed for any practical purpose.'⁴ The records of experimental data are as little likely to be perfectly objective or ideal as the theories in relation to which they are reviewed. As regards observation statements on the

4. Max Planck, *Where is Science Going?* (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1933), p. 92.

common sense level it has been maintained by some logical positivists that no genuine synthetic proposition can be ostensive, and hence absolutely certain or incorrigible.

On the other hand, it is not correct to assert that unanimity is in principle unattainable in the spheres of aesthetic and moral judgments. One could challenge the sceptics the world over to find a single expert critic who denies literary excellence to the *Meghadutam* of Kālidāsa and the *War and Peace* of Tolstoy. It is not by chance that some poets and dramatists in world literature have come to be recognised as great masters. Similarly, it would be difficult to discover an expert moralist who denied value to such virtues as courage and generosity. Even in cases where critics and moralists seem to differ radically with respect to the merits of certain art works or actions or policies, it would not be difficult to discover a hard core of agreement among them. Thus, even Tolstoy did not find it possible to deny *all* kinds of greatness to Shakespeare, though he rightly asserted that Shakespeare's compositions had many faults, and could not be considered great when judged in accordance with certain canons. Similar remarks would apply to the moral opinions of a Nietzsche or a Schopenhauer. When a thinker like Nietzsche denies merit to a virtue like humility, what he is actually denying is the relative worth of one kind of life over against another. This point will be made clearer at a later stage.

The truth, then, seems to be that we do not have ideal observers either in the realm of the physical sciences or in the fields of art and morality. In all these provinces, we should be content with having more or less expert observers. In all these domains experts of the same and different generations tend to correct the prejudices and shortcomings of one another. In the domain of art and art-criticism, the historical nature of this process of mutual correction by experts of different generations finds recognition in the maxim that 'time is the best judge'. And probably time is the best of judges not only in respect of the works of art but also in regard to the different ideals and the different ways or philosophies of living. It may

be noted here that different ideals and philosophies of life may be more or less suited to different environmental conditions, socio-political and technological, produced by man.

In the above discussion we have used the notion of the expert observer. Most people will grant that only such an observer could be a competent judge or interpreter of a work of art, or a differential equation having far-reaching implications. However, sceptical thinkers in ethics do not seem to appreciate the need of expertness in persons judging or interpreting moral situations. Ethical scepticism derives sustenance from differences prevailing among men and women in their judgment concerning moral matters. While stressing these differences sceptical moral philosophers seem inclined to attach equal importance to the judgments made by the man in the street on the one hand and the enlightened moralists on the other. These thinkers seem to believe that if moral values were objective, they would be equally visible to the learned and to the ignorant, to the criminals no less than to the conscientious and virtuous. And while it may be easier to persuade the votaries of value scepticism that the proper appreciation of great works of art requires specialised training, it will be much more difficult to convince them of the necessity of such training for the assessment of different moral acts or situations.

Prima facie this difference in attitude towards the need of expert knowledge in those who would judge art and those who judge morals respectively may seem justified. It may be pointed out that the capacity to judge morals is present in all human beings, while the love of art is characteristic of only few persons. Contrary to this, it seems arguable to me that the capacity to respond to art and literature, however unequally distributed, is no less universal than the capacity to appreciate moral values. The contrary appearance would seem to depend on the fact that the occasions for the expression of our moral likes and dislikes are both more numerous and more conspicuous than those for our aesthetic reactions. It can equally be shown that the need for education concerning moral values,

particularly in a world divided by discordant ideologies and conflicting loyalties, is no less imperative than that for instruction concerning aesthetic values. That being so, the sceptic can properly base his case only on the differences with respect to moral and aesthetic matters which are to be met with among the experts.

The problem of ethical disagreement, then, reduces itself to the following questions : What is the nature of the differences of opinion among expert moral thinkers ? Are these differences reducible, in all cases, to differences in belief, so as to be resolvable by rational discussion ? Or, they consist also of differences in attitudes which are wholly irrational, and, therefore, irresolvable in principle ? The subjectivists and the emotivists including Stevenson have argued for the latter position. The present writer believes that the position is not justified and that a strong case can be made out for the former position.

The plausibility of the view taken up by Stevenson and others, I am persuaded, derives from the incomplete nature of the analysis, so far attempted by various thinkers, of the phenomenon of "differences in attitude".

The main reason why agreements and differences in attitude do not lend themselves to thorough analysis is the poverty of our language. Exigencies of adaptive behaviour in relation to the environment, physical and social, have compelled us to invent names for various constituents of that environment. The need for giving names to various elements in our subjective attitudes, however, has not been equally pressing. For practical purposes it is enough for me to know whether a person is pleased or displeased with me, whether his attitude towards me is friendly or hostile; I rarely attempt to define the *exact* quality or amount of the attitudes under reference. Such distinctions and definitions are sought to be given only by novelists and poets. Even these latter are able only to suggest the said distinctions, the suggestion being accomplished indirectly through the narration on the one hand of the circumstances responsible for the stimulation of the attitudes, and of the overt indications expressive of those attitudes on the other. As T. S. Eliot has pointed out, what the poet has to

find is the "objective correlative" of the emotion intended to be expressed. As a matter of fact it is not possible either to define or to express an affective attitude except in relationship to the cognitive situation which is regarded as evoking or justifying it.

The subjectivists have asserted that, in judging various moral situations, what I am actually doing is to give expression to my own feelings of approval and disapproval. However, having been misled by the sameness of expressions used to express the feelings in question, they have failed to see the complexity of such phenomena as approval and disapproval. I approve of the conduct of the person who pays back his debt in time as stipulated; I also approve of the way in which a person of heroic disposition undertakes to fight for a just cause, or in behalf of another man or group of men who have been unjustly treated; but how different are the feelings experienced by me on the two occasions ! I do not merely approve of the conduct of the man who protests against injustice, I tend to admire him. And my admiration for such a person tends to grow in proportion to the extent to which he persists in making sacrifices and incurring inconveniences and hardships for the cause of justice. The feeling of admiration in me is also determined by the degree of significance that I am inclined to see in the cause in question.

Similarly, despite the sameness of expression that I may be inclined to use, my liking for one person is generally not the same as my liking for another person. I like or love my child in one manner, and my mistress or my friends in another. It would be utter simplification of the very complex psychological phenomena involved to assert that all cases of liking or loving constituted a single attitude. The reason is that the attitude of liking or loving that I cherish towards a particular person is coloured and determined by everything that I see in that person, absolutely and in relation to myself and others. Consequently, if I am asked to define the sort of liking or love that I feel for a person, all I can do is to analyse, as best as I can, the very complex congregation of qualities, physical, temperamental

and intellectual, which I tend to see in that person. And since it is possible for other persons to see the different qualities of the same person in different lights, they may have attitudes of liking or disliking towards him which are quite distinct from one another.

The same remarks apply for our likes and dislikes with respect to different works of art. My liking for Shakespeare is qualitatively different from the liking that I have for Kālidāsa or Tolstoy. In fact, the particular liking that I feel for a particular author cannot be separated from the kinds of merits that I tend to see in that author. In no case indeed, can the attitude towards an object be separated from what the observer perceives in the object. In the mind of the observer the affective attitude and the cognition or the cognised object constitute a single psychosis. As John Dewey has aptly remarked : Experience is emotional but there are no separate things called emotions in it.⁵ It follows from this that there can be no differences in attitude separable from differences in cognitions or beliefs.

The men and women that we encounter in society are complex beings; works of art and literature are also very complex entities. The greater a work of art, the more there is in it to be analysed and admired by different critics. Like human beings works of art embody different aesthetic and spiritual qualities whose relative intensities and inter-connections, holding different degrees of appeal for different connoisseurs, provide endless scope for discussion and for difference of opinion. Similar factors contribute to the complexity of moral objects or situations.

Every element in a work of art has relationship with and bearing on every other element in it; likewise, the work as a whole has relationships and bearing with respect to the aesthetic meanings and objects present in the cultural milieu of the artist or his work. This milieu may include the entire cultural history of the whole civilised

5. John Dewey, Extract from *Art as Experience*, in *A Modern Book of Esthetics*, edited by Melvin Rader (Henry Holt and Co., New York, 1952), p. 70.

mankind. The moral meanings inhering in a moral object or situation tend similarly to have relationships and bearings with respect to the kindred meanings in the cultural milieu.

Advocates of differences in attitudes unrelated to differences in cognitions or beliefs have tended to take a very narrow view indeed of what constitutes a moral object or situation. Frequently, this object or situation is identified with the visible physical situation. Thus, when Mr. A. J. Ayer, in his *Language, Truth and Logic* avers that the proposition, "You stole that money", says as much as the statement, "You acted wrongly in stealing that money", he is confusing between the spatio-temporal sequence of movements which constitute the act of removing the money in a particular manner, with the moral meanings which are seen to inhere in the act by one or more observers. The same confusion besets the views of some of the intuitionists. However, but little reflection is needed to see that the moral quality of an act does not inhere in it as greenness does in leaves; nor can that quality be ever perceived with the eyes. In fact, what we judge in a moral act or situation is the *meaning* or *value* it signifies in terms of the *deserts* and the *weal* or *woe* of the parties concerned. Thus, the movements of a knife signify one thing when that knife is being used by a surgeon, and another when it is being employed by an assassin. Further, in a case when death is deserved, we are not inclined to judge the assassin too harshly.

We are now in a position to indicate the factors which lead to ethical disagreement. Two or more observers are inclined to judge an act or situation differently when they see or interpret it differently. The differences in seeing or interpretation are likely to be due to one of the following two reasons. First, the differences may be due to the circumstance that the observers in question have at their disposal different reports concerning the facts of the case. Thus, I may object to a person's being put to death because of my ignorance in regard to the past criminal record of the person concerned. Secondly, I may disapprove of it because I am in principle opposed to capital punishment.

Now, my belief that capital punishment in all cases is unjustified is part of a system of beliefs which constitutes my legal or moral philosophy or my philosophy of life. In all crucial instance, where observers are found holding different opinions about the moral merits of an actual or proposed course of action, it would be found that those observers subscribe to different philosophies of life and so are inclined to view the given situation *in relation to different contexts of values*. Thus, an act involving violation of a social convention, which is violently condemned by a conservative moralist or a puritan, may be actually lauded by a social revolutionary or a hedonist.

This analysis enables us to see how far ethical disagreements can be resolved. Apart from the cases where differences can be removed through factual information, ethical disagreements are resolvable only to the extent to which peoples' beliefs concerning systems of values can be harmonised. These systems of values, to which people subscribe, do not refer exclusively to moral values. Our scientific, religious and metaphysical beliefs all play a part in building up our faith in a particular system of values. In this connection two important reservations must be made. First, votaries of different systems of values may find it possible to agree in regard to the moral significance of a number of individual and social practices. Secondly, when the believers in different systems of values differ with respect to an actual or proposed course of action, their differences do not necessarily involve contradictory attitudes. Generally, the differences are indicative of the different degrees of importance or value that the upholders of different value-systems are inclined to attach to different ends pursued by man. Thus, on the proper presentation of a case, even a Christian observer may be led to see that humility and charity are not always commendable. Similarly, a follower of Nietzsche may be made to see that a measure of humility and charity may be necessary even for the development of the superman.⁶

6. Cf. St. Augustine - 'For I am aware what ability is requisite to persuade the proud how great is the virtue of humility, which raises us above all earthly dignities, etc. (*The City of God*, opening paragraph).

Men's views concerning the relative worth of different kinds of enjoyment, different types of personal excellence, etc., we are suggesting, are rooted in their differing beliefs concerning man and his place in the universe. When the protagonists of different value systems argue with, and seek to convince, one another, they tend to produce different kinds of evidence in support of their respective beliefs concerning those systems. Ethical disagreements will be resolvable to the extent to which these protagonists can be made to agree as to the types of evidence that are relevant for their discussions, and to the extent to which those types of evidence are objectively ascertainable. However, if the various types of evidence tend to necessitate conflicting inferences, then, to that extent, it would not be possible to evolve agreed solutions of the moral problems. Thus, if it be agreed that the morality of an act is at least partly determinable with reference to an ultimate good, and further, if it is conceded that human beings are inclined to pursue and admire several goods as ultimate, e.g. beauty, truth, and virtue, then it would not be possible to have absolutely uniform moral opinions in regard to various courses of action, and various modes of life. Given different conceptions, or a plurality of conceptions, concerning ultimate goods and worthy lives, while it may be possible for antagonistic or dissentient thinkers to understand the reasons for their mutual disagreements, it may not be possible for them to finally overcome or resolve those disagreements.

When two experts differ in regard to the merits of a moral act, a mode of life, or a mode of writing, they may be inclined to invoke the evidence of history, i.e. the evidence of the judgments that history is seen to have passed on similar actions or modes. However, it may come to be seen that the judgments of history, too, are ambiguous. History continues to regard both Christ and Napoleon as great men, though the lives led by the two were entirely different. Similarly, critics continue to find greatness both in romantic and classical works of literature. What is surprising is that the same critic may find it possible to enjoy, though not equally, the works produced

by the romantic writers on the one hand and the classical writers on the other. Plutarch reports how, after his encounter with the cynic Diogenes, Alexander was led to remark that if he were not Alexander he would be Diogenes. This instance shows how a person adhering to one system of values may nevertheless find it possible to appreciate a life devoted to the pursuit of another pattern of values. Similarly, an impartial observer may find it possible to extend his appreciation to such divergent systems of morality as those enjoined by Nietzsche and Christianity. In general, a person temperamentally inclined to lead one kind of life, may yet find it possible to identify himself imaginatively with other kinds of life. It is by such imaginative identification that I am able to comprehend and appreciate the far richer life of a Goethe and the far more active career of an Alexander or a Napoleon than my own.

The view that disagreements in moral judgments (and also in criticism of art-works) are ultimately rooted in disagreements in perceptions and beliefs derives support from another consideration. The protagonists of different value-systems and of evaluations flowing from those systems are not content just to express their opinions. On the contrary, they are inclined, when challenged, to argue out their respective cases. This universal propensity to argue in support of evaluative judgments would be incomprehensible unless people were credited with the belief that their attitudes towards moral and aesthetic objects were correlated with qualities present in those objects, to which attention could be drawn through discussion and argument.

Our view concerning the relationship between attitudes on the one hand and perceptions and beliefs on the other renders superfluous the widely current distinction between descriptive or cognitive and the so-called emotive meanings. A word or sentence does not evoke an attitude or emotion except through the presentation or suggestions of a cognitive situation. To be sure, two writers or orators can succeed in arousing differing attitudes towards a given situation, e. g. the assassination of Caesar. Their success, however,

will depend not so much on the use by each of a certain set of words, as on their capacities to relate vividly the given situation to the value-systems cherished or sought to be defended by them respectively. The act of assassination will evoke the attitude of approval or disapproval in a neutral observer according as it is presented before him as a step in the realization of a cherished set of values, or as a measure destructive of those or other values. While it is true that words tend to arouse, through association, attitudes of one or other kinds, it is also true that good writers and orators depend for their effects not on chance associations of words but on the context deliberately constructed by the imaginative activity of their minds. Nor can it be shown that the attitudes aroused by words through their associations are wholly independent of the suggestions of cognitive situations. On the other hand, the power of the context to determine the emotional values of words even in defiance of their customary associations, can be easily demonstrated. Thus in the sentence, "That poor man stole the injection in order to save the life of his dying child", the word "stole" fails to arouse in us the attitude of condemnation usually associated with it. In view of such examples it seems theoretically superfluous to attribute emotive meanings to words and sentences, over and against the meanings imparted to them by the cognitive contexts emerging out of their combinations.

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SUFFERING AND ITS CONQUEST

A. BOYCE GIBSON

One of the most radical contrasts between the Indian and the Western moral traditions concerns the conquest of suffering. Each tradition maintains two propositions, the first, psychological, the second, an affirmation of values. On the Indian side, it is maintained (1) that the only way to get rid of suffering is to extinguish desire, or, at the very least, the self-affirming desires ; and (2) that suffering is the only evil, or, at the very least, that all other evils are reducible to it. On the Western side, it is maintained (1) that the only way of getting rid of suffering is to satisfy desires, including the self-affirming desires ; and (2) that suffering is at any rate not the only evil, and perhaps not even the major evil. The purpose of this essay is to suggest that the Indians have been right in their psychology and the West has been right in its evaluations.

Before proceeding to argue this matter, I wish to clear up questions of terminology. First, throughout this discussion, the word "suffering" is used in its broadest sense, to cover not only physical pain, but also friction, frustration, disharmony, and discontent. This, I understand, is the range of the Pali word "*dukkha*" in the Buddhist classics ; and to restrict it to physical pain or material deprivation, as is done in some Western discussions, is not only to cheapen the issue but also to preclude by definition any fruitful comparison between Western and Indian ethical concepts. (Professor Huston Smith¹, explains that the word is used to refer to an axle which is off center in respect of its wheel, and to a bone which has slipped out of its socket. In that case it means not only, subjectively, "suffering," but also, objectively, "dislocation," and applies to suffering as a case of dislocation) Second, "desire" may be taken either in a broad sense which includes the desire to

1. Huston Smith, *The Religions of Man*. A Mentor Book (New York : The New American Library, 1958), p 109.

extinguish the self, or, more restrictively, to signify a particular kind of desire, "the desire to pull apart from the rest of life and to seek fulfilment in those bottled-up segments of being which we call ourselves."² Here it will be more difficult to observe a constant usage, for either definition means that a philosophical decision has already been made. We shall try, however, to ensure that there is no confusion.

(To complete the preliminaries, though we have spoken of Indian and Western concepts, it should be added that they are mixed, in both camps, in varying proportions, and are to be found even in their pure forms on both sides of the line.)

The first thesis to be defended is that the only way of getting rid of suffering is to extinguish the affirmative desires. Here the traditional Indian analysis is at a far profounder level than that of Western utilitarianism in all its manifestations, and is a direct challenge to the working assumptions of capitalist-communist society. From this it would follow, that if suffering were the only or even the principal evil, the Indian ethical recommendations should be accepted as conclusive.

The conviction that suffering can be ended by satiation has been a familiar Western superstition since the seventeenth century (earlier and wiser views have fortunately survived in conservative pockets). Since Bacon and Descartes gave their blessing to science as a source of material satisfactions, it has been more and more assumed that the way to conquer suffering is not to master desires, let alone extinguish them, but to provide for them. But by this time it has become clear that desires grow by what they feed on. Satisfy one, and another rises to take its place. Secure a decent minimal standard of living and a broad spread of medical benefits and educational opportunities through the ministrations of a welfare state, and, instead of the contentment which might be expected, you find an odd alignment of spivs and idealists protesting anarchically against the public order without any suggestions

2. Huston Smith, elucidating the term "*Tantra*" *Ibid.*, p. 110.

for replacing it. Or take the case of public health, which has relieved immemorial suffering, only to swell the birth-rate and so to threaten us with more suffering—war, starvation, or, at best, a lacklustre subsistence on austerity pills. It is true that these evils in their turn can be dealt with by teachers, psychologists, and family planning; but the necessary adjustments will themselves produce new tensions, disturbances, and dissatisfactions. Sometimes it seems to be like knocking a dent out of a tin : you knock it out all right, but you make another somewhere else. At other times there may seem to be genuine progress. But it is never more than an asymptotic approximation. In the wide sense of the word, suffering is never stilled as long as desire continues.

It may be objected that we have so far referred only to material satisfaction, and that there is a body of Western opinion which, admitting all we have said, proceeds to locate felicity in the practices of a good life. The distinction is not meaningless, and will prove to be instructive. Desiring without willing, desiring as an uncoordinated moth-and-candle appetite, is doomed to frustration at an early stage, for in the absence of a unifying policy the disconnected conations produce conflict and therefore suffering.

But to will an organized policy of life is to rectify the disconnection and so to avert the suffering which ensues from it. This was the ground for Plato's conviction that the "just" man (i.e., the integrated man) is also the happiest. And this might be so, if it were possible to be "integrated" and then to rest on one's laurels. But willing is effort, and therefore suffering, though on a higher level of attainment. Willing means making difficult choices : difficult both in the sense of asserting a policy against clamorous inclinations, and in the sense of having to give up one good thing in favour of another, or accepting the lesser of two evils. Normally, the formed policy of the will proceeds more smoothly than the giddy succession of desires; but at the crucial turns of development, when it is most will, it is discord and suffering even in its triumph.

Thus, in the conquest of suffering, we are engaged in a war against an evil in the course of which the evil appears to be perpetuated—and the same evil is perpetuated in the struggle against other and different evils such as injustice and disloyalty. In this vicious circle it might appear that the separate self is indeed the cause of all the trouble, and that only by growing out of it into that selflessness of which the Absolute is the positive pole, and *Nirvana* the negative, can we grapple with evil at the root.

The whole argument, however, rests on the assumption that suffering has to be conquered at any cost, i.e., that it is the only evil. And to many of us this disvaluation seems to be exaggerated, and the cure to be like ridding a patient of a disease by killing him. I shall develop this theme in two stages. I shall try to show (1) that through the self-affirmations of willing and planning suffering can be reduced, though certainly not extinguished; and (2) that there are other, and perhaps more potent, disvalues against which it has to be weighed in the balance.

1. In Book IX of Plato's *Republic* it is argued that concern with eternal things produces more lasting and continuous satisfaction than concern with transitory things, and lifts us out of the unending see-saw between minus and neutral into a steadily growing positive felicity. That is to say, by directing our desires to the right things we are not diminished but enhanced. There is a sense in which desire can be satisfied. It is not a sense which excludes suffering : even at the best moments, suffering is always round the corner. But there is a stronghold from which suffering can be resisted. There may even be a reinforced concrete basement to which its bombardment does not penetrate. But, in any case, there is not only more personal identity, but more positive satisfaction. Disciplined and turned in the right direction, desire may be built into a structure in which suffering, if never excluded, is substantially reduced—without being any the less desire, and without any move toward the extinction of personal existence.

As Plato states the matter, it might be objected that in order to obtain positive satisfaction it is necessary to

turn away from the ordinary round. There is, in fact, much in Plato himself to discountenance this view; and it is best rebutted by reference to the ordinary well-adjusted citizen with a house and family : not outstandingly able (that creates complications) and happy (I use the provocative language of the Prayer Book deliberately and approvingly) to do his duty in that station of life to which it may have pleased God to call him. There still are such people, and, not only are they the salt of the earth, an object lesson to philosophers, and the pivot of any tolerable social policy, but they are content to accept and perfect the desires—unlike the fanatics who strive to extinguish them, and the counter-fanatics who want them satisfied all at once. Perhaps Aristotle had something of the sort in mind when he crowned the civilization of Greece with the doctrine of the Mean. But what concerns us here is that in their modest way men like this make terms with the world, neither expecting too much of it nor edging out of it, and find at any rate a temporary rest from their desires through equilibrium and moderation.

2. But, it will be said, this is only a stop on the journey—a stage which is indeed an advance and through which we all must pass, but an oasis rather than the Promised Land. It stops short, on its own showing, of the goal of all our striving. Suffering is not extinguished. Black care still sits behind the horseman, both when he jogs round the paddock, and when he rides out on a crusade. When all is said, we have settled for half : and that is just what a religion cannot do. This brings us to our second point. If suffering were the only evil, to compound with it, even on favourable terms, would be merely a compromise, tolerable only in transit. But, if suffering is not the only evil, situations will arise in which one is forced to choose between this evil and other evils. And in that case compromise is not a subterfuge, and may even be heroic.

At this point, the main body of Western ethical opinion (setting aside its lapses into utilitarianism) asserts that even in its widest sense suffering is not the major evil, and that moral evil, which *is* the major evil, cannot be represented as a special case of it, but is something *sui generis*.

Suffering, in all its forms, is a state of feeling. Morality is a determination of the will. And the two are not commensurable.

In its extreme version, Western ethical theory asserts that one trace of evil disposition is a greater blot on the world than any amount of suffering. So expressed, it is open to the objection that one at least of the marks of an evil disposition is that it is insensitive to suffering. But, even so, the degree of evil in the disposition is by no means always correlative with the degree of suffering it produces, or aims at producing, and some kinds of evil disposition are evil, not because they produce, or aim at producing, suffering, or even because they culpably ignore it, but because they are prone to the differently grounded vices of injustice and disloyalty. Suffering is only one of the evils which a good disposition condemns. If this is so, the conquest of suffering is of departmental import only, and not the prime concern of men and gods. Such a view is bound to affect our approach to the conquest of suffering itself.

For my own part, I accept this view, in the moderate form in which I have restated it. I do not believe that the good man's only concern is to remove suffering, or that justice and loyalty are valuable only as ways of removing them ; and I further hold that, even if they were, the act of removing suffering or producing happiness is one thing, that the suffering they remove and the happiness they produce are another, and that it would be one of the good man's duties to remove the one and produce the other, whether or not it entailed suffering or happiness for him personally. Nor do I think that moral evil is evil merely because it is a particular kind of suffering. No doubt, those who are evil *do* sometimes experience a disturbance of soul which comes under the heading of suffering as defined at the outset. But arguments to this effect usually underestimate the effects of dissociation, through which the hard-boiled egotist is deceived as to his own nature, and suffers from bad conscience hardly at all ; and also assume too easily that disturbance is not enjoyable—some people enjoy nothing else and are a nuisance except when

trouble is brewing, and then they are marvellous. Still, it may be admitted that the pleasure of bad men is precarious ; how precarious may be seen when we find we cannot substitute for enjoyment "serenity" ; and, for the sake of argument, let us suppose that evil-doing is *in fact* characterized by disturbance. It still is not the case that it is bad *because* it is characterized by disturbance. The *good* man, in his goodness, also experiences disturbance : therefore, it is not disturbance which marks off good from bad. And, if the Westerner happens to be a Christian, he cannot but draw comparisons between the negative felicity of *Nirvana* and the triumphant agony of the Crucifixion.

We have now to note certain corollaries of this way of thinking. It has been maintained (1) that suffering and moral evil are different and incommensurable, and (2) that, though indifference to suffering is one kind of moral evil, there is also the other kind of moral evil which exhibits or condones injustice and disloyalty. If this is so, then a policy of life based on the conviction that suffering is the only or the originating evil must be wrongly directed. But it was precisely as part of that policy that desire had to be extinguished. If, then, suffering is not the only evil, desire does not necessarily have to be extinguished. It may be that, to get rid of other evils, both suffering and desire will have to be stepped up.

Next, a distinction must be made between undergoing suffering and producing suffering. In either case there is suffering in the world, and in either case it would in general be better if there were not ; but producing suffering is a major *prima facie* evil which only a great good could out-balance, and could never be admitted as a good motive, while *undergoing* suffering, as a means of reducing the suffering of others, is, in that context, a positive good, and would generally be recognized as among the best motives of all. In this redistribution of suffering at one's own expense, something good comes into the world which transcends suffering and belongs to a different order.

Further, as already hinted, those best able to help are not those who have put desire behind them and are free

from all attachment. It is precisely by maintaining his attachments that every man is best able to wrestle with the sufferings of others and, for that matter, with his own. The deeper the attachment, the greater the load of suffering he can carry. The alternative, to diminish both the attachment and the suffering to the vanishing point, produces the same balance, and requires the same effort, but makes service of others a means to self-effacement, instead of practising self-effacement as a means to the service of others.

Again, if suffering is only one kind of evil, the good man will have to take measures against the other kinds and not merely against suffering, not only in himself, but also in other people. Now, wherever there are more evils than one, or more goods than one to be balanced against each other, there will have to be shifts and compromises. Compromise in such a case is not to be despised, as in a clear case of good against evil; on the contrary, it is in the discernment of the proper compromise between competitive goods that the good man is normally employed. He has to fight off suffering, on the one hand, injustice and lawlessness, on the other; and, when (as does sometimes happen) the claims clash, the result is that neither enterprise is wholly achieved, but that the best possible result has been achieved on the whole.

We conclude, then, that the conquest of suffering is only one of the calls upon us, and that a policy of life based on the assumption that it is the only or all-inclusive call is not broad enough to cover all moral contingencies. That does not mean that such a policy has nothing to teach us. In its proper subordinate place it prevents us from facing all contingencies as if they were moral crises. It facilitates two-way traffic between the more purposeful and the more relaxed regions of the soul. It saves us from what Professor T. R. V. Murti has happily described as "secondary involvement"³, i.e., incurring further suffering by fuming and fretting about already existing suffering, instead of taking it helpfully and calmly. And it

3. This phrase was used by Professor Murti in a paper written for the East-West working party at Canberra in 1957.

provides a landing-strip for rest and reconciliation before the hazardous flights that are bound to follow. But it looks inward; it is centered on the self which it hopes to exorcise; it construes compassion as self-denial; and it preaches a detachment which certainly diminishes the affirmative desires, but diminishes *pari passu* the affirmation of others. Thus, there are still reasons for preferring the combined enhancement of suffering and attachment which causes men to take other men's burdens on their shoulders. In the full unabridged Western tradition, God does just that, and man follows. It takes an infinite attachment to carry an infinite suffering. And it takes our finite attachments to carry our finite sufferings for each other.

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INDIA : ONE AND MANY

HUMAYUN KABIR

Though people often ask whether India is one or many, the question is wrongly framed and can lead only to wrong answers. It is asked because diversity is inescapable in a country so large in area and with such differences in landscape and climate. In addition, various peoples came into India at different times and brought with them different customs, beliefs and institutions. Throughout history, India has been united on the basis of geography and culture but divided into many kingdoms by differences in terrain, religion and language.

A combination of difference and unity is found in almost every country of the world. Smaller states which at first sight present an appearance of homogeneity are found on closer inspection to consist of various units with distinct identities of their own. Within England, a Devonshireman is different from a Yorkshireman. In the United Kingdom, Scotchmen, Welshmen and Englishmen value and preserve their separate identities, while taking pride in their common nationality.

The size of the country and the lack of adequate means of communication made political unification of India impossible in ancient times. Even then, a common culture had spread throughout the country. We now know that even in prehistoric times, one common culture had spread from the western reaches of the Indus to the Ganges in the east and the Tapti and probably beyond in the south. Nowhere else had civilisation a greater territorial expanse in the third or fourth millennium before Christ. It was inescapable that a culture so extensive and rich and with contacts stretching to the Mediterranean and the Pacific should show many local differences. India was one and many already at the dawn of history.

The first consciousness of Indian unity dates from the time of the great Epics. The Ramayana refers to

incidents in the earlier and the Mahabharata to the latter half of the second millennium before Christ. Rama's travels over India already indicate a growing consciousness of Indian unity. The Mahabharata explicitly states that the name of the land was derived from Bharata, son of Sakuntala, whose name is familiar to the Western reader because of Kalidasa's immortal play. Saints, poets and philosophers—Buddha and Mahavira, Valmiki, Vyas and Kalidasa and many others—did more for developing the consciousness of Indian unity than any king. Religious teachers travelled all over India and the location of major places of pilgrimage in different regions served to stress the unity of the land and the people. Kings also played their role, through politico-religious institutions like Aswamedha or Rajasuya Yajna. In Aswamedha, a powerful king let loose a horse and claimed dominion over all the territories through which it travelled. In Rajasuya, neighbouring kings were invited to pay homage to his superior might. Difficulties of communication did not permit the establishment of a stable central administration, but a loose form of federal unity was often maintained.

Islam came to India through the peaceful incursion of traders and missionaries. In the far south, the first Muslim tombs occur as early as 642 A.D. and for over a hundred years, peaceful intercourse continued. Permanent Muslim settlements in India on a large scale, however, began only in the twelfth century, but there was no attempt at suppression of the diversity of India. Muslim rulers were quite happy with their Hindu subjects so long as there was no direct revolt. What was a necessity of administration was given the status of a philosophy by Akbar who consciously planned an Indian nation in which the different sections and communities would play a significant role. Again, India was one and many and so long as this principle was followed, India remained for the Western world an El Dorado or earthly paradise.

When Aurangzeb reversed Akbar's policy and tried to impose uniformity, the Mughal Empire began to break. In the succeeding chaos, attempts were made to establish a new Indian empire, but they failed and in the end, British dominion was established over the sub-continent.

Like the Muslim rulers of India, the British also followed a policy of live and let live, and the diversity of India was maintained without break or interruption. It may be added that throughout the rule of the Pathans and the Mughals, poets and saints like Amir Khusro, Guru Nanak, Kabir, Ramanand, Tulsidas and many others helped to develop a common language and preached the message of unity in the midst of diversity.

Indian unity is the more remarkable as Indians lack almost all the elements which are usually considered necessary to constitute a nation. India has never had one language spoken throughout the length and breadth of her territories. Never have all the Indian people followed any one religion. Nor has the entire territory of geographical India ever been ruled from one centre. There are also marked differences in racial characteristics, traditional food habits, customs and institutions in different parts of the country. In spite of these marked divergences, there is equally little doubt that for at least three thousand years or more, there has been a general feeling of Indianness which has transcended all these distinctions and made the many Indian communities one Indian people.

The territorial compactness of the Indian sub-continent is one of the factors responsible for this sense of Indian unity, but by itself it could not have given it the strength which has resisted political, linguistic and religious divisions. The enduring strength of the idea of Indian unity is derived from what may be called in modern political parlance the principle of federalism. It has been recognised from the earliest times that Indian civilisation and culture is characterised by unity in diversity. The Hindu social system is itself a remarkable example of this principle. It has enabled people with the most contrary beliefs to belong to the same social group. Hindu society has rejected neither atheists nor believers in one God or many, so long as certain social proprieties are observed. It has thus given the greatest latitude to intellectual difference, while enforcing general adherence to a certain pattern of social behaviour. Even in behaviour, the greatest diversity

has been permitted as between castes, communities and regions. In *The Indian Heritage*, I have tried to point out how the institution of caste has itself served as an instrument for the incorporation into one social framework of a large number of units with differing levels of culture.

During the period of political struggle for independence, Indian leaders often played with the idea of a unitary state. Very soon they realised that for a country so large as India, with vast climatic differences, many languages, many religions and many traditions, a federal form offered the only solution. The Indian Constitution has incorporated this principle and guaranteed the fullest right of development to every element of Indian life. It has also recognised that there must not only be acceptance of and regard for them, but in addition, each element must be able to feel that it is contributing to the development of the whole of India.

Culturally, India has always exhibited a basic unity in spite of many local differences. In ancient India, Sanskrit was the vehicle of this cultural unity and it continues as a unifying force to this day. In the middle ages, Persian also served as a vehicle of common culture among the upper classes throughout the country. Sanskrit and Persian were, however, restricted to a minority of the people. The introduction of English in the latter half of the nineteenth century proved a great unifying force by developing a common political ideal and social outlook among all sections of the Indian people. One restricting factor in the past had been the absence of books, but when English came to India, printing had made the reproduction of books easy and certain. As a result, English has influenced larger numbers of Indians than Persian or even Sanskrit. Now Hindi is also developing into 'a factor of unity for the sub-continent.

The rise of the modern Indian languages in the middle ages fostered the development of local cultures but served as a barrier to interchange of culture among different regions. Since independence, conscious attempts are being made to develop these languages and simultaneously

make them the vehicle of a common Indian culture. Classics of one language are being translated into other languages and it is expected that in another ten years, important books in any Indian language will be available in all the languages of India. Besides building up a corpus of a common Indian literature, deliberate efforts are being made for establishing greater contacts among literary men of different regions and enriching local cultures by exchange of dance troupes, theatre groups, musicians and singers from one region to another.

Political unification of India has remained an unfulfilled ideal in the past. The factor of physical distance defeated the most ambitious and able monarchs of earlier days. Today, advances in transport and communication have overcome physical distance. One can now travel more quickly from Kashmir to Cape Comorin or from Shillong to Bombay than one could only fifty years ago from Delhi to Agra. Aeroplanes, railways and automobiles are making physical movement easy while the radio, the newspaper and other mass media are making assimilation and accommodation of ideas easier and more certain. Industrialisation and spread of democracy are breaking down the barriers of caste and community and creating new loyalties based on modern ideas. The emergence of all-India political parties is also helping in the process and it is interesting to note that even parties which are essentially sectarian or parochial claim a comprehensive all-India character.

Another factor which strengthens the bond of unity today is found in the conscious acceptance of federation as the principle of our political life. In the past, Indian social and political structure was federal in essence, but this was not conscious or deliberate. A social class that was kept down wanted to raise its status and could be kept down only by force. Similarly, political unification of India took place through the conquest of a king or the domination of one region by another. Naturally, the regions which were dominated were always on the lookout for asserting their independence. Today, different regions have come voluntarily together on a federal basis.

A democratic constitution guarantees equal rights and opportunities to all, so that there is no question of domination of one section or area over another. The institution of all-India services where men of any region may serve in any other region is helping to strengthen the administrative unity of the country. Modern industry and commerce requiring as they do increasingly expanding markets are helping in the economic unification of the country.

India has from the earliest times been one and many. She has prospered when these diversities have been recognised and accommodated in a larger setting. When there have been attempts to suppress differences and impose uniformity, India has suffered grievously. Today, the forces of democracy, science and technology are underlining this teaching of Indian history.

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IMMANUEL KANT

As a Spokesman for Philosophy's Concern for Perpetual Peace

CORNELIUS KRUSE

Philosophers, with few exceptions, have throughout the history of civilization thought and worked for peace. This has been true largely because of the philosopher's confidence in reason and his belief in the possibility of man's control of his destiny through the exercise of his freedom. Wars, as everybody knows, are not natural cataclysms, but are made in the minds and hearts of men, or, as UNESCO so eloquently expresses it in the justly celebrated phrase of its preamble, the joint conception of a British statesman and an American poet, Clement Atlee and Archibald MacLeish: "Since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace have to be constructed." UNESCO has requested philosophers formally to "engage upon a world-philosophy, a unified and unifying background of thought for the modern world." Several important conferences have been held in various parts of the world for the purpose of discovering whether or not there are insuperable differences of thought and world-outlook that would make world-cooperation impossible in principle, usually with reassuring and encouraging result, at least as far as philosophers are concerned. Philosophers are by nature and training usually interested in the universal rather than in the particularistic. Orchestrated harmony, not homogeneous sameness, is the ideal of philosophy. Philosophers, consequently, tend to stress what unites mankind, rather than what divides it. They are also pledged to attempt to promote clarity of concept and of statement, however much they may fall short of this ideal in their own writings. Consequently, they may serve, as UNESCO hopes, as removers of misunderstanding. But are philosophers kings, and would they be happy in the exercise

of kingly rule? No, of course not, but they have a contribution to make just the same.

And no philosopher has made a greater contribution to peace than Immanuel Kant, and it is here that Kant's *Treatise on Perpetual Peace* is so instructive. Kant was seventy-one years of age when in 1795 he published his memorable treatise on how peace could be achieved. While in certain restricted circles this essay has always been prized, one may say, in general, that its teachings have been far too much neglected. All persons interested in the establishment of a just and enduring peace could be much helped and encouraged by a careful study of Kant's short but important treatise. Lest it be thought that this little book is a peripheral writing, the afterthought of an old man who quite naturally, with the slackening of life's pulse, yearned for peaceful declining years, may I point out that Kant's mode of writing in this book reveals vigour of thought, keen and penetrating analysis, and even impressive statesmanship. One may say that this treatise, far from being a reflection of old age, sums up the best philosophic thought of his predecessors, especially of the period of the Enlightenment, and of his own long years of reflection on the nature and potentialities of man, and that it, at the same time, anticipates all modern efforts toward overcoming this greatest manifestation of man's inhumanity to man and the establishment therefore of a co-operative commonwealth of peoples and nations for the maintenance of peace and all its fruits.

Kant was singularly free of illusions regarding man. He called him a "*Klotz*," a gnarled old log, and sometimes asked, "What can one do with that?" But he never lost heart, and never failed to see great continuing potentialities in man. It was customary in Kant's days, as it is often now-a-days, to say that only angels could preserve the peace. Kant specifically put the question: Do men have to be angels to establish peace? He answered his own question with his characteristic blend of hope and caution: "*Nein, nicht wenn sie Verstand haben*" (No, not if they have sense). "Why, even devils," he says, "if they had sense, would see the advantages of peaceful

institutions." But men are not devils. Man is a paradox, as Pascal and others had already observed. At one moment he blindly follows impulse, the impulse of reckless anger, fear and hate, and then exhibits himself as but a passive instrument of Nature, as when hurricane winds bend trees to their desire; at the next moment he experiences regret and becomes poignantly aware of his not having been himself, that is, his *best* self. Man, then—and Kant constantly stressed this fact—is a dweller in two realms, a citizen of two worlds : in one, he is lured and driven by inner and outer forces over which he seems to have no control; in the other, he is and remains a free self-determined judge of his own actions and the initiator of new ways of living and doing things.

But perhaps we had better examine more closely Kant's analysis of man and especially what he regards as central in man, namely, his ethical potentialities and concerns. What Kant has to say on peace is closely articulated with his ethics, which has been one of the most solid contributions ever made to ethical theory. Kant's *Treatise*, then, is not an afterthought, but a magnificent outgrowth of his most mature thinking about man, whether regarded as an individual or as a member of mankind.

Kant, from his earliest days as a university teacher, was always interested in anthropology. It constituted one of his favourite courses, which he taught over and over again. In attempting to epitomize the essence of his teaching he singled out the following as man's most important questions to which philosophy should attempt to find answers :

1. *What can I know ?*
2. *What shall I do ?*
3. *What can I hope ?*

And, as if condensation of thought and programme had not reached its completion, he maintained that all three could be reduced to : What is man ?

Not that Kant was unmindful of the universe about him. Quite the contrary : the natural sciences, too, attracted him; he lectured and wrote on them often throughout his long

teaching career, and as early as 1755, in his *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, he anticipated Laplace's *Nebular Hypothesis* by almost fifty years and, according to Harlow Shapley, Director of the Harvard Observatory, thereby greatly influenced the scientific thinking of the nineteenth century in this point of astronomical inquiry. But Kant left no one in doubt where his heart really was, though he could not forbear to link together in awesome contemplation the starry heavens above and the moral law within. When I was in Königsberg, now Kaliningrad, in 1935 and in devotion to Kant sought out all the Kantian shrines in the city he rarely left after his establishment as a professor at the university he made famous, I saw the plaque—attached to the house built on the site where he once had lived—with this inscription : "Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them : the starry heavens above and the moral law within."

Kant, then, first and last, thought and wrote much on man and, especially, on ethics. There is the *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), and much later the *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797), but in between came the great second critique, the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), preceded by the Copernican revolution, as he called it, of the first critique, and the much neglected but very important third critique, the *Critique of Judgment* (1790), all written in that productive period of the 80's and 90's when Kant was already in years beyond the middle period of his life, but when his creative thinking was at its fullest tide.

What, in brief, are the great ethical foundations upon which Kant builds his confidence in the possibility of eternal peace ? First of all, Kant asked the question : What makes significant ethical experience possible, what makes it possible for man to transcend the realm of determinism which prevails in Nature, and enter into the realm of freedom ? The mysterious experience of the sense "ought". Kant reserved his most impressive and most moving prose to this apostrophe of duty :

Duty ! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating but

requirest submission and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror but only holdest forth a law which of itself finds entrance into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence (though not always obedience)—a law before which all inclinations are dumb even though they secretly work against it : What origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations and from which to be descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves ? It cannot be less than something which elevates man above himself as a part of the world of sense, something which connects him with an order of things which only the understanding can think and which has under it the entire world of sense . . . It is nothing else than personality, i. e., the freedom and independence from the mechanism of nature . . . , so that the person, though belonging to the world of sense, is subject to his own personality so far as he belongs to the intelligible world. For it is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to two worlds, must regard his own being in relation to his second and higher vocation with reverence, and the laws of this vocation with the deepest respect.¹

It is the recognition of this sense of obligation that leads man to a correlative recognition of his freedom. Duty, obligation, ethical imperatives are nonsense, null and void in effect, if man is not free. There is a circle here, but a beneficent and not a vicious one : the sense of duty and freedom belong together in reciprocal dependence upon each other—*without the sense of duty, no recognition of freedom : without freedom, no obligation*. The very voice

1. Lewis White Beck, trans., *Immanuel Kant · Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 193. All later quotations are also taken from this translation. Precise reference are probably not necessary for all such quotations.

of conscience, which men are often disposed to silence and often find uncomfortable at the very least, is the sign and seal of their membership in a higher world than that of sheer physical and natural compulsion. It shows that man is a free citizen in the realm of ends and not merely an animal through which natural impulses surge, without let or hindrance. And here we come to the famous "categorical imperative", which has had the misfortune of being so frequently misunderstood. During the last two wars there were those, for example, who in their ignorance solemnly and confidently assured us that Kant, the peace-loving Kant, should be held responsible for having made the German people obey the commands of their rulers blindly and without critical thought or check. As a matter of fact, Kant's categorical imperative is not imposed externally by any authority. It is the imperative that emerges as a result of self-legislation. Kant, as we shall see, was a republican in his deepest convictions, much interested in and sympathetic to the American and the French Revolution. It is a complete distortion of his central convictions to interpret Kant as a defender of blind obedience to either the ukase of a dictator or the mores of a given society. Man cannot abdicate his freedom, nor his obligation, without ceasing to be a man, in the fullest meaning of this term. As freedom is a necessity for truth, it is also a necessity for man's ethical life, and in having reverence for his obligation he has reverence for his highest self, the active self, the self that is not simply a spectator of his actions, but a creator of a new life for himself and, in conjunction with his fellows, for mankind, and, as he loves to put it, "for the realm of ends".

A complete analysis of this confusion would show that Kant's great distinction between the "must" and the "ought" had not been grasped. Emerson, though very aware of Kant's writings and prizing them highly, makes a similar slip in his otherwise admirable couplet :

*"When duty whispers low thou must,
The youth replies I can."*

Duty never whispers "thou must" in Kant's use of language. A far more deeply meaningful whisper comes

from duty, namely, thou "ought". The "must" need not touch more than the peripheral self, and compliance with the "must" is often what man "ought" not to do. This is really—to exculpate Emerson from a misreading of Kant—what Emerson has in mind when he makes the daring statement : "A good man dare not obey the laws too well." The "ought" is centered in the very depths of man's being; it is the acceptance by man of his innermost self, loyalty to which is an inner obligation inherent in his being a person and not a thing, an end and not a means.

The categorical imperative has for its first maxim this fundamental law : "So act, and so act only, that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as the principle of universal legislation or universal law." As Professor Paton in his admirable book on Kant's *Categorical Imperative*¹ has pointed out, Kant has given us no less than five formulations, or variations, of the same imperative. But they may all be summed up, perhaps, by the injunction : "Universalize thy conduct." Never treat yourself as an exception in the realm of ends or of persons. One of the formulations, which may be considered as a derivative corollary of sufficient significance to merit special attention, runs as follows : "Never treat a person, whether yourself or another, merely as a means, but always also as an end." It will be readily seen that these fundamental injunctions are in essence really re-statements in philosophical terminology of the principle of the Golden Rule, accepted the world over as the cardinal rule of ethical conduct and honoured as the highest reach of man's ethical ideals.

The Kantian ethics has been, and is still, much discussed in philosophical literature, but it is now our concern to see how his hopes for peace for mankind are solidly based on his ethics.

Kant began his treatise, written, by the way, just 150 years before the adoption of the United Nations Charter

1. H. J. Paton, *The Categorical Imperative* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1948), p 148.

in San Francisco, by observing that he is not interested in the *pax perpetua* that was referred to in a Dutch innkeeper's signboard above the picture of a cemetery.

It is clear at the outset that Kant, in thinking of the relationship between ethics and politics, was reverting to the Greek view of life, for, with Plato and Aristotle, he held that politics ought to be continuous with ethics. The Machiavellian disjunction of ethics and politics, which all too often has crept into serious modern discussion, is repudiated outright. Ethical insights are not only relevant to, but imperative for, sound political theory. I need not insist on the catastrophic consequences that inevitably must follow and the public corruption that is entailed, if a double standard of action is followed in private and public life. Kant was convinced that no proposals for peace have any chance at all if ethical demands are flouted. It is true that even devils could maintain peace if they had sense, just as Thomas Hobbes, with a most pessimistic initial view of man as engaged in war of each against each, ends with the Golden Rule on the basis of intelligent self-interest. But Kant knew that reason is not enough and that people under stress often are reckless and forget about and blindly sacrifice self-interest. Something deeper still must be appealed to in order to lay solidly the foundations of peace. It is man's sense of duty that commands him to work for peace. In Kant's view—and he was a gradualist and not a revolutionary—the intelligent seeking of means for the establishment of peace on a just and firm foundation is a moral demand, incumbent, not upon a few, but upon all rational beings, not for a little while, but always. Neglect of this command is tantamount to abdication of man's true manhood. Any abatement of zeal for the elimination of war means, then, not living up to man's high calling.

What, in brief, did Kant propose? Somewhat after the model of a special treaty of peace at the conclusion of a given war, Kant set forth articles for a treaty of *perpetual* peace, not after but before a war. Each article is deserving of close scrutiny and reveals Kant as a person who in rare degree combined theoretical clarity and sound

practical judgment. There were, to begin with, six negative conditions of peace, all of which reject existing or past practices, especially prevalent in the behaviour of despotic monarchical governments, including Prussia.

1. "No Treaty of Peace Shall be Held Valid in Which There is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War."
2. "No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation."
3. "Standing Armies (*miles perpetuus*) shall in Time Be Totally Abolished "
4. "National Debts Shall Not be Contracted with a View to the External Affairs of States."
5. "No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State."
6. "No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible; Such are the Employment of Assassins (*percussores*), Poisoners (*venefici*), Breaches of Capitulation, and Incitement to Treason (*perduellio*) in the Hostile State."

Time forbids dwelling on these articles, some of which, like 1 and 3, are just as important today as they were in Kant's time. But let us pass on to consider the second section of his *Treatise*, which deals with the positive or affirmative conditions of peace. Kant prefaced this section by agreeing with Hobbes, whose political theory in other respects he diametrically opposed, that peace is not a natural gift. *It must be won*. It must be worked for. It must be established. But this hard and realistic fact is often neglected, frequently in the name of a defeatist realism. Thomas à Kempis, the mediaeval monk, already had seen the chief difficulty in really putting efforts toward peace on a firm basis, when he observed : "All men, or most, desire peace, but few men desire that which makes for peace." It is that which day in and day out makes for peace which lovers of peace have to study and try to make effective.

Wishing and sighing for peace, linked with a perpetual postponement of doing something about it, never advances mankind by one step.

The affirmative or definitive articles of peace are three in number :

1. The Civil Constitution of Each State shall be Republican.
2. The Law of Nations of International Law shall be based on a Federation of Free States.
3. The Cosmopolitan of World Law shall be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality.

Let us examine briefly each of these definitive articles.

Kant was much influenced by Locke and Rousseau, but especially by Rousseau. He held Rousseau in such high esteem that his portrait was the sole picture that hung in Kant's study, and he called him "the Newton of ethics." It was Rousseau who taught him, he said, to honour man as man, no matter what his intellectual gifts or social position may be. Kant's apostrophe to duty, cited above, is, in spirit, much like Rousseau's 'Ode to Conscience' in his *Emile*. For Kant, since all men are ends, and not merely means, they are endowed with ethical freedom. Therefore, as citizens they are equal. Only a government of law, truly representative, and with powers separated into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, where sovereignty is vested in the citizens, can make for stability and progress. Kant felt that, if citizens were consulted, wars would be reduced, if not at once eliminated. A republic, therefore, by its very nature, is inclined to peace. He hoped that the United States, in whose founding he had the greatest expectations, would take the lead and serve as a "centre of federal union for other states wishing to join."

This hope he formulated in the Second Law, namely, that there should be formed a federation of free states embodying international law. In 1795 this doctrine was new. Of course, there had been proposals for the attainment of peace before. William Penn, for example, in his *Essay Toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe* (published in 1693), had proposed a plan for a European Parliament. Another

English Quaker, John Bellers (1654-1725), wrote on *Some Reasons for a European State* (1710). The Abbé de Saint-Pierre, who, according to Professor Bury¹, expressed for the first time in his *Observation on the Continuous Progress of Universal Reason* (1737) in definite terms the vista of an immensely long progressive life ahead for humanity, also had published earlier, in 1713, the *Project of Henry the Great to render Peace Perpetual, explained by the Abbé de Saint-Pierre*. This scheme of "great design" was to be an alliance of princes, however, and not of free peoples, and was to maintain the *status quo*, rather than move mankind forward to a higher ethical level, as Kant conceived in his federation.

There is much discussion in our day whether a federation of nations, such as the League of Nations or the United Nations represent, is preferable to a world state. Kant anticipated the attitude of many today in believing that eventually the arrangement that works *within* a nation should also work *among* nations. He recognised that the ideal demanded by reason would be a world republic. But Kant, as was observed earlier, was not a revolutionary. So long as the end goal is not lost sight of he is willing to make haste slowly. He knew how reluctantly states give up even a portion of their sovereignty. Consequently, he proposed as a second best, but none the less a step in the right direction, a "negative substitute", i.e., a federation for the purpose of averting war. For this, a compact among nations, a covenant of peace, is a necessity. It is in this section, almost lost in a footnote, that we find Kant's interesting suggestion that "on the conclusion of peace at the end of a war it might not be unseemly for a nation to appoint a day of humiliation, after the festival of thanksgiving, on which to invoke the mercy of Heaven for the terrible sin which the human race are guilty of, in their continued unwillingness to submit (in their relations with other states) to a law-governed constitution, preferring rather in the pride of their independence to use the barbarous method of war, which after all does not really settle

1 J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress* (New York The Macmillan Company, 1932).

what is wanted, namely, the right of each state in a quarrel." Elsewhere, he wrote : "War makes more evil persons than it removes." In any case, he added, a feast of thanksgiving after a war is not in accord with "the ethical idea of a father of mankind."

The third definitive article is very unusual. "The rights of men, as citizens of the world, shall be limited to the conditions of universal hospitality." This is what he called his "*jus cosmopolitanum*," the law of world-citizenship, for man is by his very nature a member of the rational world-order. What right has a stranger entering foreign territory ? The answer for Kant is clear : the right of hospitality. The earth already in Kant's time seemed small. And in spite of a much smaller world population, Kant clearly saw that "we cannot be infinitely scattered, and must in the end reconcile ourselves to existence side by side." Kant foresaw as early as 1795 that peaceful co-existence is a paramount necessity. But, contrariwise, the right of hospitality dare not be extended to the right to exploit. Intercourse should be facilitated, but the setting up of colonial empires is wrong, and he rejoiced in their yielding at least in his day, "no real profit." "The intercourse, more or less close," he wrote, "which has been everywhere steadily increasing between the nations of the earth, has now extended so enormously that a violation of right in one part of the world is felt all over it." It is difficult to remember that this was written in 1795 ! We have become painfully aware of its truth in our own day. This concludes the articles of perpetual peace, both negative and affirmative.

Thereupon follow supplementary statements and two appendices, each of them adding both wit and wisdom to the previous, more formal articles of peace. The usual text book exposition of Kant's ethics leaves one unprepared for the first supplement. Kant is usually regarded as proclaiming the ethics of duty with no regard for the ethics of consequences. There is no doubt that Kant put his main emphasis upon doing what is right, though the heavens fall. But, of course, he never believed that the heavens would really fall. Quite the reverse, he could not help

believing that the universe in which moral beings find themselves is essentially a moral universe. The biblical injunction, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and its righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you," became in Kant's re-interpretation : "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be added unto you." However, Kant was convinced, in seeking in the moral realm his equivalent for the "kingdom of God and its righteousness", men had better not squint over to those other things that would be added unto him, for then they would not be added unto him. In fact, he felt, not unlike Aristotle, that, while pleasure is a bad guide, and therefore is never to be listened to, when man leads a life of virtue, satisfaction stands unbidden at his side. So in this matter of seeking to establish peace. Kant never wavered in his conviction that all free moral agents by virtue of their manhood ought to work for peace even when the outcome seems most discouraging.

It is true that the entering wedge of regard for consequences appears even in Kant's description of the categorical imperative, because the "ought", he maintains, has no meaning if not based on man's freedom, that is upon man's ability to respond to it. Here the realm of ends and the realm of nature, the "ought" and the "possible" or the actual, retain at least a bridge. In the first part of the *Metaphysics of Morality* (*Rechtslehre*) he stated that eternal peace is the highest political good. It is man's ever-present duty to pursue it "even if there is not the least probability that it can be achieved, provided its impossibility cannot be demonstrated" Kant did not wish to take the bloom off disinterested conduct. In our day we are so prone to look for quick results that Kant's counterweight is of great ethical utility for us. But from the "not-impossible" Kant really proceeded to the "not-improbable," and then to the possible. It is almost as if Kant were now telling us a secret to be divulged only if we are ready for it. If the truth were told, he might whisper to us, "the great artist Nature", in whose realm

man lives as a sentient being, powerfully helps us in our venture for peace. First, in teaching us in the hard school of bitter experience that anarchic life in a state of Nature makes the much-prized liberty of action worthless. Life then becomes for nations, as Hobbes declared, "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short." Furthermore, an examination of nature shows that she (1) has beneficently provided that men can live in all parts of the world; (2) has scattered them, often by means of war, all over the globe; and (3) has forced them to enter into some relations more or less controlled by law. Even the self-seeking propensities of men check each other, and also bring about commercial relations, from which Kant, like many others before and since, doubtless expected too much. It will be recalled that Herbert Spencer, for example, was confident that industry with its necessity for division of labour and consequent co-operation, would greatly aid the establishment of peace. A modern reassessment of the relation between industry and war is given in John Nef's *War and Human Progress*: "The role of war in promoting industrial progress has been small compared with the role of industrial progress in bringing on war."¹ While Kant did not wish to make us too dependent upon nature, he was convinced, nevertheless, that there is a certain guarantee on the part of Nature that peace is no "mere chimera". And this fact makes it once more our duty to labour for what is at least possible.

There follows a brief ironical "secret article" to the effect that "the opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the possibility of a public peace, shall be taken into consideration by states armed for war" But, since it may derogate from the dignity of the legislative authority of a state to seek advice from philosophers, Kant proposed that the state will silently and secretly invite suggestions. Contrary to Plato, Kant felt that philosophers should not be kings, for the exercise of power corrupts the free exercise of reason. All he demanded is that philosophers shall be heard.

1. Cambridge . Harvard University Press, 1950, p. 377.

In the first appendix Kant considered once more whether there is a real quarrel between morals and politics, and, as we have seen early, he completely rejects this disjunction. Furthermore, good theory, he always insisted, is also good practice, and practice without theory, without vision, is like flying blind.

Kant saw with great clarity the increasing difficulties that are encountered as the government of larger units of mankind is involved. But he saw with equal clarity that difficulties do not alter principles. As was noted before, he was willing to proceed with caution in proposing changes and did not wish to "drag in the conditions of perpetual peace by force, but to take time and approach this ideal gradually as favourable circumstances permit." It seemed to him absurd to demand that every imperfection in government be violently altered on the spot, but it is the duty of all, especially for the rulers of the state, to apply their whole energy to correct the defects and approach the ideal as soon as possible. He had only scorn for those in authority who follow the Machiavellian principles of

(a) *Fac et excusa*, or present people with a *fait accompli* and then find convincing reasons for the illegal step;

(b) *Si fecisti, nega*;

(c) *Divide et impera*.

These maxims of astuteness of expedience can all be summed up as exemplifying the all-too-prevalent excuse that the end justifies the means. Now, Kant, as we have seen, had reverence only for the commands of the moral law. Even those who cover up immoral deeds with moral names, he felt, show how universal is the necessity to seem, at least, to have a "decent regard" for the moral judgments of mankind. In fact, "the respect for the idea of right" is "absolutely impossible for man to divest himself of." "And hence," once more he concluded, "every man sees himself obliged to act in accordance with what the idea of right prescribes, whether his neighbours fulfil the obligation or not." And politics itself cannot take a real step forward without paying homage to the principles

of morals. However difficult politics may be, and especially world politics, when united with morals the course is clear: right must be held sacred by man at whatever cost.

Kant, in conclusion, offered a second appendix which may have inspired Wilson's demand for open covenants openly arrived at. He formulated a final maxim: "All actions relating to the rights of other men are wrong, if the maxims from which they follow are inconsistent with publicity." Publicity he recognized as a moral aid, just as Josiah Royce rightly regarded the increasing use of certified public accountants in business and city and town administrations as a great aid to public morals. The affirmative statement of his maxim of publicity reads: "All maxims which require publicity, in order that they may not fail to attain their end, are in agreement both with right and politics."

We have now come to the end of our consideration of Kant as the spokesman for philosophy's concern for peace and harmony among the nations and the peoples of the world. I am sure you will agree with the great French philosopher, Leon Brunschvicg, when he wrote on an earlier occasion in his *Le Progres de la Conscience*,¹ that Kant is "Germany's best title of nobility" as it once more enters the family of nations. But, far beyond the confines of one country, Kant spoke for all mankind in reminding us where man's true "*dignidad*" resides, and what constitutes the true grandeur of peoples and nations. We do not have to wait until all men are angels; we do not have to postpone right action until we are assured that all others will do the same; we do not have to guarantee even in our lifetime the fruits of right action; but we may know now that, unless we wish to forfeit man's dignity and become the windswept instruments of unchecked passion, we must increasingly work for the peace that comes from world co-operation under law. "Seek ye first the kingdom of pure practical reason and its righteousness, and the object of your endeavour, the blessing of perpetual peace, will be added unto you."

1. *Le Progres de la Conscience dans la Philosophie Occidentale* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1927), p. 333.

The greatest tribute that could be paid to Kant or to any person or to any generation would then be the tribute paid by the University of Virginia to Woodrow Wilson after his valiant efforts for peace and a union of nations under law :

"He had the heart to match the reason and the moral hope of mankind against their passions."

■ ■ ■

FAITH AND HUMAN PERSONALITY

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

Under the caption "Perilous Faith" there appeared a news item in a Calcutta paper which said : "Superstitious villagers of Karimganj subdivision have resorted to mass prayer to God for ridding them of the menace of caterpillars and have refused to adopt anti-caterpillar measures in the belief that they would die if they destroyed caterpillars." The behaviour of the Karimganj villagers is typical, in a sense, of human behaviour in general. In view of what science and technology have accomplished one may not readily admit this; yet nevertheless it is true that man is never free from a sense of mystery. He encounters the mysterious in one manner or another : his ingenuity and intelligence seem to fail him at the critical moment : he feels compelled to resign himself to a Power more than what he is familiar with. Even if no other mystery haunts a man, there is one common and inevitable mystery which all mortal life has to face—the mystery of death. Probably, actual death is not so terrifying as death in prospect. When the dread of death grips man, he becomes helpless and turns to a Power that will save him. As Ramana Maharshi, the sage of Arunachala, says in his *Poem of Forty Verses*, "The people who have great fear of death seek shelter at the feet of the Supreme Lord who is without death and birth."

All men, it is true, do not think of God readily and immediately even when they are on the brink of a catastrophe. An English woman of fifty-five, when asked if she ever prayed, is reported to have replied, "Well, I do when I think I've got more trouble than I can handle. But it's got to be something very bad to make me pray." A priest on board a sinking ship when summoned by the captain for the last prayer, exclaimed in utter desperation, "Oh ! Has it come to that ?" In fact, most of us hold God as the last reserve. We set up other gods on the altar—gods

such as Big Money, Material Might, and Social Status—and worship them with ceremony and zeal in the hope that we shall be saved. Each time we get disappointed we are granted a glimpse of the truth; but it does not take long for *Maya* to blind our vision again and make us hug our old faith. Yes : faith in the efficiency of the temporal is none the less a faith. No man can ever be devoid of faith. As the *Bhagavad-gītā* puts it :

*śraddhamayo 'yam purushah
yo yac chraddhas sa eva sah.*

“Man is made of faith; as his faith is, so he is”. The choice before man is not between faith and no faith, but between good faith and bad. Just as the physical body subsists on food, the mind of man lives on faith. Good and wholesome food benefits the body; bad and unwholesome food harms it. So it is with faith in relation to the mind. It is not possible to deny faith because the very denial is an expression of faith. And no campaigning against faith can be made except in the name of another faith. Since faith governs the total personality of man, he may seek to reject it only at his peril. If a person does not believe in any of the traditional faiths, it may be imagined that he has no faith. But the truth is otherwise. A number of new faiths have been added to the old ones : scientism, evolutionism, behaviourism, psychoanalysis, historicism, humanism, dialectical materialism, pragmatism, positivism, linguistic analysis—these are some of the modern incarnations of faith. Each is held to with a fanaticism that is not a whit less than what is associated with the traditional religions. The followers of each swear by a prophet, a book, or a church. Each of these new cults has its own inner circle and esoteric practices, its own myths and mysteries. As Dr. Radhakrishnan observes in his book, *The Recovery of Faith*, “The age of faith is always with us; only the object of our faith changes. We depart from one creed only to embrace another.”

Answering to the main character-types, the noble, the passionate, and the dull (*sattvika*, *rajasa*, and *tamasa*), there are three grades of faith, says the *Bhagavad-gītā*. The

noble type worship the divine, the passionate the semi-divine, and the dull the diabolic powers. Only one in a thousand belongs to the noble type, observes Sankara, the majority of people are either passionate or dull (*tatra kaścid eva sahasreshu devapujadi-tatparah sattvanistho bhavati, bahulyena tu rajonistha tamonisthaś ca eva pranino bhavanti*). The progress of each individual should be measured in terms of the success he achieves in sublimating his lower nature by cultivating the higher faith. When he gets tied up in tensions and is overcome by inertia, he ceases to be even human. It is through ceaseless endeavour that he may rise to spiritual heights and realise his innate divinity.

It is difficult to define or even describe faith. Because of its uniqueness and all-comprehensive nature, faith defies analysis. This much, however, may be said of faith : it governs the whole being of man, and is concerned with the whole of reality. Dr. Paul Tillich, American theologian and thinker, characterizes faith as the ultimate concern for the ultimate, the unconditional concern about the unconditional. Faith is unconditional concern in the sense that it proceeds from the total personality, and not merely from a part or aspect thereof. In an act of faith the complete being of man is geared and set for functioning. Hence it is that faith has such a great potency for both good and evil. It can either make a god of man or a beast of him. The immense power that faith wields is derived from the ultimate or the imagined ultimate for which its concern is ultimate. If the object of faith is the pseudo-ultimate, faith becomes an idolatry fraught with evil. Success, social standing, economic power—these and similar idols have exacted men's worship under false pretensions. By surrendering themselves to these, men have gone to ruin, and have become mental wrecks. It is devotion to the true ultimate that will heal the lacerated heart of man and make him whole. In fact, the test of the true ultimate is that it integrates the human personality and makes for sublimity and inner peace. It does not matter whether the ultimate reality is envisaged as a personal god or as the supra-personal Absolute. Faith

in either results in the removal of egoity and the taming of the passions. The goal of faith is mental equanimity and inward happiness. This can be gained through self-naughting and consequent self-fulfilment. The theist and the non-dualist aim at the same consummation—the transcendent unity of the human with the divine.

Faith, it is believed, can move mountains. Miracles attributed to the power of faith are legion. Not infrequently do we hear of supernormal powers exhibited by persons said to be endowed with the vision of faith. That the frontiers of the human mind extend much farther than the sphere of sense-perception is the claim of the parapsychologists. Extra-sensory perception and precognition are stated to be experimentally verifiable phenomena. There is no part of the world which has not its tradition of miraculous events associated with its prophets and saints, holy places and sacred rivers. Whatever be the truth of all such claims, there is no denying the fact that the greatest miracle faith can perform is to heal the afflictions of the human soul. "Among all my patients in the second half of my life," says the late C. G. Jung, "there has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to say that everyone of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given their followers and none of them has really been healed who did not regain his religious outlook."

Unfortunately, the great religions—to be more precise, those who follow them—have been quarrelling among themselves. The faithful of each particular persuasion seem to believe that with them is vested the whole truth, and that all other religions deserved only to perish. Such an attitude of narrowness and bigotry has been responsible for bringing faith into discredit. Especially in the modern age when faith in the Ultimate is in jeopardy, there is no meaning in the mutual rivalries of religions. Right from the beginning of religious thought in India, the sages and saints have stressed the need for alternative approaches to the Godhead. While the essence of religion is the same, its expressions do and ought to vary. The common aim

of all those who profess a faith should be to help the progress of humanity towards perfection, and not to hinder it by introducing discord in the name of religion.

There are ultra-rationalists who today believe that the cobwebs of religion have been swept clean with the broom of science. But they little realise, that the cobwebs of ignorance are not resident only in one of the mansions of the human mind. In the name of religion, it is true, mankind has believed in superstitions. But there can be and are superstitions of science as well. It is a superstition, for instance, to believe that science can legislate for all knowledge. The truth of science cannot contradict the truth of religion. Science has neither the right nor the power to meddle with faith, even as faith has no jurisdiction in the province of science. This does not mean, however, that faith is or has to be irrational. There can be no conflict between faith and reason. To quote a well-known passage from Sankara : "That which is accepted or believed in without thorough inquiry prevents one from reaching the ultimate good and also results in great evil." True faith is open-eyed and not blind. It is vision that constitutes faith, and not belief.

There is a view which imagines that men of faith, the saint and the sage, are of no use to the world, whatever may be their personal gain. But the truth is that these men of spirit have nothing selfish to gain. They are personalities—if personalities they may be called—without inner tensions and tangles, disruptions and distortions, perfectly free and at ease, knowing no distinctions of 'mine' and 'not mine'. Their love flows towards all beings. They hate none and can be hated by none. They recognise the same Reality or God everywhere. Their very presence exalts the world. They are the greatest benefactors of mankind. In the *Bhagavad-gita*, Sri Krishna declares in a verse :

*yasman no dvijate loko lokan no dvijate ca yah,
harshamarshabhayodvegair mukto yah sa ca me priyah.*

"He by whom the world is not troubled and who is not troubled by the world, he who is free from elation and anger, fear and anxiety, he is dear to me."

In another verse we are told :

*atmaupamyena sarvatra samam pasyati yo 'rjuna,
sukham va yadi va duhkham sa yogi paramo matah.*

“He who looks upon all as himself, in pleasure or in pain—he is considered the ideal yogin.”

It is such integrated persons that are the salt of the earth. The miracle that they have achieved can be ours if we would follow them and recover Faith.

■ ■ ■

PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL

G. R. MALKANI

I

Philosophy is said to be a thinking consideration of things. We think about the *nature* of reality. This emphasis upon the *knowledge* of reality is often deprecated as being one-sided. Philosophy has become too much a matter of the intellect. It is, therefore, suggested that any philosophy to be complete must also take into consideration other aspects of human experience. We must have a well-rounded off philosophy which satisfies the whole man, not merely the intellectual man. *Truth* must be combined with *value*.

This recommendation has unfortunately only led to a swing in the opposite direction. Instead of having a complete philosophy of the intellect and the will, for instance, we have a philosophy of the *will only* as an alternative to the philosophy of the intellect. Nietzsche and Schopenhauer were philosophers of the will. So are modern existentialists. Our contention is that the unsuccessful pursuit of Truth is the real reason for this reaction. If we can have success with Truth in the literal sense, problems of the will would not arise.

It appears to us, at the outset, that we cannot construct a philosophical system in which the intellect and the will have equal importance and, therefore, equal satisfaction. A philosophy that satisfies the intellect is likely to give a secondary, and, therefore, a subordinate, place to the satisfaction of the will, and vice-versa. It is a matter of choice for us, not a matter of combining the two at the very initial stage.

Hindu philosophy has been predominantly a philosophy of the intellect. It has found its highest expression in Advaita Vedānta. There is also a philosophy of action called *Karma-Kanda*. But this is not literally philosophy. It is literally part of dogmatic religion. Scriptural authority

is not to be disputed. To act as the scripture enjoins and not to act where the scripture prohibits is supposed to be in the best interests of man. The scripture itself is not man-made or even God-made. God merely communicates an eternal law. He is not the maker of the law, but the communicator of it. The authority of the law is thus not derived from any person, it is implicit in the law itself. We are free to accept this authority or not to accept it, -we are not free to question it or to criticise it. This kind of morality, based on the revealed word, is called *dharma*. It is necessarily supernatural in its origin. It is opposed to all *naturalistic* or *evolutionary* ethics.

European metaphysics and European ethics are both supposed to be based on *reason*. The two supplement each other. A system of metaphysics implies in a way a theory of morals, and vice versa. We can start at either end. We can start with a theory of morals, and build up a metaphysics in consonance with it, or just do the opposite. This is not so in Hindu philosophy. Here knowledge of metaphysical reality is pre-eminent. It is not a species of rational or speculative knowledge, i.e. knowledge in terms of concepts only. It is knowledge in the most primary sense of the term or knowledge that is both direct and certain. It is a *darśana*. It is evident that such direct knowledge is bound by its very nature to determine the direction of the will and all its ideals. If one actually sees fire, one does not stretch out one's hand to thrust it into the fire. In this sense, knowledge is the highest virtue. It is the virtue of virtues. If one is able, for instance, to see the absolute truth, there is little left for the will to do. The will is quieted. It is absorbed in the truth. Could we then need an ethical philosophy to formulate the goals of the will ?

According to Advaitic metaphysics, reality is one, undifferentiated and absolute. This leaves no room for the reality of the individual, for time, for morality, and for achievement. No system of ethical philosophy can therefore fall in line with Advaitic metaphysics. Those who see the one Brahman in all things and in all persons lose the very distinction of 'I' and 'You'. They are above

morality and above the law. The whole of *Karma-Kānda* or the system of religious duties is only distantly and indirectly related to the philosophy of Truth. It produces a certain *purification* of the mind and a *desire* to know the truth. But no amount of such purification or moral exaltation can achieve the miracle of knowledge. Knowledge can only follow the application of the appropriate *pramāṇa* and those auxiliary processes of reasoning which make the *pramāṇa* fruitful.

The way of knowledge may not suit all persons. It is, to be sure, a difficult way. In that case, recourse can be had to the way of the will. If we take this way, we shall certainly need an intellectual picture of reality as a whole. But this picture will be subordinate to the requirements of the will and its ideal. The moral philosopher is not interested in *pure metaphysics* or in *pure truth*. He will simply argue that his moral philosophy requires a particular picture of reality, and not any other. The metaphysics of a moral philosophy must be subordinate to the requirements of that philosophy. But this evidently makes the conclusions of a moral philosophy conditional on an untruth or a lesser truth. The way of the will may be a *second best*, but not *the very best*.

A question is sometimes asked, can ethics be independent of metaphysics? Some argue that ethics cannot be independent of metaphysics. An ethical system presupposes a metaphysics,—the nature of the soul, the nature of ultimate reality, the relation between the two, the sort of destiny which the soul by its own nature is capable of, etc. This view appears plausible. Philosophy must be a whole in which our view of the universe in which we live must conform with human duties and human destiny. There must therefore be an indissoluble tie between our ethical conclusions and the metaphysical ones. But as we have seen, a complete knowledge of the truth may render any moral philosophy unnecessary, and even impossible. There is, therefore, some justification for keeping the two distinct. If we are to have a moral philosophy at all, we must start with moral questions, and treat purely metaphysical questions as of little or no importance.

We should not mix up the two. European ethics is clearly an independent science—it draws nothing directly from metaphysics. We think that a moral philosophy can stand by itself. In fact, it is possible only when it can so stand. But it is important to remember that it can solve no metaphysical problem. We cannot, therefore, agree with Kant when he made the ethical consciousness the basis of proof for certain metaphysical entities.

We conclude that a perfect metaphysics may leave no scope for ethics; but a perfect ethics (if ethics can at all be perfect) will certainly still leave scope for metaphysics—it will not silence all metaphysical questions. Metaphysics is in this sense the fundamental philosophical pursuit and more comprehensive as well as more significant than ethics.

II

An independent science of ethics based on moral experience has been pursued. But certain doubts arise. Moral experience is of a dubitable character. Moral facts, as generally understood, can be disputed and have been disputed. If anything is morally obligatory, that is a matter of *personal acceptance* only. It is only when we recognise a *higher authority*, divine or social, that the so-called moral principles assume a sort of obligatoriness upon us. So far as the purely human situation is concerned, there is nothing really obligatory. All courses of action have reference only to our immediate or mediate self-interest. We have desires of various sorts,—some gross, others subtle. Some are satisfied directly and immediately, others through deferred action. Some give only a short-lived satisfaction, others give continued and ever-increasing satisfaction. Reason itself supplies no *motive* of action. It merely regulates our desires. What is rational in action is what serves the interests of the individual *in the long run*. It is only religion with its invisible and incalculable after-effects called *dharma* and *adharma* that can really demand and inspire sacrifices of various kinds from the individual. There is no inferential basis

in our own experience for the future effects of purely religious acts. It is a new form of loyalty with a new law of conduct. If anything is *truly moral* or *truly a non-natural motive of action*, it can only be found in the religious sphere. There is, therefore, no morality without religion, and no such thing as an *autonomous ethics*.

We may well ask, in this connection, what would be the moral philosophy of a community that recognises no religion? Without this higher guidance, man is left entirely to his own resources. Society and social opinion guide him to a very large extent. So much so, that the moral may be said to be that which is approved by society. But in a time of crisis, when the society is disorganised and social opinion is practically absent, the individual has to live all by himself without any social restraints. Will there then be anything *moral* for him? He knows that all that is left to him is his will or power of decision. All the idols and the ideals that guided him before are in the dust. He is assailed by concern for his own being, and is confronted by an ever-yawning non-being in the absence of religious faith. The will is the only positive force of life for him. But, then, where does it lead? Is there a goal or an end? Evidently there can be none where the will is a law unto itself, and where all forms of authority, both secular and non-secular, cease to function. It is easily a philosophy of *nihilism*. There is no guiding ideal, no morality, no destiny, no hereafter, no God. *What alone makes morality possible is some kind of authority, social or divine.*

III

Buddhism accepted no authority. But still it gave us a pure philosophy of the will. The will is no doubt a law unto itself; but the law gives us an ideal to work for. This ideal is immanent in the will and should guide the will. Desire is the most potent factor in life. In fact, life means desire. Desire ends in frustration and pain. The will, although in principle free, is over-laid and directed by desire. It is the only motive-force in life. To be free, therefore, from the pain of existence, we must negate

all desire and with it the will *to be* or *to exist*. Here then is a positive moral philosophy and an alternative to existentialism.

We want to be *free*. *Freedom* is the goal. Our will is no doubt free to all appearance. But the freest will is motivated by desire. This makes the achievement of *absolute freedom* by the will a necessity. Here, then, is the ideal and the goal. The way to this goal is through the negation of all desire; *and when all desire is negated, the will itself is negated*. Paradoxical although it may appear, we become free as we progressively will the negation of the will itself. When the goal is fully achieved, we become free from empirical existence as such with its attendant pain. This is absolute freedom or *nirvana*. *Nirvana* is not pure extinction or nothingness. It is the perfect peace of desirelessness. It is eminently positive. Here, then, is a pure philosophy of the will without any metaphysical presuppositions or the acceptance of any religious authority.

All this may be so. But we cannot *compartmentalise* philosophical questions. Even a philosophy of the will has metaphysical implications. The Buddhist analysis of the self in terms of the not-self and its assertion of universal momentariness is bad metaphysics. A permanent self is necessary for the will. As a matter of fact, it is not the will that is free. It is the self that is free. The will is only an instrument of the self's freedom. This freedom is veiled by desire. When, therefore, all desire is removed, it is the freedom of the self that is realized. *There is no such thing as freedom by itself or freedom beyond being*. It is all freedom of the self or *freedom that is the self*.

Indeed, Buddhism has its own arguments to justify its metaphysical positions. Some of them may be stated as follows : (a) A permanent self is not to be found. Experience only reveals momentary states. (b) A permanent and unchanging self cannot act. Action entails change. If anything acts, it must change. (c) What is a moral decision worth if it changes nothing in the actor ? The actor must be able to make and to unmake his destiny through such decisions. But, then, can he remain

unchanging ? A permanent and unchanging self is a challenge to the reality of moral life.

Advaita Vedanta, the philosophy of *Truth par excellence*, reverses all these arguments. According to it, the unchanging alone can be said to be the actor. If the actor changes in the act, he is part of the act. Where is the actor ? An actor must exist prior to the act, continue unchanged through it, and survive it. The act is *his*, because he is *qualitatively* different from the act. If indeed it is paradoxical to suppose that the unchanging acts, we have got to take the *further step* that the unchanging does not *really* act,—he only *appears* acting. An act is *his* through false identification. Again, there can be a moral change in the dispositions of the *mind*. There is causal continuity here. As we sow, so shall we reap. But the real self is beyond the mind. He neither sows nor does he reap. He only *appears to do so*. All moral facts can thus be explained on a sounder metaphysical basis. Only morality is shorn of all its *glory*. All moral achievement becomes *mere appearance*. But, then, nothing is lost thereby. *We need to realize that no permanent good can be achieved through action*. What can be so achieved can also be lost. Not action, but *knowledge alone* can bring about a permanent release from bondage. This is the goal of a true metaphysics.

In our opinion, Advaita Vedanta in a sense fulfils Buddhism. If desire is the cause of pain, the cause of desire is ignorance. We are ignorant of our real, transcendent and blissful self,—and so we desire. When the error of our embodied existence is removed and we know the truth of the non-dual self, we shall cease to desire. Only a man of this higher knowledge can be truly and absolutely desireless (*niskam*). We are most moral therefore when we are perfectly enlightened metaphysically. Short of this enlightenment, a trace of desire is bound to remain somewhere. The pre-eminence of the metaphysical approach of Vedanta, even for moral perfection, is thus clearly indicated. A person that *knows* achieves all that it is possible to achieve through any other method, and much more. He alone is free in an absolute sense.

IV

An attempt is sometimes made to combine a real metaphysics with a real ethics. Metaphysically, we accept a substantival soul and a substantival God. Ethically, we accept the possibility of moral achievement by man and the eternal moral perfection of God. We can thus combine a positive metaphysics with a very positive morality.

Now the postulate of a soul-substance is good as far as it goes. But the postulate is left where it is. No attempt is made to turn our belief in a soul-substance into *knowledge* of the same. As a matter of fact, when the soul is said to *grow* in its moral stature, it ceases to be really a permanent soul. To say that it is both changing and unchanging is to speak a language which has no meaning. The unchanging can never *really* act or *really* grow. It can only do that *illusorily*.

It may here be argued that freedom to be real must be *exercised*. If, then, the self is not only intelligent, but also free, he must possess what is called elective freedom. He can cast his lot with a particular motive, identify himself with it and so will it. He thus becomes an actor. He takes part in the conflict of motives, chooses between them, supports some in various degrees, and finally takes a decision. We may suppose that this is the case. But it does not explain how a perfectly free self can choose at all or take sides. If freedom is not just eccentricity, the self must be supposed to be influenced in his choice by his whole past history up to the point of the decision. But, then, what remains of elective freedom itself? The permanent self does not decide anything of himself, but only is so far as he has falsely identified himself with competing historical forces or dispositions, which are said to constitute his *character*. Buddhism is nearer the truth when it ascribes all activity to incipient desire and not to a colourless and anaemic soul.

V

Philosophers have dissociated morality from religion.

But does this stand to reason ? We know that the truth of religion is supernatural. Its rewards too are supernatural,—the well-being of the individual soul in the hereafter. But what kind of value does morality realize for us ? If it realizes no value that has any reference to the well-being of the soul in the hereafter, we should not distinguish, as we are prone to do, moral good from other kinds of secular good *qualitatively*. We invest morality with a kind of *sanctity*, and regard moral acts as what we *ought* to do. We feel *no obligation* for realizing intellectual value or aesthetic value. Why this obligation about moral value ? The truth is that morality loses all meaning if it has only a *human sanction* behind it, and if the goals realized through it have reference merely to certain good things of this life. The moral law would be a lawless law, if people sacrifice, suffer and die for it, without any gain to themselves here and without any assured higher compensation in the hereafter. If such compensation itself appears immoral, what other value does morality realize for us ? However we try, we cannot escape an intimate connection of morality with religion. If an atheist can still have a *genuine morality*, he has only a religion of a different sort. He does not disbelieve the truth of the *hereafter* and moral *causality*. Buddhism is the prototype of any such religion.

Buddhism is atheistic in the commonly accepted sense of the term. But it has a grand morality and a genuine moral system. The goal which morality realizes for us must be immanent in the moral law. The Buddhist goal of extinction of desire or peace that has no end is clearly such. The value of practising virtue must not be an external reward or happiness in heaven, but dispassionateness and peace. The will has disobeyed no one and committed no sin. To be driven by desire is the only sin. To be free from desire is the highest heaven. The practice of virtue itself or even social service, the mainstay of Christian ethics, must take a secondary place. The first place of necessity must go to the *cessation of desire*.

Advaita Vedanta alone can claim to go beyond Buddhism. Cessation of pain is only a negative goal. The more positive goal would be *joy without end*. This is

always present in the Self and constitutes its own essential nature. We have lost it through ignorance only. We can regain it through knowledge. When we know the truth we become the truth. The will then has no further scope.

A metaphysical approach to truth thus supersedes a moral approach. It fulfils and perfects all other approaches. Will is rendered inoperative, and feeling is fully satisfied in the knowledge of non-duality. If there is an integral experience, here it is,—knowledge of Absolute Truth is at the same time Absolute Freedom and Absolute Joy. There is an internal unity of the three. This is the only genuine Absolute.

■ ■ ■

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

DR. Y. MASHI

The problem stated above is really an invitation for a definition of religion. And every student of theology knows that this is a notoriously difficult task. Religion of some sort has always remained a universal feature of human existence. Hence it has appeared in innumerable forms. It appears well-nigh impossible to bring them all under one definition. So far there has not been a single notion which has been able to clip together fetishism, animism, manatism, theism, polytheism, Jainism, Buddhism, Vedantism etc. Seeing the task of empirical generalisation forbidding, Western theologians have attempted a genetic and an evolutionary treatment of the subject. For this purpose they have assumed Christianity to be the standard form of religion in terms of which they classify, and explain all other forms of religion. Even this arbitrary procedure has not been successful, since Jainism, Buddhism and the like forms of Indian religion cannot be adequately dealt with. Mostly they have regarded them as ethical systems. Indian thinkers too have fallen into the linguistic trap. When they could not explain the Vedantic view of religion, then in order to explain it they have used the persuasive terms 'supra-theism' or 'supra-religion'. But if theism be considered as the highest form of religion then any claim for a religion higher than theism has no meaning. At least this is clear from what R. Flint has to say on the subject :

"The highest possible form of religion must be a theistic religion."¹.

He further shows in Sec. III, Lect. II that any religion less than theism is not acceptable and anything more than theism is not possible. However, the Indian view does not get invalidated by such assertion. The non-dualistic form of Vedantic religion holds that theism is only a stage

1. *Theism*, p 50.

in the spiritual ascent of man. According to it every form of theistic religion is true to the person who believes it. Hence the eloquent words of Radhakrishnan :

“The different religious traditions clothe the one Reality in various images and their visions could embrace and fertilise each other so as to give mankind a many-sided perfection”.²

Yet according to the Vedantic view of religion every form of theistic religion ultimately has to be negated in favour of the one single religion of the Supreme Spirit³. Now we may not accept the Vedantic view and yet we cannot accept a definition of religion in terms of theism only because it would lead to the rejection of Jainism and Buddhism as forms of religion. They are considered as ethical systems on the ground that they contain commands and injunctions for attaining Kaivalya and Nirvana. But this is not true of Jainism and Buddhism alone. Most of the theistic forms of religion prescribe moral life. In this connection we are reminded of Prof. R. B. Braithwaite's view according to which religious assertion is really moral assertion (an empiricist's view of the nature of religious belief). Further there are strong grounds for not regarding Jainism and Buddhism as merely ethical systems. Which ethical systems have adopted Nirvana or Kaivalya as the standard of moral judgment ? As a matter of fact the state of Nirvana or Kaivalya is a state beyond the distinction of Good and Bad. An ethical theory may be based on metaphysical systems but it does not adopt the ultimate reality as the standard of moral judgment. Hence we take Jainism and Buddhism as real forms of religion. Hence with Emile Durkheim we reject the definition of religion which is confined to 'the idea of gods or spirits'⁴. Therefore, it would be inadvisable to define religion as Galloway and Martineau have done, as

“man's faith in a power beyond himself whereby he seeks to satisfy emotional needs and gains stability

2. *Fragments of a Confession*, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SARVEPALLI RADHAKRISHNAN p. 76

3. *Ibid*-p 77.

4. *The elementary forms of the religious life*, George Allen 1954. p. 35.

of life, and which he expresses in acts of worship and service"⁵.

Again,

"Religion is a belief in an ever-living God, that is, a Divine Mind and Will *ruling* the Universe and holding moral relations with mankind".⁶

Quite clearly a Being who satisfies the emotional needs of his worshippers, or, an ever-living Being who holds moral relations with his worshippers, must be regarded as a personal entity. Manicism, Jainism and Buddhism do not require any personal and super-natural being. Hence, the above definitions given by Galloway and Martineau are too narrow and arbitrary.

The task of defining religion has become further complicated by analytical philosophy. Following the language of Warnock⁷, in defining religion I do not want to assert new beliefs or to reject old ones, but I am trying 'a kind of re-description, a shift of viewpoint, a modification of modes of thought'. I accept a great deal of what has been written by analytical philosophers⁸ in spite of the protest by Mr. M. J. Charlesworth⁹. However, I have derived a great deal of impetus from W. F. Zuurdeeg's *An Analytical Philosophy of Religion*. I want to pin down the actual state of affairs, implicit and explicit, to which the term 'religion' is applicable.

1. *The etymological meaning of 'religion'*—The term 'religion' has been derived from the two words *re* and

5. Galloway, G. *The Philosophy of Religion*, p. 184.

6. Martineau, James, *A Study of Religion*, Vol. I., pp. 1, 15.

7. Warnock, G. J. *Analysis and Imagination*, in *THE REVOLUTION IN PHILOSOPHY*, edited by A. J. Ayer and others (Macmillan, 1957), pp. 121, 122.

8. Flew, A. and Macintyre, A. *New Essays in Philosophical Theology* SCM Press, 1958.

Ramsey, Ian T. *Religious Language*, SCM Press, 1957.

Mitchell Basil, *Faith and Logic*, George Allen, 1958.

Ramsey, Ian T. *Prospect for Metaphysics*, Allen and Unwin, 1961.

9. Charlesworth, M. J. *Linguistic Analysis and Language about God*, INTERNATIONAL PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY, February 1961.

legere which mean 'to consider or to ponder'. Hence, it means that religion deals with an object on which an individual can ponder and meditate. But perhaps it is true to hold that it is derived from *re* and *legare* which mean 'binding'. According to this derivation, religion means that which binds men together, individually and socially. Hence religion is an integrative force which forges harmony, internal and external, social and individual, and physical and spiritual. Religion as such has stood for an object of devotion in relation to which the competing impulses within man are controlled and in relation to which fellowship with other men is made possible.

2. *The holistic nature of the religious response*—The very fact that all psychical processes are integrated together by religion shows that a religious response is holistic in nature. This is supposed to be the merit of the two definitions given by Galloway and Martineau. According to these theologians cognition, conation and affection are all involved in religion. The terms 'belief' and 'faith' stand for the cognitive aspect; 'worship and service' and 'moral relations' indicate conative elements; and 'emotional stability' points to affective elements. But is this holism adequately analysed?

3. *The numinous feature of religion*—The analysis of religious experience suggested by Galloway and Martineau is not adequate since it does not bring out the element of numinousness involved in religion. The term 'numinous' stands for two things. First, it indicates that religious experience is unique or *sui generis*. Hence it cannot be reduced to other categories so easily. Secondly, it holds that religious statements cannot be precise for they deal with 'tremendous mystery'. 'Mystery' does not mean ignorance for it is not stupefying. The mystery involved here becomes all the more mysterious to persons who are supposed to have the most favoured vision of God. It brings life and light to those who have the encounter with the 'hidden' God. Moses learnt that the God of the burning bush was Yahweh whose name was 'I am that I am'. This was a mystery for Moses. But

this mystery evokes the whole man. For instance, a shepherd of sheep was transformed into a leader and redeemer of men (Moses), a catcher of fish was elevated to a catcher of man (Peter). The same fate appears to have overtaken Balmiki and Tulsidas. Hence, in the state of religious experience an individual rises from his usual state of profaneness to a state of holiness. Here the psychical processes of conation, cognition and affection are not suppressed but are raised to a plane of higher potentials. Hence, in any definition of religion the element of numinousness has to be included.

4. *The symbolism in religion*—That which we worship is known as deity and the nature of this deity has been described by Rudolf Otto as the *mysterium tremendum et fascinosum*. Now, theological statements lack precision because they express something which touches off and echoes the unconscious depth in each man. A swastika, a halo, a crescent moon, a dying god are so many symbols which energise men. They seem to release the psychic energy locked up in one's unconscious. Religion may be an opiate for the masses, but in the life of prophets, saints and seers religious experience has proved to be a great power. It has not only shaken them from their roots but through them has wrought revolutions in the world. Jesus Christ, the prince of peace declared that he had come into the world not to bring peace but sword. It means that his religion was a gospel of revolution which would put an end to the distinctions of the Greek and the Gentile, the free and the slave, the circumcised and the uncircumcised. Men were to be born into new creatures. For this reason Bergson has maintained that religious mysticism changes men from being creatures into creators¹⁰. This dynamic effect of religion has been accepted both by Freud and Jung, but the latter has shown this in great detail under the process of individuation.

5. *The absoluteness of the religious attitude*—A reli-

10. Bergson, H. *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, Macmillan, p. 218. For the graphic details of the dynamic effect of religion see pp. 194 ff.

gious response is entire, absolute and non-tentative¹¹. It is the staking out of the whole personality in relation to one's object of religious worship. One has to love one's God with one's whole heart, with one's whole might and with one's whole soul. One has to sell all in order to buy the pearl of great price. Like Abraham of old, the devotee should be prepared to sacrifice even his only beloved son, in obedience to his deity. At the time of one's gravest and the greatest personal crisis, one should be able to maintain, 'The Lord hath given and the Lord hath taken away. Blessed be His name'. One should be able to cry out, 'Even though Thou slay me, I will love Thee true'.

6. *The spiritual characteristic*—When this absolute dependence on one's deity brings peace which passes all understanding, then one is said to have attained the state of saintliness or spiritual bliss¹². It is characterised by calm and bliss. It gives one the sense of becoming all that one could have been. This has been called as 'salvation' or 'Nirvana'. By 'spirit' is not meant here any shadowy existence. It stands for a psychological state of feeling complete, whole and entire within oneself. This is an empirical concept for me and is to be sharply distinguished from a supra-sensible or transcendent being. So I am approaching the subject from a standpoint of physicalism or behaviourism.

7. *The metaphysical commitment of religion*—Usually it is pointed out that in religion the whole man encounters the whole of the Reality. Galloway's definition refers more to the whole man as it is subjectively felt as emotional stability in relation to an object of devotion. But the definition does not refer to the whole reality in relation to which this experience is induced. Most probably the phrase 'the whole reality' was considered superfluous as the term 'God' for Galloway stands for the Supreme Reality.

11. Pearl, Leon, *Religious and Secular Beliefs*, MIND, July, 1960, pp. 409, 410.

12. For the characteristics of saintliness, see W. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 272f, 370. Our emphasis is slightly different, being holistic.

However, Martineau quite explicitly refers to the 'whole universe'. The point which is sought to be noted here is that the deity appears for the worshipper to be all-pervading or ruling the universe. The very heavens declare the glory of God for the psalmist, and for Tulsidas the whole world seems to be pervaded by Rama and Sita. This feature is not absent even from primitive religions. Because the capacity of the primitive people of having a synoptic view of the world is limited, their religious cosmology too remains circumscribed with narrow interests. However, they too have the notions of 'high Gods' or 'Supreme Beings' as Andrew Lang¹³ and Wilhelm Schmidt¹⁴ remind us. The worshipper feels that the religious values which he seeks and which are already accomplished facts in his deity, are not an odd achievement of a segment of the universe, but are rooted at the very heart of the entire reality as its most abiding feature. For this reason some sort of cosmogony is found in many forms of theistic religion. Cosmogony gives way to metaphysical construction in non-dualistic and pantheistic forms of religion. But here too the Supreme Spirit or the indeterminate reality is held to pervade the whole universe so much so that, according to it, all is God. This has been the most intellectual part of religion and yet we have shown¹⁵ that such a system has no cognitive but only psychological meaning. We press the cognitive statements of science, logic and common sense in the service of feeling psychological wholeness.

8. *The communal and congregational nature of worship*—A religion without its social appeal and social achievement is not possible. A 'private' religion is as impossible as a private language. This is such a common observation that it does not require a Durkheim to make us note

13. *The Making of Religion*, p. 160ff.

14. James, E. O. *Prehistoric Religion* (Thames and Hudson, 1957), p. 206.

Jack Fenigen, *The Archaeology of World Religions*, (Princeton University, 1952), pp. 20 ff.

15. Masih, Y. *The Psychology of the Metaphysicians*, DARSHAN, January, 1962.

it (*). For this reason Galloway refers to 'worship and service' and Martineau to 'moral relations' which in the end are social phenomena. Without a Samgha or a Church there can never be vividness, intensity, fullness and richness of religious life. The ecstasy induced by a ritualistic dance is a potent method of demonstrating the 'truth' of primitive religion. In the same way the congregational confession, the recital of Apostles' Creed, the saying of prayers and the congregational hymn-singing are the ways in which the 'truth' of Christianity is brought home to the believers. Nothing is mightier than the seal of communal approval. This is tacitly assumed. Hence, there has been missionary zeal for conversion and proselytization. This also accounts for religious wars. The importance of the communal life or Church is so great that W. F. Zuurdeeg holds that a certain religious community, speaking its particular religious language induces and sustains the convictional 'truth' of that religion. The emphasis of the existentialists on the fact of personal encounter, decision and commitment does not take away the truth of the contention that the communal life determines religious beliefs. Communal approval is not absent even from those cases in which revelation dawns in solitude. In the first instance, religious community approves of the method of solitary meditation. And in the second instance, there is an ideal Church or the community of angels and archangels in the heaven for the Christian *dhyani* or *samadhi* who laud and lend support to the truth revealed in solitude.

9. *The relativity of gods and the correlativity of gods and worshippers*- Of course in the final analysis the religious truth has to be subjectively realised. Hence, the 'truth' of religion depends on the experiencer in his social or communal setting. If the socio-economic conditions change and the mentality of worshippers vary, then religious entities also vary. The nature of God keeps on varying

* Emile Durkheim discards the notion of 'spirits or gods' in defining religion (Ibid, p 47). He however emphasizes that religious community is the determiner of religious truths. And this we consider to be the important point here

with different peoples and ages. In the history of any religion, even when the term appears to be the same, the connotation changes with the vicissitudes of the people. For instance, 'Yahweh' has been variously conceived at different times in the Jewish history. Formerly, he was just a tribal god having his abode in volcanic mountains. Later on he became the God of the Jews with his jurisdiction over all other gods. Similarly, one wonders whether 'Christ' continues to be the same to-day, to-morrow and for ever. The relativity of godhead is a well-known phenomenon. Again, I have argued elsewhere that God and worshippers are co-relatives¹⁶. The mentality of the worshipper accounts for their gods; and as are the gods, so are their worshippers.

Now in the light of the facts stated above concerning religion, we can thus define it :

"Religion consists in a convictional attitude towards a higher spiritual destiny of man which a believing community enjoins upon each of its member to realise by worship or/and meditation."

We shall analyse this definition first, and afterwards we shall examine its adequacy in clipping together a number of religious phenomena which often have been ignored.

First, religion has been defined in terms of 'attitude'¹⁷, which means that it cannot be called a system of articulated beliefs which a worshipper can state clearly. The very fact that often a worshipper refers to authorities or to 'revealed' books for the articles of his faith betrays the awkward fact that religious beliefs are not cognitively acquired and sustained. Further, the term 'attitude' stands for the readiness to act on the part of the worshipper in relation to an appropriate occasion. The repeated carrying out of acts without much intellectual articulation

16. *The Psychology of the Metaphysician*

17. Religion was defined as an attitude by J. B. Pratt in *The Religious Consciousness*, pp. 2 ff in 1920. By 'attitude' he meant 'a relatively active state of consciousness', involving all the three departments of the mind.

gives rise to ritualism. This is best seen in the recital of prayers, counting of beads etc.

The term 'conviction' has been most thoroughly analysed by W. F. Zuurdeeg¹⁸. In the present context it means to be overcome or subdued by the weight of evidence. Hence, it means a strong belief which induces acts and evokes feeling. As it requires 'evidence' for its formation, so it presupposes a certain intellectual activity. However, the state of conviction itself is not so much cognitive as it is affective-conative. An individual is said to be overcome or overwhelmed by his conviction. Therefore, the terms 'convictional attitude' means that religion is a matter of permanent and strong disposition which when induced overpowers an individual.

The term 'higher' is metaphorical and has been introduced for obtaining persuasive force. In the last analysis religious language is axiological and volitive. However, the key-phrase is 'spiritual destiny'. In the past the term 'spirit' meant shadowy existence of beings with subtle material bodies. Even at the present time psychical research is directed to the study of this kind of spirit-world. For us it means that which is not earthly, that which is quite different from our sophisticated world of existence. Hence, it means that which is non-natural. As the positive content is not clearly stated and as people in general cannot remain satisfied with negative description only, so spirit has been 'pictured' as beings with subtle bodies. However, the term is rather valuative. Bethel became 'holy' after Jacob had his vision, but there could have been no physical change in the place after the occurrence of the vision. And the same is true about the burning bush. 'The prophet', 'the son of man' etc., are not descriptive but are elative, evocative and exhortative phrases. The factual statements about Jesus were that he was the son of Joseph and Mary, and that his brothers and sisters were just ordinary Jews. But the confession of Peter that he was the son of the living God, or the testimony of the Samaritan woman that he was the prophet are existential statements with a view to evoking

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the sense of the deity or the 'convictor'. The Jesus at the cross was both described and 'worshipped'. The jeering mob and the unrepentant robber described what they saw. But the confessing robber and the centurion standing at the foot of the cross declared him as the saviour and truly the son of God. Similarly, the term 'jivanmukta' is not a descriptive term for in no wise does he differ physically from other fellowmen. It is an evocative term, conveying the sense that he no longer belongs to the world. Hence, by 'spiritual destiny' we mean the realisation of becoming something 'ultimately' to which all cognitive, conative and affective processes remain subordinate. A person who attains Nirvana, salvation or *mukti* feels that he has become an ultimate thing, a creature of eternity. It lies in the realization of becoming what one is as one's essential being. Hence, Yahweh declared : 'I am that I am'. A seeker sees that his destiny lay in becoming a preacher and now he is that; another person was waiting for the vision of the Most High and now he knows that he has seen the salvation and now is the time for him to depart. The language of pre-destination or of the Vedantic language of self-realization testifies to this feeling of becoming what one is in one's eternal core.

Again, an individual remains in an inter-active commerce with the world around him and his spiritual destiny too is viewed by him accordingly. The whole universe is said to be spiritual in the sense that it is conducive to self-realization.

The emphasis on spiritual destiny distinguishes religion from humanism, communism and materialism which remain on earthly plane only even when they are based on 'convictional attitude'. As Jainism, Buddhism and non-dualistic Vedantism require faith in a higher spiritual destiny of man, so they will be regarded as religion. Most of the primitive religions will be so regarded for they also support the spiritual calling of man. Of course they employ a great deal of pictorial myths in support of their beliefs.

The spiritual state of enlightenment, *nirvāna* and salvation can be attained either by *bhakti* (devotion) or

worship of a personal deity or by meditation. A theistic thinker often rejects non-dualism, pantheism, Jainism and Buddhism on the ground that there is no room for worship in them. But it does not mean that these religions have not something analogous to worship. They employ the analogous method of meditation or *samadhi* or *nididhyasan* for the attainment of their spiritual goal. As a matter of fact even a theist would greatly benefit if he would meditate on his personal God. So 'worship' and 'ritualistic service' are not the exclusive methods of attaining spiritual destiny. Keeping this in view we cannot reject mystic *samadhi* nor Spinozism nor similar forms of religion on the ground of their being atheistic.

Conviction is induced with regard to a situation or an object. Here Zuurdeeg reminds us that a man has many 'convictors'. From this fact of the ambiguity and multiplicity of convictors we maintain the correlativity of the worshipper and his deity. Further, we accept the relativity of gods¹⁹. The acceptance of the correlativity of gods and worshippers, and the relativity of gods pose the problem of the reality of God-experience. As I maintain with the majority of analytic philosophers that theological statements are non-cognitive, so the reality of God for me is not a cognitive problem. Any symbol or an object which succeeds in striking conviction or in inducing a person to accept it as a thing of supreme value or devotion is his deity. Hence, the reality of the deity is an autobiographical fact and the statements with regard to it is psychological. A statement is said to be psychological when its reference to the psychological processes within the subject is greatest and the similar reference to objects other than the subject is least. Hence the reality of the deity is to be measured in terms of the enhancement, enrichment and enlargement of the personality, in terms of wholeness, health and happiness of the individual²⁰.

19. This old Vedantic doctrine has been re-stated by C. G. Jung in *Psychology*

Jung C. G. 'Foreward' to V. White's *God and Unconscious*, p. xvii

20 Jung C. G. *Modern Man in Search of a Soul* p. 136-37, 282 : Jung C. G. *Essays on Contemporary Events*, p. 21.

This psychological effect is brought out by the communal language and activities with regard to a convictor. If the congregational saying of Lord's prayer, the recital of the Apostles' creed and participation in the Holy Communion do not contribute to the enhancement of the personality with regard to the reality of Jesus, then the member of that congregation, honestly speaking, cannot call himself 'Christian'. Similarly, born out of personal conviction a member has to support his communal group in the denunciation of other creeds and rituals of other believing communities. It is the community speaking a particular religious language and congregational worship, real or imaginary, which pertain to the reality of the convictor. In the ultimate analysis, the reality of the religious convictor is a matter of personal encounter, decision and commitment. Hence Jung writes :

"Religious experience is absolute No matter what the world thinks about religious experience, the one who has it possesses the great treasure of a thing that has provided him with a source of life, meaning and beauty and that has given a new splendour to the world, to mankind. He has pistis and peace. Where is the criterium by which you could say that such a life is not legitimate, that such experience is not valid and that such pistis is mere illusion ?"²¹

The definition proposed here can clip together a number of religions which were excluded by definitions in current use. Besides, its insistence on 'spiritual destiny' as the goal of religion excludes humanism, communism and materialism from the class of religion. The above definition in terms of convictional attitude brings out the holistic and non-cognitive elements in religion much more

21. *Psychology and Religion*, p 113

clearly than other definitions proposed so far. Its shortcoming will be felt most acutely with regard to the objectivity or the reality of the deity, or of the spiritual destiny. This is a hard lesson to learn. Those who are not prepared to hold the reality of religious experience in terms of psychological statements²², will have to face the analysis of God-statements by Wisdom, Flew, Findlay, Hare, Braithwaite and others.

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²² Masih, Y. *Religious Experience and Language*, PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY 1961.

Masih, Y. *An Empirical Study of Theological Statements*, in CONTEMPORARY INDIAN THOUGHTS, edited by Prof. K. S. Murty.

THE PRACTICAL ASPECT OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY

CHARLES A. MOORE

I

One of the constant criticisms of Western philosophy is to the effect that it is merely an "academic exercise" or an "intellectual game" without practical significance—and without even the intention of being of practical significance. This criticism comes from thinkers of India, China and Japan—from all the great philosophical traditions of Asia—and from some Westerners, too. An attempt will be made here to examine this "charge" in the light of the conviction that it is based upon a serious misunderstanding.

This point of view represents another factor in, or another basis of, the still-present widespread mutual opposition, or at least mutual misunderstanding, between East and West. Another side of the question, which will not be treated here, is the widespread reciprocal Western conviction that there is no genuine philosophy in the East, especially in India, because what we might think of as philosophy there is practical, so much so, in fact, that it is not philosophy but is or amounts to religion. Surely, "never the twain shall meet"—if both of these "charges" are correct.

This criticism would not be too serious if it were applied only to contemporary extreme tendencies, but there are no such limitations of time or even philosophical schools or systems. It is a comprehensive condemnation. As a matter of fact, if the charge were directed against twentieth-century philosophy only—as a colleague recently contended—its case would be without great importance and also without serious foundation, because this has been one of the most practical periods in the entire history of Western philosophy by virtue of the prominence of pragmatism and existentialism and in spite of the allegedly

purely intellectualistic movement of logical positivism or empiricism. (More on this later).

II

The "charge" against Western philosophy would seem on the surface to have a considerable element of truth or "validity". Its case can be made out on the basis of here-and-there quotations from great thinkers, definitions of the nature of philosophy, the apparently accepted separation between theory and practice, and the alleged lack of concern on the part of theorists or intellectuals generally for any relationship between theory and practice.

It is well-known, of course, that Western philosophy had its origin (or, did it, really?) in intellectual curiosity or wonder - and who could define the motivation of philosophy better than the authors of these interpretations, namely, Plato and Aristotle? The very definition (and explanation) of the subject, variously worded as "love of knowledge", or "love of wisdom", etc., speaks for itself. This etymology is significant, of course, because it is seldom deliberately and precisely rejected in the Western tradition, except by a Francis Bacon or a John Dewey - and, when someone does challenge it, he is considered an exception and even criticised. A disinterested love of truth or knowledge for its own sake does seem to be the spirit behind the Western philosophical endeavour, from its beginning in the early scientist-philosopher pre-Socratics down to the present day, despite occasional breaks with that traditional point of view. As has been said, in a contrasting description of the Eastern and Western traditions, "Europe wanted to *see*, Asia to *be*, the real"¹ - and the being is the motive, not the knowing. This is merely a somewhat technical way of expressing the common opinion that philosophy in the East is practical, while Western philosophy is purely intellectualistic.

1. W. H. Sheldon, "Main Contrasts between Eastern and Western Philosophy," in Charles A. Moore, ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1951), p. 289

Authoritative interpreters of the several Asian philosophical traditions are practically unanimous in describing their perspectives in terms of a practical motivation and a goal that sound strange to customary Western ears. Radhakrishnan is quoted elsewhere in this paper on this point, but there is also his emphasis—seemingly in contrast to the West—on an “intimate relationship of philosophy and life. . . Every Indian system seeks the truth, not as academic ‘knowledge for its own sake’, but to learn the truth which shall make men free.”² Elsewhere he says, with obvious implications, “Religion is not *the mere affirmation of propositions*. It is not *simply an exercise of intelligence*. It is the response of the whole man.”³ S. K. Saksena indicates this same “practical” orientation by calling for a “synoptic outlook” in philosophy and describes Indian philosophy as “integral vision”, indicating that this excludes doubt, demands faith (a conviction about the truth of knowledge) and the moral and spiritual purity of the would-be knower. He adds, “But what is of significance for us to note here is that all the different schools and systems of philosophy have been occupied with this practical problem of man and with the practical means for its resolution.”⁴ Chandraraj Sharma calls Western philosophy “essentially an intellectual quest,” whereas “Indian philosophy has been, however, intensely spiritual and has always emphasized the need of practical realization of truth.”⁵ Wing-tsit Chan describes the Chinese philosophical tradition as unmistakably practical in motive and

2. See S. Radhakrishnan and Charles A. Moore, eds., *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957), General Introduction, esp., p. xxiii, also S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy* (rev. ed., London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1929), Vol. I, pp. 24–27.

3. “The Indian Approach to the Problem of Religion,” in Charles A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture—East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), p. 260.

4. “Relation of Philosophical Theories to the Practical Affairs of Man,” in *Ibid.*, pp. 54–55, 60.

5. *A Critical Study of Indian Philosophy* (London: Rider & Company, 1960), p. 13.

spirit—as do all prominent interpreters of Chinese philosophy—even to the point of showing the basic inseparability of knowledge and action.⁶ All such descriptions are intended almost essentially as indicating a basic distinction of these traditions from the West.

Equally forceful criticism of another aspect of the alleged pure intellectualism of Western philosophy comes from other quarters, largely Asian but also, occasionally, Western—as in the case of Dewey, for example. Here, it is alleged that Western philosophy is divorced from things as they really are and from life and living because of its demand for conceptualization—and specifically dichotomizing conceptualization—as opposed to living itself without intellectualizing about it and as rejecting direct or immediate experience in the name of concepts and reason or intellect generally. Here we find that voices of some Buddhists and especially, in the East, authoritative interpreters of the characteristic attitude of the Japanese mind—as explained, for example, by such notable interpreters as D. T. Suzuki, Hideo Kishimoto, and even a Nobel Prize winner in physics, Hideki Yukawa.⁷

It is generally assumed that Western philosophy is intellectually motivated and rationally operated in the interest of the truth (or knowledge) as such, without any concern for the practical significance or application of the results of that intellectual motivation and its implementing

6. "Chinese Philosophy and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, pp. 81-95. See also, e.g., Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy*, Derk Bodde, trans. (Peiping: Hentt Vetch, 1937), pp. 1-6, also his *A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*, Derk Bodde, ed., (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1948), pp. 1-15, also Hsueh Yu-wei, "Fihai Piety and Chinese Society," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, pp. 411-427.

7. See Suzuki, "Basic Thoughts Underlying Eastern Ethical and Social Practice," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, pp. 428-446; Kishimoto, "Some Cultural Traits and Religions in Japan," in *ibid.*, pp. 215-254, Yukawa, "Modern Trend of Western Civilization and Cultural Peculiarities in Japan," in *ibid.*, pp. 188-198.

rational activity. One example is the alleged (or actual) manner in which philosophy is taught in the West, as well as the form it takes in the written words of the great masters through the ages. Even in such a seemingly practical college course as ethics, Western students are reminded that the purpose is to gain knowledge or understanding of the good and the right—as contrasted with the evil and the wrong. The application or non-application of the knowledge acquired through a study of ethics, one must realize, is of no *direct* or *immediate* concern to teacher or student. If this is true in ethics, surely it is true, or even truer, in other basic aspects of philosophy. Intellectual examination of ideas and beliefs and the search for definitions, laws, and principles represent the motivation behind or the essence of the spirit of Western philosophical activity—or so it would seem. And this, too, is opposed to, or at least decidedly different from, for example, Indian ethics—and probably Chinese ethics, too—where such intellectual analysis, definition, etc., are kept at a minimum.⁸

Philosophy, like science, is often described as a reflective activity or point of view, and no emphasis seems to be placed upon the application of the results that may accrue from such reflection. We are merely “thinking about” things. One of the most convenient traditional definitions of philosophy seems to make this point clearly :

8. E. A. Burtt comments concerning the Asian perspective in moral philosophy that its “main aim is the practical one of guiding man toward the realization of the right moral good, about whose nature Western philosophers continue endlessly to argue.” Quoted by C. A. Moore, “East-West Philosophy and the Search for Truth,” in Horst Frenz, ed., *Asia and the Humanities* (Bloomington Indiana University Press, 1959), p. 107. Hsieh says, “. . . in the eyes of Chinese philosophers, the establishment of ethics rested, not in its theoretical system, nor in mere language or words, but in energetic striving for practice. That is one distinctive point by which Oriental ethics is to be distinguished from Western,” *op. cit.*, p. 413. See also Rama Kanta Tripathi, *Spinoza in the Light of Vedanta* (Banaras . Banaras Hindu University, 1957), who considers Spinoza “rare”, practically unique among Western philosophers in this respect.

"Philosophy is a reflective and reasoned attempt to infer the character and content of the universe in its entirety and as a single whole from an observation and study of the data presented by all its aspects."⁹ Nothing is said here about a practical concern, either as the motivation or as the consequence of this attempt to understand the universe.

It is probable that such criticisms (and they are intended as that) of Western philosophy and the interpretation under consideration, as voiced by Easterners, especially Indians, stem from or are based upon a seeming discrepancy when Western and Indian philosophy are thought of comparatively, as seen in statements quoted above. Indian philosophy is widely described as the search for wisdom rather than knowledge, as concerned exclusively with values rather than facts, as leading to *being* rather than *knowing* reality, as almost (or actually) indistinguishable from religion, as leading to or at least searching for spiritual realization, and, in each of its theories, as being so practical in motive that "there has been no teaching. . . . which remained a mere word of mouth or dogma of school. Every doctrine is turned into a passionate conviction, stirring the heart of man and quickening his breath."¹⁰ In all these expressions or interpretations, the essence is that it is the practical problem of life, primarily the spiritual problem, which constitutes the beginning of philosophy, and the solution of that practical problem which constitutes the motive-goal of philosophy in India. (In China, the problem is more generally the ethical-social, and the practical aspect becomes of the essence in the traditional doctrine of the inseparability of theory and practice in the Confucian theory of the nature of truth itself¹¹)

By comparison, of course, this sort of thing is "a foreign language" to the Westerner—especially if we add to the Eastern point of view the element of intuition, the ulti-

9. B. A. G. Fuller, *A History of Philosophy* (rev. ed., New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1945), p. 1.

10. *Indian Philosophy* Vol. I, pp. 26-27.

11. See Wing-tsit Chan, *op. cit.*

mate rejection or at least transcendence of intellectualism, and even the outright denunciation of the intellect as inevitably falsifying even the facts of life and reality, let alone ultimate values. It is rather typical of Indians to say, as Dr. Mahadevan does : "Philosophy has even a greater function to fulfil than to put our minds in proper shape. . . The role of philosophy is not that of a curator of scientific curios. Its purpose is not merely to analyze intellectually certain obscure problems and throw some light on them. . . The truth that the philosopher seeks is not merely intellectual; it is total and integral." Or, "Indian philosophy is not merely a way of thought but also a way of life."¹² By comparison, one might even say that Western philosophy is not philosophy—primarily because it does not go far enough, or in the right direction, or by the right method, and for the right reason. Perhaps the one thing that can be accurately ascribed to all philosophy in India—and to the overwhelming majority of philosophy throughout Asia—is its primary concern with the practical problems of life, whether they be merely the elimination of or escape from suffering, the ultimate realization of one's spiritual destiny, the overcoming of "spiritual unrest," the attainment of peace of mind or tranquillity, or the more practical matter of orderly social life and worldly happiness. In all of these, the practical motivation is predominant, whereas, says the critic, none of these is the dominant purpose or motivation of Western philosophy—which some say, therefore takes on the role of insignificance because of its so proudly accepted spirit of an avowedly disinterested pursuit of truth.

III

There is to be no attempt here to show that the West's strictly philosophical tradition—ignoring for the moment,

12. T. M. P. Mahadevan, "The Nature and Scope of Philosophy," in *The World Philosophers' Conference*, no editor listed (Sivanandanagar : The Yoga-Vedanta Forest Academy, 1961), p. 72, also "Indian Ethics and Social Practice," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, p. 476.

if this may be done legitimately, the entire religious aspect of that tradition—is as deliberately, as directly, as strongly, and as ever-consciously “practical” as philosophy in India, China, and Japan, or that Western philosophy is ever, with exceptions of course, “practical” in precisely the same sense, and to the same degree. However, these admissions and the facts upon which they are grounded do not nullify practical motivation in Western philosophy, and they most certainly do not justify the contention that Western philosophy, even in isolation from religion (which may not be either historically accurate or even theoretically possible), has been an academic game or an intellectual exercise, and therefore insignificant from the practical point of view.

Among the inescapable considerations “on the other side” are the following.

1. *Philosophy as “love of wisdom”*—While this would certainly seem to brand Western philosophy as motivated purely by disinterested love of truth or knowledge for its own sake, regardless of practical considerations and without any practical motivation, the facts and the true meaning of this “definition” are not so simple. What philosophy or the love of wisdom really meant to the Greeks, who originated this formulation of the subject, has been extremely well expressed by Herbert W. Schneider as follows :

Philosophy should be the love of wisdom. It meant precisely this to the ancient Greeks, who spoke Greek and to whom the word “philosophy” did not mean an academic subject-matter or a speculative natural science; it meant literally and quite non-technically “loving wisdom”. A philosopher was distinguished from a sage (*sophos*), of whom there were a few in ancient Greece, and from a sophist or teacher of wisdom, of whom there were too many when Socrates began his attack on them. There is, at least in the Western tradition, something pretentious about being either a sage or a sophist, and this attitude prejudices many Western philosophers against the traditional Indian *guru*, who seems to them a synthesis of sage and sophist. A philosopher is

no more than a lover of wisdom; he neither knows what he wants to know nor teaches what he does not know. He is, if we may take Socrates as the classic model, a person who loves to know what he is doing and saying, who knows that he is not wise, and who knows that he ought to know wisdom when he finds it. This critical conception of philosophy, which has been a dominant influence ever since the Platonic Socrates made it so admirable, is evidently humanistic. One does not criticize the world or Nature (at least it is not wise to do so); one criticizes what is done by man. Hence, the primary subject-matter of the love of wisdom is human action and human production.¹³

This explanation, true to the mind of the Greek and to the spirit which seems to have brought real philosophy into being—in its distinction from the pre-Socratic era of what could be more accurately described as science—speaks for itself and is difficult to question. "Philosopher," or "one who is a lover of wisdom," is an expression of humility in the face of the very complicated problems of life and reality—not an expression of lack of interest or concern. The so-called "disinterested" love of truth or knowledge or wisdom does not mean that it is uninterested or without any practical concern. As will be explained later, it means or involves primarily a matter of procedure whereby the truth is to be sought objectively and directly without any practical bias. Furthermore, what may be considered almost the maxim—or motif?—of philosophy was voiced by Socrates in his famous statement that the unexamined life is unfit for man to live—certainly this is not an intellectual exercise or an academic game. Then, too, there is the often-stated "definition" of philosophy as "criticism of life"—with its obvious connotation of practical concern.

Furthermore, man as man, being a rational creature—

13 "Western Philosophy and Practical Affairs," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, p. 67.

even though this may not be all he is—certainly wants and loves the truth. In fact, in some way, man must have the truth simply because it is a fulfilment of the innate need of man as a rational and thinking creature. But this does not entail any rejection or neglect of the obvious need also for the truth as a guide of life and for use, no matter what form that use may take. Intellectual curiosity is unquestionably a basic aspect of the very make-up of man himself, in East and in West, and there is no incompatibility between this seeming “academic” interest and the equally universal need for practical guidance, whether one is planning to live comfortably, or the good life, or seeking escape or salvation. As a matter of fact, it is only by a process of theoretical abstraction that these two motives can be separated. Man is neither a thinking being alone nor an acting being alone. Western philosophy is grounded, it would seem, in both of these motivations—and so, in fact, is practically all philosophy.

To be sure, this entire “debate” or “charge” is based upon a much too facile contrast between Western philosophy and that of, say, India—too facile both because Western philosophy is not a mere intellectual game and also because India is much more intellectually motivated than is often realized, as this writer has attempted to indicate elsewhere at some length and in some detail.¹⁴ This latter point is mentioned, not merely as a part of the “debate”, but as a verification, as it were, of the contention that man is by nature intellectually interested as well as (and not merely) practically concerned with the truth, simply because man is man. As Professor Datta (in collaboration with Professor S. C. Chatterjee) has said, “Man, as a rational creature, cannot be satisfied unless his reason is satisfied” and “...desire for knowledge springs, therefore, from the rational nature of man. Philosophy is an attempt to satisfy this very reasonable desire.”¹⁵

14. “Philosophy as Distinct from Religion in India,” *Philosophy East and West*, XI, Nos. 1 and 2 (April-July, 1961), pp. 3-25.

15. *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (3rd ed., rev., Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1948), p. 1.

Enrichment of the mind and seeking the truth in the spirit of love of wisdom are—for *man*—noble and spiritual and are not to be denied, but this is by no means the sum and substance or the totality of philosophy in the West.

2. *Philosophy is philosophers, and philosophers are "concerned"*.—The easiest and, it would seem, conclusive way to answer the "charge" would be simply to list all of the great names in the tradition of Western philosophy—and here we can start even among the pre-Socratics—and somewhat colloquially challenge the critic to "name one" of these great thinkers who deliberately denied or deliberately ignored the problems of man and of life, and even, in many cases, his ultimate spiritual destiny. We need not limit our survey to such people as Socrates, the Epicureans, the Stoics, possibly Spinoza and Schopenhauer, the entire so-called religious period, and modern pragmatists and existentialists. Nor must we limit ourselves simply to those great names in the history of Western thought who were fundamentally social philosophers—this again being so well explained in Schneider's article previously referred to.¹⁶ We can list *all* of the great names, and—although there may be an exception here and there—the facts are the same. If one will but stop to think and to recall the actual writings of these great thinkers, the conclusion will be inescapable. As a colleague once remarked in this connection, "How can one really know the history of philosophy and misunderstand it so completely?" Plato has appropriately been called "the diagnostician of Greece," determining her intellectual and social diseases and offering cures—and many other great thinkers played the same role for their age and place. Every philosopher who has developed in his system an ethics, a political philosophy, or a philosophy of religion, or a view of the spiritual or religious destiny for man is one who admittedly is practically concerned about life and man. And this list would be almost all-inclusive, from Socrates to the existentialists of today. Throughout the history of Western philosophy, the constant question has been the good life, personally and socially, and concern with the ultimate

16. See note 13.

or essential nature of man, implying, almost automatically, concern about his ultimate destiny, whatever that may be. The questions have always been : What is man ? What is Nature ? What is reality as a whole ? And, how should man live in the light of the truth here discovered ?

Although there really is no need to name all the names, how could one deny practical concern to Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Epicureans, the Stoics, even the Eclectics of that period, the entire religious-philosophical period (Jewish, Neo-Platonic, and Christian) up to the Renaissance, Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes,¹⁷ Spinoza, Leibniz, who was vitally interested in establishing Christianity, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Fichte, Hegel, Schopenhauer. Even the Age of Reason, the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century, was an age concerned with religious beliefs—a very practical matter. The problem is that of omissions, of finding exceptions to be unlisted, *not* that finding an allegedly exceptional great thinker who is practically concerned about man and life and destiny, but one who is not. Pure and purely disinterested theorizing is the exception, not the rule.

As said earlier, twentieth-century philosophy, which is *possibly* the major butt of the criticism under discussion, is remarkably practical in emphasis, as, for example, in pragmatism and existentialism. And even the allegedly super-intellectualistic movement of logical positivism—call it what you will—is not devoid of practical concern. These thinkers, too, like those of the Enlightenment, are concerned lest man should live by superstitions and false beliefs. Cornelius Krusé, writing about contemporary Western philosophers, the relativists, positivists, etc., says that “in

17 Some may question Descartes' inclusion here, but both his religious concern and his ethics require it. His Stoic-like demand for strict virtue and for independence of externals leading to inner happiness not only expresses the ethics required by his metaphysics but also puts him in some accord with the *ethos* of the intellectuals of his day. He was not merely a scientist or a philosopher of science. In fact, he somewhat inconsistently “demanded” freedom for man because of the need of man to direct his *life*.

rejecting the claim that value-judgments are true or false they nevertheless seem *more interested in discovering how discord in value-judgments can be overcome . . . if only by 'persuasive definition.'*"¹⁸ Surely this is of practical significance in guiding man in life. Perhaps the point should also be mentioned that, if the charge of criticism is directed exclusively or directly only against this extreme attitude, it is not too significant, both because "positivism" is only one aspect of contemporary philosophy and, in its extreme character is probably destined to "reign" only very temporarily. Also, positivism is a form of traditional skepticism—and the skeptics, above all, have not been concerned merely with knowing that nothing can be known with certainty about the nature of man and his world; they have always been concerned with how man ought to live when he has no absolute (either factual or moral) to fall back upon. Thus, those who live in terms of "absolutes" live in terms of illusions or falsities, and this they should not do. Enlightenment is ridding oneself of illusions and superstitions, and enlightenment, together with its practical consequences, is the core of skepticism. The theist "looks" and finds God, and lives accordingly; the skeptic looks and finds nothing that is certain—and advises that we live accordingly.

3. *The process or procedure.*—The procedure which seems to have characterized Western philosophy in its relation to practicality is perhaps the clue to the problem and to its solution. It is not that Western philosophy is uninterested in practical matters, far from it. But it is the fundamental conviction of the West—with rare exceptions, such as the so-called "Practical Period" in Greek and Roman philosophy, the "Religious Period," and pragmatism—that the truth about man and reality is the indispensable basis upon which life should be lived and upon which our practical predicament should be solved, and that this truth is the first order of business, as it were. It is not a matter merely of having a problem of life and then seeking a solution for it, but, rather, of attempting to find out what the

18. "Concluding Remarks," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, p. 698 (*Italics mine*).

truth is and then applying that truth to whatever life-problems may arise. Pure philosophy--like pure science--must precede and guide, or even determine, proper application and practice. As F. S. C. Northrop says, "Ethics is merely true. . . philosophy applied to human conduct."¹⁹ Or, as Whitehead said, "The use of philosophy is to maintain an active novelty of fundamental ideas *illuminating the social system*."²⁰ The truth comes first, its practical application second--this order is fundamental and indispensable. And it is assumed that, once knowledge is achieved, it will guide practice--for an intelligent man. Perhaps Plato is characteristic here, too, in not permitting his philosophers, once they had reached the heights of knowledge (by intuition, by the way) of the idea of the Good, to be satisfied with their intellectual achievement. Instead, he ordered them, now that they were knowledgeable and wise, to put their knowledge and wisdom to work in ruling the state for the welfare of all--for this was the purpose of their philosophical education in the first place.

This process is quite characteristic of the West, but is apparently quite the opposite of the approach used, for example, in Indian thought, call it philosophy or religion, as one will. There, the practical problem is the starting point, as in the First Noble Truth of Buddhism and in most of the basic *Moksaśāstras* of the great Hindu systems, and determines "truth." In the West, generally speaking, the so-called practical approach to truth--characteristic of the Epicureans, the Stoics, the pragmatists, and a few others--is almost "philosophy in reverse." It is the living denial of its validity because of the numerous differing solutions which may be reached to solve the same problem--Stoic versus Epicurean, and also in India : Hindu versus Buddhist versus Jaina. Clearly,

19 "The Theory of Types and the Verification of Ethical Theories," in C. A. Moore, ed., *Essays in East-West Philosophy*, p. 376

20 Quoted by William Ernest Hocking, "Whitehead as I Knew Him", *The Journal of Philosophy*, LVIII, No. 19 (September 14, 1961), 510. (*Italics mine*.)

the truth itself suffers in this process. As Professor E. A. Burt has said in this connection, speaking specifically about the early pragmatic approach in America, this approach provides "ideas, for example, which yield personal comfort but do not square with objective fact."²¹ Surely no one can philosophically or even intelligently accept any solution which yields personal comfort but is not, shall we say, true to the facts. It is not a case of not being concerned with practical matters but a case of adopting a procedure which provides the only acceptable guide to practice. And this means guidance and practice based upon the facts of reality and the truth, rather than interpreting reality in *any* way which seems to solve one's personal problem or to please one's wishes.

This Western process calls for the objective, "disinterested," prior search for the truth, to be followed by its application. The conviction is, of course, that only that which is true can be truly practical, whereas that which is practical, or seemingly so, cannot be really so unless it is true. The truth determines practicality, not vice-versa. "Pure" philosophy, that is, must precede "applied" philosophy. This Western approach is, therefore, not only different from that which dominates thought in India and perhaps in China—both of which can justifiably be interpreted as essentially pragmatic in motive and in determination of the truth—but it is a consciously accepted and adopted procedure on the conviction that it is the only sound procedure—both intellectually and practically. Western philosophers from Socrates to today have been profoundly concerned with problems bearing on the good life, not knowledge *qua* knowledge, but knowledge for the sake of significant living.

4. *The results speak for themselves.*—Whether critics approve or not, there can be little question that the so-called intellectualism of Western thought and philosophy—coupled with science, if one wishes—has been highly practical in changing the life of man, and Westerners are convinced it is for the better. As Constantin Regamey has so aptly said, "And the proof that this kind of reasoning

21. See his "A Problem in Comparative Philosophy," in this volume.

is not a merely academic exercise of our intellect is the transformation of the world it has produced and goes on producing."²² For the sake of the argument, it makes no difference, really whether this change has been for the better or not. And, whether it has been "merely humanistic" or "this-worldly" rather than in the direction of spiritual realization or some form of identification with an Absolute, it is still practically motivated and practically effective. Even those who criticize intellectualism and devotion to reason in the West (for example, S. K. Maitra²³) on the ground that philosophy in the West guides life, to be sure, but does not lead to *mokṣa* are admitting in that very criticism the essential practicality of Western thought, at least in result, and probably in motive, too.

There is also the contention in India—and, as far as Hinduism and Buddhism have reached out to influence the people in Asia as a whole—that, in contrast to thought in the West, the effort should be, not to change the world of suffering in which man finds himself, but to transform the mind so as to provide him with an attitude or state of mind that can in some way transcend or escape from that suffering. The implied criticism here that Western philosophy is not truly practical or significant inadvertently admits the practical purpose behind Western thought, though (or because) it is in the direction of attempting to remove or relieve the suffering itself rather than change the state of man's mind. A point made by C. F. Lavell may apply here—or it may more aptly belong to earlier considerations. He once differentiated between philosophy-science and religion by pointing to the fact that both were brought about by the confusions and maladjustments of life and the world, but that religion, in the large, seeks a refuge of faith because such confusions and maladjustments

22. "The Meaning and Significance of Spirituality in Europe and in India," *Philosophy East and West*, X, Nos. 3 and 4 (October, 1960, and January, 1961), 125. Also in C. A. Moore, ed., *Philosophy and Culture*, p. 333.

23. "Reason in Hindu Philosophy—Classical and Contemporary," *Philosophy East and West*, XI, Nos. 3 and 4 (October, 1961 and January, 1962).

are a distress and a fear, while philosophy and science find such confusions and maladjustments, not things of horror to be escaped from, but "a fascination, a summons to investigation and action."²⁴ This would seem to be the spirit, the motivation, and the intended result of Western philosophy—and these are not the marks of an intellectual game or an academic exercise.

5. *What is practical?*—Western philosophy does not meet the requirements of Indian "philosophy" in the latter's extreme or highest reaches or at that level where, at least allegedly, it becomes practically identifiable with religion. As already said, perhaps it is true—although it is decidedly not true of the Western thought-tradition as a whole—that Western philosophy can be thought of as motivated by practical concerns and practical results only in the humanistic perspective. By comparison, of course, Indians do not consider this a "practical" motivation because it does not set out to achieve the same goal, either a changed state of mind or a transcendental experience or spiritual realization.

It is submitted that this latter form of practicality and motivation is not definitive of a practical purpose and cannot be taken as the criterion of interpretation or evaluation.

Western philosophy does not generally approach Indian philosophy in the sense of Radhakrishnan's previously quoted description that "there has been no teaching . . . which remained a mere word of mouth or dogma of schools. Every doctrine is turned into a passionate conviction, stirring the heart of man and quickening his breath." But Socrates and Spinoza come to mind immediately to contradict that statement, and many others do, too, perhaps. It is an unsound judgment that those who are truly of the philosophical temperament are not just as profoundly moved by their beliefs and convictions as are Indian thinkers. There is the further point that, even if such a description does apply critically to Western philosophy and philosophers, this does not mean that they

24. *A Biography of the Greek People* (Boston, New York : Houghton Mifflin Company, 1934), p. 132. (Italics mine)

are playing an intellectual game; it could mean merely that they are less emotional, less religious, if you will, but not necessarily any the less concerned and practically involved.

By comparison, then, it *may be* that Western philosophy is motivated in a different direction (and possibly, though not always or necessarily, on a different level)—humanistic rather than spiritualistic—and that it is less emotionally motivated than Indian philosophy (or philosophy-religion), but, to repeat, that does not constitute mere intellectualism or insignificant theorizing.

Another way of expressing this point would be to say simply that Western philosophy is not religion, in motive or in intended goal. But that does not brand it as being unconcerned about or uninterested in practical matters, the problems of life as man finds it. The “charge” also ignores the strong spiritual element in so very much of Western philosophy and the historical fact of centuries of religious philosophy. Such exclusion clearly falsifies the facts.

6. *Western philosophy has Western critics, too.*—Such criticisms are not exclusively from the East. Many in the West, especially those exclusively interested in ultimate values and in religion, are equally critical of the alleged intellectualism and the alleged disinterestedness of the intellectual in the Western philosophical-scientific tradition. In the West, too, the charge of looking only for facts and ignoring values is a constant refrain. Here, too, the disinterested approach is challenged—but, even more, the at-least-alleged fact that philosophy, which should guide mankind, utterly fails in this obligation because it is apparently not interested.

This criticism, whether it comes from East or West, is unsound. Philosophy is, and has always been, concerned with values—unlike science, it always asks the question “Why?” It does not assume value or values, but it does not ignore or reject them dogmatically, either. The entire idealistic tradition of Western philosophy—the dominant tradition of Western thought as a whole—is in essence a value philosophy.²⁵

25. Westerners voice the interpretation and criticism also to the

Philosophy intends to and does meet man's basic needs of seeking the truth as far as he can gain it about himself and about the world in which he lives, and in building upon this truth a way of life which will be grounded in truth and on reality. Intellectual curiosity and the rational "disinterested" search for truth are not a crime. Rather, they are natural, intrinsic, essential, and, as far as we know, completely unique to man. Therefore, not only must they be fulfilled and gratified in terms of intellectual understanding about reality, but they also provide profound spirituality to the life of man by lifting him above the merely practical and the animal that is in him and enabling him to reach heights which, to a Westerner at least, may well be called truly spiritual, if that concept is understood and interpreted without restrictive bias and appreciated comprehensively.²⁶

VI. CONCLUSION

In sum, the critics of Western philosophy as an insignificant "intellectual exercise" or "academic game" mistake a method or a procedure for the essence; mistake external appearances for the true spirit; and, basing their contention upon ancient or literal definitions, or upon temporary contemporary excesses, fail to read the facts of the history of Western philosophy correctly. Those facts provide abundant evidence of the serious practical concern of the Western philosopher in his endeavour to

effect that philosophy is essentially impractical, insignificant, and a waste of time. This charge comes from the fact that philosophy "bakes no bread", that it has no practical utility in terms of satisfying physical wants, material comforts, or financial advancement. Philosophy would reply to this criticism by admitting that philosophy is not practical in these senses and is not intended to be. But it would add that in the higher sense of satisfying the basic and unique human need for knowledge for its own sake and in terms of providing man with a plan and purpose and goal in life philosophy is the most practical activity of man—and that this is its very essence and its motive.

26. See Regamey, *op. cit.*, entire essay

seek the true welfare of man or the good life for man in terms of the truth about man and the world. This has been the spirit and the motive of Western philosophy from its inception. In fact, this is probably the basic purpose behind and the originating force of philosophy everywhere, even if there are inevitable differences in interpretation of its proper direction, its real goal, and its most effective method.

■ ■ ■

THE FUNDAMENTAL STANDPOINT OF EARLY BUDDHISTS

HAJIME NAKAMURA

1. *The Attitude toward other Philosophies and Religions.*

In the days when the Buddha lived, great freedom of thought was allowed to all people. The various philosophical and religious systems which were prevalent then can be classified into two categories, viz., orthodox and heterodox. The orthodox religion from the standpoint of the Indians in general is Brahmanism. Brahmanism is the religion which admits the authority of the Vedic scriptures. The heterodox thinkers of those days did not acknowledge the authority of the Vedas. They engaged in a free and very often an arbitrary way of thinking. They subscribed to materialism, hedonism, asceticism, determinism, skepticism, denunciation of the moral, and so on. Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, was also one of these heretical thinkers. What kind of attitude did the Buddha show to these various dissenting opinions?

Gotama, the founder of Buddhism, took note of the fact that many of the systems of philosophy prevalent in those days were contradictory to each other and that philosophers disputed with each other on various philosophical problems. Each of the philosophers claimed that his own doctrine was absolutely true and that the other doctrines contained falsehoods based on various fallacies. "What some say is truth, the reality, that others say is void, false; so, having disagreed, they dispute. Why do not the thinkers (*samaṇas*) say one (and the same thing)?" (*Sn.* 882*). "Here they maintain 'purity'; in other doctrines

*Abbreviations : *DN.*, *Dīgha-nikāya*; *MN.*, *Majjhima-nikāya*; *SN.*, *Samyutta-nikāya*; *Sn.*, *Sutta-nipata*. All passages quoted here are from the critical editions published by the Pāli Text Society, London, and trustworthy English translations with slight alteration. The sayings

(*dhamma*) they do not allow purity; what they have devoted themselves to, that they call good, and they enter extensively upon the single truths." (*Sn.* 824). "Because, he holds another (to be) a fool, therefore he calls himself an expert; in his own opinion, he is one that tells what is propitious; others he blames" (*Sn.* 888).

If, however, one who is apart from any particular philosophical standpoint views these conflicting ideas from an objective, synoptic standpoint, then each philosophical system is relative and partial in those respects in which it conflicts with, and opposes, another philosophical system. Then, just where shall we find the truth? We have the postulate that "the truth is one, there is not a second" (*Sn.* 884), and yet we suffer from such fatal contradictions. How have we to explain this?

Gotama commented on this situation as follows: These philosophers get into disputes over insoluble metaphysical problems, and are entangled in adhesion; hence, they are apt to fall into moral evils. "Saying that there is something firm in his own way, he holds his opponent to be a fool; thus he himself brings on strife, calling his opponent a fool and impure" (*Sn.* 893). "They are inflamed by passion for their own (philosophical) views." (*Sn.* 891). Gotama regarded all such disputes as valueless, and did not care to participate in any metaphysical dispute. It is said that "he overcame such disputes". (*Sn.* 907). He stood upon the standpoint of "having left all resolutions, nobody would excite strife in the world". (*Sn.* 894).

The early Buddhists did not want to be entangled in disputes held at public places. "Those wishing for dispute, having plunged into the assembly, brand each other as fools mutually, they go to others and pick a quarrel, wishing for praise and calling themselves (the only) experts" (*Sn.* 825). "Engaged in dispute in the middle of the assembly, wishing for praise, he lays

of the *Sutta-nipāta* are cited mostly from Michael Viggo Fausboll, trans., *The Sutta-Nipāta*, Sacred Books of the East, Vol. X, Pt. 1. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1881)

about on all sides; but, when his dispute has been repulsed, he becomes discontented; at blame, he becomes angry, he who sought for the faults (of others)." (Sn. 826). "Because those who have tested his questions say that his dispute is lost and repulsed, he laments and grieves, having lost his disputes; 'he has conquered me'; so saying, he wails." (Sn. 827). "These disputes have arisen amongst the ascetics (*samanas*); in these (disputes) there are blows (and) striking; having seen this, let him leave off disputing, for there is no advantage to obtain from gaining praise." (Sn. 828). "Or he is praised there, having cleared up the dispute in the middle of the assembly; therefore, he will laugh and be elated having won that case as he had a mind to." (Sn. 829). "That which is his exaltation will also be the field of his defeat; still he talks proudly and arrogantly; seeing this, let no one dispute, for the wise do not say that purification (results) from that." (Sn. 830).

The early Buddhists refrained from getting into disputes with others. In comparison with other world religions, this tendency is conspicuous, even now-a-days throughout the Buddhistic world. Religious discussions, even if they are held, do not lead to heated antipathy among the participants.

2. Silence on Metaphysical Problems

Gotama refused to give a definite answer on any metaphysical questions which were discussed. Many ascetics in those days asked the following questions :

- 1,2. Whether the world is eternal or not.
- 3,4. Whether the world is infinite or not.
- 5,6. Whether the soul is the same as the body, or different from it.
- 7,8. Whether a perfect man exists in any way, or not, after death, and so on.

To all such questions the Buddha refused an answer.

Why did he not answer ? According to a Buddhist scripture, many ascetics complained that, when they asked the Buddha, they did not receive any answer to their questions, such as whether the world is finite or infinite; or eternal or non-eternal, and whether a perfect man

exists or does not exist after death, etc. The Buddha said that he had not revealed the answers to those questions because this is not edifying, nor is it connected with the essence of the norm, nor does it tend to the turning of the will, nor to the absence of passion, to cessation, to peace, to the higher faculties, to supreme wisdom, nor to *nirvāṇa* (*MN.* 63) or, it is said : "The jungle, the desert, the puppet-show, the writhing, the entanglement of such speculations is accompanied by sorrow, wrangling, resentment, the fever of excitement. It conduces neither to detachment of heart, nor to freedom from lusts, nor to tranquillity, nor to peace, nor to wisdom, nor to the insight of the higher stages of the path, nor to *nirvāṇa* (*MN.*, Vol. I, pp. 431, 485). The Buddha stated that the answering of all these questions would leave no time for finding the way to salvation or to liberation from suffering, and he illustrated this by means of the following parable :

A man is hit by a poisoned arrow. His friends hasten him to a doctor. The latter is about to draw the arrow out of the wound. The wounded man, however, cries : "Stop ! I will not have the arrow drawn out until I know who shot it, whether a warrior, a *brāhmin*, a common man (*vaiśya*), or a slave (*śūdra*), to which family he belonged, whether he was tall or short, and of what kind the arrow was and its description,"¹ and so on. But what would happen before all these questions are answered ? That man would die !

In the same way, the disciple who wished for answers to all his questions about the beyond and the like, would die before he knew the truth about suffering.² The

1 T.W. Rhys Davids, trans., *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part I. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. II (London : H. Frowde, Oxford University Press, 1899), pp. 186 f., cf. H. C. Warren, *Buddhism in Translations*, Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. III, 9 issue. (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1947), pp. 117-128.

2. *MN.*, no. 63, cf. Maurice Winternitz, *A History of Indian Literature*, translated from the German by Mrs. S. Ketkar and Miss H. Kohn and revised by the author, 2 vols. (Calcutta : University of California, Vol. I, 1927, Vol. II, 1933), Vol. II, pp. 70-71.

theories held by philosophers in general purported to explain the origin and end of all things, to be able to give a clear and absolute decision as to the finiteness or infinity of the world, as to the eternity of the soul, and of those bigger souls, the gods, and other problems. But all of them were repudiated by the Buddha.

Even in our daily life we meet with this kind of questions to which we do not give any definite answer. And not to give any answer evidences a definite reply, in a way. Suppose one were to be impolite as to ask you : "Have you left off beating your wife ?" What do you answer ? Yes ? or No ? The Buddha's attitude may be compared to this situation.

There is this story in the scripture : A man went to various gods in turn to solve a doubt on the following question. "Where now do these four great elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—go, leaving no trace behind ?" Finally, Brahmā, the highest god, said to him : "I do not know, brother, where those four great elements—earth, water, fire, and wind—go, leaving no trace behind."³

The attack thus made on this sort of metaphysical speculation was the most formidable one that had been made so far in the history of the world on theology and metaphysics. We find here two propositions : (1) Do not discuss things on which we do not have good evidence. (2) Do not discuss things which are of no use, no good, for us. Whether true . . . or false, both propositions seem to us quite intelligible. Such metaphysical arguments as these, however, have been brought forward to show that, behind the deliberate silence of Gotama, there lay, after all, a covert and firm belief. Gotama was perfectly firm. He refused, not only to answer,

3. T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part II. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. III (London : H. Frowde, Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 280-281. (The attitude not to think of one's past and future existences is expressed in the *Sabbāsava-sutta*, in T. W. Rhys Davids, trans., *Buddhist Suttas*. Sacred Books of the East, Vol. XI. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1881), pp. 298-300. (It is a little similar to agnosticism, but Gotama was very positive.)

but even to discuss such matters. They were constantly being raised, of course. His answer was simply a list of indeterminates : such questions were barred.

The Buddhist way is designed to lead to the understanding that no substantial ego can be perceived—or any object anywhere—that lasts for ever, but only spiritual processes, e. g., sensations, feelings, perceptions, and so on. On the basis of this standpoint, the Buddha eschewed metaphysical discussion.

It may seem strange why, among the many above-mentioned questions, only that concerning the existence of the souls of perfected ones after death was discussed. However, this is a universal problem, posed in the ancient West also. Cleanthes maintained that all souls survive until the next universal conflagration (when everything is absorbed into God); but Chrysippos maintained that this is true only of the souls of the wise.⁴

Indian agnosticism finds its parallel in Greece. Epicurus spoke in the same way : The phases of the moon, for example, have been explained in many different ways; any one of these, as long as it does not bring in the gods, is as good as any other, and it would be idle curiosity to attempt to determine which of them is true. Russell said, "It is no wonder that the Epicureans contributed practically nothing to natural knowledge."⁵ Russell's comment may also hold true to some extent with reference to the fact that Buddhism did not attempt to develop natural sciences even in later days.

We can find a somewhat similar attitude in early Christianity, too. Christ exhibited strong reaction against the Pharisaism, asceticism, formalism, and speculative theology of the Jews. It is said that both Christ and the Buddha simplified religion at the outset. St. Paul says : "See to it that no one makes a prey of you by philosophy and empty deceit, according to human tradition, according to the elemental spirits of the universe, and not according

4. Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York : Simon and Schuster, 1945), p. 258.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 247.

to Christ." (Colossians II : 8). But God, together with Christ, is the center of Christian faith, while the Buddha did not assume God as the creator. The problem of God is also one of the metaphysical subtleties against which he protested. The Buddha was apparently an atheist in this respect, but basically he was religious.

Confucius, in China, like the Buddha, would not indulge in speculations about the future. Confucius insisted on the formation of good character, which will issue in good action. When asked about the worship of the celestial and the earthly spirits, Confucius answered: "We do not know yet how to serve men, how can we know about serving the spirits?" "What about death?" was the next question, to which Confucius gave the reply: "We do not yet know about life, how can we know about death?" (*Analects* VI. 12). "The Master would not discuss 'prodigies,' prowess, lawlessness, or the supernatural." (*Ibid.*, IV. 20). Though Confucius avoided discussion of the subject, he did not deny a future life, for his command to worship the ancestral spirits implies their existence after death. He commended the observance of the rites, not because they would please the deity, but because they had come down to the people from antiquity. On these points, the attitude of Confucius was very similar to that of the Buddha. But we can point out the difference that Confucius was more this-worldly, while the Buddha wanted to thrust more deeply into the existence and nature of man.

The problem which the Buddha touched upon was discussed by Kant in the West. A large part of *Critique of Pure Reason* is occupied in showing the fallacies that arise from applying space and time and the categories to things that are not experienced. When this is done, so Kant maintains, we find ourselves troubled by "antinomies", that is to say, by mutually contradictory propositions each of which can apparently be proved. Kant states four such antinomies, each consisting of thesis and antithesis. In the first, the thesis says, "The world has a beginning in time, and is also limited as regards space." The antithesis says, "The world has no beginning in time, and no limits in space; it is infinite as regards both time

and space.⁶ The other three antinomies are of the same kind, and so we need not mention them.

In contemporary philosophy, Wittgenstein's standpoint shows great similarity to that of the Buddha. Wittgenstein says that most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false, but senseless. Therefore, we cannot answer questions of this kind at all, but can only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical with the Beautiful.) And so it is not to be wondered at that the deepest problems are really no problems.⁷

The Buddha was very often compared to a doctor. According to him, human nature is sick with disease. His own role he conceived to be that of the physician. His doctrine was presented as therapy, a treatment or cure, for those who wanted to follow it—a method and a process of healing. He offered his advice in the practical manner of a spiritual physician; the art of Indian medicine seems to have been adopted by him as applied to the sphere of spiritual problems. (Compare Therapeutic Positivism in England.) So, Gotama's doctrine can be regarded as quite practical.

Among the followers of Gotama, the Buddha, there were such famous physicians as Jivaka. Buddhism was closely connected with medicine up to later days.⁸ In the West, too, the interest of skeptics centered on the problems of practice. Such later skeptics, as Aenesidemus and Agrippa, for example, were physicians.⁹ It is note-

6. *Ibid.*, p. 708.

7. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., London: K. Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., Ltd., 1922), 4. 003. p. 63.

8. Wilhelm Windelband, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie* (Tübingen, Verlag von J. C. B. Mohr, 1893-1924), 9 u., 10 Aufl., S. (pp.) 134-135; also, J. H. Tufts, trans., *A History of Philosophy* (2d ed., rev., New York: The Macmillan Company, 1893-1953).

9. Julius Jolly, *Medicin.* (Strassburg: Verlag von Karl J. Trubner,

worthy that the attitude of eliminating metaphysical assertions, being connected with positive medical science, was established on the same basis at nearly the same time in both India and the West.

The possibility of Gotama's position of modern life can be seen from the description of a similar view held by Frederic Harrison in modern Europe. "When men of high and intellectual power assure us that they find rest, unity, and fruit in intuitional truth, and in innate conceptions about themselves, their own natures, the external world, its origin, construction, and maintenance, the future state of what they conceive to be some part of, or the essence of themselves, their duty here, and a sense of right and wrong, far be it from us to dispute the value and reality of this knowledge. . . . If we do not adopt them, it is not because we believe them to be false, but because they fail to interest us. We can get no practical good out of them."¹⁰ Or, compare this, from a very different school. William James says: "Is the world one or many?—fated or free?—material or spiritual?—here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences."¹¹

Everything is to be set aside which does not make for "quiescence, knowledge, supreme wisdom, and *nirvāṇa*," Among the questions that the Buddha thus dismissed are several that have been persistently debated in Western religion and philosophy. We see this sort of thought expressed in the oldest stratum of the scriptures of early Buddhism. Gotama did not want to found a new religion, nor to advocate any particular metaphysics.

1901), S. (pp.) 15-16. (Grundriss der Indo-arischen Philologie und Altertumskunde, III, 10.) Hokei Idzumi (Izumi), "Indo Koten no Iho ni tsuite" (Medicine in Indian classics), *Shukyo Kenkyu*, New Series IV (1927), 518-547.

10. Frederic Harrison, *The Philosophy of Common Sense* (New York : The Macmillan Co., 1907), p. 38.

11. "Pragmatism," in *Pragmatism and Four Essays from The Meaning of Truth* (New York : Meridian Books, Inc., 1955), p. 42.

Eliminating, as far as he could, any metaphysical doctrine which might lead to antinomies, he wanted to elucidate the true practical knowledge of the law of human activities. The Buddha was neither a positivist nor a pragmatist. But these extracts from the scriptures may show that it is not necessary to read metaphysical notions between the lines, as later scholars have wanted to do. Buddhism, as a "philosophy," is described by some scholars as a "dialectical pragmatism" with a "psychological" turn. Here "dialectic" means the method of seeking knowledge by question and answer, as was done by Socrates. In origin and intention, Buddhism has always been marked by its intensely practical attitude. Speculation on matters irrelevant to salvation was discouraged by Buddhism from the time of its very beginning.

So, Buddhists have refused to be involved in any metaphysical discussion. Although Mahāyāna Buddhism has set forth something like a philosophical system which might be called "metaphysics," Buddhists in general have not wanted to discuss such problems as would lead to antinomies.

3. *Partial Truth of Ideas*

How, then, should we view the wrong metaphysical views prevalent in those days? The Buddha said :

*"On such points Brahmins and recluses stick,
Wrangling on them, they violently discuss;
Poor folk ! They see but one side of the shield."*¹²

This means that metaphysical views are nothing but partial apprehensions of the whole truth, which lies beyond our cognition, beyond rational analysis. In scripture we also find the famous parable of the blind men and the elephant.¹³

12. *Udāna* VI. 4 F. L. Woodward, trans, *Udāna . Verses of Uplift and Invittaka : As it was said. The Minor Anthologies of the Pali Canon*, Pt. II. Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. VIII (London Oxford University Press, H. Milford, 1935), pp. 81-83.

13. *Udāna* VI. 4. *ibid.* the Chinese version of the *Arthavargiya-*

Some ascetics and *brāhmins* once met together, and began to quarrel. Some said, "The world is eternal," and others, "The world is not eternal"; some declared, "The world is finite," and others, "The world is infinite"; again, some taught, "Body and soul are separate," and others, "Body and soul are but one." Some said, "The perfect man is after death"; others maintained, "The perfect man is *not* after death," and so forth. All this led finally to a quarrel, and to harsh and insulting words. The monks told the Buddha of this quarrel, and then he told them the following parable :

There once was a king who had all those who had been born blind brought together. When they were all assembled, the king commanded an elephant to be "shown" to them. An elephant was brought, and he told some of them to feel his head, others his ear, others his tusk, others his trunk, etc., and the last one the elephant's tail. Then the king asked them, "How does an elephant look?" Then those who had touched the elephant's head said, "An elephant is like a pot"; those who had touched the ear said, "An elephant is like a winnowing basket"; those who had touched the tusk declared, "An elephant is like a plough-share"; those who had touched the trunk said, "An elephant is like the pole of a plow"; and those who had felt the tail maintained, "An elephant is like a broom." A great tumult arose. Each one maintained, "An elephant is like this, and not otherwise; he is not like that, he is like this" until at last they came to blows, at which the king was mightily amused.

Similar, concluded the Buddha, is the case of the ascetics and *brāhmins*, each of whom has seen only a portion of the truth, and who then maintain, "Thus is truth and not otherwise; truth is not so, but thus."¹⁴

Ordinary teachers, who have grasped this or that small part of the truth, dispute with one another. Only a *Buddha*, however, can apprehend the whole truth.

sūtra (Taishō Tripiṭaka, Vol. 4, p. 178 a-c.) This parable of the blind men and an elephant (*andha-gaṇanyaya*) is a favorite one for both Hindu and Jain philosophers. (M. Winternitz : op. cit., Vol. II, p. 88 n.)

14. Winternitz : op. cit. Vol. II, pp. 87-88.

Rational analysis is useful in making clear the limitations of rationality. It is by detaching oneself from metaphysical oppositions that one is able to grasp the truth.

The way of thinking which acknowledges the *raison d'être* of all dissenting philosophical opinions was almost totally lacking in Greece. The only exceptions are Euthydemus and Cratylus, the Sophists, who said, "Words can predicate only what is existing; therefore, they cannot be false."¹⁵ It would be needless to say that such a way of thinking could not assert itself under the overwhelming sway of the clergy in the Middle Ages.

The theory of the partial truth of all philosophical assertions was stressed by Pascal. However, he finally expressed his whole-hearted devotion to Christianity. In recent years, this view has been advocated by Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's fundamental thesis is that it is impossible to say anything about the world as a whole, and that whatever can be said has to be about limited portions of the world. Russell explains Wittgenstein's standpoint as follows: "According to this view we could only say things about the world as a whole if we could get outside the world, if, that is to say, it ceased to be for us the whole world. Our world may be bounded for some superior being who can survey it from above, but for us, however finite it may be, it cannot have a boundary, since it has nothing outside it. Wittgenstein uses, as an analogy, the field of vision. Our field of vision does not, for us, have a visual boundary, just because there is nothing outside it, and in like manner our logical world has no logical boundary because our logic knows of nothing outside it."¹⁶

According to scripture, Gotama would not say, "(My doctrine) is true," nor would he say, "(Your doctrine) is false." (*Sñ* 843). He does not conflict with other philosophers (*Sñ* 847), for he does not dispute with others who adhere to any definite standpoint. He said, "I do not

15. Edward Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung dargestellt* (Leipzig: O. R. Reisland, 1923), Vol. I, Pt. 2, p. 1370.

16. Bertrand Russell's Introduction to Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus*, op. cit., p. 18.

fight with the world, but the world fights with me, for one who knows about the truth (*dhamma*) never fights with the world. And what the learned in the world regard as non-existent, that also I teach as non-existent. And what the learned in the world regard as existent, that also I regard as existent.”¹⁷

The teaching of the Buddha transcends comparison; it is neither inferior, nor equal, nor superior to other doctrines.¹⁸ “After investigation, there is nothing amongst the doctrines which such a one (as I would) embrace, and seeing (misery) in the (other philosophical) views, without adopting (any of them), searching (for truth), I saw ‘inward peace’.” (*Sn.* 837).

In the ancient West we find a similar assertion. “The Sophists, notably Protagoras and Gorgias, had been led by the ambiguities and apparent contradictions of sense perception to a subjectivism not unlike Hume’s. Pyrrho seems to have added moral and logical skepticism as to the senses. He is said to have maintained that there could never be a rational ground for preferring one course of action to another. In practice, this meant that one conformed to the customs of whatever country one inhabited. A modern disciple would go to church on Sundays and perform the correct genuflections, but without any of the religious beliefs that are supposed to inspire these actions. Ancient skeptics went through the whole pagan ritual, and were even sometimes priests; their skepticism assured them that this behaviour could not be proved wrong, and their common sense (which survived their philosophy) assured them that it was convenient.”¹⁹ Skepticism made an appeal to many unphilosophic minds. People observed the diversity of schools and the acerbity of their disputes, and ascertained that all alike were pretending to knowledge which was in fact unattainable.

The Platonic Socrates professes to know nothing; we naturally treat this as irony, but it could be taken seriously.

17. *Samyutta-mkāya* III, pp. 138 f., cf. *Sn.* 73.

18. *Sn.* 842 ff., cf. 855, 860.

19. Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy*, p. 233.

Many of the dialogues reach no positive conclusion, and aim at leaving the reader in a state of doubt. Some—the latter half of the *Parmenides*, for instance—might seem to have no purpose except to show that either side of any question can be maintained with equal plausibility. The Platonic dialectic could be treated as an end, rather than a means, and, if so treated, it lent itself admirably to the advocacy of skepticism. This seems to have been the way in which Arcesilaus interpreted the man whom he still professed to follow. He had decapitated Plato, but, at any rate, the torso that remained was genuine. Arcesilaus maintained no thesis, but would refute any thesis set up by a pupil. Sometimes he would himself advocate two contradictory propositions on successive occasions, showing how to argue convincingly in favour of either.²⁰

In later days, the second lecture given by the skeptic Carneades in Rome was concerned with refuting all that he said in his first lecture, not with a view to establishing opposite conclusions, but merely to show that every conclusion is unwarranted.

These facts will betray the other side of the ideological fact pointed out by the Buddha.

The partial truth of philosophical ideas has been advocated in the modern times also. F. Harrison has asserted, "Everything depends on our recognizing as the substratum of our philosophy, that all knowledge is relative; relative in respect of its having no absolute certainty, and relative as respects its harmonizing with the mental and moral nature of man."²¹

It is by detaching oneself from philosophical opposition that one is able to attain inward peace of mind. Thus, in Buddhism there is no dogma which opposes other dogmas or which claims to be believed. Of course, Buddhism as a historical and cultural product developed many different systems of thought in the course of time. But in the early days such systems were not in accord with the ideals of the starting point of Buddhism. And even later

20. Russell, *Ibid.*, p. 235.

21. F. Harrison, *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Buddhists did not want to coerce the followers to believe what seemed quite irrational. They always sought to avoid obscurantism.

Concerning the fundamental standpoint of Buddhism, Babbitt²² says, "The comparative absence of dogma in the humanism of Confucius and the religion of Buddha can scarcely be regarded as an inferiority. On the contrary one can at least see the point of view of a young Chinese scholar, Mr. H. H. Chang, who complains that the man of the Occident has introduced unnecessary theological and metaphysical complications into religion : he has been too prone to indulge in 'weird dogmas' and 'uncanny curiosity.' He has been guilty to a degree unknown to the Far East of intolerance, obscurantism, and casuistry." He again says that the Buddha's avoidance of the form of obscurantism is a matter of great importance. The conflict between the head and the heart, the tendency to repudiate the intellect either in the name of what is above or of what is below it, which has played such an enormous role in the Occident from some of the early Christians to Bergson, is alien to genuine Buddhism.

The supreme illumination of the Buddha was associated with the precise tracing of cause and effect, with the following out of the so-called causal nexus, which should be accepted by all men.

The belief in irrational, unthinkable dogma has been shared by many Western thinkers. For example, we can find this tendency in Pascal also. Concerning this, Babbitt says, "Pascal, one of the most profound religious thinkers, attacked casuistry in its Jesuitical form but himself supplies an example of what Mr. Chang means by weird dogmas. Man, says Pascal in substance, is unintelligible to himself without the belief in infant damnation."²³

On the contrary, obscurantism has been lacking in Buddhism as a general trend. That is why there has been hardly any problem of conflict between religion and science

22. Irving Babbitt, *Buddha and the Occident* : an appendix to his work: *The Dhammapada* (New York, London : Oxford University Press, 1936), pp. 67, 72.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

in the East as in the West.

In spite of the difference between Buddhism and Western thought, we should not miss the essence of religion underlying both. Concerning this essence, Babbitt asserts, "The truth is that though Christianity from the start was more emotional in its temper than Buddhism, and though an element of nostalgia entered into it from an early period, it is at one in its final emphasis with the older religion. In both faiths this emphasis is on the peace that passes understanding"²⁴ What both religions have aimed at is nothing but peace of mind, the difference being the way of representing this final aim and goal to their believers.

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²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL ROOTS AND VALIDITY OF TAGORE'S GENIUS

F. S. C. NORTHROP

Tagore was a genius. Such a person may, however, express a novel creative vision, the philosophical assumptions of which are invalid. To determine whether this is the case with Tagore, the philosophical roots of his genius must be examined.

He was a beautiful harmony of the provincial and the cosmopolitan. He belongs unequivocally to India. No other place than the source of Hinduism and Buddhism could have produced him. Speaking thus provincially from the heart of his native land, he says something, however, that expresses the deepest and best in human hearts' everywhere. Hence, all humanity, equally rightfully with Indians, claim him today as their own.

His language was Bengali. His theme also bespoke the culture of his native province. An Indian of Tagore's genius from another Indian state would have behaved and written differently, as did Gandhi of Gujarat. Nevertheless, Tagore's Bengali poetry and prose had in essential part a different style and spirit from the Bengali which he learned in his youth. India's cultural historian and recent Ambassador to France tells us why : Tagore's cosmopolitanism led him to learn other languages and to study the poetry and faiths of other peoples. In particular, he mastered English and the classics of the English-speaking world. He could hardly, therefore, have missed the influence of Locke's *Essay Concerning Toleration* in both religion and politics or Jefferson's same belief, derived from the Stoic Romans and Locke and built into the Bill of Rights of the American Constitution and written by Jefferson into the Americans' Declaration of Independence.

These English and American philosophical and political classics must have reminded Tagore of his native India.

For, over the ages, rather than for a mere couple of modern centuries, India has been notable for the manner in which her sons and daughters of countless different religious faiths and racial, legal, and political customs have lived together without the faith, race, or zeal of one corrupting or destroying that of the other. Thus, notwithstanding the provincial differences between his India, Locke's London, and Jefferson and Lincoln's America, and between Bengali-speaking Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, Muslims, and modern English-speaking Judaic-Christians, Tagore, by seeking out the deepest and best in the provincialism of each, found something harmonious among them.

But he also learned something from the other while confirming his own in that other. Otherwise, the Bengali language which he inherited would not have been transformed in both its style and its modern spirit into the Anglicized Bengali which Dr. K. M. Panikkar tells us it became in Tagore's hands.¹ To understand, therefore, what one is honouring when one honours Tagore is to realise that, in both the form and the substance of what he did, the soul and linguistic syntax of the modern English-speaking nations at their religiously tolerant and multiparty political best went by way of the spirit and language of Bengal into the soul of India to harmonize there beautifully with the best in her own pluralistic religious and political tradition.

Even so, Tagore gave predominant expression to but one part of India's religious, political, and cultural heritage—namely, its Hindu-Buddhist component. Yet, Bengal is as Muslim as it is Hindu, as is much of the rest of India. Just as Iqbal of Lahore gave poetic, religious, and political form in native Urdu, equally Anglicized, beautiful, and profound, to Islamic India, so Tagore in Bengali voiced the ancient spirit and modern vision of Buddhist-Hindu India. The major theme and image of Iqbal's *The Tulip of Sinai*, *The Secret of the Self*, and *Question and Answer* is that of an Indian Muslim examining his own deepest self to rededicate

1. K. M. Panikkar, *Asian and Western Dominance* (New York · John Day, 1953).

himself to Allah and thereby set the caravan symbolizing the spirit of Islam on the march again. Tagore's image in "The Garden" and his other poems is that of the lotus on the pool, persisting with calm equanimity through the transitorily whipped-up waves that from time to time would disturb its placidity.

It is upon this lotus that the Buddha is seated in most of the paintings and statues that portray him. The present official seal of Free India is Buddhist. Note also in any painting or statue of the Enlightened One the blissful equanimity of the timeless pool's placidity that is reflected from within his face. Contrast this with the religion of Islam, which regards such religious imagery as infamous and idolatrous, or with Christianity, which portrays the face of its Saviour in agony on the cross. Contrast it even with much Hindu Indian religious art that pictures the creator, his mouth drooling blood and gore, as he devours his human creatures. Clearly, Tagore has selected and eliminated even within his Buddhist-Hindu Bengal and India

Nevertheless, he regarded himself to be as deeply Hindu as he is Buddhist. Nor is this difficult to understand. For the Buddha was the first-born son of a second (ruling) caste Hindu *maharājā*, destined by this Aryan Hindu racial patriarchal primogeniture to be king when his royal father retired; and, although the Hindu Buddha repudiated, as did the Hindu Gandhi and Ambedkar centuries later, the codes of caste of Aryan Hinduism, he did so because he was convinced that Aryan racialism and its castes were incompatible with the very earliest Vedic and the persisting Hindu teaching that the true self in all persons, like the timeless pool in all its transitory waves, is not merely equal, but identical in all men, being identical even with the self that is Brāhman, the divine consciousness. With this concept of the person, only egalitarian free democracy is politically and culturally compatible.

It is such a Buddhistically reformed Hindu Indian soul that Tagore put poetically before his fellow countrymen as both the oldest and deepest part of their own past and present selves and the most modern and trustworthy guide

to their future. It is, moreover, by studying and incorporating the English and American contractual common law, after the manner in which Tagore mastered and expressed the style and modern liberal spirit of the English language, that recent India's Constitutional Committee, chaired by the Buddhist-Hindu minded, British and American educated Ambedkar, created the present government of Free India with its contractual legal constitution and its Fundamental Freedoms, the equivalent of the American Bill of Rights, in which Aryan-Hindu racialism and caste are repudiated and all of India's sons and daughters are treated under a common law which they themselves freely and contractually create with the conviction that their truest and real selves are identical. Clearly, the Buddhist official seal of this government is of more than antiquarian interest; also, Tagore's contribution to India's nationalism is not negligible.

But Tagore's nationalism transcended all national boundaries, as did the spirit of his Buddhist Hinduism. Because his religious philosophy taught him that the deepest and real self in all persons, whether Buddhist Hindus or not, is, like the timeless pool or ocean in its relation to its transitorily different waves, the same in all mankind and even all cosmic creatures, Tagore envisaged the different religions and religious nations of the world as diverse wave-like differentiations of the divine self in all of us.

This led him to seek out the deepest and best in all religions and religiously rooted peoples. Like India's President, Dr. Radhakrishnan, he realized that God is one, though the ways to him be many. Conversely, the revelations of God to men are many. For clearly the divine, which is timeless, indeterminate, and infinite, cannot be revealed in determinate, transitory, finite terms without being exhibited as but one manifestation of its infinite nature. Consequently, any nation or religion which is to be true to the deepest nature of its own adherents must behave similarly, in the same cosmopolitan and tolerant spirit, enriching its deepest understanding of its own self and provincial nation by seeing God's different religiously political manifestations in

other religious faiths and nations. This Tagore did for Islam as well as Buddhist-Hindu India, and for all the other religious civilizations and nations of the world as well.

At this point he struck a note in concord with the Stoic Roman cosmopolitans when, repudiating the religious racialism of law-of-status tribal nations, they created contractual legal science to give the *jus civile* of any other tribal religion and nation the same status under Roman law that was enjoyed by the *jus civile* of their own tribal Roman nation and its religion. This note echoes still in the doctrines of religious and political toleration of England's Locke and of Jefferson and Lincoln's America. The manner in which it has been reinforced by Gandhi and Nehru's India to re-echo throughout Africa and the rest of the world is today a commonplace.

Judging, however, by the number of contemporary nations that permit only a one-party political system, it is easier for many contemporary politicians to hear this note in its anti-imperialistic, than in its domestic, political overtones. Conversely, in the writer's own nation at least, it is easier for many to voice this note in its implications for the domestic and foreign policy of other nations than it is to apply it consistently in domestic matters themselves. The old religions and customs, all of which originally, and most of which still, are rooted in race and in caste, do not make, what Sir Henry Maine called the "shift from status to contract" easily.² Of this, more later.

In any event, the key to Tagore's genius is clear. He looked at the beliefs and practices of his own religion and nation and those of the English-speaking modern liberal democratic nations, not solely in terms of the patent facts indicating where each falls short of its tolerative religious and multiparty political ideals, but in terms of the deepest beliefs and behaviour of each at its best. And because the deepest conceptions of the real self of (1) his provincial Buddhist Hinduism and of (2) the modern tolerative multiparty democratic English-speaking nations taught

2. Sir Henry Maine, *Ancient Law*, (London : John Murray, 1908), p. 151.

that all human beings are normatively either identical or equal with respect to their obligations and their privileges, he found the universal and the cosmopolitan in the provincial. Also, having thus found two basic philosophical conceptions of the religious and secular person which, if not identical, were harmonious, the one reinforcing and adding something to the insights of the other, Tagore's poetic spirit expressed this philosophical synthesis in a beautiful harmony.

This experience Tagore then generalized, as we have noted above, for all mankind. Was this generalization warranted?

To answer this question we must first note its ambiguity, distinguish its different meanings, and then answer one by one the two or more unambiguous questions that are contained within it. The word "warranted" in our question may mean: Does the cognitively correct theory of the self and its normative status with regard to other persons indicate any person's self to be what Tagore's (1) Buddhist-reformed Hinduism and (2) modern Anglo-American tolerative religious and multiparty political philosophy affirm?

Merely to put this less ambiguous question is to suggest that Tagore's generalization of his Bengali-English experience to all other religions and nations may be a precarious one. For, even if it were cognitively demonstrable that the philosophy of Tagore's Buddhist-reformed Hinduism and Anglo-American pluralistic religious and political idealism were the correct philosophy, the fact is, nevertheless, that many other religions and national groups even in their most basic concept of the person and in their ideals at their best do not hold such a philosophy. The white patriarchal, Filmerian Protestant Christians in the Old American South today, with their doctrine that only white folk are fit to govern, vote, and have the best governmentally supported education, are one example. The Aryan *Mīmāṃsā* dualistic right-wing Hindus, still persisting in India today, with their doctrine of Aryan racial and religious leadership for India, represent another example. The patriarchally selected Arabic sultanates and fundamentalist followers of Islam generally who affirm

that God reveals himself only perfectly in the Prophet, are a third. Moreover, even many racially and religiously tolerative and multiparty political Christians believe that one can come to God only through Jesus and that God revealed himself perfectly to humanity only in Jesus. The Marxists are, of course, even less cosmopolitanly tolerative with respect to religion, since they in their best and most basic philosophical ideal regard religion of any kind as a poison, and hence something which, except for tactics of momentary political expediency, is to be eliminated rather than tolerated. Moreover, as we shall see shortly, the people of any "law-of-status" society believe in and practise only a provincial religion and politics, knowing no law beyond that of their own tribe and knowing no God except the one who is the first Patriarchal Father of their own race.

These examples suffice to show that the warrant for Tagore's generalization from his Indian-English experience cannot be separated from a knowledge of the different specific, most basic philosophical beliefs and ideals of the particular provincial religions and nations from which and to which one is generalizing. In this very important, but not the most important, sense, the generalization in which Tagore and so many other contemporary people today indulge is not warranted.

Nevertheless, there is another, the most important, sense in which Tagore's generalization of his Bengali-English experience is warranted. This sense is that, notwithstanding the existence of religions and nations whose ideals are both unc cosmopolitan and intolerant, Tagore's concept of the nature of any human being anywhere is true; and, this being the case, any person who lives as guided by the truth must act accordingly and do everything in his capacity by persuasion rather than force to urge his and other nations to do so also. It remains to give the empirical and other evidence for this affirmation.

It has been noted that Tagore's cosmopolitanism has two components : (1) the influence of modern tolerative liberal contractual legal and political ideals and their human values on his Buddhist Hinduism, and (2) his Buddhist Hinduism itself. Let us examine the former of

these two factors first. In doing so, the following question has to be asked : Is the Anglo-American and present Free Indian religiously tolerative, liberal, legal and political philosophy on the same level of validity as other religious beliefs and political philosophies which, being both intolerant and unc cosmopolitan, are incompatible with it ? Stated more generally, this is equivalent to asking whether one religious belief is as true as another, whether atheism and its political belief that religion is a poison is as true as a religious philosophy and whether one legal and political philosophy is as true as any other.

If the answer to this more general form of our question is in the affirmative, this is equivalent to saying that Tagore's philosophy, like any alternative to it, is a mere matter of taste or historical cultural accident with respect to the provincial place of one's birth and the effects of cultural diffusion upon it. If so, "truth" is completely provincial and culturally relative, and Tagore's or any other kind of cosmopolitanism is an error. It then becomes a case of each religious group and nation universalizing itself imperialistically for the rest of humanity to produce a dog-eat-dog interreligious and international world. If this is the only kind of truth Tagore's religious and political philosophy can claim for itself, then, clearly, his generalization of it is not merely unwarranted but also is likely to do positive harm by generating one more religious and national imperialism. Furthermore, if this is the only kind of "truth" any religious or political philosophy has, then the present prevalent analysis of the international situation is incorrectly described as a cold war for which the Soviet Union and the United States are largely to blame; instead, it must be seen to be a perpetually hot war to which every religious group and every national philosophy is contributing. Clearly, the question of the objective as distinct from the culturally relative of Tagore's tolerative religious and liberal democratic political philosophy must be faced.

To do this we must define what the word "liberal" means as applied to law and politics, since this word is used today very carelessly. It is the equivalent in secular politics of the word "tolerative" in religious policy. Opera-

tionally defined, it means a many-party legal and political system rather than a monolithic one party state. These operational definitions are, however, mere instruments for giving expression to a particular philosophy of the legal, political, and religious person. What is this philosophy? What are the empirical or other grounds, verifiable by anyone anywhere, for believing it, rather than some other philosophy, to be true?

To these questions, there are two answers. One answer entails an analysis of the basic concepts and assumptions of contractual legal science, since modern legal and political systems are impossible without assuming the concepts and principles of that science to be valid and without using the techniques which their validity provides. The other answer arises from an evident fact of common-sense knowledge.

This common-sense fact is the finiteness of human knowledge. Confronted with a universe which presents an endless number of facts to us, finite human minds arrive at different theories and beliefs concerning what these facts add up to and signify and also with respect to what they imply concerning the goal of religious, moral, legal, and political conduct. Even with respect to revealed religions, this is true of the human words in which these revelations are conveyed. A person of a particular religious faith interprets the revelation in a different way from that in which another person, equally sincere and devout in that same faith, may interpret it. But any legal and political system lays down at least some norms that are universally prescriptive for everybody in the system. How is this prescriptiveness for all to be reconciled with the different beliefs of its members concerning the goal of human conduct, and what, therefore, should be made prescriptive for all? Clearly, to have this question answered by but one individual, party, or group in the community, not allowing any other group even to present its judgements for examination by representatives of all groups and parties, is to be false to the patent fact of the finiteness of human knowledge. Conversely, to be true to this evident fact in creating any legal and political

system entails that everybody be represented as equals in having something to say about what is to be made prescriptive for them.

A deeper and more decisive ground for the non-culturally relative truth of the liberal democratic legal and political philosophy becomes evident when one examines the novel elemental concepts of contractual legal science. Without this science and its assumptions, no modern nation, be it the Soviet Union, Ghana, Free India, or the United States of America, could be constructed; nor would it be able to specify its state and federal structure or its norms for ordering the religious, economic, legal, and political life of its people. It is, moreover, to the basic assumptions of this science that people the world over today are appealing when they demand the right to run their own affairs themselves instead of having them run for them either by foreign imperialists or by their traditional ancient and medieval *maharājās* or tribal chiefs.

The Soviet Union inherited this science from the czarist regime which inherited it in turn from Stoic Roman law by way of Constantinople and Justinian. Free India and the United States received it in the Court of Chancery portion of English common law. The reception of it by other modern nations can be traced back similarly to Stoic Rome.

Thomas Jefferson knew Roman law and its contractual legal science. He read nine languages, including Greek and Latin. He tells us that he studied the Greek and Roman philosophical, legal, and political classics. This enabled him, apparently, to separate the basic principles of Stoic Roman contractual legal and political science from the old law-of-status tribal religious and patriarchal joint-familial customs that accompanied it in both the later Roman law and the Court of Common Pleas portion of English case-law. Thus Jefferson's conception of contractual legal and political science was not compromised by the inclusion of the customs of white Christian patriarchalism and caste of the early English case-law-customs which passed from early seventeenth century England into the Old American South through the Virginia Company and

its First Families, as Mr. Peter Laslett has recently shown.³ Nor was Jefferson's conception of contractual legal and political science combined, as is the case today in the Soviet Union and Communist China, with Marxist materialistic, anti-religious, one-party political philosophical content which is equally incompatible with it. The consequence was that Jefferson stated the kind of legal and political system for normatively ordering human beings religiously, legally, and politically which a consistent contractual legal science entails. This occurred first in the American Declaration of Independence and later in the Bill of Rights to be interpreted by the courts as law⁴ which, upon his initial insistence, was added to the Constitution of the United States.

What has to be realized is that liberal political democracy is not, as many lawyers and politicians today suppose, but one possible form of a contractual legal and political nation, of which a Marxist Communist legal and political system is another consistent alternative. Instead, it was, I believe, the genius of Jefferson to have seen that the elemental concepts of Western legal science entail liberal democracy. In other words, the situation is not that Jefferson came, on independent personal grounds, to believe in religiously tolerative multi-party political democracy and then used the supposedly normatively neutral techniques of contractual legal science to articulate this arbitrary choice, but that his study of Western legal science made him aware that its legal techniques presuppose an elementary postulate for their validity of which liberal democracy is the corollary.

What is this elemental proposition of contractual legal science and what is the evidence for its validity? The question of validity is irrelevant, however, so far as the

3. Peter Laslett, ed., *Patriarcha and Other Political Works of Sir Robert Filmer* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1949).

4. Thomas Jefferson, *The Life and Selected Writings of Thomas Jefferson* edited and with an Introduction by Adrienne Koch and William Peden (New York: Modern Library, 1944); see also F. S. C. Northrop, *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1960), chap. 17.

issue between the liberal democratic and the Marxist Communist philosophies of modern legal and political institutions is concerned. As noted above, the legal and political system which is the Soviet Union has made use of and required Western legal science for its articulation, just as does any liberal democratic nation. Consequently, any modern nation, be it Marxist Communist or liberal democratic, assumes the validity of Western legal and political science in affirming its own validity. This conclusion can be avoided only if one reverses what Sir Henry Maine called the "shift from status to contract," by returning modern nations to the old patriarchal law-of-status joint families and tribal nations, in which all political authority and anyone's rights and duties are identified with his or her racial purity of ancestry, sex, and temporal order of birth and breeding. Such a reversion to racial gods and their tribal nations, no modern nation, be it Marxist Communist, free democratic, or of any form, accepts.

Stated positively, this means that in any law-of-contract nation the facts of one's ancestry, breeding, and birth have nothing to do with one's legal and political rights and obligations; instead, rights and duties are meaningless except as they are contractually constructed and specified by the people concerned. From this it follows, as Jefferson and his colleagues stated in the American Declaration of Independence, that with respect to their political obligations and duties "all men are created equal." What has to be realised is that the latter statement is not, as many who should know better have assumed, a proposition in biology or the descriptive comparative psychology of new-born babes. So taken, the affirmation is obviously false. Instead, as Jefferson was well aware from his study of Stoic Roman law and also from the fact that he was writing a political rather than a biological or psychological document, it is a proposition in contractual legal and political science. Moreover, as such, it is, as the Declaration of Independence affirms, "self-evident", following tautologically from the meaning of the words "right" and "politically obligatory" in this science. Because such rights and obligations are meaningless unless anyone for whom they

are prescriptive has, either directly or through his chosen representatives, contractually agreed to what they are, it follows that contractual legal and political science entails a liberal democratic legal and political system.

Negatively, this means that to use the legal concepts and techniques which they have inherited from Stoic Rome, as do the Marxist Communists, to construct a modern nation in which the overwhelming majority of its people have nothing to say about their rights and obligations is to create something embodying a legal and political philosophy which is self-contradictory and, therefore, false. In other words, the elemental principles of Marxist Communist philosophy are incompatible with the concept of "right" or "political obligation" in Western legal science without which this Marxist philosophy cannot be given legal and political articulation. Similarly, to combine the principles of a liberal democratic contractual legal and political nation with the normative content of a law-of-status religious racialism, as do the politicians of the Old South in the United States and the right-wing Hindu Fundamentalists in Free India, is, likewise, to affirm a philosophy which is self-contradictory and, therefore, false.

Three conclusions follow with respect to the religiously tolerative liberal democratic component of Tagore's cosmopolitanism. First, Marxist Communism, its major modern alternative, is false because it is a self-contradictory combination of Marxist philosophical and contractual legal and political concepts. Second, Right-Wing Hinduism, its major Hindu Indian alternative, is similarly false, being also, when combined with modern legal and political institutions, self-contradictory. Third, a consistent contractual legal and political system entails religiously tolerative liberal democracy, as Jefferson and the other American Founding Fathers and Lincoln later realized, and as Tagore envisaged.

Even so, one categorical question remains : Why assume contractual legal and political science ? Does not the modernity which it makes possible mechanize and materialize human existence, thereby destroying all human values by confusing the means of human existence with its ends ?

An affirmative answer to the latter question is very popular today. Unfortunately, such an answer has two fatal weaknesses: first, the deeds of the people who make such a claim give the lie to what they say. The fact is not that the United States or other modern Western nations are, against the will of the people of India, Africa, and the rest of the world, thrusting contractual legal and political science on the rest of mankind. Instead, the latter people are appealing again and again to the American Declaration of Independence and insisting that its principle applies to them also. To make such an appeal is to accept and act on the principle of the validity for all mankind of contractual legal and political science. The second error in the prevalent popular notion that modernization by this science destroys human values centres in the aforementioned meaning of the words "right" and "duty" or "obligation" in this science. These words are value terms. Hence, instead of destroying human values, contractual legal and political science brings a new theory of what they are. To those demanding contractual legal and political values in order to run their own affairs, while still cherishing old law-of-status joint-familial, tribal and social values emotively and unconsciously, the coming of the values of self-government, which contractual legal and political science give, will always be presented as the destruction of human values, meaning thereby the old law-of-status conception of what values are. In this they are right. The values of contractual legal and political science are incompatible with most of the values of any law-of-(biologically defined)-status society. But contractual legal and political science has its values, and in this sense it does not mechanize or materialize; but, instead, it replaces old false values with true values. We come back, therefore, to our previous question: Why assume contractual legal and political science, thereby having to give up the traditional racial and tribally focused religious and national values for the new values which this science entails.

The answer to this question was given, a few paragraphs back, where we referred to the tautologically true and hence self-evident truth of the principle of contractual legal science which Jefferson expressed in the Declara-

tion of Independence. What this amounts to is the thesis that the concepts of contractual legal and political science, like those of the modern and the Democritean and Platonic science of mathematics, are not radically empirical or naive realistic concepts getting their meaning existentially by intuition, but are, instead, constructs or what the writer elsewhere has called "concepts by postulation that are concepts by intellection."⁵ In the elemental laws of any such science, the subject term of the proposition has no meaning other than that which the predicate of the proposition imagelessly and axiomatically assigns to it. It follows that the elementary propositions of such sciences are analytic statements and, therefore, true tautologically. For additional technical reasons for this conclusion, together with the formal axiomatic statement of the elemental analytic propositions of contractual legal and political science, see the writer's *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience* and *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics*.⁶ Since analytic propositions are true for anyone anywhere, it follows that the modern liberal democratic component of Tagore's cosmopolitanism is warrantably generalizable for all mankind. Mankind today reciprocates this truth intuitively when, without knowing the reason why, Africans and Asians insist that the Jeffersonian principle applies to them also.

What of the Buddhist-Hindu component of Tagore's cosmopolitan spirit? Is its philosophical concept of the religious, moral, legal, and political person true also in a sense which is verifiable by anyone anywhere? In short, is any human being, whether he believes the contrary or not, the kind of self which Tagore's Buddhist-Hindu philosophy says he is?

It was noted above that Tagore's is a Buddhistically reformed Hinduism. Our question then takes on the following more precise form. What was there in the

5 F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), chap. V.

6 F. S. C. Northrop, *The Complexity of Legal and Ethical Experience* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959), chap. XXII, and *Philosophical Anthropology and Practical Politics*, chap. 18

Hinduism before the Buddha which was an error ? Or was the unreformed Hindu philosophy of religion, law, and politics a true philosophy, with the Buddha, Tagore, and contemporary Free India in error ?

To answer these questions we must determine the philosophy of the classic Hindu law books, and then examine this philosophy with respect to its truth or falsity. At the East-West Philosophers' Conference at Honolulu in 1959, Professors D. M. Dutta and P. T. Raju reported independently that the codes in these law books are the work of Mīmāṃsā dualistic philosophers. The fundamental assumptions of any dualistic philosophy are naive realism in epistemology and ontological dualism in one's theory of reality.

Naive realism is the thesis that we know directly, through our senses, objects and their defining properties, which are real in the sense that they are the same for all perceivers and hence not relative to the particular perceiver. Ontological dualism is the thesis that the objects so known are external material substances and private introspectively given substantial selves or mental substances.

It is well known that the Aryan conquerors of the ancient Hindus brought to India two things—the Aryan Sanskrit language and law codified in terms of this language. The subject-predicate grammar of any Aryan language expresses a naive realistic way of thinking about oneself and nature as a substance with its sensed or introspected determinate properties.

The codes of classical Aryan Hindu law are also characterized by the fact that one's religious, moral, legal, and political obligations and rights are identified with the naive realistic natural-history biological concepts of one's racial origin, sex, caste, and primogeniture of birth. Thus, in the classical Aryan Hindu law books only those whose blood and race in the patriarchal line is purely Aryan can govern the state, advise religiously, or administer its codified law. Just as the patriarchal Christian norms of early seventeenth-century England, described in Sir Robert Filmer's *Patriarcha*, entered, via the Virginia Company, the customs of the Old American South, to pro-

duce there the present conflict with the contractual liberal democratic norms of the United States Supreme Court's desegregation decisions, so the patriarchal Hindu normative customs of Aryan India were similarly what Sir Henry Maine in his *Ancient Law* has called those of "a law of [biological pedigree-defined] status" society. In such a society, equality before the law or consent has nothing to do with one's religious moral, legal, or political rights and duties, instead, they are defined by one's biology of breeding at one's birth.

As noted above, it is precisely this law-of-status criterion of political obligation which Jefferson denied in the American Declaration of Independence when he affirmed that all people are created free and equal so far as their legal and political obligations and rights are concerned. It is this same repudiation of racially and biologically defined law-of-status moral, religious, legal, and political obligation which the Buddha, without knowledge of Stoic Roman contractual legal science, repudiated when he turned his back on the Aryan Hindu's racialism and caste, notwithstanding the fact that he was the eldest son of the Hindu *maharaja* of his province at the time and would have inherited all of the regal patriarchal prerogatives of breeding and birth, had he remained a traditional Aryan Hindu.

These being the epistemological, ontological, and normative religious, legal, and political premises of the Mīmāṃsā dualistic philosophical component of classical Aryan Hindu law, our next question is : What, if any, is the error in them ? This is equivalent to asking, What is the error, if any, in the opposition of the political leaders of the Old South in the United States to the recent decisions of its Supreme Court with respect to desegregation ? More generally, it is the question : What is the error, if any, in the philosophy of any law-of-(biologically defined) status society ?

The Indian answer is to be found in the development of (a) Buddhist philosophy through its four major systems and (b) later Hindu philosophy. Taking Mīmāṃsā dualism as their stepping-off point, these two philosophical developments proceed quite independently but similarly to deny,

first, the reality of the determinate substantial self and, second, the reality of the determinate material object, thereby arriving, in the case of Buddhism at the *Nirvāṇa* reality and in the case of non-dualistic Vedānta at the *Ātman-that-is-identical-with-Brahman* self which we described in our analysis of the lotus symbol in Tagore's poetry at the beginning of this inquiry. The answer given by both of these developments is that naive, i. e., radically empirical, knowing does not give one the idea of substance, as, ages later, Hume and William James made clear to modern British empiricists. Consequently, there is no empirical evidence for the naive realistic ontological dualist's belief in either a determinate material or a determinate mental substance. Furthermore, careful empirical examination of every quality given through the senses, be it primary, secondary, or tertiary, shows that it is relative, not merely to the percipient, but to different sense faculties of the same percipient. Since it is self-contradictory to define a realistic epistemological object, i. e., one purporting to be the same for all percipients, in terms of sensed qualities, all of which are relative to percipients, it follows that Mīmāṃsā dualism is a self-contradictory as well as empirically unverified philosophy, and, being self-contradictory, is, therefore, false.

One neglected question arises immediately. If Aryan Hinduism and its law is the law of Mīmāṃsā dualistic philosophers, as Professors Datta and Raju have indicated,⁷ why would not this demonstration of the falsity of Mīmāṃsā dualistic philosophy by Buddhist and Hindu Indians lead to the rejection of both Hindu law and Hinduism generally?

The answer which the writer has published in more detail elsewhere⁸ is that it would be an error to infer from Datta's and Raju's studies that the only philosophy in the

7. D. M. Datta's and P. T. Raju's articles in *Philosophy and Culture—East and West*, the Proceedings of the 1959 East-West Philosophers' Conference (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962).

8. F. S. C. Northrop, "The Comparative Philosophy of Comparative Law", *Cornell Law Quarterly*, Vol. XLV, No. 4, 1960, pp. 617-658.

Hindu law books is that of Mīmāṃsā dualism. An examination of the Laws of Manu shows that the normative content of the law-of-status Aryan racial and caste system, which rests upon naive realistic Mīmāṃsā dualism for its validity, applies for the most part only to the householder stage of any Aryan Hindu's life. In the other three stages, another philosophy with quite different moral, religious, legal, and political prescriptions for personal conduct is affirmed—that, namely, of the only real self, which is the *Ātman*-that-is-Brahman described at the beginning of this paper. This may well have been part of what the Buddha meant when he said that he was not teaching the Hindus anything new but was, instead, recalling them to something they had known from the beginning. As the excavations at Mohenjodaro and Harappa suggest, this beginning may well antedate the coming of the Aryan conquerors. Swami Nikhilananda has shown, in his translation and annotation of the *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary*,⁹ that the unqualified non-dualistic Vedāntic philosophy of the one and only true and real self did not originate with Śaṅkara, since it is present in the earliest Upaniṣads and the Vedas. All that Śaṅkara did, therefore, in the present writer's opinion, was to free it from its associations with the Mīmāṃsā dualistic portion of the Hindu law books when this portion is taken as expressing the real self. The Mīmāṃsā dualistic self is, after Śaṅkara, a temporary *as if* self which one may treat *as if* it were the real self during the householder stage of one's Hindu existence but which in fact, because of its *esse est percipi* character, is not the real self which one must leave the householder stage to pursue and with which one becomes identified in the two final stages of the Hindu's life as prescribed in the Laws of Manu.

A final crucial question remains : What is the empirical or other evidence for believing that Tagore's Buddhist-Hindu self, in which Brahman and *Ātman* are one, exists and is such that its existence is confirmable empirically

⁹ Swami Nikhilananda, *Māṇḍūkyaopaniṣad with Gauḍapāda's Kārikā and Śaṅkara's Commentary*, (Mysore : Sri Ramkrishna Ashram, 1955).

by anyone anywhere who will take the trouble to do so ?

This evidence is well known to those who have been brought up in Indian culture, where the psychological operations of meditation, *yoga*, etc., have been practised in which one eliminates all the relativistic differentiations or sensing and introspecting from one's all-embracing, radically empirical experience to be left with the undifferentiated *Atman*-that-is-Brahman, which, like the pool embracing its transitory waves, is not merely identical in all persons but is also the divine consciousness.

Because Western scientists, philosophers, and religious people are accustomed to think only about facts in experience and knowledge which are differentiated and hence determinate, factors that are this rather than that, it is in the writer's judgement, impossible, or at least unnecessarily difficult, to convey to Westerners the empirical evidence for this Buddhist-Hindu concept of any person's self in terms of Buddhist and Hindu philosophy, whether Westerners read this philosophy in the original Sanskrit and Pali or in a translation or whether they listen to expert Asian scholars' expositions of it. What happens again and again when Westerners try to understand *Nirvāṇa* or the *Atman*-that-is-Brahman is that, because it has never occurred to them that anything undifferentiated exists and can be real, they always read into *Nirvāṇa*, *Atman* and Brahman Western determinate concepts of reality, conscious personality, and the religious object.

At this point it may well be asked : But you are a Westerner; how, then, can you have your apparent confidence that you understand the Buddhist and Hindu concept of the self ? The answer is that I would not if I depended on any of the foregoing methods to determine what it means. The fact is that in analyzing the theories of recent mathematical physics I found myself wrestling with the problem of relating (a) its imageless, theoretically known, unobservable, and inexperienceable, mathematically constructed scientific objects and their laws to (b) the concrete differentiated data of radically empirical immediate conscious experience, so that both were accounted for with the minimum number of elementary assumptions. For reasons which are to be found in greater detail in the last chapter

of the writer's *Science and First Principles*,¹⁰ it became evident that, if one is not to be left with as many elementary concepts in one's philosophical analysis of recent mathematical physics as there are different sense qualities relative to different people over the whole of human history, thereby creating a philosophical beard so prodigious that even an Ockham's razor powered by atomic energy could not shave it, it is necessary to assume something immediately experienced, all-embracing, psychical, and undifferentiated. With such an elemental, purely existentially experienced factor taken as primitive, together with one mathematically constructed concept by postulation that is the physicist's field equation taken also as primitive, the countless sensed, introspected differentiations relative to particular percipients and occasions can be derived as defined concepts. With only these two primitives, the elemental assumptions are not multiplied beyond necessity, and Ockham's principle is not violated.

The problem then became that of finding a way to express this primitive, radically empirical factor. Note again its characteristics. It is conscious, immediately experienced, undifferentiated, embracing both the transitory relative, differentiated knower and the differentiated objects of knowledge, identical in both subject and object, and yet the spontaneously creative source of all the differentiated *esse est percipi* qualities that come and go as phenomenal appearances within it. Little did the writer realise at the time that ancient Asian philosophers had attempted to use determinate words referring to differentiated factors of experience to express the undifferentiated and had given up trying to do so, realising that, strictly speaking, it cannot be done.

This is a deeper reason for the belief that understanding of the meaning of the Buddhist-Hindu concept of the person cannot be conveyed to Westerners by the use of the Buddhist Hindu texts in either the original or translation or by the commentaries of Asian experts on those texts. Even the

10. F. S. C. Northrop, *Science and First Principles* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1931, and Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931).

texts themselves tell us that they are useless to this end. When asked by his pupil what the word "Brahman" means, the *guru*, who knows, bats the question back to the pupil, asking him to state what he thinks it means, knowing full well that, whatever the reply, it will be wrong and will have to be answered with the words "*Neti, neti!*" It is not this, nor any other determinate that. Paradoxically, in such a reply the *guru* had answered the pupil's original question, the point being that Brahman is undifferentiated and hence cannot be described in determinate language.

Not knowing in the 1920s of these experiences of my ancient Asian Buddhist and Hindu predecessors, I proceeded to try to solve the problem of describing the indescribable. My first result, which appears in the aforementioned chapter of *Science and First Principles*, attempted to describe this primitive factor as "bare indeterminate experienced quality." When Whitehead read this with much interest, he said that the word "*quale*" would be better, since quality is a determinate entity. Then it became evident that the expression "bare, indeterminate experienced quality" was self-contradictory, since to predicate indeterminateness of a determinate quality is to affirm a contradiction. Clearly, this expression would not do. Nor did "*quale*" seem satisfactory, since even it suggested too much the atomic and locally provincial.

During this same period, the following question occurred of a sudden to the writer: Is not the factor in concrete experience and human consciousness which I am trying futilely to describe precisely what the Buddhist philosophers mean by "*Nirvana*" and the Hindus by the "*Atman-that-is-Brahman*" ? It was with this question in mind and with the hope of getting an answer to it that I went to the first East-West Philosophers' Conference in Honolulu in 1939.

By then it had become evident to me that an expression had to be found which would not describe this fact in anybody's conscious experience but point to where it is to be found, since only experiencing it can give it. Reacting from the localized atomicity of the word "quality" and even its less determinate form "*quale*", I selected the word "continuum." This gave expression to the all-

embracing character, the Brahman cosmical nature, of this elemental factor in anyone's experience. But the word "continuum" in mathematical physics has a determinate, axiomatically constructed concept-by-postulation meaning. Hence, the word "continuum" by itself will not do, if it is not to mislead Westerners, since the Brahman without differences is not a mathematically constructed, theoretically known entity. Instead, it is immediate experience with all differentiations of sensing and sensa removed, signifying nothing beyond itself. What adjective best distinguishes the all-embracing, radically empirical continuum of immediacy with all sensing and sensed differentia eliminated? At this point, the word "aesthetic" suggested itself, since art does not talk about its subject-matter but shows it denotatively and existentially as immediately experienced. Even so, the use of the adjective "aesthetic" is misleading unless it is taken, as the writer specified,¹¹ in the *radically immediate* sense of impressionistic art, or "art in its first function,"¹² rather than of "art in its second function,"¹³ which signifies some doctrinally inferred or mathematically conceived *logos* that transcends radically existential immediacy. But the continuum of impressionistic, immediately experienced aesthetic immediacy is, except at its periphery, usually differentiated, whereas the primitive factor necessary to clarify the relation between the mathematical constructs of mathematical physics and the concrete data of experience, without growing a prodigious philosophical beard, is this aesthetic continuum of immediacy without the differentiations which sensing and sensa exhibit. The adjective "undifferentiated", added to the words "aesthetic continuum", seemed, therefore, to suffice to point the Western reader

11. F. S. C. Northrop, *The Meeting of East and West* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1946), pp. 335-343, 352-357, 366-371.

12. F. S. C. Northrop, *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947), chap. IX and II-V, see also "The Complementary Emphases of Eastern Intuitive and Western Scientific Philosophy" in Charles A. Moore, *Philosophy—East and West* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1944), chap. VIII.

13. *Ibid.*

to the factor in question, and to prevent anyone from supposing that it is an object of sense awareness, since both sensing and the objects of the senses are differentiated.

These autobiographical experiences have been given here to one end. They suggest that the truth of Tagore's Buddhist-Hindu concept of the person is empirically verifiable by anyone anywhere in at least the following three ways : (1) by the Asian operational techniques of meditation and *yoga*, in which all differentiations are removed from radically empirical experience, (2) by William James's observation that radically empirical experience is an all-embracing continuum which is undifferentiated at its periphery and transitorily differentiated only at what he called, "the focus of attention", and (3) it may well be the case also that the determinate mathematical constructs of contemporary mathematical physics, for which the writer used the words "concepts by postulation" to distinguish from naive realistic hypotheses, can be made understandable in their epistemic correlation with, and predictive power concerning, the differentiated data of concrete empirical experience by taking as one of the two primitives in one's scientific theory and philosophy what the Buddha named *Nirvana*, what the non-dualistic Hindu refers to as the "self-without-differences" in which *Atman* and *Brahman* are one, and what the writer called "the undifferentiated aesthetic continuum."

Clearly, Tagore was a genius. Clearly, also, his genius was fed by the two provincialisms of his own Buddhist-Hindu India and the influence of the modern English-speaking world upon it. By probing these two major materials of his experience to their deepest and most elementary best, his poetry gave expression to a beautiful cosmopolitan harmony which he generalized for all mankind. This generalization we have found, upon philosophical analysis, to be valid due to the fact that the two philosophical principles at the root of each provincialism escape all cultural relativism because the one is an analytic proposition which is true tautologically and the other is radical empirically experienceable and operationally confirmable by anyone anywhere.

THE LOGICAL CHARACTER OF THE CAUSAL RELATION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

KARL H. POTTER

It has been Professor Datta's constant aim, in a lifetime of fruitful philosophical endeavour, to bring closer together the philosophical techniques and findings of India and contemporary Western philosophy. In this paper I wish to propose a modest contribution to this worthwhile program by suggesting the application of certain Western technical terms in understanding better what some of the classical Indian *darśans* have to say.

Some philosophers in India have taken the analysis of the causal relation as crucial to the over-all purpose of philosophy; some have not. The latter are frequently called *ajativādins*. The over-all purpose of philosophy, to which both the causal theorists and the non-causal ones subscribe, is the justification of the self-realizational endeavour, the refutation of incipient or blatant skepticism or fatalism which threatens to undermine faith in man's eventual divinization. This philosophical purpose is carried out by the causal theorists through the construction of more or less elaborate systems, based on a choice of ontological categories and the analysis of a crucial relation between the entities falling into those categories. The success of such systems is to be measured against the ultimate purpose for which they are constructed : do they or do they not explain the world adequately, consistently, and simply, and yet leave open the possibility of a man's attaining *mokṣa* or *nirvāṇa* through a discipline of some sort ?

This ultimate purpose lays down rather severe restrictions upon the logical character of any candidate for the title of "causal relation." Since the possibility of attaining freedom must be left open, the relation in the first place must be neither too strong nor too weak.

If the causal relation is too strong, the result is fatalism. This will occur if the relation between cause and effect is

what we may call a necessary relation, one which could not but hold, given the nature of its relata. Logical relations come to the Western mind as examples of necessary relations : for example, given the defined meanings of "2", "+", and "4", the identity of " $2+2$ " and "4" could not but hold. Classical Indian thought does not distinguish formal relations of this sort from material relations among entities, but it is clear that the sort of relation of which I speak cannot function for them as the causal relation without undermining the program I have mentioned. For example, suppose that the relation between the cause of bondage and bondage were a necessary relation; then that cause could not but produce bondage, being what it is. Likewise, since the bondage (*karma*) which results in its turn produces more bondage, this could not be avoided, and so on indefinitely. In that case the attainment of freedom is impossible. We are fated to be bound. We cannot be free from bondage, and freedom from is one aspect of complete freedom.

On the other hand, a causal relation which is too weak is what I shall call a "merely empirical" relation. Hume's "constant conjunction" is an example. If this model is used for analyzing causation, the result is skepticism. To be sure, freedom from is now assured, but the other aspect of complete freedom is now removed from our reach, namely, freedom to. Freedom to is that aspect of freedom which allows us control over the removal of bondage; without freedom to we could get complete freedom only by accident. We cannot be free to control the causes of complete freedom, that is, to destroy the causes of bondage through any discipline or path, unless the relation between cause and effect is strong enough to guarantee results. Since it is precisely the purpose of speculative philosophy to set at rest the kind of doubts and fears that stem from incipient skepticism, the causal relation must be strong enough to guarantee a sequence of events which constitutes a path leading to complete freedom.

There are certain faults in systematic philosophy which are recognized by Indian logicians and which are closely connected with the general requirement that the relation

be neither too strong nor too weak. For example, the relation cannot involve the fault of *atmaśraya*, "self-residence." If bondage can be removed and freedom thereby attained, there must be some necessary condition x for bondage which is avoidable by man's disciplined effort, the removal of which constitutes the sufficient condition for complete freedom. But in order for x to be removed, there must be some sufficient condition y for x 's removal which is distinct from x , or else it would be impossible for us to effect x 's removal. The general point here is that the events we care about, whose occurrences form part of a chain leading to complete freedom, must, some of them, be independent of each other, which is to say that the cause of freedom cannot be self-resident, i.e., without distinct conditions of its own. There must be a route, a chain of causal conditions, leading "non-gappily" all the way from here to freedom.

For similar reasons, the defects of *anyonyaśraya*, *cakraka*, and *anavastha* are avoided by systematic Indian philosophers. These are extensions of the same fault indicated by *atmaśraya*. *Anyonyaśraya*, "mutual interdependence", proscribes the use of a causal relation in which the effect is in turn the cause of its cause. This violates the requirement that there be a route of the kind mentioned above. *Cakraka*, vicious circle, suggests that any finite series which contains an event which is both the cause and the effect of another event in the series is defective for the purposes here in view. And *anavastha*, infinite regress, extends the same reasoning to infinite series of events we care about which are to be linked by the causal relation.

Western logic utilises a group of technical terms to characterize relations, and it seems to me that these terms and their implications can be fruitful in assessing the nature of the Indian's causal relation. The terms I have in mind are "symmetry," "transitivity," and "reflexivity," and their respective contraries and contradictories.

A relation R is said to be reflexive if it is the case that any individual which bears this relation to another must bear it to itself. For example, anything which is as old as another thing is as old as itself—therefore, "as old as" is a reflexive relation. If, on the other hand, a relation R

is such that an individual which bears it to another cannot bear it to itself (e. g., "father of"), it is called an irreflexive relation. If a relation is neither reflexive nor irreflexive, e. g., if it sometimes holds to itself and sometimes does not, it is called "non-reflexive."

A relation *R* is said to be symmetrical if it is the case that if any given individual *a* holds the relation to an individual *b*, then *b* must also hold the same relation to *a* (e. g., "sibling of"). It is asymmetrical when it is the case that, if *a* holds *R* to *b*, *b* cannot hold *R* to *a* (e. g., "father of"). It is non-symmetrical if it is neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical, e.g., if it is sometimes symmetrical and sometimes not.

A relation *R* is said to be transitive if the following is always true of it : that for any *x* which bears *R* to *y*, if *y* bears *R* to *z*, then *x* must bear *R* to *z* (e. g., "older than"). An intransitive relation is one where transitivity is precluded (e. g., "father of"). A non-transitive relation is one which is sometimes transitive and sometimes intransitive, for example.

From what was said above, we can be sure that the causal relation for which the Indian philosopher is searching is asymmetrical. If *x* is cause of *y*, *y* cannot be cause of *x*, or else *anyonyaśraya* is committed.

The causal relation cannot be reflexive. If *x* causes *y*, *x* cannot cause itself, or else *atmaśraya* or a related fault will be committed. Thus, the causal relation we are seeking must be either irreflexive or non-reflexive.

The transitivity of the causal relation poses a more difficult question. Transitivity is surely not *required*, for we might gain freedom through a chain the first of whose members is a causal factor of the second, which in turn is a causal factor of the third, but the first may not by itself cause the third, because an additional element, say our disciplined effort, must be counted among the causal factors of the third. But transitivity is not *precluded* either, for if we could find a causal relation such that by bringing about a certain occurrence the relation guaranteed that complete freedom would eventually occur, we should have solved the problem at hand.

If we now turn to the varieties of causal relations that

are proposed by the various *darśanas*, we shall find an interesting relationship among them. There are four, possibly five, major proposals as to the nature of this crucial relation. Broadly, causal theories can and are first divided into two varieties, *satkaryavada* and *asatkaryavada*, the theory that the effect pre-exists in its cause and the denial that this is so. Each of these two broad classifications in turn has two varieties. The *satkaryavada* view may be divided into *parinamavada* and *vivartavada*; *asatkaryavada* may be divided into *sarūpyavada* and *samavayavada*. The *parinamavadins* include Īśvarakṛṣṇa, Rāmānuja, and the Bhedābheda-vādins such as Bhartṛprapañca and Bhāskara; *vivartavada* is the official doctrine of Advaita Vedānta. *Sarūpya* (or *sadṛśya*) is the causal relation proposed by the Vijñānavādins such as Dharmakīrti, while *samavaya* is the crux of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ontology. The possible fifth variety of which I speak is the position of *anekantavada* propounded by Jainism. I am not sure whether this is a distinct theory or an eclecticism. My suspicion is that the Jain causal theory, in so far as there is one, involves multiple relations between entities, but that, when the logical character of these relations is clarified, they do not turn out to differ from those of the *samavayavadins* and the *parinamavadins* in nature, although the Jain's ontological account bearing upon the *relata* connected by the relation differs sharply from that of the Naiyāyika or the Sāṃkhya, for instance.

All these four relations are, as we predicted, asymmetrical, and none are reflexive. Briefly, the *satkaryavada* theories make the causal relation transitive, and the *asatkaryavada* theories make it non-transitive; while, as to reflexivity, the *parinamavadins* and the *samavayavadins* make the causal relation irreflexive, but the *vivartavadins* make it non-reflexive. To conclude this discussion, I shall expand on this last suggestion.

The difference between *parinama* and *vivarta* is that, while both are transitive, the former is irreflexive and the latter not. We can appreciate this by comparing and contrasting the stock examples the philosophers who hold these views use to illustrate their ideas. The Sāṃkhya, for instance, holds that the world of manifest form evolves

from unmanifest *prakṛti* as curds do from milk. Milk is transformed into curds, which are the same milk in a different form. If the curds should then be transformed in turn into cheese, it would still be the milk that is transformed; therefore, the relation of transformation is transitive.

On the other hand, the Advaitin illustrates the workings of *vivarta* by the analogy of the rope and the snake. The rope may appear to us as a snake in the dusk; it is really a rope, but a "false" (*anirvacanīya*) snake manifests itself to our consciousness while we are under the illusion. In turn, the snake might be mistaken for a garden hose; if this should happen, we should have to say, after having discovered both our errors, that it was the rope which manifested itself first as snake and then as garden hose. Neither of these aspects is unimportant for the philosophies concerned. The Sāṃkhya takes advantage of the transitivity of *parinama* in explaining the world through an evolutionary series which ultimately stems from one stuff, *prakṛti*, while the Advaitin takes advantage of the transitivity of *vivarta* in explaining how, for instance, Brahman can manifest itself as God or self, which in turn manifests itself as empirical world, though in reality all is Brahman.

The difference between *parinama* and *vivarta*, formally speaking, lies, rather, in the irreflexivity of the one and the non-reflexivity of the other. It is on the ground of its irreflexivity, in fact, that the Advaitin criticises the *apriyamavadin's* explanation. The relation between an *x*, the cause, and a *y*, the effect which is a transformation of the cause, is a relation which cannot ever hold between *x* and itself. Milk is transformed into curds, but milk is never transformed into milk—the relation of transformation just does not work that way. As a result, if a Vedāntin like Rāmānuja or Nimbārka, for example, uses transformation to explain how Brahman creates the world of bondage, the Advaitin charges him with committing himself irrevocably to a vicious problem of evil; Brahman transforms himself into evil (bondage), and thus suffers actual limitation in a way that the supreme power ought not to, in the Advaitin's opinion. Furthermore, release cannot be gained merely by removing the generating relation,

any more than curds become milk by removing the generating relation. The *vivarta* relation differs precisely because, according to Advaita, Brahman's holding this relation to something does not preclude its holding it to itself. Thus, release is possible, even in this life; the manifestation relation between Brahman and the world of bondage must be removed, and be replaced by the manifestation of Brahman as itself to itself; this constitutes complete freedom.

If we turn now to the *asatkaryavada* theories, we tend to find a similar pattern. An important difference between inherence (*samavaya*) and co-ordination (*sarūpya*) seems to be that, while both are non-transitive, the former is irreflexive and the latter non-reflexive. Again, this may be made clear by appealing to stock examples. For the Naiyāyika, the pot-halves cause the pot, and the crucial aspect of this causal relation is inherence : the pot-halves are referred to as the inherence cause (*samavayikarana*) of the pot, which inheres in its halves. Now, inherence is not a transitive relation. The inherence cause of the pot-halves, in turn, are some *tulis*, aggregations of atoms, and they are a more ultimate cause of the pot, to be sure. But, although potness inheres in the pot, and the pot inheres in its halves, potness does not inhere in the halves. So, inherence is non-transitive, since it is sometimes transitive and sometimes not.

On the other hand, the co-ordination relation made use of for example, by Dharmakīrti in *Nyayabindu*, is also non-transitive. Co-ordination is the relation between the Buddhist logician's *svalaksana*—"point-instant," to use Stcherbatsky's words—and the image which is linked with it in experience by the non-grasping of the difference (*bhedāgraha*) between them. But it is also the technical analysis of the causal relation between one moment and the next in the flux of *pratityasamutpada*. If we pay attention for a moment to the Buddhist's stock example, the wheel-of-fire (*alatacakra*), we can say that the former use of co-ordination is between each point-instant which is correlated in experience with the perception of a fiery circle, while the latter use comes in the co-ordination of one element in the series which causes the circle with the next element. The Buddhist is evidently trying to find

one relation to accomplish both purposes. In the former use, the relation is transitive; if we fail to grasp the difference between a given *svalaksana* and the conceptual construct of it as, say, a blue something, and then identify the blue something as a blue pot, we have identified the point-instant as a blue pot. But, in the latter use, the relation is intransitive, since it is a relation of temporally immediate succession. Therefore, this relation must also be classed as non-transitive.

To turn to the difference between *samavaya* and *sarūpya*, we can first see easily that inherence is an irreflexive relation. The pot inheres in the pot-halves, but it makes no sense to say that the pot inheres in itself. With *sarūpya*, the matter is more complex, since there are two kinds of use to which the relation is put. If we concentrate on the epistemological use, the relation is non-reflexive. The *svalaksana* becomes co-ordinated (through *bhedagraha*) with a negative characteristic which is reconstructed by us as a positive concept. This relation generates an unreal concept as an effect from a real point-instant, and thus in that context it is irreflexive. But in yogic perception, according to Dharmakīrti, the *yogi* experiences the *svalaksanas* as they are, so that presumably the point-instant is co-ordinated with itself in his experience, and thus in that context co-ordination is reflexive. As a result, the epistemological relation of co-ordination must, it would seem to me, be classified as non-reflexive. And it further seems to me that the Buddhist logician wishes to assimilate the other use of *sarūpya*, its use in relating point-instants with each other in the flux, to this epistemological model.

But I must confess that this latter analysis is very hypothetical; perhaps it would be wiser to say that, given the regularity of the rest of the scheme as I have outlined it, we have good reason to expect this account to be forthcoming from the Buddhists. Further investigation of Buddhist logic, despite Stcherbatsky's pioneering work, is necessary.

And, indeed, this is just the note I should like to end on. For it seems to me that any borrowing from Western logic of the sort I mention is to be adjudged worthwhile just

if it engenders fruitful hypotheses about Indian views, their interrelationships, or their relative successes and failures, hypotheses which allow the investigator to understand what is cogent to look for in the material he is investigating, whether he is merely trying to find out what the Indians are saying, or trying to adjudge the worth of a given Indian philosophical theory. There is nothing particularly remarkable *per se* about the paraphernalia of Western logical theory; much of it is undoubtedly beside the point for purposes of Indian philosophical scholarship. But there may be some aspects of Western logic which can be put to use by Indian scholars, and I have been suggesting that the analysis of relations is one such aspect.

■ ■ ■

THREE TYPES OF ETHICAL ANALYSIS

RAJENDRA PRASAD

The expression 'ethical analysis' is not as precise as it seems to be. Its ambiguity is clear from the fact that it may mean the analysis of the ethical or moral worth of an agent or action, or the analysis of the logic of an ethical concept or judgment. If I analyse what Nathu Ram Godse did in murdering Gandhi in order to ascertain whether or not and to what extent his action was, from the moral point of view, condemnable, I would be doing ethical analysis in the former sense, and if I analyse the notion of moral condemnation in order to find out what it means to say of an action that it deserves moral condemnation, I shall be doing ethical analysis in the latter sense. In the first sense ethical analysis is essentially a normative, evaluative, work of a particular type the results of which would be stated in the form of moral judgments. In the second sense it ceases to be a work of ethical evaluation and becomes more akin to logic. To analyse the logic of an ethical concept is not to do ethical (in the first sense) but meta-ethical analysis. In this paper I shall be dealing with ethical analysis in this, second, meta-ethical, sense. What I aim at is the analysis of what seem to me its three important types. Therefore, being the analysis of meta-ethical analyses, what I am doing here can, if we wish to be very fastidious about our technical terms, very rightfully be called meta-ethical analysis.

To analyse ethical concepts and judgments the analyst has to analyse the behaviour of ethical expressions. Therefore, he is mainly concerned with the language we use for letting our fellow-beings know our moral opinions and decisions. His concern with the language of ethical communication does not affect the generality of enquiry because he does not restrict himself to the study of any particular national language; he does not study the peculiar functions of the moral words or expressions of a particular national language, say, Hindi. Rather, he studies the

Three Types of Ethical Analysis

logic, the use we make, of the various expressions which constitute our moral language. To talk about the use or uses of an expression is to talk not only about that expression but also about all those which are similarly used, irrespective of the fact that they may belong to different national or historical languages, if I characterize how its synonyms or equivalents in other languages are used. If it is true that normally "good" is used to express admiration, it must also be true of all its synonyms in all other languages.

There can be several types of non-philosophical studies of ethical language as are done by linguists, sociologists, anthropologists, historians, etc. For example, one can study how ethical words in a particular language are formed or derived from primitive roots, how they have changed or developed in the course of their history, how they are related to the social and cultural conditions of the people using them, how the ethical terms of one language, say, English, compare with those of another language, say, Hindi, in such and such respects, etc., etc. These are not useless ventures, but certainly we do not treat them as examples of philosophical or ethical analysis. Ryle describes the distinction between a philosophical and a non-philosophical study of language by saying that the former is concerned with *use* and the latter with *usage* or linguistic conventions. By a usage he means a linguistic "custom, practice, fashion or vogue."¹ If this distinction between use and usage is made only to emphasize the generality of a philosophical study of language, there is nothing objectionable in it. But if it is designed to suggest, as it seems to do, that the philosopher must avoid all references to usage, then it is certainly misleading. Even after accepting that his main task is to study how language is used, we cannot ask him to avoid referring to usage, though we know that he does not do the same thing with it as the linguists, historians, etc., do. His is a general enquiry which is not restricted to any particular language or group of languages, whereas

1. Gilbert Ryle, "Ordinary Language," *The Philosophical Review* LXII (1953), p. 174.

the enquiries of the latter are not so general. The point I want to emphasize is that in order to determine how an expression is *used* it is necessary to pay attention to usage, and that is why the philosopher cannot be advised to shun all references to it. It is perfectly respectable to say of a particular *use* of a word that it is incorrect because it is against usage, and almost always the way to decide whether a particular use is correct or not is to appeal to usage. It should be noted, however, that usage is not everything he needs to pay attention to; rather, in order to understand how an expression is used, he must examine very carefully the situations or contexts, both verbal and non-verbal of its normal uses.

Ethical analysis can be practised in more than one way. The chief types of it may be called (i) Descriptive, (ii) Prescriptive and (iii) Constructive.

■ ■ ■

TRENDS IN CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

DR. P. NAGARAJA RAO

A certain section of Indian thinkers and some savants abroad have accused that Indian Philosophy has not grown as it did in the period of the *Darśanas* in the early ages of our history. Some have oversimplified this feeling and dogmatised "that the creative period of Indian thought roughly stopped at the close of the Hindu period." They say that all subsequent development of Indian Philosophy is only a series of foot-notes to the triple texts, (the Upanisads, the Gītā and the Brahma Sūtras) and the Philosophy of Vedānta. They hold that there is no originality in the modern Indian thinkers as in the systems of Kant, Bergson or Whitehead. We have no imposing systems of metaphysics as of those in the West. They say, this is due to our lack of creative thinking. We are still lulled into quietude by the prison-house of tradition and scriptures in which we live. They declare that Indian Philosophy is not affected by the remarkable transformations that are effected in the field of science and the world of ideas. Some look upon Indian Philosophy as an unchanging system with set doctrines. An unchanging philosophical system is a proof of intellectual stagnation. This is attributed to the tendency in Indian Philosophy to assimilate more with religion than with science. Some have failed to appreciate the opinion that mystical experience conveys the truths of a deeper nature than those that can be scaled by the intellect. They hold that we have no right in Philosophy to suspect clarity because it is rare and difficult. Some have felt that the effect of Indian philosophical truths on the lives of men and in the affairs of the nations have not been effective for the simple reason that their tone is always portentous and they use the apparatus of Sunday sanctification and sermonising. They are too earnest and rigid in the message conveyed. Further,

many a critical thinker feels the Philosophy for our times must satisfy the scientific temper of our age, sympathise with the social aspirations of our times and foster world unity and peace.

It is a gross error, to think, that in the last two centuries, the contribution to Indian Philosophy by contemporary thinkers is not a step ahead of the traditional thought. It is not mere repetition of the scriptures. It is a creative restatement of the eternal ageless message of the scriptures, shorn of their historical corruptions and accidents in terms of the needs of our age, in the psychological idiom suited to the intellectual climate of our times. It is a creative interpretation. In the writings of the topmost contemporary Indian philosophers, Gandhiji, Tagore, Ramkrishna, Vivekananda, Aurobindo, Radhakrishnan, K. C. Bhattacharya and Vinobaji, we discern the significant contemporary trends. They take up the challenge thrown open to Indian Philosophy. Their contribution is significant. It can be described as the age of creative interpretation.

Contemporary Indian philosophers with the exception of Sri Ramkrishna have been influenced by modern education in science and humanities. The advent of the British education in the wake of British rule in India brought the educated classes in contact with the English language and the ideas which it threw open to them. There were three different types of reactions to the impact of English education and the ideas it disseminated. The conservative section in the country reacted against it. They wanted to preserve the Indian ideas without the contamination of the Western view of things. They kept away and remained isolated. They, in their anxiety to preserve the precious ideas of Indian Philosophy, petrified them. They isolated Indian thought and kept it unfertilised from the main stream of world-thought.

A second section fell a victim to the fascination of Western thought. They were subjugated by the new knowledge. They went completely West and looked down on all that was Indian and entertained Western modes of thought and aped Western pattern of social life. They had no roots and they were completely swept off their feet. They lost their moorings. They were culturally uprooted and displaced,

There was the third small vital section with their roots firm in Indian tradition, "the creative minority" in the words of Toynbee, who reacted to Western ideal in an attitude of "trust tempered by criticism". They represent the renascent Indian philosophers. They were fascinated but not subjugated. They assimilated the best in the West. They were shaken by many of the views of the West, but were not shattered. They stood their ground. They did not live in hothouse plants. Gandhiji's expression of their attitude is typical. He writes : "I do not want my house to be walled on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all the world to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any." We can draw the circle as large as we like but we must be steady at our centre. The renascent thinkers were unequivocal in their stand. They said, we must stand on our own feet, even if it be bare rather than in borrowed shoes. They laid great stress on *svadharma*. All of them were for an active assimilation of the best. They showed a remarkable intellectual tolerance. Tolerance was for them something positive. It was not indifference : it was an active appreciation of the good in the other points of view and an active assimilation of it in their systems. By their self-respect and high integrity, these thinkers roused the drooping faith of Indians in their own spiritual and cultural heritage. Their attitude to the past was liberal. They did not make their past a fetter on them. Their attitude to the past has been expressed in Aurobindo's statement : "All that we do to create must be consistent with the abiding spirit of India, but framed to fit into a greater harmonised rhythm and plastic to the call of a more luminous future. There cannot be a healthy and victorious survival if we make of the past a fetish instead of an inspiring impulse."¹ These thinkers did break from the past in a creative way. They were not senseless iconoclasts attacking all things old indiscriminately. They built firmly on the past. "We must take from the altars of the past the fire and the

(1) *The Foundation of Indian Culture*.

glow, not the ashes." The renascent Indian thinkers follow the advice of the poet. "Everything is not good simply because it is old; no work of literature should be treated as unworthy simply because it is new. Great ones accept the one or the other after due examination. Only the fool has his understanding misled by the beliefs of others."² Contemporary Indian philosophers were inspired by the Western ideals and Western thought and science. One of the most important influences that worked for the creative period in contemporary thought is the work of the *Orientalists*.³ Their debt to Indian Philosophy is great and it is sheer ingratitude to ignore it. Successive generations of European and American Orientalists have dedicated their lives to the difficult and fundamental task of editing, compiling and translating the basic Indian philosophical classics of the different systems. The work was no easy job in view of the different manuscripts in different countries with variant readings. The several oriental societies helped us a good deal. Some of the great names that come before us are—Maxmuller, Thibaut, Oldenburg, Jacoli, Venis, Cowell, Strcherbatsky, Wintermitz, Bloomfield, Hopkins, Roth, Rhys Davids, Lanman, Warren, Woods, Hume, Keith, Poussin, Tucci, Edgerton.⁴

In the early stages, contemporary Indian Philosophy passed through hard and unspectacular work. The first stage, marked the edition of the texts on scientific lines, collating the variant readings in the different manuscripts. Then we had in the second stage, the English translations : we had two varieties, one a faithful, literal, wooden translation, and the second a fairly readable translation keeping to the idiom of the language into which it is translated

A third stage marked the pure and clear expositions of the subject. We have best expository accounts of the history of Indian Philosophy in *Outlines*, and

2. Kalidāsa's *Malaṅkagminitraya*. Act I, V 2

3. See Dr. P. T. Raju's paper on "Indian Philosophy Today" in *British Journal of Philosophy*.

4. See D. M. Datta's article on "India's Debt to the West in Philosophy" in *Philosophy East and West (Journal)*, Oct., 1956.

Essentials, of Indian Philosophy, and also in the excellent manual of Datta and Chatterjee.⁵

The fourth stage is the introduction of the comparative method, attempting on elaborate exposition of Indian Philosophy with Western comparisons. This is the stage at which we can say the real interpretation of Indian Philosophy started. The doyen among the Indian Philosophers Dr. S. Radhakrishnan set the comparative method in vogue. The great merit of the comparative method is, it gives us an insight into the wide area of agreement between not only the different systems of Indian Philosophy but also between European Philosophy and Indian thought. The comparative method proved the way for the creative era in Indian Philosophy.

The dominant trend of the contemporary thinkers is the total global view they take of things, and seek the universal, perennial and permanent elements in Indian thought. They attempt to discover the great synthesis and the wide area of agreement between the East and the West. They are not afraid to assimilate and make anything good, their own. They have brought to the forefront the central characteristics of Indian thought, i.e., assimilation and not exclusion.

This trend has put India once again on the map of the world. Lord Russell writes : "Asia must come to the rescue of the world by causing Western inventiveness to subserve human ends, instead of the basic cravings of suppression and cruelty, to which it has been substituted by the dominant nations of the present day." The stress on tolerance is remarkable.

The stress is laid on experience and not on dogmas, scriptures or rituals. The validity of religious truth rests on spiritual experience and its efficacy is its manifestation in society in the form of a genuine Humanism : "There cannot be happiness for any of us until it is won

5 (a) See *Indian Philosophy*—2 Vols. by S. Radhakrishnan, and Hiriyanna's *Outlines of Indian Philosophy*

(b) Hiriyanna's *Essentials of Indian Philosophy*.

(c) S. N. Das Gupta's 5 Vols on *History of Indian Philosophy*.

(d) *Spiritual Heritage* by Swami Prabhavananda.

for all.”⁶ Such an interpretation of religion has made it scientific and humanistic and has taken away the wind from the sails of the critics and detractors of religion.

Spiritual experience is one and it is described in many ways. The essential element in the experience is agreed to by all religions. They differ only in their historical accidents and their local setting. This line of interpretation has enabled us to work for the *fellowship of faiths*.

This interpretation has made Indian Philosophy satisfy at once, the demands of reason, the needs of humanity and further the cause of peace and world-unity. It is in complete sympathy with the social aspirations of our age.

Another dominant trend is the *reverence for life* and the endowment of significance to this world. The significance of *Samsāra* is brought out and its spiritual possibilities are disclosed. The charge of *other worldliness*, indifference to social agonies, and the desire to escape, rather than dominate are rectified and refuted by the stress laid on the positive good in life. Sri Aurobindo has outlined the ideal in his grand declaration :

“To know, to possess and be the divine being in an animal, egoistic consciousness, to convert our obscure physical mentality into the plenary supra normal illumination, to build peace and self-existent bliss where there is only a stress of transitory satisfactions besieged by the physical pain and emotional suffering, to establish an uniform freedom in a world which presents as a group of mechanical necessities, to discover and realise the immortal life in a body subject to death and constant mutation. This is offered to us as the manifestation of God in matter, and the goal of nature in her terrestrial evolution.”⁷

We have also grand, imposing system of philosophy in the integral *yoga* of Shri Aurobindo, K. C. Bhattacharya, and Radhakrishnan, Sarvodaya of Gandhiji and Shri Vinobaji.

6. M. K. Gandhi.

7. *Life Divine*, Vol. I.

As for the charge of the lack of originality, it is worthwhile to examine what entitles a thinker to be called original. A. E. Taylor has clinched the issue : "There are two qualities which we may fairly demand from the work of a man whom we have to recognise as a great philosopher with a permanent importance in the history of human thought. In the first place the work must be original and in the second it must be critical. When I say that the work must be original, I do not mean it must be startling or revolutionary but that it must be the achievement of a genuine personal intellectual effort. The great philosopher must be one who has thought for himself and has thought hard. And by saying that the work must be critical, I do not mean that it must necessarily be largely devoted to criticism of other men's thoughts. I mean it must be something more than a construction of a brilliant but indisciplined speculative imagination."⁸ Judged by this test, many of the contemporary Indian thinkers are original.

Professor Muirhead observes : "Originality in philosophy as in poetry consists not in the novelty of the tale, not even in the distribution of the light and shade in the telling of it, but in the depth with which its significance is made to dominate over the details."

Yet another important characteristic is the re-statement of the *idealist position*, accommodating the reality of change and the value of multiplicity. Idealism is being purged of acosmism i. e., *māyāvāda* and inactivity or *nivṛtti mārga*. Such an important interpretation of Sankara is attempted by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan.

The re-interpretation of the two paths *Samnyāsa* and *pravṛtti* seeking to overcome the defects of both is praiseworthy. While it does not abandon activity it still preserves the spirit of renunciation. Activity to be truthful must give no room for the play of selfish impulses : "Freedom in action, not freedom from action." Social service is made spiritual. The synthesis is given wide and permanent currency by the *Gītā*, the single source of inspiration for all contemporary thinkers.

8. See *An Idealist View and Life*.

The inadequacy of the rational and conceptual modes to express completely the nature of Ultimate Reality is declared by all contemporary thinkers. The inexhaustibility and endless multi-personal manifestation of reality is assumed together with the strong repudiation of the uni-personal manifestations of Reality.

Contemporary thinkers emphasise the well-being of the community and the good of the individual. They stress the need for world salvation and not for mere individual liberation. The debt of the spiritually realised soul to society is stressed. He is to enlighten all, and work for *loka sangrah*. The different trends in contemporary Indian Philosophy have modified the great spiritual heritage of India to suit and answer to the needs of our troubled age through their interpretation.

■ ■ ■

EXISTENTIALISM AND THE MODERN MOOD IN EUROPE : MARTIN HEIDEGGER

FRITZ-JOACHIM VON RIMTLEN

My theme is existential philosophy as a recent movement in European culture. It has gained a remarkable influence in Germany, in Europe as a whole, and throughout the world. In Europe it was native and gave expression to a prevalent mood, but now it is serving various interests in many countries and in a variety of cultural contexts. One of its chief exponents is certainly Martin Heidegger. He himself, to be sure, once said that he is not an existentialist and that he would restrict the meaning of "existentialism" to the philosophy of the French writer Jean-Paul Sartre. I, too, prefer to speak of existentialism not as a philosophy but as a movement; just as I would call romanticism not a philosophy but a movement, reflecting a kind of mood or the temper of an age expressing itself in a great variety of points of view and schools of thought.

The existentialist movement is understandable only as the result of the catastrophic events which the people of Europe have experienced in consequence of two world wars. It is the typical analysis of the basic mood of our times. When, overnight, all your worldly possessions can be destroyed on account of war, when the persons to whom you are closely related through family ties or ties of friendship can be taken from you unexpectedly and suddenly, then the only thing you have left is a problem unto yourself—the more so since man has shown himself capable of indescribable acts of horror. Add to this the fact that in the time prior to these events man's spiritual life had become infected with skepticism and relativism and that modern positivistic philosophy, which found even wider acceptance, had no answer to the ultimate questions of human existence. Existentialist philosophy represents a reaction to all of these developments.

Much has been said about the difficulties of Heidegger's style and use of words; even a native German has trouble in understanding him. Even if his strange terminology reveals many genuine relationships, his choice of words and phrases strikes one at times as far-fetched and arbitrary.

Let me say at the outset that Heidegger's philosophy—and existentialism—is not my philosophy. I do not accept this "arational" position. Nevertheless, we must acknowledge that—especially in his analysis of existence—Heidegger has seen much that is genuine and new.

The method of Heidegger's philosophy is, presumably, that of phenomenology, a method which describes phenomena. Ontology is possible for him only as phenomenology.¹ But Heidegger's phenomenological analysis does not lead to valid statements about essences—as with Edmund Husserl (the founder of phenomenology) and with Max Scheler, since Heidegger's phenomenology consists simply in a description of the forms in which human existence and appearances present themselves to us. To this he relates his ontology. We are to inquire into the thing itself, into that which "shows itself." In other words, Heidegger is primarily concerned with the question of man's own proper Being, his existence; and he accuses Husserl and Scheler of having put this problem in brackets and brushed it aside. But why must we insist upon this question concerning the Being of man? Precisely for the very reason that, through the developments of recent times, the very Being of man has been radically threatened. Now, in the ultimates of his Being man is placed into time, and this, his Being in time, we are to probe to its depths. In the title of his best-known work, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), Heidegger has thus announced his fundamental thesis. In the past, so Heidegger argues, we have spoken of Being only in the sense of a most general and abstract concept, but this way of speaking is empty. Through this abstract way of speaking, Heidegger believes, we have fallen into a state of "*Seinsvergessenheit*",

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (3rd and 4th eds. Tübingen : Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1931), pp. 27 f., 35. Hereafter referred to as *S. u. Z.*

"*Seinsverfallenheit*," of deterioration of Being.² We construct concepts out of our own ambitious subjectivity and believe that in this way we can gain something decisive and fundamental, but this is a radical error. Heidegger sees in this abstract approach, not an encounter with Being, but a concern with dummy beings, with external stage-settings, as it were—stage-settings which, after the fashion of technology, we ourselves construct in order to contemplate them in amazed admiration. The presupposition for this is the constructive will to mastery as we encounter it in modern science. But this attitude leads us as human beings into an epoch of universal darkness, into a time of need.³

Heidegger is right here in maintaining that this approach can yield only a technological control over the world of things. But Heidegger is wrong, I believe, in applying his thesis to all rational and, in his opinion, subjectively constructed concepts. Through the technological approach, according to Heidegger, we create a misleading separation of subject and object, whereas, after the manner of the Romantics, the elimination or surpassing of this separation appears as our ideal. But Heidegger does not see that, in all his efforts, man's spirit is bound to certain propositions which mediate for us a qualitatively intellectual meaning. Perhaps we understand Heidegger best at this point when we remember that his repudiation of all rigid conceptualism arises from a repudiation of Neo-Kantianism, for in Neo-Kantianism all spiritual content is regarded as logically deducible. Heidegger calls such deducible content "that which is present to" conceptual thinking (*Vorhandenheit*), and this can never belong to the

2 *S. u. Z.*, pp. 175 f., 335, 346. Also, Martin Heidegger, *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit. Mit einem Brief über den Humanismus* (Bern Verlag A Francke, 1947), p. 78. Hereafter referred to as *Humanismus*. Also, Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen G. Neske, 1954), p. 91. Afterwards referred to as *Vorträge und Aufsätze*.

3. Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt · Klostermann Verlag, 1950), pp. 236, 267, 271. Also, Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt : V. Klostermann, 1944), pp. 236, 267, 271. Also, Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, p. 91.

decisive center of "there-ness," of human "there-ness," for example, of the simply being-there of man, and thus of existence.⁴ Here, confronted with our own "being-there," we find ourselves in a sphere quite different from that of conceptual thinking—in a sphere in which our concepts no longer provide the measure. In the "being-there" of human existence, and only here, what we call Being is revealed.⁵

With this understanding, we now turn to Heidegger's analysis of existence. In order to carry through such an analysis we must, first of all, achieve a certain delimiting of the concepts hitherto in use. As Heidegger puts it, this delimiting is achieved in a thinking which is prior to ordinary thinking, in a thinking which is a more genuine thinking than conceptual thinking.⁶ This deeper thinking, however, is not concerned with constructed things as objectified, with an objectivity which we have made, but with what Heidegger calls the trans-objective (*Ungegenständlichkeit*).⁷ Karl Jaspers, by the way, makes the same point, and I call to attention the striking resemblance of this idea to the rationale of modern trans-objective art, which, after all, also reveals the spirit of our Age.⁸ If we follow Heidegger here, then we must, from the very beginning, discard every definite qualitative statement, and especially all trans-temporal ideas which point to a transcendent realm. To quote Heidegger: "The assertion that there are external truths belongs to that remainder of Christian theology within the range of philosophical problematics which has not yet been sufficiently eradicated."⁹ We see thus that, for Heidegger, everything is in flux, and that we must abandon ourselves to the changes and transitions of the times.

4. *S. u. Z.* pp 42, 49.

5. *Ibid.*, pp 7, 11, 55.

6. *Humanismus*, p 110

7. *Holzwege*, pp 100, 242, 281

8. Karl Jaspers, *Philosophie III* (Berlin: Julius Springer Verlag, 1932), pp. 114-115, 160. Karl Jaspers, *Der Philosophische Glaube*, (München: Piper Verlag, 1948), p. 18.

9. *S. u. Z.*, p. 229.

If we want to say something decisive and important in philosophy, we must first of all return to man himself; we must interrogate his existence. According to Heidegger, however, this is not possible in terms of rational categories—categories such as substance or causality. We must, rather, disclose the characteristics of human existence—such as the basic mood of anxiety, understanding, our Being-unto-death, or the continuous anticipation of ourselves in so far as we are always directed toward that which is yet to come.¹⁰ Existence, Heidegger tells us, is that form of Being toward which man, in his being-there, can take such and such an attitude. Here the term “existence” takes on a meaning which it has never had before. Until now, philosophers have spoken of existence in referring to all objects or things which may be encountered in space and time. But now the preference is for the existence of man, and through the analysis of what it means to exist as a human being, through the elucidation of the specifically human dimensions, we are to come to an understanding of Being in itself.¹¹

Later on, Heidegger compares the meaning of existence to an ecstatic standing-in or projection into the truths of Being, which only here reveal themselves.¹² We thus pass beyond what he calls the actuality of the manifoldness of things, anything, what is, the ontic realm, and penetrate to the proper ground, the ontological basis. But this is a self-projection which we ourselves must complete, in freedom, and which carries us beyond the foreground of ontic facticities (*Faktizität*).¹³ It is thus a standing above or beyond everything else. And this standing-above Heidegger calls “transcendence.”¹⁴

10. *Ibid*, pp 234, 265. Also, Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?* (5th ed., Frankfurt Klostermann Verlag, 1949), p 27. Hereafter referred to as *Metaphysik*.

11. *S. u. Z*, pp 12, 45, 117.

12. Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt Klostermann Verlag, 1943), pp 16, 22. Hereafter referred to as *Wahrheit*. Also, *S. u. Z.*, p. 350. Also, *Humanismus*, pp. 70, 79

13. *S. u. Z*, pp. 13, 56, 135.

14. *S. u. Z*, p 38. Also, Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Frankfurt Klostermann Verlag, 1949). p 18.

In a book entitled *Beyond Existentialism* (1961) I have attempted to show that the transcendence of which Heidegger speaks is an inner human act or project in which the originality of Being discloses itself. Hence, by transcendence in Heidegger's sense we must not understand a going beyond our space-time reality into a supersensible and extra-mundane realm, beyond the world, in which we may ask about God—as tradition has it. Rather, for Heidegger, the inner human transcendence is that free projection within which the essence of our being-there reveals itself. It is this meaning which is implied in Heidegger's often misunderstood phrase that "essence itself is existence."¹⁵ Here something ultimate is revealed which is not rational and which carries us beyond man as a rational being. Indeed, here in existence we find an "elucidation of our being-there"—but an "elucidation" (*Lichtung*), an uncoveredness (*Unverborgenheit*), not accessible to conceptual thinking.¹⁶

This existential comprehension of my self-exposing existence is in itself at the same time an actual free projection, which is ahead, never complete, never closed and finished.¹⁷ But in making this projection the ultimate possibilities of human existence itself are revealed. Only in this inner struggle does man truly find himself. It is possible, however, that man fails to come to himself in this process. He then remains in a non-existential state. Just what does this mean? We men of today, Heidegger holds, are in a state of deterioration. He calls it the state of our "every-day-ness," of our banality.¹⁸ At one time or another, every person is in this state. But man has the inner calling to surpass this every-day-ness, this banality. In our every-day-ness we know only our being-there with other human beings, our co-being with our fellowmen. We are only "somebody" along with other "somebodies." Indeed, we are lost in the impersonal "somebody" and

15. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 42, 212, 318. *Humanismus*, p. 72

16. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 137, 170, 219. *Holzwege*, p. 42. *Humanismus*, pp. 69, 72, 77.

17. *S. u. Z.*, p. 266.

18. *Ibid.*, pp. 43, 50, 106, 127.

are no longer our own true self.¹⁹ The superabundance of modern technological achievements, brought about by the subjectivity of rational thinking, presses us down into the mode of being of human averages or mediocrities. In our own time, under the pressure of public opinions, we experience this levelling down into mediocrity. We are no longer truly or authentically ourselves, but are, as it were, unauthentic.²⁰ The voice of conscience, however, urges : You must become your own true self, you must rise from the unauthentic to the authentic existence²¹. This rising to our true self is the process of projective transcendence referred to above.

The unauthentic existence of modern man is his being lost as a true and distinct self, his having no firm ground on which to stand, his being uprooted, his ambiguity, his being absorbed in the externalities of the world.

In order to overcome this state of affairs we must assume a resoluteness which should lead us to the disclosedness of Being (*Entschlossenheit-Erschlossenheit*).²² But, if such is our resolve, we cannot become attached to what is merely present externally (*Vorhandenheit*).²³ We have a "being in the world," to be sure, and this world surrounds us as something which is close "at hand" (*Zuhandenheit*), ready for use, and which "temporalizes" itself in temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*).²⁴ We can never step beyond this boundary. The full temporality of that which is ontically (*ontisch*) actual and of that which, ontologically (*ontologisch*) is Being, is the basic condition of all human experience. We stand in this time as an active "there"; we are "thrown into" our being-there (*Geworfenheit*).²⁵ It is our destiny to be homeless—a fate which is characteristically expressed in the deep pathos of our times. We find ourselves in continuous

19 *Ibid.*, pp. 233, 263, 331.

20 *Humanismus*, p. 78.

21 *S. u. Z.*, pp. 269 f., 277.

22 *Ibid.*, pp. 297 f., 382.

23 *Ibid.*, pp. 88, 183, 211.

24 *Humanismus*, p. 96. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 17-18, 59, 69, 96, 234, 327.

25 *Humanismus*, p. 90. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 135, 221, 284.

inner danger, completely insecure (*Ungeborgenheit*), abandoned onto the world of things.²⁶ If we cannot rise above this situation, we are a "nullified ground" for worthless projections. Our human fate is a constant worry which—because of our concern with the superficial—is directed toward that which is "merely present," the world of things. It is characteristic of our times that exactly this point has been so strongly emphasized by Heidegger. This same worry, however, manifests itself especially in our "being onto death." We are constantly surrounded by death. Death is what is ahead for all of us (*Bevorstand*), an anticipating death. Our Being-there dies factually in so far as it exists. But, filled with worry though we are, we must still accept the freedom toward death.²⁷ To be able to do this is our innermost realization of Being. In death the limitations of our finitude become clear to us—a thought, incidentally, which is reminiscent somewhat of what Karl Jaspers expresses in the notion of border-situation (*Grenzsituation*).²⁸

But in and through worry or care we begin to come to ourselves. It is not astonishing, therefore, that Heidegger, in his *Letter about Humanism*, writes that, in the last analysis, worry is worry for Being itself, for in this way, worrying about our own being, we become "guardians and shepherds of Being." And thus, in worry man can find that which constitutes his existence.²⁹

We have seen that the anticipation of death shakes man into an attitude of existence. It is, as it were, "death understood" whom we encounter here in its cold haughtiness.³⁰ But we always experience only the death of someone else. Only our own death can we

26. Cp. Friedrich Otto Bollnow, *Neue Geborgenheit* (Stuttgart Kohlhammer Verlag, 1955).

27. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 245, 259, 266, 386.

28. Karl Jaspers, *Existenzphilosophie* (Berlin und Leipzig Walter de Gruyter Verlag, 1938), pp. 53, 70.

29. *Humanismus*, pp. 75, 83, 91. Also, *S. u. Z.*, pp. 57, 121, 182, 193.

30. Dolf Sternberger, *Der Verstandene Tod. Eine Untersuchung zu M. Heidegger* (Leipzig · S. Hirzel Verlag, 1934), pp. 76 ff.

realize existentially. And thus we stand in the presence of death as the competitors of God. What is man's fate after death?—this question Heidegger does not ask. But, if we disregard this question, do we not neglect essential matters?³¹

Still more inclusive than worry for Heidegger is the basic inner feeling of anxiety (*Grundbefindlichkeit der Angst*).³² Anxiety is not a psychological phenomenon, like fear, which we experience relative to something definite and concrete. Rather, it is an ontological, existential, phenomenon and, as such, is our basic experience. We can compare anxiety, in Heidegger's sense, with the despair of Søren Kierkegaard. It reveals to us our own complete nothingness—a nothingness through which our "being-there" is ultimately determined. It is, thus, the nothingness, the possibility of not being, of the world which causes man to be filled with anxiety, and in view of which he feels himself threatened with his own non-existence, with the sinister, the awesome—so that he no longer feels at home in the world.³³ In so far as Heidegger here points up the forlornness and deep melancholy of human existence, he has become the spokesman for the feeling of our times.

Contemporary man has become conscious of inescapable tragedy—although this is perhaps but a magic phrase which leads us astray. Still, the burdensome character of human existence (*Lastcharacter*) becomes ever clearer to us. "Woe unto him," Heidegger writes, "who does not want to be crushed." The anxiety already referred to becomes a veritable "existentialist madness."³⁴ We sense that we are suspended above a bottomless abyss, aware of an inexplicable and colourless nothingness, of an empty, seamless unity. Such words as these may be used in all sincerity and in deep disillusionment, but often they are used as expressions of a weary aestheticism.

31. *S. u. Z.*, p. 248.

32. *Metaphysik*, p. 41. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 256 f.

33. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 283, 305 f.

34. *S. u. Z.*, p. 134. F. J. Von Rintelen, *Beyond Existentialism* (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1961), pp. 125 f.

But does not this line of reasoning lead Heidegger to the very brink of nihilism?³⁵ He repudiates this thought, for the argument so far has but prepared us to ask the decisive question—the question, namely, how we are called to achieve Being in itself and existence—something we can accomplish only in the distant future. What is involved here, however, lies beyond all determinate content, if by such content we mean rational and conceptual construction. We must sense it, as it were, as we must sense in immediate experience the content of a great work of art, which we also cannot define rationally.

We are now prepared to attempt, with Heidegger, to transcend the oppressive world of surface things, of rational constructions. But this transcending of the world of things, which are at hand, is not possible in the sense proposed by rational metaphysics—so Heidegger holds, following Kant at this point. This means that, so far, the last word in Heidegger's philosophy has not been spoken. We achieve the ultimate only when we complete the process of transcendence, for only then do we rise above the nothingness of the world of things.

On the basis of his epistemological position Heidegger rejects all rational metaphysics, and looks for another way. All of a sudden we hear that nothingness is only the "veil of being" in so far as being conceals itself behind nothingness.³⁶ But, indeed, nothingness is most intimately united with being and, proceeding out of being, it is the finitude which constantly "nullifies" (*nichtet*). Since being coincides with nothingness, we must also say, in Heidegger's words, that it is finite to the deepest ground. Yes, finitude, time, and being are all on the same level.³⁷ And yet, being is more than the being of

35. *S.u.Z.*, pp. 186, 189, 343. *Metaphysik*, pp. 31 f. Also, K. Loewith, "Les Implications Politiques de l'Existence chez Heidegger," *Les Temps Modernes*, II (1946), 345 f., quotation of a letter of Heidegger.

36. *Heidegger*, pp. 205 f., 231. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche I.* (Pfullingen: Gunther Neske Verlag, 1961), pp. 35 f.

37. *Metaphysik*, p. 46.

that which is in the foreground. Once Heidegger said even, "It is the total other," a phrase which is often applied in Protestant theology.³⁸

But Heidegger says, "Being is still waiting to become worthy of thought for man." Hence the "turning of thought" (*Kehre des Denkens*).³⁹ That is to say, it is not my subjective thought which approaches being, but, rather, that being expresses itself in us. In a certain way we are drawn into the truth of being itself.⁴⁰ In order to understand this, think of an artist who is convinced that his inner inspirations are exerted upon him from somewhere higher, that they are bestowed upon him from a level which transcends his ego. Compare this with the following sentence: In this sense I would say that the bird does not fly a flight, but, rather, that the flight flies the bird. In a certain measure it is an overlapping dimension which expresses itself in all of this. But Heidegger is not in the least willing to have Being understood in the sense of an Absolute; rather, he tells us unequivocally, "Being in itself never subsists without the concrete being of things," and for that reason being is most fundamentally finite.⁴¹ We must now comment on what Heidegger calls historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*). Our temporality is at the same time a historicity.⁴² It is the here and now, the present moment of the world situation, in which we find ourselves. It is not possible to set off truths as independent of time. According to Heidegger, it is not our task to seek unchangeable truths, because Being itself delivers to us its stipulations in history. To which should I attach myself? In order to answer this do we not need a criterion of significance?

At this point Heidegger refers us to the poet, who proclaims to us the directives of Being.⁴³ But here a

38. *S. u. Z.*, p. 219 *Metaphysik*, p. 36.
Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik (Bonn : Verlag Friedrich Cohen, 1929), pp. 23, 69, 208, 222.

39. *Metaphysik*, p. 15.

40. *Humanismus*, p. 72.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 103.

42. *Metaphysik*, p. 41.

43. *S. u. Z.*, pp. 372, 382, 392 ff.

new question arises: by which poet should I allow this to be said?

For Heidegger poetry is an existential attitude. It is symbolic speech, not conceptual cognition or speculation. He acknowledges, to be sure, that philosophy, so understood, is not science; but, then, rational science could never penetrate to the ultimate anyway.⁴⁴ It would be completely mistaken, however, to attempt to explain Heidegger's thesis psychologically or anthropologically, which he especially and specifically rejects, for he means it to have ontological significance. Let us, therefore, with Heidegger (who appeals to the German poet Hölderlin) go straight to the well-spring, the "fountainhead"—the "fountainhead," however, which in its beginning is not rational spirit.⁴⁵

In this context, everything (for Heidegger) takes on a religious value. He does not speak of God, but of gods and the divine, of divinity and humanity. Our only disaster is to live today in the closedness of this dimension, he says. Here Heidegger follows Hölderlin completely; and the meaning of God becomes far-reaching indeed.⁴⁶

But the divine (or the gods) is not the Ultimate. The Ultimate is the Holy. The Holy, however, is not the highest reality of the supernatural; it is, rather, something impersonal—the fate-like condition of the destiny of the originally given process within Being. The Holy is never something immediately given; it is that force which represents that which is whole, that which is originally preserving. It is the fundamentally healthy.⁴⁷ The Holy, therefore, as far as Heidegger is concerned, means something quite different from what it means in Christian theology. Nevertheless, it is, for Heidegger,

44. *Humanismus*, p. 117.

45. *Holzwege*, pp. 248, 303

46. Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung* (Frankfurt a. M. Klostermann Verlag, 1944), p. 45. Also, *Holzwege*, p. 64. Also, *Andenken* (in Hölderlin-Gedenkschrift) (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr Verlag, 1943).

47. Hölderlins Dichtung 24. Humanismus 102. Andenken 287, 311, 322. Rintelen, *Beyond Existentialism*, pp. 289 f.

the highest region. It is what Rudolf Otto has called the Numinous.⁴⁸ From here, theologians may advance to their further confession of faith; Heidegger has no objection.

But now an unexpected thought intrudes: The inner discrepancy of all things extends even into the highest level of Being, into the Holy itself. Evil and conflict—I might say, nothingness in one form or another—cause a disturbance in everything.⁴⁹ The Ultimate, therefore, is not harmony, not a cosmic world in the Greek sense, but, rather, a tragic disharmony invades and pervades everything and places in doubt the sense or meaning of whatever is. This is a thought which stands in sharpest contradiction to classical Greek thinking, according to which (since Heraclitus) *Logos*, Spirit, is the most profound, the deepest ground of the world. Heidegger, on the other hand, comes close to holding that intellect, as a rational force, is the most destructive factor in the universe, for every attempt to elucidate Being as the truth, as the “uncoveredness” of a self-revealed reality, is at the same time a re-veiling, a concealment.⁵⁰ The process is in essence a dialectical one. Every word which fixates and objectifies a meaning has, according to the irrationalism of Heidegger, its destructive effects!

It is difficult to submit the ideas here developed to philosophical criticism because the presupposition of such criticism—that we have at least terms and concepts which are amenable to a common and meaningful elucidation and understanding—is not fulfilled.

As especially characteristic of Heidegger's position is the idea that, despite all existential elucidation, we are, even at the very core of Being, still confined to a finitude. Within this limitation, however, we are to rise from an unauthentic mere “Being-there” to genuinely human existence (*Überstieg*). If we achieve transition, then

48. *Andenken*, p. 294. Holderlins, Hymne “Wie wenn am Feiertage” (Halle: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1941), p. 21.

49. Rudolf Otto, *Das Heilige*, (22nd ed., München: Biederstein Verlag, 1933).

50. Heidegger, *Humanismus*, pp. 112-114.

there is opened up before us the future course which will lead ultimately to Being itself.

Heidegger may be regarded as a revived Hegel, but without the speculative part of Hegel's philosophy, for Heidegger shares Kant's skepticism with respect to rational metaphysics also. In the works of Heidegger we encounter an earnest effort to transcend philosophy as rational science in order to be taught and guided by poetry. He believes passionately that in this way we can prepare a comprehension of Being.

■ ■ ■

51. *Holzwege*, pp. 42, 43, 310.

INFLUENCE OF INDIAN THOUGHT UPON THAT OF THE UNITED STATES

DALE RIEPE

Sir William Jones in 1786 announced the birth of comparative grammar based upon his newly acquired knowledge of Sanskrit. Joseph Priestley came to the United States from England eight years later and in 1797 wrote his *Comparison of the Institutes of Moses with those of the Hindoos*. Priestley states in this work that the "logic, the metaphysics, or the physics of the writers [are] all equally trifling and absurd."¹ Here he is referring to not only the Indians, but also to such other "heathen" as the Chinese. In a bumptious mood it was Thomas Jefferson who said that he was disappointed in philosophers, who appear to be "as mad as Hindoos, Mohamedans, and Christians."² Another American ex-President-to-be, John Adams, raised the question as to whether Christianity is more perverted than the religion of "the Druids or Hindoos"³ These remarks, not all completely serious, give some hint of one tradition of American attitude towards Indian thought.

At the same time the publication of Sir William Jones' writings on Indian language and thought, Friedrich von Schlegel's *Über die Sprache und Weisheit der Indier* (Heidelberg, 1808), the studies of Indian language by his brother, August Wilhelm von Schlegel, who became one of the first professors of Sanskrit in a Western university, at Bonn,⁴ stimulated other Americans to examine Indian

1. I. Woodbridge Riley, *American Philosophy the Early Schools* (New York : Russell and Russell, Inc., n.d.), p. 397.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 287.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

4. Holger Pedersen, *Linguistic Science in the Nineteenth Century*, trans. from Danish by J. W. Spargo (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1931), pp. 18-19.

claims. These included Ralph Waldo Emerson and other transcendentalists around Boston, and somewhat later, such men as William Dwight Whitney, second professor of Sanskrit in an American University, Yale, who published his *A Sanskrit Grammar* in 1879, a work still being used for teaching Sanskrit in the United States.

Some of the reasons for American interest in Indian thought include not only concern with language studies, but also boredom with theological problems concocted in Western Europe, disillusionment with Christianity, the rejection of trinitarianism, and the usefulness of Indian thought in the ideological warfare being waged in New England against science, scientism, materialism, and what was interpreted to be Yankee indifference to spiritual claims. As one might expect, those Americans who deplored the attack on science and materialism, such as Priestley, Jefferson, and John Adams in the early days of the American Republic have had their successors right down to the sixth decade of the twentieth century, who regard Indian philosophy and religion as obscurantism, superstition, and a buttress for irrationalism. Not until the end of the nineteenth century did American thinkers of a scientific and naturalistic bent slowly pay attention to Indian thought; thus the interpretation of Indian thought lay in the hands of the transcendentalists (Emerson), the St. Louis Hegelians (W. T. Harris), the spiritual pragmatists (James), the Anglo-American idealists (Royce) for more than a hundred years.

Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) in an autobiographical note indicated the attitude of some of the early American empirical philosophers in the following passage :

I was born and reared in the neighborhood of Concord—I mean in Cambridge—at the time when Emerson, Hedge,⁵ and their friends were disseminating the ideas they had caught from Schelling, and Schelling from Plotinus, from Boehm, or

5. Levi Hedge taught philosophy at Harvard College from 1795 to 1832.

from God knows what *minds stricken with the monstrous mysticism of the East*.⁶

Generally speaking, the other American philosophers whom we associate with the empirical, naturalistic, or materialistic tradition like Morris R. Cohen, John Dewey, Roy Wood Sellars, Ralph Barton Perry, Marvin Farber, E. A. Singer, and George H. Mead, with the notable exception of George Santayana, paid little attention to Indian thought. Both Whitehead and Stace, of course, received their training outside the United States, although they showed considerable interest in Buddhism.⁷ It seemed likely that these philosophers seldom thought of Indian philosophy except as it impinged, as with Morris Cohen, on social philosophy represented by Tagore or Gandhi.⁸

Although not a technical or academic philosopher, Ambrose Bierce easily stands out as the most hardheaded critic to achieve literary fame in the United States. In his *The Devil's Dictionary* Bierce shows himself familiar with some Indian religious philosophy, defining Brahma as follows :

Brahma, n. He who created the Hindoos, who are preserved by Vishnu and destroyed by Siva—a rather neater division of labor than is found among the deities of some other nations.⁹

Then follows a playful poem attributed to a fictitious poet :

*O Brahma, thou rare old Divinity,
First Person of the Hindoo Trinity,*

6. Peirce, *Collected Papers*, ed. C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss (Cambridge Harvard University Press, 1931-35), VI, 86. (my italics).

7. A. N. Whitehead's brother was one time Bishop at St. George, Madras. His concern with Buddhism may be found in *Religion in the Making* (1926). W. T. Stace lived many years in Ceylon as an official of the Government. Several of his works show the influence of Indian philosophy.

8. See Morris Raphael Cohen, *American Thought A Critical Sketch*, ed. Felix S. Cohen (New York Collier Books, 1962), p. 79.

9. Ambrose Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary* (Cleveland The World Publishing Co., 1942), p. 41.

*You sit there so calm and securely,
With feet folded up so demurely—
You're the First Person Singular, surely.*

—POLYDORE SMITH.¹⁰

Some Americans have used Indian thought to bolster their own; others to complement their knowledge sufficiently to give it a patina of universality; and still others, to use it as a knife in cutting out notions that they hold to be falsely held by mankind. Bierce, in attacking the notion that all of us desire life everlasting, refers to the hope of Buddhists that just the opposite may obtain.¹¹ Sometimes he prefers to contrast, as Voltaire did in the eighteenth century, the superstition of the West with the good sense of the Chinese. Of the "*Occident*," n. Bierce says] The part of the world lying west (or east) of the Orient. It is largely inhabited by Christians, a powerful subtribe of the Hypocrites, whose principal industries are murder and cheating, which they are pleased to call "war" and "commerce."¹² Moving from those skeptical of any inherent wisdom in Indian thought, such as Peirce and Bierce, we turn now to Ralph Waldo Emerson, often called the Brahmin of Concord.

At first there were few bones with sufficient meat for him and the other transcendentalists to chomp on, but in time Europe supplied them with victuals to satisfy some of their more obvious hunger for new viands served up on square plates.¹³ Between 1820-25 Emerson was borrowing numbers of the *Edinburgh Review* reading especially the articles dealing with India. Even before 1820, however, Emerson's aunt, Mary Moody Emerson, had sent him some literature about Rammohun Roy involving Unitarian missionary work in India. Emerson became the leading and most knowledgeable exponent of

10. *Ibid.*

11. Bierce, "Immortality," *The Shadow on the Dial and Other Essays* (San Francisco A. M. Robertson, 1909), p. 161.

12. Bierce, *The Devil's Dictionary*, p. 234.

13. Basil Hall Chamberlain (1850-1935), I believe it was, claimed that at one time the Japanese referred to Westerners "as the people of the round plates."

Influence of Indian Thought Upon That of the United States

Indian thought among the transcendentalists, many of whom saw in it an antidote to the rising American materialism. It had been hoped that New England would provide a kind of Christ's Kingdom in the Wilderness; instead rationalism, deism, and worldly concerns in Boston and elsewhere were setting a tone described as "low thinking and money-grubbing." That a number of the transcendentalists themselves were relieved of the most onerous task of making a living was not conducive to their understanding of economic reality.

About 1836, some years after Emerson had begun reading the Indian classics,¹⁴ a group of intellectuals "with high moral aim" met together at Emerson's study in Concord, Massachusetts to discuss new developments in philosophy, literature, and theology. Later called the New England Transcendentalists, this group was the first body in America, however loosely knit, to pay serious attention to Indian thought. Included among them were, besides Emerson, Theodore Parker, George Ripley, F. H. Hedge, Amos Bronson Alcott,¹⁵ Henry David Thoreau, William Ellery Channing, Margaret Fuller, Elizabeth Peabody, Nathaniel Hawthorne, and Orestes W. Brownson. These New England spirits, most with strong clerical backgrounds¹⁶ or fideist leanings, found in Indian thought not only idea with which they agreed, but suggestions as to the possible shape future spiritual developments might take if they were to be universalistic in appeal. Emerson himself found in Vedānta¹⁷ an

14. Some of Emerson's reading included Sir Wilham Jones, *To Narayana*, "Hindu Mythology and Mathematics", in the *Edinburgh Review*, Vyāsa, Kālidāsa, and after 1839, The Vedas, *Vishnu Sarna*, *Bhagavadgīta*, *Vishnu Purana*, *Sakuntala*, and the *Laws of Manu*. H. D. Thoreau gave Emerson the *Rig Veda Samhita*, *e. g.*

15. Not to be confused with Col. Henry Steele Olcott (1832-1907), founder of the Buddhist Theosophical Society in New York City in 1875.

16. See George F. Whicher, ed., *The Transcendentalist Revolt against Materialism* (Boston : D. C. Heath and Company, 1949), p. vii.

17. Non-dualistic Vedānta as expounded by Gaudapada and Śaṅkara. See T. M. P. Mahadevan, *The Philosophy of Advaita* (Lon-

answer to his quest for absolute being : illustrated in the *Chāndogya Upanishad* by the dialogue on the soul (soul equals Reality) between Svetaketu and his father. In his journal at this time Emerson records, "Blessed is the day when the youth discovers that Within and Above are synonymous."¹⁸ His receptivity to non-dualistic Vedānta is a remarkable testimony to the fact that even though men may be separated by a dozen cultures and ten thousand miles, yet still they have strikingly similar thoughts. And if it is the duty of intellect to not only analyse and dissect, but also discover parallelisms and similarities, then Emerson found these in Indian philosophy. Nevertheless, as Swami Paramananda pointed out,

this does not mean that Emerson borrowed....
A gentleman once said to Emerson that he had studied all the different philosophies and religions of the world, and he was now convinced that Christianity was the only one; to which Emerson replied : "That only shows, my friend, how narrowly you have read them."¹⁹

Besides being highly receptive to the Vedānta view of deity, Emerson was greatly influenced by the notions of *māyā* and karma, although transmigration seems to have left him less enthusiastic. Emerson's own understanding of *māyā* may best be shown by our quoting his own short poem having that word as its title :

"Maya"

*Illusions work impenetrable,
Weaving webs innumerable,*

don · Luzac and Co , 1938), Swami Prabhavananda and F. Manchester, *The Spiritual Heritage of India* (London : George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1962), chaps. 15, 16.

18. Emerson, *Journals*, III, 399.

19. Paramananda, *Emerson and Vedānta* (Boston : The Vedānta Centre, 1918), p. 9. I found my copy of this work in Moore Market, Madras in 1951.

*Her gay pictures never fail,
Charmer who will be believed
By man who thirsts to be deceived.
Illusions like the tints of pearl,
Or changing colors of the sky,
Or ribbons of a dancing girl
That mend her beauty to the eye.*²⁰

Few can fail to be enthusiastic, not only of Emerson's diction, which among American poets appears to some to be nearly flawless,²¹ but one is also aware that he has captured the quintessence, in so far as it can be expressed in English, of *māyā*. Man Mohan Singh has reminded us that Emerson frequently used books for their quotations alone. If this is true, then the mass of quotations concerning *māyā* that he gathered, is evidence of his pre-occupation with illusion as interpreted by the ancient Indian philosophers. According to Leyla Goren, Emerson, after he had composed "Hamatreya,"²² was still "playing with the idea of illusions." In 1861 he wrote about the legends surrounding the successive *māyās* of Vishnu.

Turning from Emerson's view of illusion to his view of *karma*, we are again pleased with his perceptiveness. Writing in his journal, he says :

The Indian system is full of fate, the Greek not. The Greek uses the word, indeed, but in his mind the Fates are three respectable old women who spin and shear a symbolic thread,—so narrow, so limitary is the sphere allowed them, and it is with music. We are only at a more beautiful opera, or at private theatricals. But in India, it is the dead reality, it is the cropping-out in our planted gardens of the core of the world : it is the abysmal Force, untameable and immense.²³

20. Emerson, *Works*, IX, 348

21 According to the American poet and critic, F. Y. St. Clair. Private conversation between St. Clair and Lawrence W. Beals of Williams College, June 12, 1962 in Grand Forks, North Dakota

22. A poem which includes a minor poem, called "Earth-Song."

23. Emerson, *Journals*, VII, 123.

Not only does he bring out what Indian artists have symbolized through the cosmic dance of Siva, but in a sentence or two he recommends the scrapping of much twaddle concerning Greek drama. For comparative philosophy²⁴ there is much to be learned here.

A final influence on Emerson is to be found in his doctrine of the Oversoul, certainly an atypical conception in the history of American thought. Kurt Leidecker has examined Carpenter's belief that this notion was probably not based upon an Indian prototype. On the other hand, it was believed by W. T. Harris and John Smith Harrison that *Bhagavadgītā*, 8.3 was the prototype Emerson used, in which *adhyātman* easily yields "Oversoul."²⁵ That Emerson did not know Sanskrit is adduced by Leidecker to show the unlikelihood that Emerson did in fact borrow his notion from the *Gītā*. Various translations with which Emerson was familiar, such as Ram-mohun Roy's or Sir William Jones' might have stirred his imagination more, Leidecker thinks, than the Neo-Platonic concept of emanation.²⁶ After a scrutiny of the "Self-Reliance" essay of Emerson, Leidecker concludes that no sense can be made of it without seeing it "against the philosophical or metaphysical background of the 'Indian Self'."²⁷ Relevant to this discussion is Emerson's poem published in the *Dial* magazine called "The Three Dimensions" in which he expresses an image of Creative Principle manifesting itself in diversity :

Room, room [sic] willed the opening mind,
And found it in Variety.²⁸

This angle of vision is closer to Neo-Platonism than to Indian views. Still many have said something important

24. An agriculture-minded friend of mine claims that "comparative philosophy" or "comparative literature" have the same intellectual status as "comparative potato." I'm not sure what this means, yet have a sneaking hunch that it might be significant.

25. See Leidecker, "Emerson and East-West Synthesis," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. I, No. 2, July 1951), p. 43.

26. Goren, *Elements of Brahmanism*, p. 41.

27. Leidecker, "Emerson and East-West Synthesis," p. 47.

28. Goren, *ibid*, p. 42

about Emerson's Oversoul; and nearly all have found passages to plausibly substantiate his own critical opinion of Emerson's notion. Why then not say that both Brahmanism and Neo-Platonism may well have entered Emerson's notion of Oversoul.²⁹

That Emerson was deeply influenced by Indian thought can scarcely be doubted and in more ways than we have mentioned here. Herambachandra Maitra has said that Emerson's writings represent a union of the modern spirit with what was noblest in ancient times.³⁰ While I sit here writing, the literature on Emerson by Indians continues to be written. When Principal A. S. Narayana Pillai visited me in Grand Forks last winter (1962) he told me of a venerable scholar not far from Trivandrum who although nearly ninety is in process of writing a work on Emerson's philosophy; perhaps he is the same scholar of whom I heard when I lived in Mylapore, Madras just ten years ago (1951-52) when I frequented my favourite bookstall at the end of the trolley line from Mount Road. I have written more about Emerson than any other American because he was probably most influenced among all the greatest of American writers by Indian thought.

Emerson created no greater enthusiasm for India in his friends than in Henry David Thoreau whose first recorded awareness of Indian thought is found in his *Journal* of 1841, during the decade in which the American Oriental Society was founded. Thoreau makes his imaginative experience of India concretized by referring it to objects of nature. In his journal he records that :

I cannot read a sentence in the book of the Hindoos without being elevated as upon the table-

29. According to S. Radhakrishnan, "Emerson's Oversoul is the *paramātmān* of the Upanisada," for which he adduces no evidence. See his *Eastern Religions and Western Thought* (New York : Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 249.

30. Goren, *Elements of Brahmanism*. . . , p. 46. According to Protap Chunder Mozoomdar in "Emerson as Seen from India," pointed out shortly after Emerson's death in 1882 that, "Yes, Emerson had all the wisdom and spirituality of the Brahmans." Goren, *ibid*.

land of the Ghauts. It has such a rhythm as the winds of the desert, such a tide as the Ganges, and seems as superior to criticism as the Himmalee Mounts. . . . The great thought is never found in mean dress, but is of virtue to ennoble any language.³¹

For another twenty years Thoreau read widely in Indian wisdom literature, religion, and philosophy, but frequently with more an eye to the enjoyment of new modes of description than for philosophical concepts.

In a letter to H. G. O. Blake in 1849, Thoreau writes the following :

Free in this world as the birds in the air, disengaged from every kind of chains, those who practise the *yoga* gather in Brahma the certain fruit of their works. . . . Depend upon it that, rude and careless as I am, I would fain practise the *yoga* faithfully. . . . To some extent, and at rare intervals, *even I am a yogi*.³²

By the most exacting standards of India, Thoreau did not live an extremely ascetic life, but by American standards few have equalled him in his abnegation of what Americans are thought to stand for. Around Walden Pond is the forest in which the yogi Thoreau retreated; from his meditations there, another great poet was inspired to act to free enchained souls in Africa and India : this was Gandhiji. As with Emerson and India, there was reciprocity between Thoreau and India, and in this respect, Thoreau may be considered an important avatar of Indian wisdom in the United States.³³

Another transcendentalist motivated by reading Indian philosophy and religion was Amos Bronson Alcott, whom Arthur Christy calls the propagandist for the Concord School. As shown by a diary entry of August, 1849, Alcott wished to include Indian and other oriental literature in his projected *Mankind Library*. Another

31. Thoreau, *Journal*, I, 266.

32. Arthur Christy, *The Orient In American Transcendentalism* (New York : Columbia University Press, 1932), p. 201.

33. See Romain Rolland, *Mahatma Gandhi* (New York : Century Press, 1924), pp. 264-66.

entry, for February 11, 1851, shows that Alcott had brought home from the Athenaeum Library in Boston a full armload of Asian classics. Although Alcott's enthusiasms was based upon English translations and European commentaries, by 1855 the Yankees were getting some first-hand information about India through such travellers as William Healey Dall, the first foreign missionary of the Unitarian Church to go to India. Dall established himself in Calcutta; his wife was a member of the transcendentalists. It is likely that Alcott's enthusiasm influenced not only William Torrey Harris, first of Connecticut and then of St. Louis, who was involved in the Concord Summer School of Philosophy, but also Charles de Berard Mills of Syracuse in Western New York, who wrote such works as *The Indian Saint or Buddha and Buddhism*, around the middle of the century. On August 19, 1879, Alcott wrote in his journal that he and W. T. Harris of St. Louis and F. B. Sanborn of Concord had received from Edwin Arnold, its author, *The Light of Asia*. Oliver Wendell Holmes, writer and father of the famous jurist, wrote an exhaustive review of it which effected the sale of the book in America. It was first published in the United States in Boston, January 1880. Besides Holmes' account, Ripley, W. E. Channing, and Sanborn gave it highly favorable notices, and as dean of the Concord Summer School of Philosophy, Alcott impressed upon the listening and reading public the value of Arnold's work as well as many others casting a favorable light on the classics of India.³⁴

In treating Alcott, we have already passed from the Atlantic shore to Syracuse and from thence to St. Louis. There, in the heartland of expanding America, beside the Mississippi which might be called the Indus of North America, William T. Harris (1835-1909) and other philosophers without portfolio, sent out further waves and eddies to quicken American interest in India. Unlike Josiah Royce, who was born in the American West, Harris migrated to Missouri from the Atlantic coast at the age of

34. I am indebted for this account to Christy, *The Orient In American Transcendentalism*, pp. 237-59.

twenty-two.³⁵ In St. Louis, Harris met Henry C. Brokmeyer (1826-1906) who was the main impetus to the organization of the St. Louis Philosophical Society and the founding of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*³⁶ which in its first volume exposed readers to Indian thought.

Of the famous American philosopher to be encouraged by Harris and Brokmeyer, such as C. S. Peirce, Josiah Royce, William James, and John Dewey, only Royce showed any zealous interest in Indian thought, although, as we shall see, James was by no means without some interest. The St. Louis School encouraged what Townsend has called a deliberate colonization³⁷ in such cities as Chicago, Milwaukee, Cincinnati, and Denver, but it was only in Chicago that real fruit was born for Indian thought through the efforts of Edward C. Hegeler, Paul Carus, and Edward L. Schaub. Hegeler founded *The Monist* in 1888; Carus edited it from 1888 until 1919 at which time Schaub³⁸ took over the editing until its publication was suspended in 1936. It was revived under the editorship of Eugene Freeman in 1962.³⁹ No American of that day provided the reading public more help in getting to know Indian thought than Carus (1852-1919): besides publishing *The Monist* and *The Open Court* he was also responsible for more than a dozen books concerning Indian thought, some of which are still being printed today by The Open Court Publishing Company of La Salle, Illinois.

35. Harvey Gates Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas in the United States* (New York: American Book Company, 1934), p. 116.

36. This is the first philosophical periodical published regularly in the English language.

37. Townsend, *Philosophical Ideas*, p. 127.

38. At one time President of the American Philosophical Association, Western Division, Professor of Philosophy at Northwestern University for many years. Paul A. Schilpp has carried on at Northwestern where Schaub left off, high-lighting his Indian interests in editing a volume in honor of S. Radhakrishnan.

39. Freeman is a Professor of Philosophy at San Jose State College.

Paul Carus, a strong devotee of Buddhism, emphasized that Buddhism is a positive creed during the heyday of American optimism, for, he said :

Buddha's doctrine is no negativism. An investigation of the nature of man's soul shows that while there is not *ātman* or ego-entity, the very being of man consists in his karma, and his karma remains untouched by death.... Thus, by denying the existence of that which appears to be our soul and for the destruction of which in death we tremble, Buddha actually opens... the door of immortality to mankind.⁴⁰

Carus wished to point out the truths that Buddhism and Christianity share, rather than define the exclusive rightness of Christianity :

"There are many Christians who assume that Christianity alone is in the possession of truth and that man could not, in the natural way of his moral evolution, have obtained that nobler conception of life which enjoins the practice of universal goodwill towards both friends and enemies. This narrow view of Christianity is refuted by the mere existence of Buddhism."⁴¹

When the World's Parliament of Religions was convened concurrent with the Columbian Exposition of Chicago in 1893, not only was William T. Harris present, but as we might expect, Paul Carus too.⁴² India was represented by Protap Chunder Mozoomdar, Manilal N. Dwivedi, B. B. Nagarkar, Vicha Virchand A. Ghandi (*sic*), S. Parthasarathy Aiyanger, Ervad Sherizriji Dadabhai Bharucha, and Swami Vivekananda.⁴³

Swami Vivekananda founded the first Vedānta

40. Carus, *The Gospel of Buddha* (Chicago : The Open Court Publishing Co., 1921/first published in 1894/), p. viii

41. *Ibid.*, p. ix.

42. Also present at the Parliament was a young philosopher by the name of Wilham Ernest Hocking who later became famous for his *The Meaning of God in Human Experience*. Hocking will celebrate his 90th birthday this year (1963).

43. John Henry Barrows, ed., *The World's Parliament of Religion*, 2 vols., (Chicago : The Parliament Publishing Company, 1893).

Society in the United States in 1894 based upon the teachings of Sri Ramakrishna (d. 1886). These teachings, in turn, were influenced by those of Keshab Chandra Sen, one of the leaders of the Brahmō Samaj reform society. A short time before the Parliament was to be held in Chicago, Vivekananda caught wind of it in Madras. Seeing an opportunity to spread the faith combined with an informative trip to America, he excitedly remarked, "The time has come for the Hinduism of the Rishis to become dynamic... Shall we remain passive or shall we become aggressive, as in the days of old, preaching unto the nations the glory of the *Dharma* ?"⁴⁴

Vivekananda did attend the Parliament at Chicago, and as one can easily see by reading the two volumes commemorating the event, that he made his presence felt. During the following year he founded the first Indian religious center, still extant in New York, with branches at Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. It has had centers in Pittsburgh, Seattle, Boston, Santa Barbara, San Diego, Long Beach, Pasadena, Hollywood, and Portland, Oregon. Three decades after the founding of the first society in New York, Wendell Thomas, after visiting it, describes the center as follows : "Looking around to the left, I saw in the long parlor a large bookcase containing about a thousand books, which I later discovered to be mostly the works of Western Idealists."⁴⁵ Besides a painting of Vivekananda, a small photograph of Ramakrishna, where flowers, burning candles, and incense fuming. As Thomas stood there, Swami Jñānesvarananda entered, mounted the one-step platform and with hands folded across his shining golden robe said :

"Let us all try to meditate on our inner divine nature." Silence. Broken by the Swami's reso-

44. Quoted by Wendell M. Thomas, *Hinduism Invades America* (New York : The Beacon Press, Inc., 1930), p. 72. Still the best account of Vivekananda's visit to America is that of Romain Rolland, *Prophets of the New India* trans. E. F. Malcolm-Smith (London : Cassell and Company Ltd., 1930)

45. Thomas, *Hinduism Invades America*, p. 96.

nant voice in a quaintly appealing Sanskrit chant. Then a prayer in English : "May that One who is called Siva by the Shivaïtes, Visnu by the Visnuvites, Brahman by the Vedantins...the Heavenly Father by the Christians, inspire our hearts with love for all mankind. Peace ! Peace ! Peace !" ⁴⁶

Between 1894 and 1929 there were seventeen Ramakrishna swamis in the United States, with never more than eight at a time, sent out from the Matha at Belur, Bengal, which was founded in 1886, the year of the death of Ramakrishna. By 1960 there were 27,500 avowed followers of Hinduism in the United States.⁴⁷ Over the year since the 1890's some of the Americans who became devotees of the Indian religious philosophy include Sarah J. Farmer, who gave her fortune for the study of oriental religions at Greenacre Inn, Mrs. Ole Bull, wife of the famous violinist, who bequeathed several hundred thousand dollars to the Vedānta Centre, Luther Burbank, the botanist, Madame Galli-Curci, the singer, Edward B. Davis, a Texas Oil Magnate, and Gerald Heard, the writer.

We cannot here dwell upon all the fascinating byways into which Indian thought leads us in the American scene, sometimes touching upon the work of such poets as Walt Whitman and novelists such as Theodore Dreiser. Let us be content to complete our account with some mention of outstanding impacts upon philosophers from around 1900 to the present. What is left out is sometimes deliberate, sometimes inadvertant, although I shall complete a fuller account in the near future if permitted.

William James refers to Indian thought in a host of

46. *Ibid.*, pp 96-97.

47 According to the 1962 *World Almanac*, ed. Harry Hansen (New York New York World-Telegram and The Sun), p. 719. Thomas claims that in 1906 there were 340 members, 190 in 1916, and 200 members in 1926. Of these in 1926, 2/5 were unmarried, 3/4 were women, ages ran from 35 to 70 with an average age of 48. Thomas, *Hinduism Invades America*, p 116. Buddhists number 165,000 in North America, many of whom are Far Easterners by birth. 1962 *World Almanac*, *ibid.*

citations, particularly in his *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, first published in 1902, and in *Pragmatism* also. He refers to Swami Vivekananda's London Lectures of 1897, to Swami Ramkrishna's maxims found in F. Max Muller's *Ramakrishna, his Life and Sayings* (1899), admitting that :

I am ignorant of Buddhism and speak under correction, and merely in order better to describe my general point of view; as I apprehend the Buddhist doctrine of Karma, I agree in principle with that.⁴⁸

With his sensitive doctrinal nose lowered in the pragmatic pheasant hunt, James goes on to discover in Buddhism a kind of ally to the activism he espouses against the block universe :

...for Buddhism as I interpret it, and for religion generally so far as it remains unweakened by transcendentalistic metaphysics, the word "judgment" here means no bare academic verdict or platonic appreciation as it means in Vedantic or modern absolutist systems; it carries on the contrary, *execution* with it, is *in rebus* as well as *post rem*, and operates "causally" as partial factor in the total fact.⁴⁹

Writing of the *neti, neti* James says, "Their very denial of every adjective you may propose as applicable to the ultimate truth [for these Indian philosophers]...is a denial made on behalf of a deeper yes."⁵⁰

Although James was not enthusiastic about most of Indian philosophy, his outlook was that of a watchful, judicious observer who was certainly in no way antagonistic to studying it; indeed he encouraged his younger colleague James Haughton Woods, who became the first American academic philosopher to learn an Indian language and to publish a first-rate scholarly work on Indian philosophy, *The Yoga System of Patañjali* (1914)

48. James, *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, The Gifford Lectures in 1901-1902 (New York The Modern Library, n. d), p 512.

49. *Ibid.*,

50. *Ibid.*, p. 416.

which appears in the Harvard Oriental Series. At this time, around the turn of the twentieth century, Harvard University became the center of the main academic interest in Indian thought, although one dare not disregard the splendid work being done at Johns Hopkins, first by Charles Rockwell Lanman, who subsequently went to Harvard, or by his famous pupil, Maurice Bloomfield.⁵¹

James Haughton Woods was a direct influence upon William Ernest Hocking, William Savery, Daniel S. Robinson, and many others, including James Bissett Pratt. Hocking was already aware of Indian thought having attended the Parliament of 1893, particularly, he says in a letter, by Swami Vivekananda's moving phrase, "Sinners! It is a sin to call men sinners."⁵² Concerning Hocking's opportunity to study Indian thought, his own vivid account admirably reveals:

I had done some reading in the translations of Indian literature available at Harvard and some of the writings of George Foote Moore. It happened that Moore was just at that time (1904) leaving Andover to come to Harvard, and Andover Theological School was in straits. Whom could they get to take Moore's place? They consulted George Herbert Palmer:⁵³ who told them they could not fill that place. He suggested a wild alternative: "Get a young fellow interested in the subject: give him three hours a week to teach (instead of 15), and let him spend his days in the great library built up by Moore in Andover, and *work up the subject* with his class." The staff at Andover accepted the suggestion, if Palmer could

51. Bloomfield is remembered for many excellent works, including the famous Concordance of the Vedas. Lanman was a founder of the Harvard Oriental Series.

52. Letter from William Ernest Hocking, Professor Emeritus of Harvard University, Madison, New Hampshire, May 6, 1962, p. 2.

53. A well-loved professor of philosophy at Harvard in the Golden Age of philosophy there who was somewhat outshone by James, Royce, Santayana.

suggest a "young fellow." Palmer nominated me. I was in a considerable doubt; and consulted Jim Woods, recently back from two years in India. Woods proposed a course of reading for me, and encouraged me to go ahead—which I did, with trepidation.⁵⁴

Hocking became, twenty-seven years later, chairman of the "Commission of Appraisal" of the Laymen's Inquiry, and as such visited India, China, and Japan, in 1931.

Woods also influenced William Savery, who with E. O. Lovejoy⁵⁵ and W. P. Montague⁵⁶ was called by James "my three metaphysical racehorses," took his doctorate at Harvard in 1898, moved out to the Western frontier and became head of the philosophy and psychology department at the University of Washington. There he met H. H. Gowan,⁵⁷ founder of that university's department of Asian studies. Savery for several years taught advanced students "Hinduism" and "Buddhism" until his death in 1945, while his second wife, Hallie, taught Indian art as a Curator of the Frye Museum in Seattle. Savery, in turn, stimulated at least two of his students, Curt J. Ducasse⁵⁸ and myself to delve more deeply into Indian philosophy and religion.

Daniel S. Robinson, for many years Director of the School of Philosophy at the University of Southern California was another student of Woods who had taught comparative religion and included "Vācaspati and British

54. Letter from William Ernest Hocking, *op cit*

55. For many years Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Johns Hopkins University, founder of the history of ideas movement in the United States with a keen interest in Chinese thought

56. Late Professor of Philosophy at Columbia University and author of *The Ways of Knowing*

57. Born in England, former missionary for the Anglican Church to the Far East. A pioneer in Avestan, Japanese, and Indian studies in the United States, died recently in his nineties in Seattle

58. Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at Brown University Long concerned with the philosophy and psychology of religion and psychological research, originally from France who worked his way to America on a cattle boat to the West Coast.

Idealism" a paper he wrote for Woods in Indian Philosophy at Harvard in his doctoral dissertation entitled "The Place of Inference in Logical Theory," part of which has appeared in *Philosophy East and West*.⁵⁹

Two other Harvard philosophers at this time were considerably influenced by Indian thought : Josiah Royce (1855-1916) and George Santayana (1863-1952). Royce first became enamored of Indian thought through Charles Rockwell Lanman, originally professor of Sanskrit at Johns Hopkins, later of Harvard,⁶⁰ by introducing Royce to the Upanishads. Royce, originally a Californian, was aware of Asia because of the Chinese population in that state. His interest in Japanese thought was also considerable, yet he seemed more taken with Indian conceptions. By 1892 Royce was presumably hooked by the Indian thought emphasizing idealistic monism, precisely that part rejected by James. Royce's main concern was with the Indian philosophy represented by the Upanishads and the Indian religion found in Hīnāyana Buddhism.⁶¹ His estimate of Indian philosophy is given at the time of his writing of *Studies of Good and Evil* as follows :

The Hindoo, as a philosopher, has always been a keen critic of human illusions, but since it chanced, accident of race development, that the Hindoo, from an early period of his evolution, did not love life, Hindoo philosophy, extensive as are its literary monuments, is in essential doctrine always very brief and unfruitful. Life for the Hindoo is an ill; one philosophizes to seek salvation.⁶²

Sāṃkhya provides Royce with a horse to beat, since

59. Vol. I, No. 1, pp 63 f.

60. Lanman moved to Harvard around 1885, at which time he was replaced at Johns Hopkins by Maurice Bloomfield. Letter from Herbert Pierrepont Houghton, Professor Emeritus of Classical Languages, Carleton College, Wellesley Hills, Mass., June 20, 1962.

61. Kurt Leidecker, *Josiah Royce and Indian Thought* (New York Kailas Press, 1931), pp. 7-9.

62. Royce, *Studies in Good and Evil* (New York : D. Appleton and Company, 1898), p. 353.

it represents many of the weaknesses he presumed to find in realism. For, Royce says,

The world of the realist is full of chasms; all elements are in greater or less isolation; unity becomes mysterious and, if dispensed with, will still leave the problem of the linkage in knowledge which the realist must assume but cannot satisfactorily solve.⁶³

Royce's concern with Hinduism perhaps waned after 1900, whereas his desire to understand and use Buddhism increased as he approached the First World War. Presumably he was most stimulated in this direction by reading Schopenhauer.⁶⁴ Royce's attachment to Buddhism depends, not only upon his belief that it was Christianity's greatest rival, but also that it was profoundly important in helping us understand life's fundamental problems, and equally important, to state what these problems are. Furthermore, the Buddha was loyal in the one basic sense of loyalty, that is, loyal to the community and not simply to himself.⁶⁵

Paul Elmer More, one of the founders, with Irving Babbitt, of American literary humanism, was asked to write a review of Paul Deussen's *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* translated in 1906 for *The Atlantic Monthly*. More characteristically attacked Deussen's approach to "The Forest Philosophy of India" as being too intellectualistic and too close to the lecture room. For, More says, "To grasp the force of these books we must go back to the time of the Vedas and store our memory with those earliest hymns of the Aryan race."⁶⁶ Furthermore, we must be on guard against *Gefühlphilosophie*, "the Romantic complement to German metaphysics. Nothing could be farther from the virile faith of the ancient Hindus. . . ."⁶⁷

63. See Leidecker's admirable synopsis of Royce's analysis in *Josiah Royce*, , pp. 11-15.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

65. *Ibid.*, pp. 20 f.

66. More, *Shelburne Essays*, Sixth Series (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1909), p. 4.

67. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

After all, our interpretations of the philosophy of ancient India comes from the same romanticism that "dissolved the philosophy of J. J. Rousseau into a cloud of mystifying words."⁶⁸ Higher religion, "Ritschlianism" has come down to us from Fichte, Schelling, and Schleiermacher. The *Ich* of Fichte is not the Ātman; it is a mummary of egotism, part of the romantic magnification of the ego to be found in emotional self-containment and self-contemplation. This is not the Vedāntic self-restraint and discipline of knowledge, says More, and Deussen as a disciple of Schopenhauer must be fingered as having led us astray. Furthermore, says More, "The publications of modern Hindus in the Vedānta Society and elsewhere only increase the confusion."⁶⁹ One cannot but wonder if the attack by More on Deussen and later Santayana's and Dewey's attacks on German philosophy were not part of the tendency around the First World War for many American intellectuals to display their Germanophobia through the medium of philosophy.

It may well be that George Santayana first learned of Indian thought at Berlin listening to Paul Deussen. Upon returning to Cambridge, Mass. in 1888 he begged Royce to let him write his dissertation on Schopenhauer, but instead he wrote on Lotze. As a philosophical naturalist, it is to be expected perhaps that he would have found the Sāṃkhya philosophy most congenial, as forty years later, George P. Conger⁷⁰ did at the University of Minnesota. In the *Realm of Matter* Santayana says, "...at the threshold of natural philosophy, the Vedānta system must yield to the Sāṃkhya: and this the Indians seem to have admitted by regarding the two systems as orthodox and compatible. It might be well if

68. *Ibid*, p. 36, (footnote)

69. *Ibid.*, p. 38, (footnote)

70 Late Professor of Philosophy who died in 1961, after three visits to India and after having in 1954-55 received the signal honor of giving the S.N. Ghosh Lectures at the University of Calcutta. Like D. M. Datta, his good friend, Conger had infinite patience in trying to understand an opposing position, but never concluded a dialectical fight until he thought his own position had been understood.

in the West we could take a hint from this comprehensiveness."⁷¹ Furthermore, one may note that "...we shall not...avoid an ultimate materialism...Plato, Plotinus, and the Indians never conceived the thing otherwise; and this material underpinning to the migration of souls seems indeed indispensable, if they are to be supposed to communicate and interact, as is requisite for all offices of charity."⁷²

Santayana had much to say about Indian philosophy, but I shall conclude discussing his views by quoting from his last written words on Indian thought presented in the first issue of *Philosophy East and West*⁷³ in April 1951 :

I have a great respect for Indian philosophy and for Buddhism and should like to believe that I share some of their insights...You speak of "synthesis" between Eastern and Western philosophy : but this could only be reached by blurring or emptying both systems in what was clear and distinct in their results. [therefore]...From a literary or humanistic point of view I think that it is the *variety* and *incomparability* of systems, as of kinds of beauty, that make them interesting, not any compromise or fusion that could be made of them.⁷⁴

Here, in the year before he died at eighty-nine, America's most distinguished philosopher to have concerned himself with Indian thought, reveals the aesthetic naturalism that accepts everything human so long as it contributes to the beauty and variety of man's conceivable experience.

One of Santayana's students at Harvard, James Bissett Pratt (1875-1944), for many years Professor of Philosophy at Williams College, said to his wife in April

71. Santayana, *Realms of Being*, one vol ed (New York : Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942), p. 211

72. *Ibid* , p. 390

73. America's only journal devoted to topics indicated by its title, founded in 1949, during the Second East-West Philosophers' Convention in Honolulu with Charles A. Moore as its general editor with the subvention of the Rockefeller Foundation.

74. Santayana, "On Philosophical Synthesis", *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. I, No. 1 (April 1951), p. 5.

1913: "Let us take a little walk [as] I have decided that I feel a little stale having taught these [Indian] religions ten years or thereabouts—we shall go to India and see them practised."⁷⁵ Ten years later, after having taught comparative religion at Williams during the years after his return from India, Pratt again went to Asia with his wife and two children to study Buddhism in detail during a sabbatical from 1923-24, the result of which was his invaluable study, *The Pilgrimage of Buddhism* (1928). During his third sabbatical in 1932-33, Pratt again visited India, this time giving weekly lectures on Buddhism at Shantiniketan at the behest of his good friend, Rabindranath Tagore.⁷⁶

If James Haughton Woods was America's first philosopher to become an all-around expert in Indian philosophy, including linguistically, Kurt F. Leidecker was the second. At first stimulated by reading Edwin Arnold's *Light of Asia* in German as a young boy, Leidecker did his M.A. thesis in Indian philosophy in 1925 under the guidance of Simon Frazer MacLennan and Ethel M. Ktuch at Oberlin College. He then continued his studies at the University of Chicago under the Sanskritist Walter Eugene Clark, later of Harvard, writing one of the first doctoral dissertations on Indian philosophy in the United States by an American. It was entitled: "Nôetical Terminology in the Upanishads and the Bhagavad Gītā," (1927).⁷⁷ Few if any other Americans have written so much on Indian philosophy beginning with his first article in 1929 entitled "Indian Philosophy and Western Thought," and including the definitions of hundreds of Indian terms for the Dictionary of Philosophy.⁷⁸ Leidecker also has done pioneer work recording the influences of Indian thought upon American beginning with his *Josiah Royce*

75. Letter from Mrs. James Bissett Pratt, Williamstown, Mass., June 11, 1962., p. 2.

76. *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

77. Letter from Kurt Leidecker, Fredericksburg, Virginia, March 8, 1962.

78. Edited by Dagobert D. Runes with 72 contributors (New York Philosophical Library, 1944), pp. 343.

and Indian Thought (1931). He has taught Indian philosophy at Mary Washington College of the University of Virginia where he is Professor of Philosophy and elsewhere. I first met him in Calcutta in 1951 and later visited Elephanta Caves with him in early 1952 in the company of Solomon Levy⁷⁹ of the University of Kansas City who has done work on Swami Prabhavananda's outlook.

Charles A. Moore, for many years Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii and a graduate of Yale University, came under the influence of Kalidas Nag of the University of Calcutta and Wing-tsit Chan of Dartmouth College while these two Asian philosophers were visiting the University of Hawaii.⁸⁰ Moore has become the most influential disseminator of Indian thought in the United States in the twentieth century. Besides editing four books, including *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy* (1957) with S. Radhakrishnan, Moore's influence has been felt by means of his East-West Philosophers' Conventions held in 1939, 1949, 1959⁸¹ at the University of Hawaii. These conferences were subvented by Judge Walter F. Frear, the Watumull Foundation, the McInerny Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, the University of Hawaii and private citizens in Honolulu and on the United States mainland. Out of these conferences developed also, the East-West Center (1961) subvented by the United States Government, but supervised by the University of Hawaii.

Some of the American philosophers influenced by these conferences to do significant work in Indian thought include F.S.C. Northrop of Yale University, author of the best-selling *The Meeting of East and West*, E. A. Burtt, emeritus of Cornell University, author of *Man Seeks the Divine*, Abraham Kaplan of the University of California,

79. A former student of Daniel S. Robinson at the University of Southern California and a former student at Calcutta University.

80. Letter from Charles A. Moore, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 16, 1962.

81. The Fourth East-West Philosophers' Conference held at the University of Hawaii from June 29 to August 7, 1964.

author of *The New World of Philosophy*, Charles Morris of the University of Florida, author of *Paths of Life*, and Dale Riepe of C. W. Post College of Long Island University, author of *the Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought*.

Certain other influential American philosophers strongly influenced by Indian thought include Daniel H. H. Ingalls of Harvard University who studied under Sri Kālipada Tarkācārya at the Sanskrit Research Institute, Ingall's student, Karl Potter of the University of Minnesota who has studied at Andhra and Banaras, Archie Bahm of the University of New Mexico who has written several books on Indian thought, Francis P. Clarke of the University of Pennsylvania who wrote his M.A. dissertation on Indian thought in the 1920's at the University of Nebraska, David White of Macalester College, Clarence Hamilton of Oberlin College, Richard Robinson at the University of Wisconsin, John Plott, the first American to receive his doctorate in philosophy from an Indian university, George B. Burch of Tufts University, W. T. Stace, emeritus of Princeton University who served in the British Government in Ceylon for a number of years.

I have not been able to include, unfortunately, all the signs of influence of India upon American thought, nor given credit to all those who have helped in the process of acquainting Americans with Indian philosophy. Nor have I given full accounts of such important figures as Royce and Santayana about whom I shall write more in the future. And finally, I can think of no Indian philosopher who has had a greater personal impact on the many Americans: teachers of philosophy as well as students whom he has met and taught, than Professor D. M. Datta. I have lying open before me his outstanding contribution to comparative philosophy, *The Chief Currents of Contemporary Philosophy* published in 1951, where, with typical generosity, he gives credit to J. B. Pratt for having stimulated his work in this area. As a philosopher who has shared his insights with Americans in Hawaii, Wisconsin, and Minnesota, Datta makes the plea on the last page of his book: "If it is felt that these

ideas are not the monopoly of India but can be found also in the greatest teachers of all countries and times, it will only mean, what India has always believed, that there is a bedrock of human unity behind the superficial diversities of time and place, and that the greatest persons of many lands have often penetrated to it. It should be the duty of modern philosophers—persons with the widest outlook and the deepest insight—to discover this, our common human heritage, and try to mold their own lives and thereby those of others around them in the light of these basic truths.” Would any American philosopher studying Indian thought disagree with this?

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DIGNĀGA AND THE FOUR BUDDHIST SCHOOLS

A. K. SARKAR

The purpose of this paper is not a detailed study of Dignāga, the leader of the Buddhist Logical School of the 5th century A.D. This paper tries to clarify his attitude as reflected in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, a compilation of aphorisms on Pramāṇa or valid knowledge; the above book is a criticism and also a continuation of the principles of the four schools of Buddhism. The later thinkers in the line of Buddhist Logical School who primarily commented on Dignāga's works, were Dharmakīrti, Jinendrabuddhi, Dharmottara, Vinitadeva, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla, all preceding the great Vedāntic thinker Śaṅkara (788-820 A.D.).¹ No thorough study of the four Buddhist schools or of the thinkers before Śaṅkara is possible unless Dignāga's position is properly determined. This paper attempts to elucidate that aspect of Dignāga's thought.

The thinkers of the four Buddhist schools²—Vaibhāsika, Sautrāntika, Mādhyamika and Yogācāra—were inter-

1. If one studies Tucci's several works . *On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya (nātha) and Asanga* (University of Calcutta, 1930), *Buddhist Logic Before Dinnāga* (Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland, July, 1929) and *Pre-Dinnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic* (Gacwad's Oriental Series, 1929), one will readily accept the view that Dignaga was not the initiator of the Buddhist logic, but one will not have any hesitation to admit that a complete shape of a developed Buddhist logic can be traced to Dignaga alone, and not to his predecessors.

2. The four Buddhist schools flourished from the 1st century to the 4th century A.D. For details vide . *2500 years of Buddhism*, Foreward by Radhakrishnan, Government of India, 1956, Ch VI; also Stcherbatsky *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Royal Asiatic Society, 1923) and *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana* (Leningrad, 1927).

ested in the intellectual analysis of the presented universe tentatively. Their final aim was to prove the vacuity (*śūnyatā*) of the entire intellectual modes—the roots of the presented universe—by drawing attention to the real experience, which is transcendental (*atīndriya*). The transcendental experience, being neither intellectual nor sensuous experience, is only realised by the Buddhist triadic discipline viz., *sīla* (conduct), *samādhi* (meditation) and *prajñā* (insight).³ From this standpoint it is obvious that the Buddhist transcendent experience is a disciplined experience and not akin to the method of understanding of the idealists and mystics of the west. If one bears in mind this difference between the Buddhist discipline and western thought-processes, one will not be inclined to interpret the Vaibhāṣikas as *realists*, the Sautrāntikas as *relativists*, the Mādhyamikas as *nihilists* and the Yogācāras as *absolutists* in the usual western sense, even when the great Indian scholars like Sinha⁴ and Murti,⁵ have given some reasons to compare the standpoints of the thinkers of the above schools with some aspects of western thought. In the understanding of the standpoints of the four schools of Buddhist thought, one can take some valuable hints from Stcherbatsky's works, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, and *Buddhist Logic* (in two volumes)⁶, and interpret the thinkers of the Buddhist schools as *transcendentalists*.⁷

The Vaibhāṣikas by their intellectual stand posit the *particulars* or the *elements* (*dharmas*), just to depart from

³ Stcherbatsky *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, pp 25-53, also Takakusu *The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy*, University of Hawaii, 1949

⁴ *Indian Realism*, Kegan Paul, 1938, specially for the Yogācāras and the Sautrāntikas, Chs. I-III

⁵ "The Metaphysical Schools in Buddhism" in *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, ed. by Radhakrishnan and others, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1952-3, Vol I, pp 191-200 and *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1955, Parts 2 and 3.

⁶ and ⁷ Leningrad 1932 and 1930, specially Vol. I, also vide writer's "Changing Phases of Buddhist Thought", *Proceedings of The Indian Philosophical Congress 1954*, for a critical study.

the monistic and substantivist stand of the Upaniṣadic thinkers; they maintain that these *particulars* are *non-empiricals*, untouched by any intellectual or sensuous characters. These *elements*, to them, are independent flashes of intuitions either in *association with* the law of *pratītya-samutpāda* (dependent origination) or in *dissociation from* it.⁸ Their main basis is in the transcendent background. The Sautrāntikas, like the Vaibhāṣikas, admit the disciplined transcendent experience as basic, but they do not admit that this experience can be expressed as discrete flashes or particulars; they think that the intellectual understanding of transcendental experience is essentially relational or phenomenal; hence their stand is *critical* of the Vaibhāṣika-standpoint, *only* from a transcendent aspect. The Mādhyamikas (chiefly Nāgārjuna) accept that transcendent experience is basic and can be determined by triadic Buddhist discipline, but they discourage all intellectual determination of the transcendent experience in terms of an *assertion* as held by the Vaibhāṣikas, or the *negation* of that assertion as suggested by the Sautrāntikas; they hold that the moment the intellectual mode is admitted, the entire *process*, beginning with the assertion and denial, and ending with the disjunctive assertions and denials – has to be examined. The intellectual process, being a continuous flux towards the last point of disjunctive negations, is a presentation of *alternatives* in the form of *neither nor*, where the presentation is not for *choice*, but for *abandonment* of the contradictory alternatives. The suggestion of the final form of intellectual process is a hint at its own cancellation or at its restricted outlook, and when the intellectual process is thus resisted, it prepares the ground for the transcendent experience which shines by itself; it is then not a *dr̥ṣṭi* – a point-of-view, but a *prajñā* – a comprehensive insightful experience.

The Yogācāras also, like the previous Buddhist thinkers of the different schools, admit a transcendent experience, and declare that it is a finally efficient principle or a causal background of the less efficient causal processes, viz., the causal process of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)

8. Stcherbatsky . *The Central Conception of Buddhism*.

and of ideation (*ālaya-vijñāna*). The transcendent efficient principle, according to the Yogācāras, is a non-dual experience (*advaya*); it is consciousness only (*vijñāna-mātram*), or thusness (*tathatā*). The Vaibhāṣikas and the Sautrāntikas draw attention to the experience in the order of *pratītyasamutpāda* or a dissociation from it, the Mādhyamikas draw attention to its voidness (*śūnyatā*). According to the Yogācāras, there is a transcendent process—the ideational principle (*ālaya-vijñāna*) which is beyond the law of dependent-origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*), and more efficient than it; this *ālaya-vijñāna* in the aspect of *abhūta-parikalpita* (wrong-ideation) is relative to *śūnyatā* (voidness), and exists together," but both are finally cancelled by the transcendent experience or the final causal principle of *tathatā* (thusness). Takakusu thinks that the Yogācāra idealism expresses a triadic series of causality, viz, (i) causality by action-influence (*pratītyasamutpāda*), (ii) causality by ideation (*ālayavijñāna*), and (iii) causality by thusness (*tathatā*).¹⁰ The first two causal principles are dependent on the third which is the supreme psycho-moral principle of causality. The evolution of the thought of the Buddhist schools, therefore, is towards the clarification of the transcendent experience, and the empirical experiences of the sensuous and intellectual orders, are explained through the transcendental; the empirical experiences of the sensuous and intellectual orders have a relative place or they have only relative efficiency, according to the final standpoint of the Yogācāras. The voidness (*śūnyatā*) of Nāgārjuna also, has a relative place, in relation to the *abhūtaparikalpita* (wrong ideation); what is fundamental, therefore, is the

9 Tucci On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of Maitreya (*natha*) and Asanga, Ch. II, specially pp. 34-5

10 "Buddhism as a Philosophy of Thusness" in *Philosophy East and West*, ed. by Moore (Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 79-82, for the mystical interpretation of final experience, vide Sthiramati's *Madhyantavibhagāsūtrabhāṣyatīkā*—a subcommentary on Vashubandhu's Bhāṣya on the *Madhyantavibhagāsūtra* of Maitreyanātha, Part I ed. by V. Bhattacharya and Tucci, Calcutta Oriental Series, No. 24, 1932, and Friedmann Sthiramati's *Madhyantavibhagatīkā*, Utrecht-UTR TYP. ASS—MCMXXVII. Chiefly Introduction

transcendent experience, which is realised by the triadic Buddhist discipline, or by deep meditation or yoga. Certainly all these modes of reflection, in strict conformity with a discipline, cannot be understood in any western conceptual or empirical point of view.

In the background of the reflective activities of the four Buddhist schools, Dignāga initiates the logical school of Buddhism. If one pursues the trend of this discourse one will find that in Dignāga, there is a return to the Vāi-bhāṣika mode of reflection, in an aspect, and an upholding of the Yogācāra standpoint, on the other. But the main purpose of Dignāga is to give a correct analysis of the transcendent experience, removing all possible confusions. According to Dignāga, the reality is a point of experience revealed in *pure sensation*. It can be contrasted with the Upaniṣadic notion of reality which is pure *self-shining* experience. Its tone, therefore, is realistic, though this realism has to be conceived with a discipline. It is an attempt to understand the flash of reality in pure sensation by a total detachment from all intellectual propensities. Thus it is neither idealism nor realism from any restricted point of view. In the words of Dignāga, positively, the real is efficient (*arthakāriyakārin*) and negatively, the real is non-ideal (*nirvikalpaka*). It corresponds to pure sensation alone (*satta mātram*) as distinguished from pure reason (*śuddha kalpanā*) or imagination. From a detached standpoint, one can describe the transcendent experience as of a *pure object*, because, it is unique, absolutely dissimilar, it has no extension in space, or duration in time; it is a point-instant (*kṣana* or *svalakṣana*) of reality; it is infinitesimal time, the *differential* in the running existence of a thing—individual, ultimately simple, pure existence (*sattā mātram*), pure reality (*vastu mātram*), the own essence (*svalakṣaṇa*) of the thing—particular (*vyakti*) and efficient (*arthakriyākārin*). It stimulates the understanding to construct images and ideas (*vikalpa-utpatti-sāktimat*) but by itself it is transcendental (*atyanta-parokṣa* or *nirvikalpaka*) and unutterable (*anirvacanīya*).¹¹ When com-

11. Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. Part I-II, specially pp. 181.

pared with the empirical order of experience it is *nothing*, but really it is the basis of all empirical experience. It is difficult, however, to form any definite idea of the empirical experience from this disciplined standpoint.¹² The experience as referred to is transcendental and is opposed to all ideality, generality, and ideational construction (*parakalpita*). The pure reality of the moment is unutterable—a reflex whose scope is strictly limited to the objective reality of *one* moment, hence susceptible neither of conceptual determination nor of linguistic expression; it is not a vacuity but a productive experience in so far as it produces a sensation which is followed by a vivid image (*sputa pratibhāsa*) as distinguished from the vague image (*asputa-pratibhāsa*), which is produced in memory by the thought-process of an object or by the name in speech.¹³ The vivid image as referred to in the case of the momentary experience is *before* the operation of conceptual thought or productive imagination. According to Dharmakīrti, the vivid image is only an *impression* of the moment of experience—the cause *stimulating* the intellect; it is not really an image because image is not efficiency. When expressed in concrete terms, say, of the experience of *fire*, what is implied is not the *flaming object* of a definite shape or extension, but merely the moment of *caloric energy* (*ausnyam-evaagniḥ*), the rest is imagination. Similarly, the *jar* is not the extended body having definite colour or shape, but the efficient moment represented in the *fact of pouring water*, the rest is imagination.¹⁴ The external reality is the *force* which stimulates imagination, but not the extended body, stuff or matter; it is *energy alone*; our *image* is only the *effect* of the *efficient reality*. Thus the reality is dynamic (*sattava vyīprtiḥ*);¹⁵ all elements of the world are forces; the forces are the unique points of efficiency-particulars; the reality refers only to a 'pure sensation', stimulating the intellect to construct an image, but it is not that constructed image. This affirmed reality is only *existentiality itself*, it

12. *Ibid.*, Vol I pp 184-5.

13. *Ibid.*, pp 186-90

14. *Ibid.*, pp 189-90

15. *Ibid.*, p 190.

cannot be expressed as *it is*, for that would be repetition, nor can it be expressed as *it is not*, for that would be *contradiction*.¹⁶ As in this judgment, there is a reference to a sensible point, it is not the purely imaginary experience of a 'sky flower'; it is also distinguished from the illusory and hallucinatory experiences which have only some basis in experience. To Dignāga, the existential judgment is not a deduction from a sensuous experience or from a concept; it is the *core* of sensuous experience, and has *existence* before there is any glimmering of intellectual activity. It is an *external object* in the sense of *efficiency* only; it is the *first flash* of sensation and the *point* where the subject and the object coalesce, hence, it is the *absolute experience*.¹⁷ As already mentioned, it can be distinguished from the constructed intellectual experience.

When summarised, Dignāga's transcendent experience is of a *pure efficiency of sensation*, which is the *bare particular*, the *point*, the unique, unrelated, dynamic, non-extended, non-enduring experience yet *stimulating* the intellect for the production of a corresponding image or imparting vividness to an image, and constituting an assertive force of a judgment.¹⁸ Even when the intellect is stimulated, the suggestion is not for *construction*, for, the immediate sensation is *detached and unemployed*.¹⁹ It suggests an *externality*, which can be contrasted with the Upaniṣadic standpoint of reality as an inner self-shining experience, or Self. In Dignāga, the emphasis is on a *core* or experience, the *intensity* or *efficiency* of a sensible experience; it cannot be empirically cognised; it is not a *predicate* or a *category*, but a *common subject* of all predication. In Dharmakīrti's words, 'it is the external thing as it is *strictly in itself*, shorn of all relations. The corresponding internal thing is *pure sensation*, shorn of all construction (*nirvikalpaka*).'²⁰ 'The pure object

16. *Ibid.*, p. 193.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

19. *Ibid.*, pp. 198-9.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 202, according to Tucci (*On Some Aspects... and Asanga*, pp. 61-2), 'it was somewhat difficult to insert the *pratyakṣa* doctrine in a system like Buddhism in which the reality of external

(own essence) and pure sensation are not two things existing on equal terms of reality; they refer to the ultimate basis or reality, dichotomised into 'object' and 'subject' by the same faculty of constructive imagination which is the architect of the whole empirical world and which works always by *dichotomising* or dialectic method. There is a relation between the pure sensation and the dichotomising intellect only at the *point* where the pure sensation *stimulates* it, and not in the aspect of pure dichotomising process; they are opposites. The reality of the dichotomising intellect has, therefore, to be determined always in the point of stimulation, and only in that aspect some truth can be discerned. Dignāga tries to maintain this element of truth throughout his discussion of the relation between the pure sensation and dichotomising intellect. His is not a discussion in the exclusive aspect of dichotomisation, which fosters either false idealism or false realism. The forms, idealism and realism, are mental constructions, and hence they are to be discouraged in all genuine modes of logical reflection. Dignāga is against the realistic logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, and also against the idealistic evolutionary standpoint of the Sāṃkhya, prevalent during his time. Dignāga points out that if the presented empirical universe is nothing but the expression of the dichotomising intellect, then there are only infinite divisions, and as such, there cannot be any unsplit units as *atoms* as held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. Again, to think of the presented universe as aggregates of atoms, is a construction of a 'second moon'. The Sāṃkhya notion of evolution of the unconscious Prakṛti due to the operation of the three different qualitative processes, lacking any stimulating experiential principle—is, according to Dignāga, vapid and unmeaning.²¹ Hence, criticising these two above modes of reflection, Dignāga presents before us two aspects of

things is not admitted, but in which we have, at least as it appears. . . a series of internal and external moments running parallel. So that the perception of a thing is nothing else than the particular internal *vyñāna* corresponding to a single *rūpa-ayātana*.'

21. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 19-20, 24-5, 48-52, 79-83, 96-8, 261-7.

experiential fields, viz., (i) the *point* of pure sensation stimulating the intellectual process, and (ii) the intellectual process. The first is the sphere of *existential judgment*, a field of continuous reference, and the second is the field of intellectual activity in its varied aspects of *perceptual judgments*, *inferential judgments*, *negative judgments* and *judgments expressing otherness*. It should be mentioned that though the two spheres are placed wide apart, viz., one as constituting the Reality, and the other as the Appearance (the apparent universe), there is always a kind of reciprocity, this reciprocity has to be understood with a discipline. Hence the following reflections are given as a *discipline* and also to account for the realistic character of the presented universe. The presented universe which can be understood in terms of perceptual judgments, inferential judgments and negative judgments (excluding other judgments which are derivatives from these primary judgments), is a dynamic view of the universe,²² and its realistic tone can be com-

22 *Ibid.*, p 221, Sharma (in his *Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedānta*, Nand Kishore and Bros., 1952, pp 80-116, 155-170) perhaps misrepresents Dignāga's reference to the experience of the *point* in pure sensation as an experience of momentariness, and he thinks that Dignāga advocates a doctrine of momentariness. In Dignāga, however, there is no *doctrine* or thought-construction, but only an indication to a *point* of intense experience which one has to understand or entertain. From that experiential stand, one will discern that reality is found only in that efficient point, the moment one leaves that point and starts reflecting, one falls into the clutches of intellectualisation, but, that also can be checked if one's attention is always on the dynamic basis, the *point of pure sensation*. On this basis of the stimulating point, which is efficiency itself, Dignāga's reflection of *perceptual judgment* in relation to *inferential* and other judgments, takes place. Sharma swiftly passes from Dignāga's analysis of perceptual experience to *inference* (p 80), he, therefore, misses the essential link between the pure point of existence or efficiency and perceptual judgment, and between perceptual judgment and inferential judgment, his reflection, therefore, seems to be very sweeping, for this reason, in spite of his lucid exposition of Dignāga's criticism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and other standpoints, one will not find the strain of *realism* that can be discerned in Dignāga's *translogical* mode of reflection, which is not

pared in many aspects with the advanced thought-processes of Peirce and Whitehead of the contemporary west Dignāga's position is a kind of realism and evolutionism by a criticism of the realism of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas, specially of their formal and static seven-fold method of classification of the universe as *substance, qualities, actions, universals, particulars, inherence and absence*. Dignāga suggests a five-fold scheme of arrangement (*pancha-vidha-kalpanā*) of the presented universe. These dynamic modes of Dignāga are the proper names (e. g., Ditthi), classes (e. g., cow), qualities (e. g., white), motions (e. g., he cooks) and substances (e. g., stick possessor). All these processes, to Dignāga, are not things but *names only* (*svasiddhaiva kevala kalpanā nāma vikalpa*).²³ Dignāga interprets the perceptual judgments always in relation to the *existential judgments*. The jar, for example, in perceptual situation, as a *point* of pure sensation, is only an efficient moment representing the fact of pouring water, and in the aspect of its image, it is variously interpreted as having a shape, colour etc. In this judging aspect, a *dual-process* is involved, viz., a *process of analysis* or differentiation, and a *process of synthesis*. In the first aspect, the movement of thought is from the *point* of pure sensation to the *images*, from unity to plurality; it is a kind of dispersion of rays from a focal point. In the second aspect, the movement of thought is in a reverse direction, from the images to the *point* of pure sensation—a return of the rays back to their sources, to the focal point. Judgment in these dual aspects, is a continuous process

akin to any western subjectivism or idealism. If Dignāga's stand is rightly understood, it will be seen that it is very difficult to criticise him from Śāṅkara's *advaita* standpoint. One has, however, a liberty to re-interpret Śāṅkara's standpoint in relation to Dignāga's realistic interpretation of perceptual experience, and draw attention to the specifically important aspects of Śāṅkara's realism in a translogical background. In this paper an attempt has been made to relate the realistic suggestions of Dignāga with the realistic suggestions of Śāṅkara, they are undoubtedly two eminent thinkers supporting two dominant Indian thought-processes. They actually meet in many points though the conventionalists might not agree.

23. Stcherbatsky *Buddhist Logic*, Vol I, pp. 217-8.

of establishing identity or similarity between apparently dissimilar aspects.²⁴ It is a process of projection and a return to the original condition. Dharmottara, a later commentator of Dignāga, says that to judge means to deal with one's internal reflex, which is not external object, in the conviction that it is external object. This identification is neither grasping of an external object by its image, nor a converting of an image into an external object, nor is it a real uniting of two things, nor a real imputation, or placing one thing in the place of another one. It is our illusion, a wrong imputation (*alika eva*).²⁵ This stress on some form of idealism in one aspect of Dignāga's thought (though he adheres to the stimulating point of reality) can be contrasted with the thoroughly realistic attitude of Saṅkara and his followers—all of the *advaita* school of Vedānta; their realistic attitude is found in the discovery of the function of *antaḥkaraṇa* (not the same as the intellectual function of Dignāga but more than that), which can be posited as the sensible core of experience even in the deep-sleep state when the intellectual function in the subjective-objective mode ceases,²⁶ *antaḥkaraṇa* is also operative as a similar core of sensibility in the other orders of experience, viz., the dream and the waking.²⁷

24. *Ibid*, p. 220

25. *Ibid*, p. 221.

26. and 27. Datta (in his *The Six Ways of Knowing*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1932) clarifies the notion and function of the *antaḥkaraṇa*, according to the *advaita* school of Vedānta, thus, viz., *Antaḥkaraṇa* '... is but a mode of *ajñāna*, and *ajñāna* is directly revealed to the self in dreamless sleep and even in waking life in our experiences of general ignorance' (p. 52). He states further regarding *antaḥkaraṇa* as '... but the subject in its objective attitude—the lapse of the atman from undifferentiated experience into the sinful duality seeking an 'other'. It marks, therefore, the transition of consciousness from pure subjectivity towards objectivity. It serves as a mediating principle through which the subject knows the object.' (p. 69). Datta concludes by saying that 'the *antaḥkaraṇa* can thus be regarded only as a factor in the modification of the already existing consciousness, and not as an instrument in the generation of knowledge.' (p. 58). If all these modes of reflection in connection with *antaḥkaraṇa*, are taken

Its varied functions, viz., the grasping of an external object or assuming its shape in the act of perceptual experience, are nothing but realistic modes of interpreting perceptual experience up to a point, without clashing with the ever-shining principle of consciousness of the advaitins.²⁸ Datta defends the Vedāntic standpoint in his *The Six Ways of Knowing*,²⁹ in the background of the past and present, Indian and Western thought, without imposing any of his views, revealing his pristine humility which is so characteristic of his nature. If one goes deep into Dignāga's thought one will not fail to mark a kind of realism behind his final idealistic stand. This realism is nominalistic in Dignāga's special sense, and can be contrasted from Saṅkara's new realistic standpoint.

The realistic element in Dignāga's reflection becomes clear when he tries to show that the *perceptual judgment* is a link between the reality reflected in pure sensation and the images constructed by the intellect.³⁰ It is really an actual *intellectualising process* (somewhat akin to the process and function of *antaḥkarana*) and not a mere glimmering of intellection due to the stimulation of the point of pure sensation. As Dignāga says : "As soon as our intellectual eye begins to glimmer, our thought is already beset with contradiction. The moment our thought has stopped running and has fixed upon an external point, so as to be able internally to produce the judgment, say, *this is blue*, at that very moment, we have separated the universe of discourse into two equal halves, the limited part of the *blue* and the less limited part of the *non-blue*. The definite thought of the *blue* is nothing more than the definite thought of the *non-blue*. There is nothing *intermediate*".³¹ Thus,

note of, then is not Dignāga's concrete dynamic intellect, in its link with the stimulating point of pure sensation, the same mediating principle of *antaḥkarana* of the *advaita-Vedantins* ?

28. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, pp 69, 88-9

29. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

30. Stcherbatsky . *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 225, 238. According to Dignāga, *contradiction* is not *confusion*, but a *direct* and *positive* experience.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 400.

to Dignāga, to think actively is to think *dichotomisingly*. The terms, construction (*kalpanā* or *ekikaraṇa*) and dichotomising (*vikalpa* or *daidhikaraṇa*), in their application to thought, are synonymous; they embrace every act of consciousness. To Dignāga the terms, conception, image, representation, presentation, judgment, in one aspect, express constructive imagination, and in another aspect, indicate *dichotomising*.³² So what is fundamental to thinking is not *forming ideas* by observing *similarity* or *identity*, but it is a process of *dividing* or *separating* (*sarvam pṛthak*).³³ What is true in intellection is *division* and not pointed observation. As Dharmakīrti says, 'everything when imagined or intellectualised, presents itself in couples of two parts, of which one is the complete negation of the other.'³⁴ Śāntarakṣita³⁵ expresses the same thing in a different language, viz., there is on the one part not the slightest bit of what is in the other part. In other words, the bifurcation is complete in two halves. Therefore, what is operative in any intellectual activity, is the *law of contradiction*, which *excludes* the middle or the third part (*trītya-prakāra abhāva*); it is also called the *law of double negation* of the other part just in the same degree in which the latter is the negation of the former. In other words, the relation of negation is reciprocal. The *perceptual judgment*, therefore, is not a pure intellection but a positive *outspeaking*—a *decision* to express experience in an aspect, *separating* it from its opposite, and, in this function, it is a *complete* process of experience. Its apparent dissection of reality into two halves, giving equal importance to both the aspects, shows that it is a kind of evaluative process of selection and elimination for some practical purposes, and not a *dissection* to destroy its inner core, as a twentieth century western thinker Bergson supposes. An intellectual function, therefore, can be fostered and developed in this aspect, when the *division* is associated with the entire aspect of reality. The initial observation made with regard to *perceptual judgment*

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 400-1.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 402.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 403.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 403-4.

(i) as the *analysis* (the differentiation of the process from the point to the image) or (ii) as *synthesis* (the return from the image to the point) has to be modified by its selective-eliminative-purposive function just now brought out. This gives the judging-process, not a continuous serial or linear movement, but a complex activity of selection and elimination, a positive division of experiential field in various interconnected orders. The positive assertion in perceptual judgment, thus involves the operation of a *division* or a *general negation* of a concrete experiential situation.³⁶ Judgment, therefore, is not a mechanical, regular or spontaneous process, as can be viewed in the formal reflections of Aristotle (389-322 B. C.), the eminent Greek philosopher who dominated western thought till Hegel (1770-1831); Hegel, in turn, introduced an ideal dialectic or the operation of negation, having no concern with the concrete presented sensible situation, and so he missed the stimulating basis or point of pure sensation.

The realism of Dignāga does not lie in a formal analysis of a perceptual situation, but a practical *facing* of a presented universe; it is dealing with it for the realisation of some practical goal in such activity, viz., success or failure in life. Thus to Dignāga, the intellectual function as expressed in perceptual judgment, is not accepting a presentation merely, but *selecting* it by actively eliminating it from its opposite or from other aspects which oppose it in some ways. Here Dignāga refers to the character of general negation and also to such characters which are in some way opposed to the presented perceptual experience. The character of *otherness* as implied in all perceptual situation in contrast to what is positively presented, can be illustrated in the case of perceptual experience between the *blue* and the *yellow*; the *yellow* is opposed to the *blue* not exactly as its opposite *non-blue*, but it is an opposite indirectly, in the sense that it is a kind of *non-blue*; it cannot escape from being *non-blue* or it is one of such other characters which must be placed in the aspect of the *non-blue*. The experience of the *yellow* as a variety of the *non-blue*, has to be distinguished from the experience of the *non-blue*,

36. *Ibid*, pp. 403-9.

which is a general negative or opposed character associated with all perceptual experience. Drawing attention to the general character of negation and also to such characters implying *otherness*, involved in all perceptual activity, Dignāga directs a special attention to the *negative judgments* and the *judgments implying otherness*, as quite independent kinds of judgments standing on par with the actual perceptual judgments.³⁷ Here in the case of such *negative judgments* and *judgments implying otherness*, the reference is not to the basic general character of *negation* or *otherness* operative behind perceptual judgment, but to such concrete situations where the judgments themselves are definitely of a negative sort or of the types implying judgments of *otherness*. This is illustrated in a sort of a parallel way by examples as follows : 'Just as we arrive at the negative judgment, viz., *there is no jar on this place* after hypothetically imagining its presence on this place and after having repudiated that suggestion, just so do we decide that the *blue is not yellow*, after having hypothetically assumed the presence of the *blue* on the yellow patch and having repelled that imagined presence.'³⁸

In brief, the function of judgment is a positive effort to utter, to decide, to infer and to see whether some suggestions, in terms of *negation* or by way of *otherness*, fit in with the point of pure sensation. The negative judgments and the judgments implying otherness, are the baffled suggestions which cannot be fitted into the point of pure sensation.

The perceptual judgment is directly referred to the point of pure sensation, and it has to be distinguished from the *inferential judgment*, which is a cognition of a point of reality in pure sensation, by a *mark* or *symbol*. If, in the perceptual judgment, one grasps the particular (fire) and constructs the symbol, in the inferential judgment, one marks the symbol (smoke) and grasps the particular (fire). In inferential judgment, the *fire* is imagined by the percep-

37 *Ibid.*, pp. 365-84, 408-413.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 409, vide, in this connection Datta's analysis of the *advaita*-notion of non-cognition (*anupalabdhi*) in *The Six Ways of Knowing*, specially, pp. 180-94

tion of the *smoke*. Hence, inferential judgment is not an argument from a proposition, or a deduction of conclusion from two propositions taken together, but a direct inquiry into a point of reality and a determination of that reality by way of identity or causality.³⁹

If all these complex thought-processes from the perceptual judgments to the inferential judgments, through the intermediaries of negative judgments and judgments implying otherness, are observed, then it will be seen that Dignāga is trying to establish a realistic logic on the basis of a stimulating point of pure sensation, refuting the view of the voidness of logic as sponsored by the four schools of Buddhism. This realistic logic with a background in a translogical experience, is a complete ousting of the so-called realistic logic of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. It is the preparation of a ground of realistic logic with a translogical basis of the advaita-Vedānta of Saṅkara and his followers and of the Neo-Vedāntic thinkers of present-day India. From Saṅkara to the Neo-Vedāntins, however, there is a change in the determination of the translogical aspect of experience.⁴⁰

Along with Dignāga's realistic logic or realistic interpretation of the intellectual activity, one can find in Dignāga, a novel theory of language, names and sounds. From the above discourse we know that the intellectual activity is a kind of *outspeaking*, an effort to utter, while its stimulating background is *unutterable*. The intellectual activity and utterability are inextricably bound together. The intellectual activity and language, therefore, are on the same line;⁴¹ they are stimulated by the *point* of pure sensation, but they cannot touch the *point* or reality, which is only *existential* and *non-predicable*; both,

39. Stcherbatsky . *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. Chs. II-III. In the case of the inference of the *tree* from the mark, *śimśapa*, the identity between *śimśapa* and *tree*, is determined, and in the case of the inference of the *fire* from the mark, *smoke*, the causal basis of *smoke* in the *fire*, is determined.

40. For details vide *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. by Radhakrishnan Murhead (George Allen and Unwin Ltd , 1952).

41. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. pp. 458-9.

however, *echo* the reality.⁴² Thus, there should be no illusion about the place and function of either conceptualisation or its expression in terms of language. Dignāga not only influenced the Advaita-Vedāntic logic but also influenced its theory of names, language and sounds. It was Advaita-Vedānta, which in subsequent Indian thought revolted against the Mīmāṃsā theory of names and sounds as ultimate characters. One may study in this connection Datta's analysis of the Advaita Vedānta theory of language and can see how far its revolt against the Mīmāṃsā theory of language,⁴³ is a carrying forward of the realistic theory of language initiated by Dignāga and developed by his illustrious disciples, Dharmakīrti, Sāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. If one studies Dignāga's view of concepts and language in the context of his realistic logic, one can understand the superficiality of some of the contemporary western linguistic philosophers who find sole reality in some kind of linguistic expressions totally missing their trans-logical experiential background.⁴⁴

With sufficient restraint and discipline, one can understand Dignāga's nominalism (*vastu-śūnya-prajñapti-vāda*), conceptualism (*vikalpavāsanā-vāda*), his theory of conformity (*sārupyā-vāda*), dynamical theory (*śakti-vāda*), and his dialectical theory (*apoha-vāda*);⁴⁵ they cannot be associated with idealistic standpoint of any western variety. Sharma's⁴⁶ suggestion to interpret Dignāga from an idealistic standpoint of the west, is denounced in this paper. This paper interprets Dignāga and his Yogācāra masters as *transcendentalists*. They continue the Indian tradition of transcendental experience which begins with the Vedas and the Upaniṣads. The speciality of Dignāga lies in introducing a realistic logic in a transcendental background. From

42. *Ibid.*, p. 458.

43. *The Six Ways of Knowing*, Book VI, specially pp. 296-307, 323-7, 334-41 for the Advaita interpretation of Language.

44. Carnap . *The Unity of Science*, Kegan Paul, 1934, and also Ayer *The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge* (Macmillan and Co. Ltd., 1947) and *The Problem of Knowledge* (Pclican Book Ltd , 1956).

45. Stcherbatsky . *Buddhist Logic*, Vol. I. P 445.

46. *Dialectic in Buddhism and Vedanta*, pp. 159-70.

Dignāga's standpoint, there is no longer any force in the formalistic logic of Aristotle and the ideal dialectic of Hegel. He can be placed on par with such realistic thinkers of the present-day west as Peirce, Whitehead and Price (1899), who have detached themselves, not only from the idealistic thought, but also from the positivistic mode of realistic reflections of the west. Only a casual reference to the analysis of perceptual situation by perceptual judgments can be made to show how close Dignāga is to these contemporary thinkers of the west. According to Price, perceptual consciousness is more *negative* than positive. The initial stage of perceptual acceptance is 'not an intuitive apprehension, not inference, not opinion or belief, its object does not necessarily *exist*, it is undoubting and unquestioning and inattentive to the difference between the sense-datum and material thing. . . .'⁴⁷ The subsequent stage of perceptual consciousness, according to Price, is a series of perceptual acts to be progressively confirmed. It is a stage of settled conviction, above the level of doubting and questioning.⁴⁸ Who does not find here an echo of Dignāga? To Peirce, the perceptual experience does not present a positive *sensum*, but a series of general characters with urges in different orders. Whitehead utters the same when he draws attention to such general characters as *eternal objects*, *God* and *creativity*, behind the perishing and changing features of the universe. The intellectual activity, according to Whitehead, left to itself, is a selective-restrictive process; it is a process of abridgment and even of distortion; its apparent clarity is a setting aside of the pervasive aspects of experience that envelop it and operate upon it. Whitehead, like Dignāga, often draws attention to the deep non-sensuous feeling-experience which stimulates and controls the presented universe. Only by penetrative understanding—*wisdom* or *peace*—and not by emergent restricted intellectual activity, can one understand the varying orders of the changing universe.⁴⁹

47. *Perception* (Methuen and Co Ltd., Second Edition, 1950), p 170

48 *Ibid*, p 172

49 For general ideas on Whitehead's philosophy, vide his *Process*

In Dignāga and the aforesaid contemporary western thinkers there is a complete realistic-nominalistic tendency.

If philosophy is a disciplined reflection, one should not ignore Dignāga merely because he is a past thinker, but must utilise the fundamentals of his reflections in interpreting not only the posterior thought-processes of India, but also the dominant reflective activities of the contemporary west.⁵⁰ In these days of research and scholarship, when more and more of Dignāga's works are being discovered from the Tibetan and the Chinese sources, one should patiently wait to determine the exact position of Dignāga in the background of contemporary Indian and far-eastern thought.⁵¹ Rahul Sankrityayana, in his preface to his commentary on Dharmakīrti's *Parmāṇavārtikam*, considers Dharmakīrti as the 'central figure round whom all the creative minds of India revolved',⁵² but one must bear in mind that the germs of his reflections can be traced to his master—Dignāga.

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and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1929) and *Adventures of Ideas* (Cambridge University Press, 1933).

50. Tucci . *On Some Aspects . . . and Asaṅga*, p. 36.

51. Suzuki . *An Introduction to Zen Buddhism* (Rider and Co. 1948).

52. Kitab Mahal, 1943 Preface, p. II.

RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY IN AMERICA

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

When the Massachusetts Puritan theocrat, Cotton Mather, wanted to ridicule the neighboring colony where religious toleration was being practised, he wrote: "If anyone has lost his religion, he can find it in Rhode Island." It is now true of America as a whole that all kinds of religions flourish there in peace, and many of them in oblivion. The New England Puritans themselves split into several factions which, when they were unable to crush each other, were compelled to tolerate each other -- Universalists, Unitarians, New Lights, Old Lights, Hopkingsians, Presbyterians; they all made their peace even while the issues which separated them were still burning. Now, of course, most of their descendants are unaware that their "fathers" ever held warring faiths. The Quakers, whom the Puritans despised, since they persisted in insulting Puritan worship and doctrines, began to live peacefully with their neighbors in America even before the laws of the land gave them legal protection. And they in turn split into minority groups such as the Shakers, who live celebrate in exclusive communities, and the Hicksites or Liberal Quakers, who tolerate almost any creed among them.

In addition to these groups, most of which America inherited from England, there came an even more bewildering variety of Germans, persecuting and persecuted groups, whom the religious wars of Europe had persuaded that they could live only in a New World where they could separate, with ample distances between them. There came Mennonites, Dunkers, Moravians, Amish, Ephrata monastics, Amana communists, and so many varieties of Reformed and Lutheran churches that they themselves lost count. Though these Germans lived apart and widely scattered for a short time, they soon found themselves to be neighbors with common enemies. As early as the days of Benjamin Franklin there was an effort in

Philadelphia on the part of many of these German sects to bury their differences and to build a federation of churches. Time proved that these sects prospered more through peaceful and neighborly independence than they could have through an artificial federation.

It would be idle to mention the other religious minorities which Europe drove, many in desperation, to the American shores, and which have become accustomed to live there as fellow citizens in spite of religious barriers. But it is well to notice in passing not only that even those groups which in Colonial times were so small as to cause little trouble in spite of the fact that they were not tolerated—"Catholics, Jews and Infidels," to use the common Colonial phrase—have become important and highly respected citizens, but also that these groups, too, in the communities where they chance to be majority groups, have in turn learned to respect the Protestant groups who formerly persecuted them. The American experience has proved conclusively that religious wars are unnecessary and criminal.

It was not until the last quarter of the nineteenth century that Asian religious groups invaded America in considerable numbers, but here again the American environment almost unconsciously produced the same religious freedom that had grown up among the European sects in this country. In some ways religious toleration was easier to achieve for Asian groups because so many of them, unlike the belligerent Europeans, were accustomed by tradition and doctrine to toleration. Christians learned, though reluctantly, that the very "heathen" whom Christian missionaries were supposed to convert in the Orient, did not need conversion when they came to America! In the chief American seaports the Muslims built mosques and the Buddhists erected their temples. In 1875, the American Theosophical Society was founded and dedicated itself to the task of making available to men of all nations and religions the "wisdom of the Mahatmas." In the decades that followed, a number of pandits, Buddhists, Vedantists, representatives of the Brahmo-Samaj and the Arya-Samaj, and other Oriental scholars lectured on the principal Hindû traditions and

made possible for Americans a better understanding of what Oriental religions really are. Under the leadership primarily of Orientalists, a notable World Parliament of Religions was held during the Chicago World's Fair of 1893 which had an enduring influence on religious thought and which contributed much toward transforming the traditional attitude of suspicious tolerance into a positive cultivation of reciprocal understanding and sympathy. In general, the bringing together in America of so many different groups from all parts of the world has proved to be an experiment of large significance for all cultures and for all religions; it has become a settled fact or tradition of American life that fellow citizens need not share their religious beliefs any more than fellow believers need be citizens of the same state. The practice of religious peace and political co-operation has far outrun the theory.

Some attention should be given to those religious movements that are of American origin and that have added still further to the varieties of religious experience prevalent in the United States. It is instructive to note, first of all, the fate of those groups whose aim it was to escape the secular institutions of American life and the mixture of creeds, in order to cultivate their own exclusive religious communions and communities. The Utopian and religious socialists (Fourierists, Owenites, Rappites, etc.) reflected the "escape mechanisms" of Europe and flourished in America precisely to the extent that they mingled with other Americans and participated in the more general movements of social criticism; and they failed when they segregated themselves to live in "purity" and isolation. The Mormons, too, who most clearly represent an American religious adventure, and who carried the experiment of religious exclusiveness further than any other group, have been at last compelled to scatter themselves and to admit foreigners or "gentiles" into their State of Utah. They finally came to see, as did the Reform Jews when they felt emancipation a century ago, that the "scattering abroad" of their people, their communities, and their faith was not divine punishment but providence. The Spiritualists, Swedenborgians, Adventists, House of David, Dowie-ites, and other American

groups with special revelations have all abandoned, often after bitter experience, their attempts to live in seclusion, and have survived as "minor sects" when they failed as holy commonwealths.

There are several American religious bodies, however, which have from the beginning chosen to operate with and among other religions. Theosophy, Christian Science, Unity, and New Thought are significant, though relatively small, groups in American religion because they have acted as a leaven, stimulating the thoughts and aspirations of many *individuals* without disrupting their normal social ties, and even in some cases, without disturbing their other religious affiliations.

In short, religious incompatibilities are greatly exaggerated. Americans inherited the belief that differences must lead to separations. It was through several centuries of democratic discipline that they discovered that religious differentiation need not bring political and moral division. It was more than a sense of humor and less than a theological doctrine that induced the many devotees to say to each other, half in earnest, half in sympathy, "We are all doing the Lord's work, you in your way and I in His."

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THE NATURE OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

RICHARD V. DE SMET

The philosopher of *The Six Ways of Knowing* will not despise a study of the relationship between philosophy and Christian Revelation, especially from one who is aware that he owes him much and is related to him by solid bonds of admiring esteem and sincere affection.

The problem of Christian philosophy was faced and solved in various practical and theoretical ways by the Christian thinkers of the first nineteen centuries after Christ. It became explicit again and promptly claimed the attention of European philosophers after the three lectures delivered in Brussels by Prof. Emile Bréhier in 1928. Prof. Bréhier, a non-Christian rationalist, had entitled his lectures : "Is There a Christian Philosophy?" His answer was that there is not. Prof. Etienne Gilson took up the challenge and soon opened a discussion in the *Société Française de Philosophie* on March 21st, 1931. This debate has become famous and the years that followed have seen the publication of hundreds of articles and a few scores of books on the subject.

It is generally agreed nowadays that the phrase "Christian philosophy" has a definite and useful meaning which is not merely historical or geographical, that the doctrines it designates are truly philosophies (i.e., rational enquiries concerning beings as beings) and not theologies, that it is not sufficient for a doctrine to have a Christian as its author to deserve that label, but that this attribution should be warranted by some intrinsic characteristics which internally relate a particular philosophy to the Judeo-Christian revelation and the distinction between the natural and the supernatural order which it entails.

There are two levels of such characteristics and consequently two principal interpretations of the notion of "Christian philosophy". First, a philosophy may be constituted autonomously, yet under the indirect but avowed influence of Christianity. The latter then provides

suggestions, conceptions, working hypotheses, standpoints and values. It orientates and guides, marking out problems and suggesting solutions. All this may be received uncritically, but a philosopher who is aware of the autonomy of his own discipline as well as of the reality of that influence upon his thinking will not fail to subject it to the critical exigencies of philosophical knowledge. Faith as such will not be a determining factor in his arguments and final statements.

Thus, for instance, St. Thomas Aquinas, being a Christian, did naturally enquire about the possibility of proving the existence of God, but, being at the same time a very critical philosopher, he rejected outright as fallacious the ontological argument of his predecessor, St. Anselm. Again, he inherited from his faith the doctrine of creation which had remained foreign to Aristotle, but he explained away the anthropomorphism of the potter-God and great Artisan of *Genesis* and conceived creation as the total, existential dependence of creatures upon their transcendent and immanent Cause. Yahweh's utterance in *Exodus*: "I am who am," guided his meditation upon being. Under its influence he developed a radically new metaphysics of existence in which the inner "act" of existing took pre-eminence over the essence or *ousia* of the Greeks, beyond which the great St. Augustine himself had not penetrated. Similarly, he was guided by Christianity in his elaboration of the concepts of "person" and "relation" but, here also, the authority of his predecessors did not prevent him from thoroughly criticising their teachings.

This outstanding example shows that a philosophy can be Christian due to the influence it accepts, yet remain pure, autonomous philosophy. This sort of dependence does not destroy philosophical autonomy but rather strengthens it. It also shows that Christian faith can in that way help to improve the natural activity of reason and incite it to depths of thinking which, left to itself, it might not have cared to reach.

However, this first interpretation simply ranges the term "Christian philosophy" side by side with parallel appellations, such as "Islamic" and "Indian philosophy". In Islam also philosophers have depended on their religious

convictions in their reflections without mixing up faith and philosophy. In India, the case is different. *Srutivada* is a testimonial science. It receives the word of *Sruti* as the supreme and infallible authority which rational reflection (*manana*) can only confirm and defend till it is directly realised at the end of peaceful contemplation (*nididhyasana*). Though its subject-matter is philosophical and it makes full use of reason, it is not autonomous philosophy but is rather akin to Islamic and Christian theologies. Yet, there are other *darśanas* which were developed against the background of religious Hinduism and are notwithstanding purely rational in their argument.

The second interpretation is more important because it goes beyond the mere consideration of influences which was the standpoint of the first. It upholds that a philosophy is Christian if it proclaims the insufficiency of pure reason to resolve the whole problem of man and reality. Thus it discerns and in some sense marks out the possibility of a supernatural order of divine Revelation and self-gift, which would secure the aim of philosophy but for which philosophy itself cannot substitute.

This conception of Christian philosophy applies, and applies exclusively, to any philosophy which tends of itself to indicate its relationship to a supernatural order which it desires. But such a philosophy does not thereby become confused with the theology of revelation which could only be its distinct complement. This recognition on the part of philosophy is the preliminary condition of all conceptual developments which could be considered as philosophical and as Christian at the same time. Let us now see how this conception is arrived at.

The scope of philosophy is unlimited. The aim it desires is perfect truth concerning all realities as beings. It is not content, as the positive sciences are, to explain the varieties of the development of realities. It questions their very existence; it desires to know their existential root; or, in Aristotle's terms, it endeavours to know them through their ultimate causes. It is convinced that so long as the Absolute is not reached, explanation is incomplete, and that if the beings we experience directly are not absolute and ultimate, they can never be known

properly apart from the Absolute they presuppose. It thus approaches the Absolute from the side of that relation of existential dependence which links beings to their Source. The knowledge it attains of that Absolute is relational and negative. But what that negative knowledge marks out can only be Fulness of Existence, Knowledge, Bliss, Power and Love. It is Fulness known through hollowness, Plenitude indicated by dependence and want.

This is a great philosophical achievement, but the desire of philosophy goes beyond it. It knows the difference between abstract knowledge and intuition, relational indication and direct experience, distant gaze and embracing grasp. It is therefore naturally directed by its own intention towards a direct apprehension of the divine Reality and thereby of all realities in It.

But it now faces divergent paths: the path of direct conquest, the path of humble expectation of a divine self-surrender, even the path of "reasonable" suppression of an impossible desire.

Indeed, to take up first the third alternative, the philosopher can say that he has now reached the limit of his own power of penetration into the mystery of reality and that, renouncing any dream of a possible intuition of the supreme Cause, he should be content to explore further the realm of accessible knowledge which his first efforts have delimited. This sort of moderate self-restraint was familiar to the Greek philosophers.

But the path of direct conquest holds a greater attraction and the possibility of its leading to the desirable goal should be carefully examined. It has already been ascertained that God, the Absolute, is omnipresent as the creative Cause and internal Ruler of all. He sustains all being and all life and is never far away from anyone of us. Should we then not say that the intimate union with Him which we desire is already realised from our very beginning and that we should simply put an end to our ignorance by becoming aware of this realised fact? Would that not be possible by a sort of perfect *en-stasis*, which would simply continue the regression towards the centre of our being and attain the Absolute through the related, just as

by climbing up through the valley of a stream we may reach the lake that feeds it? A direct realisation, some sort of intuition may very well be the terminal point of that retrogression performed entirely through the sole power of our intellect, aided perhaps by some suitable technique of *yoga* or acquired mysticism.

One has recognised here the characteristic feature of the philosophies of the Plotinian or Vedānta type. Yet the very fact that Plotinus speaks of *ec-stasis* rather than *en-stasis*, and that Śāṅkara considers it exceptional that one could succeed in this without the guidance of a *guru* expert in *Sruti*, should guard us from believing too easily that such an achievement lies simply within the reach of a determined man. Even this sort of mysticism appears to be a gift of some sort, and it may therefore not be a matter of mere conquest.

But a more important restriction has now to be made. Without denying the possibility and the high value of this "natural mysticism", the exacting philosopher should refuse to identify it with the highest goal he pursues. Let us remember that this should be a perfect intuition of the very nature of God, the Absolute. Is it possible that God should be, like a lifeless thing, investigable to man at will? Should we not say that the intimacy, the mystery, which characterise even the human person, are surely to be found in Him in the most eminent degree? How could God be within the reach of any sort of conquest when even the personality of a child remains hidden and inaccessible to our grasp unless he freely reveals himself to those he loves. No knowledge from outside can substitute for self-communication. A free being can retain his own secret even though he be subjected to the worst torture. Love alone, which is a free surrender, can unfold that secret. But God cannot be anything but the very Fullness of Consciousness, Freedom and Love. No one, therefore, can enter into His mystery, unless He first freely reveals and surrenders Himself to him.

This is why the Christian philosopher, doubtless guided by his faith, but with a conviction born from merely philosophical considerations, avows at the same time the insufficiency of philosophy proper to achieve its own pur-

pose and the possibility of a complement of the surrender-through-love type, which he may humbly hope for and expect. The order in which his own powers can fully achieve their aims, he calls "natural", whereas he speaks of "supernatural order" when he considers that possible complement. The "supernatural" is "beyond nature" in the sense that it lies beyond its proper powers, rights and exigencies, but it is not above its receptive capacity. By its very nature, the intellect is open to the Fulness of reality and, though it cannot conquer its ultimate recess, it can yet penetrate into it when invited by Love in person. God can summon us to an intimate knowledge of Himself in this life and to the "beatific vision" in the next. We must here speak of invitation and summons, rather than of invasion and self-imposition, because even to give us our supreme bliss God cannot annul the freedom with which we can radically dispose of ourselves either to accept or to reject His own free gift. The supernatural order can only be an order of inter-personal relationships.

God, of course, can gain nothing by self-surrender to us. The Fulness cannot be improved and supreme Love is supremely disinterested. But we have everything to gain. This was the conviction of St. Justin, the first Greek philosopher converted to Christianity, who spent the rest of his life justifying his conversion in the eyes of his colleagues. He finally died a martyr, laying down his life for the sake of the faith he had embraced.

It is not the business of philosophy to determine whether the possibility it has discovered is in fact realised. But as a man interested in his own destiny, the philosopher who has become aware of this possibility should naturally concern himself with this question of fact. He may thus discover the credibility of the Judeo-Christian revelation and become a believer. And he may after that apply himself to the scientific elaboration of his faith, but he will then have become a theologian and no longer a mere philosopher.

The interpretation of "Christian philosophy" here presented is to my mind the most acceptable.¹ It is no

1. In his *Presidential Address* to the 1952 session of the All India

longer simply based upon a mere matter of influence, but upon an analysis of the very nature, goal, capacities and limits of the philosophical project. It respects the autonomy and characteristic nature of philosophy, yet it discovers in it an intrinsic appeal to a revealed complement which may very well have been offered to us in the life and teaching of Jesus Christ.

■ ■ ■

Philosophical Congress, Dr. D M. Datta put forth a very similar conception of philosophy :

“Philosophy tries to know reality by reasoning that obeys the laws of logic. But it should also bear in mind the limits of human knowledge and logical thought. The moral effect of such an attitude on philosophy would be humility that would prepare the mind for new and unexpected revelations of the Absolute and remove cocksureness which more than anything else stands in the way of the attainment of truth. As in religion so also in philosophy, the self, as a knower and reasoner, has to recognise its limitations and helplessness, and ultimately surrender itself to the Absolute for sharing as much of it as the Absolute chooses to reveal.”

A STUDY OF ANCIENT CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND ITS SIMILARITIES TO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

TAN YUN-SHAN

I. Introductory Remarks

The German philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer said : "Man is a philosophical animal." The Chinese philosophers say : "Man is the most intellectual of all beings." Philosophy is therefore common to all peoples. In other words, all peoples have their own philosophies.

But strictly speaking, there are only three main systems of philosophy in the world, namely : (1) European philosophy, including American philosophy; (2) Indian philosophy; and (3) Chinese philosophy. European philosophy sprang from Greek source and its peculiar characteristic is the naturalistic and scientific trend. Indian philosophy and Chinese philosophy both have been indigenous, and the distinctive feature of Indian philosophy is its religious and theosophical tendency; and that of Chinese philosophy lies in its ethical and humanistic outlook.

All the basic problems and the main branches of philosophy dealt with in European and Indian philosophies, such as Metaphysics, Ontology, Cosmology, Epistemology, the so-called "Philosophy proper", and Logic, Ethics, Aesthetics, the so-called "Philosophical sciences", have been duly discussed by the Chinese philosophers. But the methods and attitudes in dealing with philosophical problems and the processes of the development of Chinese philosophical thought are in certain respects quite different from those of European philosophy as well as those of Indian philosophy.

European philosophy is more linked with natural science, Indian philosophy is more connected with religion, and Chinese philosophy is more related to human life

and society or humanity or humanism. In other words, European philosophy is essentially scientific, Indian philosophy religious, and Chinese philosophy ethical. Another striking contrast is in their respective attitude towards Nature. The European attitude towards Nature is a process of conquest, the Indian attitude towards Nature is a process of assimilation, while the Chinese attitude towards Nature is a process of harmonization. Of course, there are also many similarities among them all. Obviously, the similarities between Indian philosophy and Chinese philosophy are much more than that between European philosophy and Indian philosophy or European philosophy and Chinese philosophy.

II. The Beginning and Source of Chinese Philosophy

As Indian philosophy (including *Astika* and *Nastika*) begins with the four *Vedas*, especially the *Rig Veda*, Chinese philosophy begins with the six *Chings* or Canons, especially the *Yi-Ching* or the "Book of Changes".

The *Yi-Ching* starts with sixty-four symbols called *Kua* or "Diagrams". Each of these Diagrams consists of six straight lines, either broken or unbroken or both. They are therefore also termed by foreign scholars as "The sixty-four Hexagrams". These sixty-four Hexagrams were made up of eight basical and simple symbols, each consisting of three straight lines, broken or unbroken, called *Pa-Kua* or "The eight Trigrams". These eight Trigrams may be shown as follows :

<i>No.</i>	<i>Figure</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Significance</i>
(1)≡.....	<i>CH' IEN</i>	Heaven
(2)≡.....	<i>K' UN</i>	Earth
(3)≡.....	<i>CHEN</i>	Thunder
(4)≡.....	<i>SUN</i>	Wind
(5)≡.....	<i>K' AN</i>	Water

No.	Figure	Name	Significance
(6)	☲	<i>LI</i>	Fire
(7)	☶	<i>KEN</i>	Mountain
(8)	☵	<i>TUI</i>	Marsh

The multiplication of these eight Trigrams by combining each with one another for eight times becomes sixty-four ($8 \times 8 = 64$) such as :

(1)	☰	.. The <i>P'I</i> Hexagram	{ CH' IEN . above } Misfortune { K' UN . below }
(2)	☷	.. The <i>T'AI</i> Hexagram	{ K' UN . above } Fortune { CH' IEN . below }
(3)	☱	The <i>CHI-TSI</i> Hexagram	{ K' AN . above } Accomplishment { LI . below }
(4)	☴	The <i>WEI-TSI</i> Hexagram	{ LI . above } Non-accomplishment { K' AN . below }

The creation of the eight Trigrams was traditionally attributed to the first ancient Emperor Fu-Hsi (2852-2738 B.C.). The multiplication of the eight Trigrams into sixty-four Hexagrams was either done by Fu-Hsi himself or by his successor, the second ancient Emperor Shen-Nung (2737-2698 B. C. ?).

The lines of the sixty-four Hexagrams numbering 384 are called *TAO*. They together with the Hexagrams symbolize and indicate : First, the *T'AI-CHI* or "Great Ultimate", the One and Absolute Truth. Secondly, the *LIANG-YI* or the "Two Principles", namely, the *YANG* or the "Positive and Masculine Force", and the *YIN* or the "Negative and Feminine Force". Thirdly, the *SZU-HSIANG* or the "Four Emblems", namely, (1) the *Old Yang*, (2) the *Young Yang*, (3) the *Old Yin*, and (4) the *Young Yin*. And lastly, the manifestation of the natural phenomena of the whole Universe as well as the Development of all Human Affairs.

In other words, the Great Ultimate produced the Two Principles; the Two Principles, the Four Emblems; the Four Emblems, the Whole World. This showed the *TAO*, or the "Way or Process of the Evolution of the Universe".

The sixty-four Hexagrams are immediately followed by two literary texts called *KUA-TZ'U* or "Expressions of the Hexagrams", and *TAO-TZ'U* or "Expressions of the Lines". The former gives the names and definitions to all the Hexagrams; the latter, the names and indications of the significances of each individual lines of all the Hexagrams according to their positions and circumstances. The authorship of these two texts is still in dispute. The first text might have been done by Huang-Ti, the Yellow Emperor, (2697-2598 B.C.); and the second text by Wen-Wang, the father of the first Emperor named Wu-Wang of the Chou Dynasty (1122-255 B.C.) These two texts are similar to the *Samhitas* and *Brahmanas* of the *Rig Veda*.

Then came the *Shih-ti* or "Ten Wings", termed by the Western scholars as "Appendixes" or "Commentaries". They are: (1) *T'UAN-CHUAN*, Commentary on the Expressions of the Hexagrams; (2) *HSIANG-CHUAN*, Commentary on the Expressions of Lines of the Hexagrams; (3) *HSI-TZ'U-CHUAN*, Commentary General or "The Great Appendix" as called by some Western scholars. The above three are each divided into two sections called the Upper and the Lower, and are therefore together reckoned to be six in number. (4) *WEN-YEN*, special Commentary on the first two Hexagrams (incomplete); (5) *SHUO-KUA*, or Discourse on the Eight Trigrams; (6) *HSU-KUA*, or Treatise on the Sequence of the Sixty-four Hexagrams; (7) *TSA-KUA*, or Treatise on the Hexagrams taken Promiscuously. All these Commentaries were traditionally ascribed to Confucius, but in reality only the *HSI-TZ'U* and *WEN-YEN* were done by him. The first two Commentaries should be ascribed rather to Chou-Kung, the Duke and brother of Wu-Wang (1122-1115 B.C.). The last three are works of Confucius' disciples or even later scholars. All these Appendixes

expounded the mystery of the phenomena of nature and their relation to human life. These are similar to the *Aranyakas* and *Upanishads* of the *Vedas*.

The other five Chinese "Chings" or Canons are :

(1) *SHU-CHING* or "Book of Documents", containing a collection of speeches and exhortations of ancient kings and sages, mostly of a high moral tone. (2) *SHIH-CHING* or "Book of Odes", a collection of ancient folk songs, religious odes, and dynastic hymns, mostly of social and political reflections. (3) *LI-CHING* or "Book of Rites", containing three works : (a) *CHOU-LI* or "Ritual of the Chou Dynasty"; (b) *YI-LI* or "Ceremony and Propriety"; (c) *LI-CHI*, or "Discourse on the Principles of Rites". (4) *CH'UN-CH'IU* or "The Spring and Autumn Annals", a chronicle of events with severely critical praises and condemnations by Confucius. (5) *Yueh-Ching* or "Book of Music" which was lost long ago. All these books were collection works and has been once re-edited by Confucius. They dealt mostly with human life, conduct, relations etc., and revealed a great deal of moral, social and political truth and philosophy.

All Chinese philosophies, philosophies of different schools and sects of Chinese thoughts have their common root in these six Canons above.

III. The School of Chinese Philosophy

The period of the Chou Dynasty (1122-255 B.C.) was called a golden age of Chinese history. Progress and improvement were made in a most remarkable manner in all branches of human activity. The period is specially remarkable for its numerous thinkers and savants. We have only to remember that the great Lao-Tzu, K'ung-Tzu (Confucius), and Mo-Tzu belong to this era, as well as Meng-Tzu (Mencius), Chuang-Tzu, Hsun-Tzu, Han Fei-Tzu and many others. It was indeed a happy coincidence that in India Lord Buddha, Lord Mahavira, and the Founders of the six-Orthodox schools of philosophy also belong to this era, and that in Europe the three great Greek philosophers—Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, belong to this era too. It

was really a period of free thinking and learning, a real efflorescence of world philosophy.

In China, during this period, there were developed a great number of schools of thought usually referred to as "Hundred Schools of Thoughts of the Masters" (*Chu-Tzu Pai-Chia*). Recently Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, the supreme leader and great thinker and writer of New China, referred to this and gave out his political and cultural motto as "Let hundred flowers blossom together; let hundred schools of thoughts contend with one another." (*Pei-Hua Ch'i-Fang; Pai-Chia Cheng-Ming*). But actually there had not been and could not be so many schools of Chinese thoughts or philosophies. The Chinese word *Pai* means 'hundred' as well as 'numerous'; and *Chia* means 'family' as well as 'schools', and also 'master'. Therefore *Pai-Chia* in the first case may be meant 'numerous schools', and in the second case 'hundred masters'.

This term *Pai-Chia* was first mentioned in the last chapter of the book *Chuang-Tzu* under the caption *T'ien-Hsia P'ien* or "Under Heaven". It says: "The hundred schools of masters of thoughts have gone and would not return." But at the same time it mentioned only sixteen names of Masters in eight groups including Chuang-Tzu himself, namely: (1) Mo-Ti, Ch'in Ku-Li; (2) K'u Huo, Chi Ch'ih, Teng Ling-Tzu; (3) Sung Hsing, Yin Wen; (4) P'eng Meng, T'ien P'ien, Shen Tao; (5) Kuan Yin, Lao Tan (Lao-Tzu); (6) Chuang Chou (Chuang Tzu); (7) Hui Shih; (8) Huan T'uan, Kung Sun-Lung. In the sixth chapter of the book *Hsun-Tzu* under the caption "Denunciation of Twelve Masters" (*Fei-Shih-Erh-Tzu P'ien*), names of twelve masters grouped in six groups are mentioned and criticized, namely: (1) T'o Hsiao, Wei Mou; (2) Ch'en Chung, Shih Yu; (3) Mo Ti, Sung Hsing; (4) Shen Tao, T'ien P'ien; (5) Hui Shih, Teng Hsi; (6) Tzu-Szu, Meng K'o. Besides, it also named four other great personalities, Chung Ni (another name of Confucius) and his disciple Tzu-Kung, Emperor Shun and the great Yu for praise and regarded them as the criterion of human thoughts and deeds. But in the "Records of Arts and Literature" (*Yi-Wen-Chih*) of the "History of the Former Han Dynasty" (*Ch'ien-Han-Shu*)

it was said that there were Hundred and Eighty-nine Masters of thought usually referred to as the Hundred Schools. They were then classified into six groups called *Liu-Chia* or "Six Schools" by Szu-Ma T'an (.....?—110 B.C.) in his treatise on "The Essential Ideas of the Six schools" (*Lun Liu-Chia Yao-Chih*). The six schools are named as : (1) *Yin-Yang-Chia*, (2) *Jü-Chia*, (3) *Mo-Chia*, (4) *Ming-Chia*, (5) *Fa-Chia* (6) *Tao-Te-Chia*. Later on, Liu Hsin (46 B.C.-23 A.D.) added four more to these six schools. The additional four schools are : (1) *Tsung-Heng-Chia*, (2) *Tsa-Chia*, (3) *Nung-Chia*, (4) *Hsiao-Shuo-Chia*. There were then altogether ten ascertainable schools of Chinese philosophy before the Han Dynasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.).

But strictly speaking, there were only six groups of masters of thought that can be really called schools of Chinese philosophy, and they are :

- (1) *Jü-Chia*, The Confucianist School.
- (2) *Tao-Chia*, The Taoist School.
- (3) *Mo-Chia*, The Mohist School.
- (4) *Fa-Chia*, The Legalist School.
- (5) *Yin-Yang-Chia*, The Cosmologist School.
- (6) *Ming-Chia*, The Logician School.

These six schools may be further grouped into three :
(1) the Legalist School may be attached to the Confucianist School. This is similar to the *Mimansa-Vedanta* of Indian philosophy. (2) The Cosmologist School may be attached to the Taoist School. This is similar to the *Sankhya-Yoga* of Indian philosophy. (3) The Logician School may be attached to the Mohist School. This is similar to the *Nyaya-Vaisesika* of Indian philosophy. The other four Schools added by Liu Hsin to Szu-Ma Tan's list as mentioned before : (1) *Tsung-Heng-Chia* or "School of Diplomats", (2) *Tsa-Chia* or "School of Eclectics", (3) *Nung-Chia* or "School of Agrarianists", (4) *Hsiao Shuo-Chia* or "School of Story Tellers", are not important and have little to do with philosophy as such.

IV. "*Jü-Chia*", or *The Confucianist School*

The Chinese word *Ju* originally means "learned

scholar with perfect virtue" (*Tao-Hsueh Chih-Shih*). It is similar to two Sanskrit words, *Brahman* and *Pandita*. All learned and virtuous scholars can be called *Jü*. Then why and how was it applied specially to the School of Confucianists, or rather how and why was the Confucianist School especially called *Jü-Chia*? This has never been explained satisfactorily. The answer may be, first, because Confucius (551-479 B.C.) was regarded as the first and greatest master of learning and virtue to the perfection of both. Secondly, because Confucius was the first teacher who taught the common people learning and virtue which were monopolized by the aristocratic ruling class before. Thirdly, because Confucius and the Confucianists respected learning and virtue more than anything else.

In the book *Lun-Yü* or "Confucian Analects", the first work mentioned by Confucius was *Hsueh*, meaning "to learn". The Master said: "To learn with a constant perseverance and application, is it not a pleasant thing?" (Book I, Chapter 1.) Then on a number of occasions Confucius spoke of or discussed with his disciples about learning and virtue. Such as: "The Master said, 'At fifteen, I had my mind bent to learning. At thirty, I stood firm. At forty, I had no doubts. At fifty, I knew the decrees of Heaven. At sixty, my ear was an obedient organ for the reception of truth. At seventy, I could follow what my heart desired, without transgressing what was right.'" (Book II, Chapter 4). Again, "The Master said, 'In a hamlet of ten families, there may be found one honourable and sincere as I am, but not so fond of learning.'" (Book V, Chapter 27).

According to Confucius, learning and thought must go together. The Master said: "Learning without thinking is labour lost; thinking without learning is perilous." (Analects: Book II, Chapter 15). Even thinking and learning together is still not enough; they must be accompanied by action. In other words, learning and thought must be put into practice. In the book *Chung-Yung* or "The Doctrine of Golden Means", Confucius said: "There are requisite the extensive study of what is good, accurate inquiry about it, careful reflection

on it, the clear discrimination of it, and the earnest practice of it." (Chapter 21). In the *Yi-Ching* or "Book of Changes", The Master also said : "The superior man learns and accumulates the results of his learning; puts questions and discriminates among those results; dwells magnanimously and unambitiously in what he had attained to; and carries it into practice with benevolence" (Appendix IV, *Wen Yen* or Special Commentary on the First Hexagram).

Virtue in Chinese is called *Tao* or *Te* or both *Tao-Te*. There are a number of categories of virtues specially advocated and exhorted by Confucius and the Confucianists. The most important of these are the *San-Ta-Te* or *San-Ta-Tao*, both meaning "Three Universally Binding Virtues", and the *Wu-Chang* or the "Five Constant Virtues". The former category is : (1) *Chih* or Wisdom, (2) *Jen* or Benevolence, (3) *Yung* or Courage. The latter : (1) *Jen*—Love, (2) *Yi*—Justice, (3) *Li*—Propriety, (4) *Chih*—Wisdom, (5) *Hsin*—Sincerity. These are again closely connected with learning. As Confucius said : "There is the love of being benevolent without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to dissipation of mind. There is the love of being sincere without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to an injurious disregard of consequence. There is the love of straightforwardness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to rudeness. There is the love of bravery without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to insubordination. There is the love of firmness without the love of learning; the beclouding here leads to extravagant conduct." (*Analects*: Book XVII, Chapter 8).

From what has been said above we see that the Confucian ideas and thoughts are peculiarly ethical, moral, social and humanitarian. Confucius had purposely avoided certain abstruse problems. It was said in the *Confucian Analects* that the subjects on which the Master did not talk were :—(1) strange things, (2) supernatural power, (3) things not in proper order, and (4) spirits and deities. (Book VII, Chapter 20). Once his disciple Chi-Lu asked about serving the spirits of the

dead; the Master said: "While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?" Chi-Lu added: "I venture to ask about death." He was answered, "While you do not know life, how can you know about death?" (Book XI, Chapter 11). Another disciple named Tzu-Kung once remarked; "The Master's personal displays of his principles and ordinary description of them may be heard. His discourse about man's nature, and the way of Heaven cannot be heard." (Book IV, Chapter 12). Confucius himself once said to Tzu-Kung: "I would prefer not speaking." Tzu-Kung said: "If you, Master, do not speak, what shall we, your disciples have to record?" The Master said: "Does Heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their courses, and all things are continually being produced, but does Heaven say anything?" (Book XVII, Chapter 19).

The supreme doctrine of Confucius is the cultivation of the goodness of man, the perfection of human relation, and the greatest happiness of the world based on perfect wisdom and perfect virtue. This has been summarized into three Chinese characters: (1) *Chung* similar to the Buddhist term *Maitri*; (2) *Shu*, similar to the Buddhist term *Karuna*; and (3) *Jen*, the combination of both. Once Confucius said to his disciple Tseng Ts'an: "Ts'an, my doctrine is that of an all pervading unity." Tseng Ts'an replied: "Yes". When the Master went out, the other disciples asked "What do his words mean?" Tseng Ts'an said: "The doctrine of our Master is nothing else but *Chung* and *Shu*—to be true to the principles of our nature and the benevolent exercise of them to others." (Analects: Book IV, Chapter 15). On another occasion Confucius was asked by Tzu-Kung: "Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?" The Master said: "Is not the word 'Shu'? What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others." (Book XV, Chapter 23). Again, Confucius said: "The man of *Jen* wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to aggrandize himself, he seeks also to aggrandize others." (Book VI, Chapter 28). When his disciple Tzu-Lu asked what constituted the superior man, the Master said: "The cultivation of

himself in reverential carefulness." "And is this all?" said Tzu-Lu. "He cultivates himself so as to give rest to others," was the reply. "And is this all?" again asked Tzu-Lu. The Master said: "He cultivates himself so as to give rest to all the people." (Book XIV, Chapter 45).

After Confucius, two other great figures of this school are Meng-Tzu or Mencius (371-289 B.C.) and Hsun-Tzu (about 289-238 B.C.) Prof. Fung Yu-Lan regards the former as the idealistic wing and the latter as the realistic wing of Confucianism. (*A Short History of Chinese Philosophy*). Both of them respected Confucius as the Greatest Master and the Founder of this school and apparently followed his teachings. But they interpreted Confucius in different ways and from different points of view. The most salient difference between them is in regard to the theory of human nature. Mencius regarded human nature as originally good. (*Men-Tzu*: Book IIa, 6). But Hsun-Tzu said: "The human nature is evil; its goodness is acquired through training." (*Hsun-Tzu*, Chapter 23). But Confucius himself only once said: "By nature men are nearly alike; by practice, they get to be wide apart." (*Analects* Book XVII, Chapter 2). Since then it has been one of the most controversial problems in Chinese philosophy.

V. "*Tao-Chia*" or *The Taoist School*

Tao is the most significant, comprehensive as well as mysterious word in Chinese language and literature. It means, sometimes, the absolute reality or the eternal truth; sometimes, the ultimate aim or the supreme power of Nature; sometimes, the manifestation or the process or the way of the evolution of the Universe; and sometimes also doctrine and virtue. It is equivalent to three Sanskrit words,—*Brahma*, *Dharma* and *Marga*. It has repeatedly appeared in almost all the Chinese scriptures, especially the philosophical works, and has been dealt with or applied by almost all the Masters of different schools in different aspects, to different things and in different ways. This school was especially entitled to the name of *Tao*, because it has expounded the *Tao* more specially, more properly,

and more profoundly than any other.

The greatest and most famous Master of the Taoist School is of course Lao-Tzu. He was actually the Founder of the Taoist philosophy but not the Taoist religion, both of which have been called Taosim and have been frequently confused by foreigners. (As a matter of fact, the Taoist religion is a quite different thing from the Taoist philosophy).

Lao-Tzu regards *Tao* as the supreme soul of the universe, self-existent, absolute, and eternal, from which all things emanate and to which all return. In the book *Lao-Tzu*, named after him, or *Tao-Te-Ching*—the Canon of Tao and Te, he said: "Tao begets One, One begets Two, Two begets Three, Three begets all things." (Chapter 42). In another passage of the same book Lao-Tzu said: "All things in the world come into being from *Yu* or 'Having', and *Yu* or 'Having' comes into being from *Wu* or 'Non-Having'." (Chapter 40). Here *Yu*, or 'Having' means 'One'; and *Wu* or 'Non-Having' means *Tao*. Then, why is *Tao* called *Wu* or 'Non-Having'? Because *Tao* is something that is really inappreciable and inexpressible by name or word. Therefore Lao-Tzu said at the very beginning of the book: "The *Tao* that can be expressed by words is not the eternal *Tao*; the name that can be named is not the eternal name. The Unnamable is the beginning of Heaven and Earth; the namable is the mother of all things." (Chapter 1). Again "There is something formlessly fashioned, that existed before Heaven and Earth; without sound, without substance, dependent on nothing, unchanging, all pervading and unfailing. One may think of it as the mother of all things in the world. I do not know what is its true name, but call it *Tao* and forcibly name it *Ta* or the 'Great'. And *Ta* means passing on; passing on means going far away; going far away means returning." (Chapter 25.)

According to Lao-Tzu, *Tao* is also the Maker of everything for everything, yet as if it makes nothing; the doer of everything for everything, yet as if it does nothing. Lao-Tzu said: "*Tao* never does anything, yet through it all things are done." (Chapter 37). Again: "The

great *Tao* drifts about. It may go this way or that. All things owe their existence to it, and it does not disown them. Its achievements are completed while it is nameless. Like a garment it covers all things and brings them up, but makes no claim to be master over them." (Ch. 34.) Again: "Such is the scope of the all-pervading Power that it alone can act through the *Tao*. For the *Tao* is a thing impalpable, incommensurable. Incommensurable, impalpable; yet latent in it are forms. Impalpable, incommensurable; yet within it are entities. Shadowy it is and dim; yet within it there is an essence. This essence is extremely pure, but none the less efficacious." (Ch. 21.) Again: "Tao gave them birth; the Power of Tao reared them, made them grow, fostered them, harboured them, brewed for them. Made them grow, but not lay claim to them; brewed for them, but never lean upon them; be chief among them, but not manage them. This is called the Prime virtue." (Ch. 51.)

Men therefore should only follow the way of *Tao*, and not do things in any way against it. As Lao-Tzu said: "Men should exemplify the way of the Earth; the Earth, the Heaven; the Heaven, the *Tao*; the *Tao*, the Nature." (Ch. 25.) Here the word 'Nature' is, however, not something above the *Tao* but the *Tao* itself. Arthur Waley has properly rendered it as 'Self-so'. (*The Way and Its Power*: P. 174.) "Therefore the Sage relies on actionless activity, carries on wordless teaching." (Ch. 2.) "Ruling a large kingdom is indeed like cooking a small fish." (Ch. 60.) "The tree big as a man's embrace began as a tiny sprout. The tower nine storeys high began with a heap of earth. The journey of a thousand miles began with what was under the feet. He who acts, harms; he who grabs, lets slip. Therefore the sage does not act, and so does not harm; does not grab, and so does not let slip." (Ch. 64.) "It was when the Great *Tao* declined that human kindness and morality arose. It was when intelligence and knowledge appeared that the Great Artifice began. It was when the six near ones were no longer at peace that there was talk of filial piety and parental tenderness. It was when the country was in disorder and chaos that we hear of loyal ministers." (Ch. 18.)

"After *Tao* was lost, then came the Virtue; after virtue was lost, then came human kindness; after human kindness was lost, then came righteousness; after righteousness was lost, then came ritual. Now ritual is the mere *husk* of loyalty and promise-keeping, and is indeed the first step towards brawling. Foreknowledge may be the flower of doctrine, but it is the beginning of folly. Therefore, the full-grown man takes his stand upon the solid substance not the mere husk; upon the fruit, not the flower. So he rejects that and takes this." (Ch. 38.)

The second greatest Taoist master is Chuang Chou or Chuang-Tzu (369-286 B.C.). He expounded the *Tao* Doctrine even more intensively and extensively than Lao-Tzu. He was also regarded as the greatest mystic of China. In the "Record of History" (*Shih Chi*) it was said: "His erudition was most varied, but his chief doctrines were based upon the sayings of Lao-Tzu. His writings, which run to over 100,000 words, are for the most part allegorical. His literary and dialectic skill was such that the best scholars of the age were unable to refute his destructive criticism of Confucian and Mohist schools. His teachings were like an overwhelming flood which spreads unchecked according to its own will, so that from rulers and ministers downward none could apply them to any practical use. King Wei of the Ch'u State (339-329 B.C.) hearing of his good name sent messengers to him, bearing costly gifts and inviting him to become Prime Minister. At this Chuang Chou smiled and said to the messengers: 'A thousand taels of gold is valuable indeed, and to be Prime Minister is an honourable position. But have you never seen the sacrificial ox used for the suburban sacrifice? When after being fattened up for several years, it is decked with embroidered trappings and led to the altar, would it not willingly then change place with some uncared-for pigling? Be gone! Defile me not! I would rather disport myself to my own enjoyment in the mire than be slave to the ruler of a state. I will never take office. Thus I shall remain free to follow my own inclinations.'

The fundamental idea of Chuang-Tzu is absolute equality and freedom for every being, and absolute unity

or absolute Oneness of all beings. There should be no distinction such as 'good and bad', 'right and wrong', 'large and small', 'long and short', 'high and low', 'heavy and light', 'rich and poor', 'patrician and plebeian', 'old and young', 'beginning and end', 'life and death', etc. For all these are only relative terms created by men. In reality all are 'one and the same'. Because all beings come out from the same *Tao* and will return to the same *Tao*. The trouble with men is that when these things are once created, they see only the separation and difference but not the basic unity and oneness. This is the cause of all prejudice and ignorance, struggle and strife, hatred and enmity, violence and cruelty, bondage and slavery, and many other evil things, which in turn cause every kind of pain and suffering. Until we abolish all these things there will be no true freedom and happiness in the world. Only those who could rid themselves of all kinds of distinctions or discriminations could have real and absolute freedom and happiness. Such people Chuang-Tzu calls *Chen-Jen* meaning 'True Man', or *Chih-Jen* meaning 'Perfect Man', or *Shen-Jen* meaning 'Spiritual Man', or *Sheng-Jen* meaning 'Sage'.

On this 'True Man', 'Perfect Man', 'Spiritual Man' and 'Sage' Chuang-Tzu said: "The Perfect Man has no self; the Spiritual Man has no achievement; the Sage has no name." (*Hsiao-Yao-Yu-P'ien* : *Chuang-Tzu* : Ch. 1) And : "The True Man of old slept without dreaming and waked without anxiety. He ate without discrimination, and his breathing was deep." (*Ta-Tsung-Shih-P'ien* : *Chuang-Tzu*. Ch. 6.) Again : "The True Man of old knew neither to love life nor to hate death. Living, he felt no elation; dying, he offered no resistance. Unconsciously he went; unconsciously he came; that was all. He did not try purposely to forget what his beginning had been or to seek what his end would be. He received with delight anything that came to him and left without consciousness anything that he had forgotten. That is what is called not preferring the conscious mind to *Tao*, or supplementing Nature with man. Such is what we call the "True Man." (Ibid.) Finally : "The Perfect Man is spirit-like. Were

the great lakes burned up, he would not feel hot. Were the great rivers frozen hard, he would not feel cold. Were the mountains to be riven by thunder or the seas thrown into waves by a storm, he would not be frightened. Being such, he would mount upon the clouds, would ride on the sun and moon, and would thus wander at ease beyond the seas. Neither death nor life can affect him; how much less can the consideration of what is beneficial and what is harmful!" (*Ch'i-Wu-Lun-P'ien : Chuang-Tzu*, Ch. 2.)

VI. "Mo-Chia" or The Mohist School

"Mo-Chia" or the Mohist school was named after Mo-Ti or Mo-Tzu who was generally regarded as the founder of this school. Mo-Tzu was one of the most important figures in ancient Chinese history. From the Warring States period down to the beginning of the Han dynasty his name was constantly linked with that of Confucius. According to the *Mo-Tzu Nien-Piao* or "Chronological Table of Mo-Tzu" made by the noted textual critic Sun Yü-jang (1848-1956 A.D.) he lived from 468-376 B.C.

In many respects Mo-Tzu may be compared to the ancient Indian Mahavira Jaina and the modern Indian Mahatma Gandhi. Their life and doctrines are very similar. The most prominent tenets of Mo-Tzu are: "Universal Love and Non-Violence", and absolute "Altruism and Asceticism". Mencius once remarked: "Mo-Tzu loves all men without discrimination. If by grinding his whole body from the crown to the heel he could have benefited the world, he would have done it." As ideas, "Universal Love and Non-Violence", "Altruism and Asceticism" had all existed prior to Mo-Tzu. But Mo-Tzu's great contribution to Chinese philosophy is that he not only practised these ideas himself, but that he gave them a rational foundation and welded them into a unified philosophical system.

Mo-Tzu opposed not only the theories of Confucius and the Confucianist school but also the traditional practices and institutions. The Confucianists tried to be "correct

in righteousness, without considering whether profit would result; pure in their principles, without considering whether this would bring material return." (*Tung Chung-Shu : Ch'un-Ch'iu Fang-Lu.*). But Mo-Tzu and the Mohists school, on the other hand, laid exclusive emphasis on "Merit and Profit". Mo-Tzu said: "The purpose of those who are virtuous lies in procuring benefits for the world and eliminating its calamities." (*Mo-Tzu : Ch. 16. Chien-Ai- P'ien.*). And: "Mutual love produces mutual profit." Again: "Love without partiality is that which will yield profit." "Common good arises from loving and profiting others." "One who loves others will be loved in return; one who profits others will be benefited by others." (*Ibid.*).

Now what are the calamities in the world? Mo-Tzu said: "Among all the current calamities, which are the most important? I say that the attack on the small states by the large ones, disturbance of the small houses by the large ones, oppression of the weak by the strong, misuse of the many by the few, deception of the simple by the cunning, disdain towards the humble by the honoured, these are the misfortunes in the world. Again, the lack of kindness on the part of the ruler, the lack of loyalty on the part of the ruled, of affection on the part of the father, and of filial piety on the part of the son: These are further calamities in the world. Also, the mutual injury and harm which the unscrupulous do to one another with weapons, poison, water and fire are still another calamity in the world." (*Ibid.*).

What is the cause of all these chaoses in the world? According to Mo-Tzu, it is the lack of love for one another. "A robber loves his own house but not that of the other; so he robs it to enrich his own house. A thief loves himself but not the other man; so he steals from the other man in order to benefit himself. A Minister of State loves his own family but not that of another man; so he disturbs another family for the advantage of his own family. All the princes love their own but not other countries, so they make attacks upon them, for the benefit of their own countries.When the other man's house is looked upon as one's own house, who will steal? When

the other man's interest is looked upon as one's own interest, who will offend? When the other man's family is looked upon as one's own family, who will violate it? When the other man's country is looked upon as one's own country, who will attack it"? (*Ibid*).

Another important doctrine of Mo-Tzu is his teaching against war. According to Mo-Tzu, the greatest crime is to attack a country. There should be no excuse for such action. In the Chapter entitled "Condemnation of War" Mo-Tzu said : "If a man walks into another man's orchard and steals peaches and plums, he will not only incur the anger of the public, but also the punishment of the authorities. This is so because he had done injury to others for his own gain. If a man steals a dog, a pig, or a chicken, his offence is graver than entering an orchard to steal peaches and plums because he has done greater injury. The offence is graver and the crime of a higher degree. If a man breaks into a stable and steals an ox or a horse, then the offence is graver than stealing a dog, a pig, or a chicken because the injury done is greater. As an injury is greater, the offence is graver and the crime is of a higher degree. If a man kills an innocent man, steals his clothing and his spear and sword, his offence is graver than breaking into a stable and stealing an ox or a horse. The injury is greater, the offence is graver, and the crime is of a higher degree. Any man of sense knows that it is wrong, knows that it is unrighteous. But when murder is committed in attacking a country, it is not considered wrong; it is applauded and called righteous. Can this be considered as knowing what is righteous and what is unrighteous? When one man kills another man it is considered unrighteous and he is punished by death. Then by the same sign when a man kills ten others, his crime will be ten times greater, and should be punished by death ten times. Similarly one who kills a hundred men should be punished a hundred times more heavily."

(*Mo-Tzu : Fei-Kung-P'ien*).

Mo-Tzu's teachings and ideas are of course very lofty, and his own life and activities were true examples of them. But sometimes he had gone rather too far so that it was very difficult for the common people to follow him,

Therefore it was said in Chuang-Tzu : "To show no extravagance for future generations, to show no wastefulness in the use of things, to make no display in measures and institutions, to keep themselves under the restraint of strict rules so as to be prepared for the emergencies of the world; such were some of the aspects of the Way in ancient times. Mo-Ti and Ch'in Ku-Li (his disciple) heard of these and delighted in them. But in practising them they went to extremes, and in following them they were too strict. They wrote an essay entitled *Fei-Yueh* (Against Music) and another entitled *Chieh-Yung* (Frugal Expenditure). There were to be no singing in life, no mourning garments at death. Mo-Tzu taught universal love and mutual benefit, and condemned war. His teaching excluded anger. He was fond of study and had wide learning. Some points in his teachings were not different from those of others. Whereas at other points he did not agree with the ancient kings."

(*Chuang-Tzu : T'ien-Hsia-P'ien*).

And : "These objections do not suffice to overthrow Mo-Tzu's system. Yet though men sing, he condemns singing. Though men mourn, he condemns mourning. Though men enjoy music, he condemns music. Is this truly in accord with man's nature ? He would have men toil through life, with a bare funeral at death. Such teaching is too barren. It would lead men into sorrow and lamentation. Its practice would be too difficult. I feel, it cannot be regarded as the Way of the Sage. It is contrary to human nature and would not be tolerated. Mo-Tzu himself might be able to do it, but what about the rest of the world ? If one separates the rest of the world, one's position is far indeed from the Royal Way." (*Ibid*).

Among the other Mohists only a few names need be given here : (1) Chin Ku-Li, (2) Sung Hsing, (3) Yin Wen, (4) K'u Hou, (5) Chi Ch' ih, (6) Teng Ling-Tzu, as already mentioned before.

VII. The Other Three Schools

The other three schools, i.e., (A) The *Fa-Chia* or

the Legalist school, (B) *The Yin-Yang Chia* or the Cosmological school, (C) *The Ming-Chia* or the Logician school, are not so prominent and important as the Confucianist school, the Taoist school and the Mohist school. They can therefore be conveniently put together here.

(A) *The Legalist School* :—Scholars usually trace the origin of this school to Kuan Chung (708-643 B.C.) and Tzu-Ch'an (543-522 B.C.). But the real figure in whom this school finds its culmination was Han Fei-Tzu (died in 233 B.C.). Another prominent representative of this school before Han Fei-Tzu was Shang Yang (died in 338 B.C.). The philosophy of the Legalist school is, strictly speaking, only a system of political theory which freely absorbed the ideas and ideals of the Confucianists, the Taoists and the Mohists. But it is more related to the first than the latter two. Therefore it may be attached to the Confucianist school as I have said before. Notwithstanding all these correlations, the Legalist school differs from all the three schools specially in regard to politics, polity and law. The Confucianists held that the people should be governed by virtue and morality which were embodied in *Li*, or propriety. The Taoists maintained that the less interference or action the better government. This is called the Rule of *Wu-Wei*, having no activity or non-action. The Mohists took a middle path between these two positions but sided more with the Confucianists. The Legalist strongly contended that the people and the country should be ruled by law. Han Fei-Tzu said : "The government of the wise is based rather on the restraint of evils than on the virtuous dispositions of mankind. The criterion of virtuous conduct may appeal to very few, but the prohibition of evil is a universal standard. As the standard is set with reference to the majority rather than the minority, law instead of virtue is the criterion." (*Han Fei-Tzu : Hsien-Hsueh-Pien*). Han Fei-Tzu's definition of law is : "Law is that which is observed by the government as orders and regulations, and observed by the people as standards of reward and punishment. Reward lies in the obeying of law; punishment is meted out to those who disobey." (*Han Fei-*

Tzu : Ting-Fa-P'ien). The Legalist also classified the law as follows : "Law can be divided into four kinds : the unchangeable law which regulates the relationship of the emperor and his officers; the social law which helps to overcome differences in customs; the public law which metes out rewards and punishments; the commercial law which regulates the standards of measurements." (*Yin Wen-Tzu : Ta-Tao-P'ien*).

(B) *The Cosmological School* : The philosophy of this school was based on the two cosmological principles, namely *Ying* and *Yang*. Hence the name *Yin-Yang-Chia* or the Cosmological school. As we have already mentioned that the term *Yin* and *Yang* first appeared in the *Yi-Ching* or the Book of Changes; and that *Yang* means the positive and masculine principle or force, and *Yin* means the negative and feminine principle or force. These two together generated the whole universe. It was said in the "Great Appendix" of the *Yi-Ching* : "In the *Yi* there is the Great Ultimate which produced the Two Principles. The Two Principles produced the Four Emblematic Symbols, which again produced the Eight Trigrams. The Eight Trigrams served to determine the good and evil, and from this determination was produced the successful prosecution of the Great Task." Again : "One *Yin* and one *Yang* constitute what is called *Tao*. That which is perpetuated by it is good; that which is completed by it is the individual nature. The benevolent see it and call it benevolence. The wise see it and call it wisdom. The common people, acting daily according to it, yet have no knowledge of it." (*Yi-Hsi-Tzu* : Section 1). The theory of the principles in the *Book of Changes* were later on further analysed and developed into another theory of the *Wu-Hsing* or the Five Elements, in the *Book of Documents*. In the chapter *Hung Fan* or "Great Plan" it was said : "The first category of the 'Nine Categories' (*Chiu-Ch'ow*) is called the Five Elements. These are : first Water, second Fire, third Wood, fourth Metal, fifth Soil. The nature of Water is to moisten and descend; of Fire, to flame and ascend; of Wood, to be crooked and straight; of Metal, to yield and to be modified; of soil to provide

for sowing and reaping." (*Book of Documents* : Book IV, Ch. 6). This is very similar to the four *Bhutas* of the *Charvaka* school, which was also accepted by the other schools of Indian philosophy; and also to the four "Roots" of the philosophy of the Greek philosopher Empedocles (490-435 B.C.). These theories of *Yin-Yang* and *Wu-Hsing* originated in the *Book of Changes* and in the *Book of Documents* were adopted and expounded by almost all Chinese philosophers, specially by the Confucianists and the Taoists. But the Cosmologists applied them to almost every aspect of human affairs into the minutest details. They tried to explain natural phenomena both in terms of time and space, and maintained that these phenomena are closely inter-related with human conduct. The so-called Cosmological school is actually more or less a mixture of Confucianist and Taoist schools with certain special emphasis upon the "Two Principles", *Yin* and *Yang*, as well as on the "Five Elements" or *Wu-Hsing*. But it is more related to the Taoists rather than the Confucianists. Therefore, this school may be attached to the Taoist school. The only prominent master of this school is Chow Yen, who lived in the end of the Warring States period but the exact date is unknown.

(C) *The Logical School* : In Chinese it is called *Ming-Chia* literally meaning "School of Names". We use the term "Logicians" here because they are similar to the Logicians of Western philosophy. They are also called in Chinese *P'ien-Che* meaning "Debaters", in the sense of the ancient Greek Sophists or Dialecticians. The fundamental ideas of this school were already laid by Confucius, Lao-Tzu, Mo-Tzu, and specially by the Mohists. The Logicians only developed them into a definite system of philosophy. Therefore, they may be attached to the Mohist school as I have said before. The most important representatives of this school are : (1) Hui Shih (about 350-260 B.C.), and (2) Kung-Sun Lung (about 284-259 B.C.). Hui Shih's book *Ivan-Wu-Shuo* or "Discourse on Ten Thousand Matters" was long lost. The authenticity of Kung-Sun Lung's work entitled *Kung-Sun Lung-Tzu* is doubtful. What we know of their theories are the *Shih-Shih* or "Ten Problems" of

Hui Shih, and the *Erh-Shih-Yi-Shih* or "Twenty-one Problems" of Kung-Sun Lung and other Logicians, preserved in the chapter titled *T'ien-Hsia-P'ien* or "Under the Heaven" in the book *Chuang-Tzu* and also repeatedly quoted or mentioned in the works of their masters. The "Ten Problems" of Hui Shih are: (1) "The greatest has nothing beyond itself, and is called the Great One; the smallest has nothing within itself, and is called the Little One." (2) "That which has no thickness cannot be increased in thickness, yet in extent it may cover a thousand miles." (3) "The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes." (4) "The sun at noon is the sun declining; the creature born is the creature dying." (5) "A great similarity differs from a little similarity. This is called the little similarity-and-difference. All things are in one way all similar, in another way all different. This is called the great similarity-and-difference." (6) "The South has no limit and has a limit." (7) "Going to the state of Yueh today and arrived there yesterday." (8) "Connected rings can be separated." (9) "I know the centre of the world; it is north of Yen and south of Yueh." (10) "Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one."

The "Twenty-one problems" of Kung-Sun Lung and other Logicians are: (1) "The egg has hairs." (2) "A fowl has three legs." (3) "Yin contains the whole world." (4) "A dog may be a sheep." (5) "The horse has eggs." (6) "The frog has a tail." (7) "Fire is not hot." (8) "Mountains produce mouths." (9) "Wheels do not touch the ground." (10) "Eyes do not see." (11) "*Chih* do not reach; things never come to an end." (12) "Tortoises are longer than snakes." (13) "T-squares are not square; Compasses cannot make circles." (14) "Chisels do not surround their handles." (15) "The shadow of a flying bird never moves." (16) "There are times when a darting arrow is neither in motion nor at rest." (17) "A puppy is not a dog." (18) "A brown horse and a dark ox make three." (19) "A white dog is black." (20) "An orphan calf has never had a mother." (21) "If a rod one foot in length is cut short every day by one half of

its length, it will still have something left even after ten thousand generations."

These "Problems" are usually regarded as "Paradoxes." In truth, they are not paradoxes but really philosophical and scientific problems, metaphysical as well as phenomenal, ontological as well as cosmological, epistemological as well as logical. They are all illustrations of the relativity of things in the world. The main points are these : (1) All divisions and distinctions of time and space are artificial and unreal. (2) All differences and discriminations of matters and affairs are superficial and relative and not absolute. (3) All things and beings are in reality one and the same. (4) Time, space and the universe are eternal, beginningless, endless and limitless. Therefore, Hui Shih's conclusion is : "Love all things equally; Heaven and Earth are one."

VIII. Conclusion

The above brief sketch of the different schools of Chinese philosophy has given us some general idea of their tenets and theories. It is quite natural that all of them should have their own peculiar views and theories of certain things, opposed to one another. Yet they hold many things in common, presenting a kind of diversity in unity and unity in diversity.

As the ultimate goal of all the different systems of Indian philosophy, including *Astika* and *Nastika*, is *Mukti* or *Moksa*, or "Liberation" of Humanity, the ultimate aim of all the various schools of Chinese philosophy is *Tsi-Shih* or "Salvation" of the world. Both "Liberation" and "Salvation" are a state of "Perfection." "Perfection" is real "Happiness". Real "Happiness" is true "Peace", "Love", "Harmony", "Freedom", "Equality", and "Unity". All these things should be and can be realized not in any other world, but in this world, here and now.

Therefore, all the different schools of Chinese Philosophy lay great stress on human life and ethics. Ethics in Chinese has a very broad meaning. It deals with not only the relation between man and man, but also the relation between man and nature, and that between man

and all other things in the world. According to Chinese philosophy, humanity is a life of harmonious collectivity and not of exclusive and contending individuality. The ultimate goal and aim of humanity must be to achieve the well-being of all mankind, neither the individual, nor the race, nor the state is to be the ultimate end.

In the *Tuan-Chuang* of *Yi-Ching* or "Commentary on the Expression of the Hexagrams" of "The Book of Changes", under *Chien-Kua* or the first Hexagram, it is said : "The way of *Chien* is to change and transform, so that everything obtains its correct nature and life; and then great peace and harmony are preserved in union. The result is what is advantageous, and righteous and firm. Man appears aloft, high above all things, and the myriad states all enjoy tranquillity and repose !"

In the first chapter of *Shu-Ching* or "Book of Documents", it is said : "To cultivate and illuminate the great virtue in order to endear and fraternize the nine clan relations. While the nine clan relations were endeared and fraternized, all the people would be pacified and enlightened. While all the people were pacified and enlightened, all the states in the world would be harmonized and united, and peace and tranquillity would be maintained !"

The most popular Chinese classic *Ta-Hsueh* or "The Great Learning", originally a chapter of *Li-Chi* or "Discourse on the Principles of Rites", says at its very beginning : "The way of the Great Learning is to illuminate the illuminant Virtue; to renovate the people; and to rest at the highest point of perfection." And : "The Ancients who wished to brighten the illustrious virtue in the world, first ordered well their states. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their personalities. Wishing to cultivate their personalities, they first rectified their minds. Wishing to rectify their minds, they first purified their volitions. Wishing to purify their volitions, they first extended their knowledge. Such extension of knowledge depended upon the study of things. Things having been studied, knowledge became perfect. Knowledge being perfect, their volitions were

then purified. Their volitions being purified, their minds were then rectified. Their minds being rectified, their personalities were then cultivated. Their personalities being cultivated, their families were then regulated. Their families being regulated, their states were then well ordered. Their states being well ordered, the whole world could then be maintained in perfect peace and tranquillity !”

Another important Chinese classic called *Li-Yun* or “The Way and Use of the Rites”, also a chapter of the *Li-Chi* or “Discourse on the Principles of Rites”, says at the beginning : “In the progression of the Great Natural Process, the whole world is free and common to all. The wise and the able should be chosen to rule; faithfulness and peacefulness cultivated by and maintained among all. Man must not only love his own parents and endear his own children, but also endeavour to give to the aged rest and comfort, make the grown-ups work and serve, and help the young to grow in body and mind. The widower, the widow, the orphan, the bereft, the disabled and the sick should be offered proper treatment and carefully looked after. Every man has his duty, and every woman has her place in the scheme of human life. Natural resources should be drawn out of the earth and utilized, but not necessarily for private property; personal abilities should be exerted from the body and mind and exercised, but not necessarily for selfish purposes. Thus, there will be no chance for conspiracy and intrigue, nor rise of theft and robbery, and every home can be safe with open gates at night. This is called *Ta-Tung* or ‘The Great Unity!’

These ideas put forward thousands of years ago by the Chinese sages and philosophers are now being actually put into practice by both the New China and the New India, although in different ways. Let us all pray for their success not only for the sake of the two countries and the two peoples but for the sake of the whole world and all mankind. And that will be the best argument and practical justification of Chinese philosophy which has been humanistic in the highest sense and always wanted that the “myriad states all enjoy tranquillity and repose” !

■ ■ ■

CHINESE ATTITUDE TOWARDS WORLD RELIGIONS

T'ANG-CHUN

Before I discuss the Chinese attitude towards religions, I wish to cite two sayings, one of Mencius and one of Lu-hiu Yuan, as an introduction to the subject. Mencius said : "The homes of sages may be more than a thousand miles apart, and the time of one sage may be a thousand years later than that of another, but the principles of the early sage and of the later sage are the same." Lu-kiu Yuan said : "The universe is my mind, and my mind is the universe. If in the Eastern Sea there were to appear a sage, he would have this same mind and this same principle. If in the Western Sea there were to appear a sage, he would have this same mind and this same principle. If in the Southern or Northern Seas, there were to appear sages, they, too, would have this same mind and this same principle. If a hundred or a thousand generations ago, or a hundred or a thousand generations hence, sages were to appear, they, likewise, would have this same mind and this same principle."

Mencius and Lu-kiu Yuan were both Confucians. The Confucian teaching is mainly ethical; however, it has its religious aspect. The foregoing quotations and what is implied therein can be taken as still representative of the attitude of the Confucians and even of the Taoists, of the Chinese Buddhists and of the Chinese people as a whole toward religion.

The significance of these sayings is simple : A principle that is really universal should be universally and immanently presented and realized by human minds of different ages and places. Religious principles are no exceptions. Of course, the religious principle may be revealed by a transcendent God or Heaven. But, at least in the moment of its revelation, what is transcendent must reveal its transcendence to a human mind. Its transcendence cannot transcend the human mind, though this mind

becomes self-transcendent in that revelation. In this sense, what is transcendent is at the same time immanently revealed to the human mind, which is as divine as it is human. Therefore, the really universal principle in religion is not only a universal by itself but also a universal which can be universally and immanently revealed and then presented or realized by any human mind. Only during the time when it is actually presented and realized by human minds in different ages and places, can its universality be actually revealed to this world and existing in this world. The human minds in which God or Heaven and His (or its) principle are revealed, presented, and realized are called the minds of the sages. The God or Heaven and His (or its) principle may be one and the same, but the minds of the sages are as many as the sages themselves—and all men who are capable of being sages—so that one and the same truth can reveal its universality, actually, in the many and different minds.

What Mencius and Lu-kiu Yuan said and its significance as I have explained it, may not be consciously recognized by the ordinary Chinese, yet this is the very essence of the Chinese attitude towards religion.

This attitude can be illustrated socially and historically. In Chinese society, individuals are not easily persuaded to think that God is simply incarnated in a physical body at a particular time and place. Nor are most Chinese inclined to believe that there are chosen persons who are predestined to be sages or prophets, and that there are others predestined to be excluded from the Grace of God and to be ignorant of God. It appears strange to a Chinese when he is told that only one religion is revealed and that all other religions are but natural. The Chinese usually think that if the rain and sunshine of Heaven are present everywhere, if God loves all human beings equally, and if human nature is essentially the same, then there seems no reason for any people to claim the privilege of being a chosen people or to claim that the universal God has been incarnated in a particular body and has revealed His truth only to a particular people or church. The Chinese prefer to believe that "the full realization of human nature in a sage is at the same time the realiza-

tion of Heaven-nature and the realization of Heaven-mind or God-mind to men"; that "all men can be sages, and sages are as divine as they are human"; and that "all religions are only different expressions of the deepest human nature and at the same time the different channels where the mandates of Heaven flourish or are the different ways (Tao) by which different people attain their sagehood and likeness or conformity to Heaven."

The belief that different religions are different ways of attaining sagehood, all conforming to Heaven, implies that the ultimate destination of all the ways may be the same, but that no one way is itself ultimate. A "way" also implies a deeper insight: when a man has travelled the way and has arrived, he can afford to forget the way. Men need not ask others who are also going home whether "home" for all is in the same place. If we mean by "home" the same destination of human life—sagehood—then we may say that whoever is already at home should remain at home to entertain the guests coming from different directions and that he should never reproach the guests for not coming by the way he came.

The historical evidences for what I have said are plentiful. For example, there have never been religious wars and only a few religious persecutions in Chinese history. The controversies among the Buddhists, the Taoists, and the Confucians in Chinese history usually culminated in a theory of reconciliation among the three teachings or of syncretism and mutual respect, each teaching performing a different function. The metaphor of three rooms in a home, used by the Confucian Wang Lung-hi is apt and significant.

It is not an exaggeration to say that the Chinese people in the past have found genuine enjoyment in religious toleration and religious freedom. However, too much religious toleration may weaken one's religious enthusiasm and may result in the absence of religious fervor. We must confess that this, too, is the case among the Chinese.

If we agree that the Chinese are most tolerant in religion, then we shall see why the most tolerant, the most liberal, and the most broad-minded religions are most convincing to the Chinese mind and most heartily wel-

comed by the Chinese people.

In Chinese history, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism, Nestorianism, Catholicism, Protestantism, and, recently, Hinduism have had followers. But the religion that is most deep-rooted in the lower class Chinese remains Taoism, though it is usually neglected by contemporary Chinese intellectuals. Taoism is a religion derived from Chinese primitive religion and is a variable mixture of Taoist philosophy, Confucian teachings, and Buddhist beliefs. What appeals most to the Chinese people is its love of longevity and its syncretism, which is a vague, synthetic expression of the Chinese liberal spirit, though the spiritual level of Taoists may not be so high as that of Buddhists or Confucians.

Buddhism, especially Mahāyāna Buddhism, is a religion that is widely accepted by different classes, including the highly intellectual Chinese. The liberal spirit and broad mind of Buddhism are expressed, not by its syncretism, but within the Buddhist teaching itself. Generally speaking, in Buddhist teachings every sentient being has "*Buddha-nature*" and is capable of becoming a *Buddha*. Also, there are different and convenient ways for spiritual cultivation, adapted to different circumstances and different mentalities. Actually, there are no, or very few, dogmas in Buddhist teaching. The Chan School (or Zen Buddhism), created by the Chinese, rejected all kinds of articulate preaching and used words simply as tools for the self-awakening of the mind to its own nature. This is close to the idea of "realization of human nature" in Confucianism. Hence, the flourishing of Ch'an Buddhism in Chinese culture is not an accident.

In contrast to Taoism and Buddhism, Islam and Judaism have practically no followers outside the Muslim and Jewish groups. This fact is not due to any defect in their teachings when compared with other religions, but to the fact that it is said that Muhammad preached with the *Qur'ān* in one hand and a sword in the other. This story terrified the Chinese people, and they suspected that Islam was narrow-minded, although this is not actually the case. As to Judaism, the Biblical idea of Israel as a "chosen people" has been repulsive to the Chinese

people. Yet, the historical fact that the Jews who came to China in the T'ang Dynasty (618-907) were wholly assimilated with the Chinese people is significant. It is well known that Jews are difficult to assimilate. It is not improbable that the Jews of the T'ang Dynasty were influenced by the liberal spirit of the Chinese people and that their sense of belonging to a chosen people gradually melted away.

The Chinese attitude towards Christianity is rather complicated. It seems to be something between their attitude towards Taoism and Buddhism, on one side, and their attitude towards Islam, on the other.

Christianity is admired by Chinese because it is a religion for all men and not simply the religion of a single group. According to Christianity, all men who follow the ways of Jesus Christ can be saved. In this sense, it is broad-minded. When Jesuits first came to China in the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), their erudition in Chinese classics and their writings on the similarities between ancient Confucianism and Christianity won the hearty respect of the Chinese, and a number of Chinese became devoted converts to Christianity. Unfortunately, in the Ching Dynasty (1644-1912), the Pope of Rome ordained that Chinese Catholics be forbidden to join in the sacrificial ceremonies for their ancestors or for Confucius and other sages. The Chinese Emperor was irritated by this ruling and decreed that Catholic missionaries be forbidden to carry on their activities in China. So, the intolerance of an emperor towards the Catholics was, in fact, a reciprocal response to the intolerance of a Pope. The contact of China with the Western world was thus interrupted for almost two hundred years.

When Westerners came to China again two hundred years later, the forerunners were then not gentle churchmen but merchants and warriors. Since the Opium War China has been compelled to make many contacts with the West. As churchmen came to China at this time by the same boats as merchants and warriors, the Chinese people looked upon them, too, with suspicious eyes. They were suspected of being aggressive imperialists and covetous capitalists in disguise, or of being at least their tools.

Moreover, the majority of the Chinese who had been converted to Christianity at the end of the Ching Dynasty did not belong to the families of the nobles, and they even refused to participate in Chinese traditional and sacrificial ceremonies. At last, the so-called Boxer Rebellion broke out, and for the first time in the history of China, the Chinese practised religious persecution—towards Christianity. To most Chinese, this rebellion is considered as a criminal act. Consequently, the rights of missionaries stipulated in the treaty were interpreted as punishment imposed upon China for the evacuation of the Allied Troops of the Eight Nations from Peking.

Twenty years later (forty years ago), when the students of the Republic of China considered the penalty too severe, an anti-Christian movement broke out again, combined with an anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist movement. These movements led Chinese youth to believe in materialistic Marxism and Leninism, which are hostile to all religions as well as to the Western world. But, if one has only a little knowledge of modern China, he will not be misled by the communist occupation of Mainland China to conclude that the Chinese people are irreligious, materialistic by nature, or generally intolerant towards religions.

Outside of Mainland China, however, the influence of Christianity on the Chinese is advancing. There are many Chinese who have been converted to Christianity with inner sincerity and deep devotion. But, owing to the general poverty of the Chinese, on one hand, and Western economic and political policies, on the other, a Chinese, after being converted to Christianity, will usually seek and receive material benefits through Christian churchmen. I cannot say with confidence that Christianity is a religion deep-rooted in the culture and minds of the Chinese people.

A genuine Confucian may have a religious feeling of reverence for mystical union with Heaven or God through the realization of his moral nature, which is directly conferred from Heaven. However, it is not necessary for him to be converted to any particular institutional religion. According to the doctrine of the sameness of all humanity and the universality of Heaven, a genuine Confucian

believes that there is something common to all genuine religions, that the differences among religions should be considered simply as different ways of attaining the same goal, and that one should pay reverence to all the sages of all religions. It is not necessary for us to judge which of the sages is the greatest and has attained the highest state of spirituality. Is it not more humble for us to suspend judgment and keep silent on this question, concentrating our spiritual energy on admiring their greatness and cultivating our personalities towards attaining the stature they have attained?

The only thing that can solve the dis-union and collision of different religions is neither religious syncretism nor religious imperialism, but a reverent attitude towards all genuine religions, which are the different revelations of the same Heaven or God or Brahmā or Allah, and at the same time different expressions of the human religious spirit or human nature. This may be taken as a religious attitude towards religions themselves which will bring the world of religions into a "great harmony" and overcome all religious syncretism and imperialism.

In conclusion, we may quote a paragraph from the *Doctrine of the Mean*, which was supposed to have been written by a grandson of Confucius: "All things are nourished together without mutual injury. All ways are parallel without collision. The smaller virtuous merits flow as rivers. The greater virtuous merits fulfil the whole transformation. It is this which makes Heaven and Earth so great."

This is the essence of Confucian thought, which is also more or less implied in Taoism and Chinese Buddhism, and which also consciously or unconsciously expresses the Chinese attitude towards the religions of the world.

■ ■ ■

EARLY BUDDHIST ANATMAVĀDA

VISHWANATH PRASAD VARMA

I. Introduction

One of the most difficult problems of the history of philosophy has been to decipher the real meaning of Buddha's gospel.¹ The devout Buddhists of China, Japan and Tibet regard him (Buddha) as the personal embodiment of the highest metaphysical reality, something like the *avyaktam vyaktimāpannam* of the *Bhagavadgita*. In the later phases of medieval Hindu tradition, Buddha was regarded as an *avatāra* whose compassion was universalistic. Dharmakīrti considered him a herald of a critical revolt against Vedicism, traditionalism and philosophical absolutism. Since the middle of the nineteenth century kinship has been sought to be established between early Buddhism and the developments of modern Western thought. Buddhist *dukkhavāda* has been compared to the cosmic pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann; the notions of *anītyatāvāda* and *kṣhanikvāda* have been compared to the Bergsonian conception of dynamic reality and even to the phenomenistic and energetistic schools of physics; and the Buddhist emphasis on *maitrī* and *karuṇā* in a non-theistic context has inspired some of the social idealists, humanists and humanitarians. The Buddhist *anatmaavāda* has also been regarded as a remarkable precursor of the conception of "psychology without a soul"² and hence as comparing favourably with the advance of German

1. K. J. Saunders, "The Quest of the Historic Sakya-Muni", *Buddhist Studies* (1931), pp. 178-185; Kern, *A Manual of Indian Buddhism*.

2. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Calcutta, Sushil Gupta, 1961, 3rd Indian edition), p. 23, says. "It is a matter of surprise how long it has taken European Science to realize this doctrine, which is so clearly stated in numberless passages of Buddhist writ, and in one of them even in terms very nearly approaching to Hume's statement (*Samyutta*, iii, 46) : 'All Brahmins or Sra-

philosophy up to Brentano, French philosophy up to Bergson and British philosophy up to Bertrand Russell.¹

The problem of the soul has been ever present since the beginnings of human speculations.² The Vedas refer to *manas*, *asu*, *prāna* and *ātman*. In the Vedas the notion of a substantial human soul, independent of the body, which could survive bodily death began to develop. The dualism of the body and the soul is a persistent part of the Indian philosophical tradition. In the Israelite, Zoroastrian, and Islamic religions also, the question of a perdurable non-corporeal entity which will enjoy eternal felicity has been investigated. The Greek philosophers discuss the nature of the *nous* and the *psyche*. The patristic and scholastic philosophers were busy with the problem of the nature and destiny of the *anima*.

It is difficult to accept that there is an immediate universal intuition of the soul or of the self,³ as the spiritual entity which expresses itself through mental phenomena like thinking,⁴ feeling and willing. It is true

manas who attentively consider the soul, which so variously has been described to them, find either the five groups of phenomena (physical, feelings, ideas, volitions, or pure sensation), or one of them, etc. 'The stumbling-block has always been the supposed theory of transmigration of souls and its 'glaring' contradiction with the denial of soul Buddhism always had two languages, one for the learned (*nītartha*) and one for the simple (*neyartha*).'

1. Th. Stcherbatsky, "The Dharmas of the Buddhists and the Gunas of the Samkhya", *The Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X.

2. According to the ancient Egyptians, man was not an individual unity but a compound consisting of the body and of several immaterial parts called souls—the *Kā*, the *Ba*, the *Sekhem* which continued to exist separately even after death. Eliot, *Hinduism and Buddhism*, Vol I, p. 218. The ancient Egyptians who had great interest in problems of after-death believed that fate after death depended on actions of present existence. See *Precepts of Ptahotep* and *Book of the Dead*.

3. In this article the words 'soul' and 'self' have been almost interchangeably used.

4. The nature of the soul has been variously described in systems of Indian Thought. According to the Nyaya it is indeterminate unconscious, the Samkhya holds that the *purusha* is of the nature of

that some philosophers state that everybody experiences his "I-ness", but I think that this self-experience refers not to the direct experience of an autonomous spiritual substance but to the whole personality of a man which is a composite formation of bodily and mental phenomena. The acceptance of the human soul or self as a spiritual entity is not based on direct experience but is inferred on various grounds. It is a convenient hypothesis to explain the differences among men's fortunes. Furthermore, it provides a psychological solace to man who somehow wants to endure beyond death.

II. Views Regarding the Atman in the Upanishadic Literature

(1) *Absolutism* : The ancient Upanishads are a vast corpus of philosophical views. On the problem of the human self it is possible to point to at least four different kinds of views in them. The most important philosophical standpoint of the Upanishads is an absolutistic spiritualism which inculcates the identity of the human psychic entity¹ and the immanent cosmic and trans-cosmic *brahman*. The Upanishadic texts like *tattvamasī* regard the self as a spiritual principle which although it energises the human body is not a separate independent entity but is only a particularization or delimitation of the supreme spiritual real. Some of the schools of Indian philosophy like Samkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaisesika and Jaina-Mīmāṃsā accept the multiplicity of selves but according to the Upanishadic spiritual monism only the one supreme *brahman* is real and in its inmost essence the human being is identical with that. Some interpreters of Buddhism like Anand Coomaraswamy say that in his discourses Buddha does not refer to this absolutist view but I think that it is possible to allude some reference to

pure consciousness.

1. In the *Rigveda* the word *atman* first meant the vital spirit (from *an* to breathe), then it signified the self of the world (*R.V.* I, 164, 4) and finally it connoted the self of man. Besides *atman* the other terms that signified the soul in the *Rigveda* are *manas* and *asu*.

this monistic view in the Tripitakas.¹

(ii) *Animism* : In the first view of the Upanishads, mentioned above, the human *jiva* is considered to be only the personalized and individualized form of the supreme self as is evident from the statement—*anena jivenātmanā-nupravishya nāmarupe vyākaroṇi ti*². But there is present an entirely animistic conception of the word *jiva* in another statement of the *Chhandogya* : जीवापेत बाव किलेद म्रियते न जीवो म्रियते and also अथ यदेका साखा जीवो जहाति अथ सा शुष्यति द्वितीया जहात्यथ सा शुष्यति....

Here the word *jiva* is used in an animistic sense and is attributed the capacity of transmigration.³ This view I have called animistic⁴ since the tree is regarded as having the *jiva*⁵. It appears that the popular primitive conception of *jiva* has been given here a literary recognition. Thus it appears that even after the emergence of metaphysical monism, some place was provided in the Upanishadic literature to animistic notions which were current among the populace and which might have been taken from the tribal population.

(iii) *Quasi-Materialism* : The Upanishads also contain reference to materialistic views. In the *Katha*, which is a later poetical composition we get the following verse :

1. In Buddha's second discourse there is a reference to this view. See *Vinaya Texts*, pp. 100 ff

2. *Chhandogya*, VI, 3, 2.

3. There are animistic notions even in the *Rigveda* "There seems to be a belief in the Vedas that the soul could be separated from the body in states of swoon, and that it could exist after death . In a hymn of the RV. (X 58) the soul (*manas*) of man apparently unconscious is invited to come back to him from the trees, herbs, the sky, the sun etc." S. N. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 25.

4. For the Dravidian character of animism, G. W. Brown, *Studies in Honour of Bloomfield*, pp. 75 ff.

5. The views of Aristotle and Descartes regarding the residence of the soul in specific portions of the human mind are also animistic. Descartes in his *The Passions of the Soul* thinks that in the pineal gland the soul resides. The *Chhandogya Upanishad* says that there is a pond in the heart and therein the soul resides.

येयम्प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्त्यीत्येके नायमस्तीति चेके । एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं
वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः । देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं पुरा

(*Katha*, 1, 1, 20-21)

This Upanishadic passage shows that in those days there were two standpoints regarding the destiny of the soul—one view maintained that the soul continued to exist as an entity even after the extinction of the body and the other held that with physical death there was the disintegration of the soul also. Here there is the explicit mention of the view that according to one school of thinkers, after death, the soul ceased to exist. Thus it is held by this school that the soul existed only as long as the body did. This opinion resembles the belief of the Susikshita Charvakas (as distinguished from the Dhurta Charvaka) that the soul survived so long as the body did. To some extent the Upanishadic view mentioned here may also be compared to the view of the two principal Semitic religions—Christianity and Islam, according to which the soul lasted as long as the body but the vital difference between the above materialistic view (as mentioned in the *Kathopanishad*) and the Semitic view is that although the latter repudiates the notion of a beginningless soul it upholds that at the time of Resurrection¹ the souls would miraculously rise. The Upanishadic view, although partly resembling the materialistic standpoint in its advocacy of the notion that with death there is the disintegration of the soul, is immensely different from materialism to the extent that the latter (materialism) would not sponsor the notion of anything like the soul as an entity even during the living state of the body.

(iv) *Radical Pluralism* : A peculiar meaning of the word *Dharma* which implies that the Upanishadic literature even sanctions 'soullessness' has been put forward by the Russian academician Stcherbatsky. According to Stcherbatsky, early Buddhism is a radical pluralistic philosophy accepting the reality of seventy-five elements which are called *dharma* in that system. Although only

1. The dogma of resurrection (Latin *resurrectio*) is first foreshadowed in the Old Testament. In the New Testament it becomes an accepted tenet. See also Hodgson, *Resurrection of Human Body*, 1853.

the Sarvastivadins explicitly maintain this doctrine, there is sanction, according to Stcherbatsky, for this view even in the early Buddhist literature. He even goes on to say that this meaning of *dharma* as element which would imply the repudiation of a substantialistic soul is contained in a passage of the *Kathopanishad*. He says : "In the *Kathopanishad*, which belongs to this class, a doctrine is mentioned that is evidently strongly opposed to the monistic view of an immortal soul (*ātman*), and favours instead a theory of separate elements (*pythag-dharmān pasyati*). This theory is repudiated with the following remark : 'Just as rain-water that has fallen down in a desert is scattered and lost among the undulations of the ground, just so is he (philosopher) who maintains the existence of separate elements lost in running after nothing else but these (separate elements).' Professor H. Jacobi has shown that unorthodox opinions, opposed to the accepted soul-theory, are alluded to even in the oldest set of the Upanisads. These indications are made in the usual Upanisad style and are anything but precise. What emerges from the passage of the *Kathop* cited above is that there was a doctrine opposed to the reigning soul-theory, that it maintained the existence of subtle elements and separate elements (*pythag dharmān*) and that such a doctrine, in the opinion of the author, did not lead to salvation. Sankara, in his commentary, agrees that Buddhism is alluded to, but, very bluntly, he interprets *dharma* as meaning here individual soul. As a matter of fact, *dharma* never occurs with this meaning in the Upanisads. Its occurrence in the *Kathop* leaves the impression that it is a catchword referring to a foreign and new doctrine, some *anātma-dharma* theory."¹

The assertion of Stcherbatsky with reference to 'soullessness' in the *Kathopanishad* is too ingenious and even artificial. I have mentioned it, however, as an alternative hypothesis which was maintained with great seriousness by that Russian scholar.

1. Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Calcutta, Sushil Gupta, 1951, Indian edition), p. 58.

III. Buddha's Theory of Anattā

The difficulty with early Buddhist philosophy is that Buddha does not make categorical statements. Some teachers and reformers express themselves in explicit and clear terms and we know exactly where they stand. Dayananda Saraswati is one such example. On the other hand there are teachers who adopt positions of compromise and speak at different levels. Buddha, Samkara and Kant are examples of this second type. At the absolute metaphysical level Samkara repudiated God but accepted theism at the theological and devotional level. In the realm of pure reason there is no place for God according to Kant but he accepts God in the field of practical reason. Buddha was a cautious teacher and although sometimes he would claim that he had given out his teachings unreservedly, it appears that at other times he would make a distinction among his listeners and would refuse to disseminate some esoteric teachings to the unregenerate multitude. Sometimes he would list certain questions as *avyākṛita* and would not say either yes or no in answer to them. Thus it becomes most embarrassing to ascribe any explicit metaphysical position to him. This uncertainty is further increased by the difficulty of putting an uniform interpretation on the vast literature of the Tripitakas which might have been composed by different authors at different times. Thus Buddha has been regarded as an agnostic, a radical pluralist, an ethical idealist and a psychological negativist. Whatsoever be the position ascribed to him, it can always be countered by citing some clear or obscure passage from the Tripitakas.

During the Upanishadic period keen discussions were going on regarding the nature and destiny of the *atman*.¹ But in place of abstract metaphysical speculations, Buddha

1 It is possible that the remote root of Buddhist *anatman* may be found in the statement of Indra to Prajapati where the former says that the *atman* in the deep-dream state unrelated to the empirical consciousness appears like 'annihilated' (*vinashamevāptu*) *Cikhandogya*, VIII, 11, 1.

evinced a tremendously urgent concern for the elimination of the positive concrete fact of suffering. It is true that there are cosmological and eschatological discussions in the early Buddhist scriptures but the overwhelming burden of all these writings is the end of sorrow. The pragmatic approach to the cessation of suffering through an austere and disciplined life is ascendant in Buddhist thought. But although on account of his pragmatism and positivism Buddha could dismiss enquiries into the nature of the absolute, he could not remain silent on the problem of the human self because all questions of moral perfectibility and the extinction of suffering are concerned with the nature of the human personality and hence ethical discussions could not afford to ignore the problem of the human self.

Sometimes it is said that Buddha never denied the transcendent-immanent self¹ as inculcated in the Upanishads and his immediate purpose was merely to clear the ground for the triumph of the Upanishadic view which had been out of focus because of the revolt led by scepticism, agnosticism, determinism and materialism.² By denying to the empirical phenomenal psycho-physical *nāmarūpa* the character of selfhood, he was preparing the ground for the emergence of the absolutistic view of the self. Radhakrishnan ascribes such a role to the founder of Buddhism. He says : "Buddha clearly tells us what the self is not, though he does not give any clear account of what it is. It is however wrong to think that there is no self at all according to Buddha . . . Buddha is silent about the Atman enunciated in the Upanishads. He neither affirms nor denies its existence. . . Buddha consistently refuses to deny the reality of the soul."³ Radhakrishnan, at

1. In the *Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 17ff. there is a denial of immanence. According to *Alagaddupama Suttanta* of the *Majjhima Nikaya* the notion that world and soul are one has been repudiated.

2. Cf. the revolt of the six Tirthaka teachers, V. P. Varma, "The Decline of Vedic Religion", *Journal of the Bihar Research Society*, December, 1945.

3. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, I (Indian edition) pp. 386-89.

one place, even categorically ascribes to Gautam Buddha the role of a Upanishadic teacher and says : "The Upanisads arrive at the ground of all things by stripping the self of veil after veil of contingency. At the end of this process they find the universal self, which is none of these finite entities, though the ground of them all. Buddha holds the same view, though he does not state it definitely."¹ The "Vedantification" of early Buddhism attempted by Radhakrishnan appears untrue. If in his heart of hearts Buddha did adhere to the concept of a spiritual real, why was he shy of saying so. It must have been a stupendous task of self-deception (or hypocrisy ?) for Buddha to adhere to a monistic spiritualism and keep mum over it for forty-five years. If the Tripitakas are to be considered the basis for the views of Buddha, then the concept of 'Soullessness' seems to me to be the view of the founder of Buddhism.

There are three cardinal conceptions of early Buddhism—impermanence, non-soulism (*anattā*) and the gospel of sorrow. Since there is nothing permanent, it almost automatically follows that the soul or self as an abiding self-subsisting entity does not exist.² Soon after the *upasampadā* of the Panchavargiya Bhikkhus (which included Kondanya) Buddha delivered a sermon to them on *anatman* and emphatically stated that *rupa*, *saṃjñā*, *vedanā*, *samskāra* and *viññāna* do not constitute the self. The question, however, of anything besides this *name-rupa-skandha* being the self is an open one. One school of interpreters would argue that Buddha only meant to deny that the phenomenal categories are the self but he silently meant to assert the selfhood of something super-phenomenal. This positivistic interpretation derives partial strength from the last sermon of Buddha in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* where he exhorts his disciples to be *atmadīpa* (a light unto oneself) and *atma-saṃhāra* (a refuge unto oneself).

There are several references in the early Buddhist scriptures to the denial of the soul or self. In the *Anguttara Nikāya* it is stated : "Even so do men of true creed declare

1. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

2. The *Anguttara Nikāya*, III, 359.

the gnosis they have won—they tell of their gain (*artha*) but they do not bring in the ego.”¹ *The Samyutta Nikaya* contains similar repudiations of the ego : “When one says ‘I’, what he does is that he refers either to all the skandhas combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was ‘I’. Just as one could not say that the fragrance of the lotus belonged to the petals, the colour or the pollen so one could not say that the *rupa* was ‘I’, that the *vedanā* was ‘I’, or any of the other skandhas was ‘I’. There is nowhere to be found in the skandhas ‘I am’.”² In the *Simha Sutta*³ of the *Samyutta Nikaya* it is stated that Buddha taught the doctrine of the recomposi-

1. Cf. N. K. Bhagavat, *Early Buddhist Philosophy of the Theravada School*, (Patna University Readership Lectures), pp. 51-52 . “In his own days the Upanishadic doctrine of the Atman had assumed such disproportionate importance that the savants and dialecticians had expounded crude and absurd theories about it, and the whole of the *Brahmajalasutta* is an attempt at describing all those fantastic notions. That static concept of the soul had made the people inactive, self-sufficing, narrow-minded, dogmatic, and in the Buddhist sense heretics. Their narrow outlook created barriers between beings and beings, clans and clans, sects and sects and these contending units holding self seeking ends before themselves entirely forgot the loftier notion of universal life, the cultivation of the nobler states of *metta* or love towards all creation, the necessity of studying and giving up what was accidental and, therefore, compounded and aiming at what was uncompounded (*Asamikhata*) , deathless, undecaying and uncreated. So long had people stuck to the notion of the Soul or Ego no progress or spiritual edification or nobler conception of duty was ever to be dreamt of. In his first sermon Gotama, therefore, demonstrated the soulless character of life. In his *Anatta Pariyaya*, he struck at the root of the idea of ego. His teaching, though anticipated in the *Kathopanishad*, was not so pronounced and as such produced a revolution. He was, however, in his conception of the Ego too far ahead of his times. Mental states (*Chittas*), according to Gotama, were phenomena like other phenomena and nothing substantial as a soul or ego lay behind them. The names of things were merely concepts, when the component parts of consciousness were analysed, there was no residue.”

2. *The Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 13.

3. *The Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 85.

tion and dissolution of matter and he taught Baka that even the *brahmaloka* was not eternal. In this same *Samyutta Nikaya* it is stated that the world "is empty of a self or of anything of the nature of a self." When Ananda asks Gautama Buddha the meaning and significance of the phrase 'the world is empty' the latter says : "That it is empty Ananda, of a self, or of anything of the nature of a self. And what is it that is thus empty ? The five seats of the five senses, and the mind, and the feeling that is related to mind—all these are void of a self or of anything that is self-like."¹ In the *Majjhima Nikaya*² the doctrine of the permanence of the soul or self is regarded as a foolish doctrine. Thus it is clear that there are several explicit statements with reference to *anattā*.

Sometimes it is said that Buddhist *anattāvāda* is directed not so much against the metaphysical notions of the self as formulated in the Upanishads but against the primitive animistic views prevalent in the popular circles.³ But it is also true that some of the Upanishads themselves contain primitive and animistic notions. The *Kathopanishad* twice refers to the human soul as being of the size of the thumb (*angusthamātrah*).⁴ The *Svetasvatara* says that the human soul is of the same subtle size as the ten thousandth part of the tip of the hair. But Buddha would give no quarter to such conceptions.

Neither would he seriously consider the Jain conception of the soul as *sarvaparimāna*. Beyond the psycho-

1. *The Samyutta Nikāya*, IV, 54

2. *The Majjhima Nikāya* I, 138

3. 'There are some passages, however, in the early Buddhist literature which sound like denials of the Upanishadic notions of the self. The *Mūjhma Nikāya* I, 138 contains the following : "Since neither self, nor thought belonging to self, brethren ! can really and truly be accepted, is not the heretical position which holds 'this is the world and this is the self, and I shall continue to be in the future, permanent, immutable, eternal, of a nature that knows no change, yea, I shall abide to eternity', is not this simply and entirely a doctrine of fools ?"

4. In the "Savitri" section of the Mahabharata also it is said अंगुष्ठमात्रं पुण्ड्रं निश्चर्कं यमो बलान् । See B. G. Tilak, *Gita-Rahasya* (Hindi edition, p. 191).

physical organism or the *namarūpa-skandha* Buddha would refuse to acknowledge any other subtler metaphysical entity.

Buddha also says that the *viññāna* is not the self.¹ This statement has been interpreted as being directed against two schools of thought—the Upanishadic and the Jaina. Buddha has no sympathy with the conception of the soul as an abstract cogniser and he wants to repudiate the Upanishadic notion of the *viññāna* as Brahman.² He also repudiates the conception of the soul as one having consciousness as its essence. Buddha's view that the *viññāna* is not the self is further reinforced with the view that in the fourth and fifth stages of *dhyāna* there is the experience of *naivasamjñānāsamjñāyatana* and *samjñāvedayitanirodha*.

Besides the animistic and the Jaina notions of the soul, a third contemporary school repudiated by Buddha was that of Alara Kalama. In his early wanderings Buddha approached the renowned sage Alara Kalama and became his disciple "learning the successive degrees of ecstatic meditation." Alara taught the view that the individual soul when it abolishes itself is set free. "...having abolished himself by himself, sees that nought exists and is called a Nihilist; then like a bird from its cage, the soul escaping from the body, is declared to be set free; this is that supreme Brahman constant, eternal and without distinctive signs, which the wise who know reality declare

1. In the *Tanhasamkkhaya Sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya* (M N No 38) it is maintained that *Viññāna* is not only not to be regarded as the *attā* or the soul but is not to be conceived as even a life-long immaterial substance. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "Soul Theory in Buddhism", *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1903, says that *viññāna* is not an abstract entity but a series of intellectual processes or force-moments. But her statement that *viññāna* is 'hypothetical quasi-noumenal continuum of self-induced flashpoints of consciousness' is over-sophisticated. There seems, to me, no reason as to why *viññāna* should be regarded as hypothetical. Stcherbatsky has interpreted *viññāna* as the fundamental element of pure undifferentiated empty consciousness.

2. In the *Satapatha Brahmana*, X, 3, 5, 13, the self is defined either as mind or as consciousness.

to be liberation.’¹ Buddha objected to this doctrine on the ground that the liberated soul was still a soul, ‘and whatever the condition it attains, must be subject to rebirth,’² and ‘the absolute attainment of our end is only to be found in the abandonment of everything’.³

IV. Textual References to *Attā* in the Pali Scriptures

The overwhelming refrain of the Tripitakas is that there is no soul or self as a substance. In the preceding pages we have cited explicit references which negate any notion of a transcendent ‘I’. Nevertheless, there are certain passages and statements which mention the word *attā*. These do create a problem. Either it has to be accepted that there is inconsistency in the Tripitakas, which, considering the great bulk of this literature and also the fact that its different portions were composed at different periods, by several disciples, is not surprising, or it has to be accepted that the references to *attā* are to the empirical personality of man and not to a metaphysical substance.

(i) In the *Mahāvagga* Buddha asks the thirty Bhadravargiyas to make a search after the soul. Sometimes it is said that the word *attā* used here is merely taken from the current terminology and its sole purpose is to strengthen the resolve of men to follow the path leading to the extinction of sorrow and there is no implication of the definite positing of a spiritual entity as a self-subsistent being.

(ii) In the *Dhammapada* it is said : अत्ता हि अत्तनो नाथो को हि नाथो परो सिता. Here the word *attā* which is a Pali form of *atman* is used.⁴ This statement has a complete resemblance to this *shloka* of the *Bhagvadgita* :

1 Quoted in A Coomāraswamy, *Buddha and the Gospel of Buddhism* (Indian edition, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1956, p. 21).

2. *Ibid.*

3. *Ibid.*

4. The word *atta* is used in the sense of moral consciousness in the *Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 120, IV, 47; I, 169 and in the *Anguttara Nikaya*, III 255, 267, I, 149, III, 65 and I, 53.

उद्धरेदात्मनात्मानं नात्मानमवसादयेत् ।

आत्मैव ह्यात्मनो बन्धुरात्मैव रिपुरात्मनः ॥

(B. G., VI, 5)

(iii) Besides the use of the word *attā*, the words *ātmadīpa* and *ātmasharana* are also used in the *Mahāparinirvāna Sūtra*. The bhikkhus are exhorted to regard the *attā* as their light and refuge. Thus Gautama Buddha makes an emphatic and righteous protest against the doctrine of grace which is sponsored in some of the Upanishads as the *Katha*.¹ Buddha recognizes the dignity and worth of human personality and human efforts. Thus he repudiates the notions of the prophetic and mediating role of the Saviour. Buddha, thereby, denies having any pretension to supernatural authority or to kinship with any extraordinary immortal principle (although there are some other passages in the Tripitakas which may support such claims). However, it may be pointed out that these words *ātmadīpa* and *ātmasharana* cannot be taken as enunciations of the positive concept of the soul as substance. Their aim is to stress individual efforts but no metaphysical soul seems to be implied here.

(iv) In the *Samyutta Nikāya* (III, 25) it is said : "O ye mendicants, I am going to point out to you the burden as well as the bearer of the burden : the five states are the burden and the *pudgala* is the carrier of the burden; he who holds that there is no soul is a man with false notions." In this statement the duality of the *pudgala* (self) as the subject and the matter-stuff as the object is posited. Later on this *bhāravāhi* conception as formulated in the *Samyutta Nikāya* was taken up by the Sammitiyas and the Vatsi-putriyas and they adhered to the notion of a soul as distinct from the *nāmarūpa*.² This passage of the *Samyutta* does sanction the notion of a soul as a self-subsistent entity and unless it is explained away, as by A. B. Keith, as a reference not to any transcendental substance but only

1. The *Kāthopanishad*, I, 2, 23.

2. According to Stcherbatsky there is a difference between the *atta* and the *pudgala*. *Atta* connotes the psychical-physical self while the *pudgala* means a permanent soul. This distinction seems far-fetched.

to the popular empirical view, it is bound to prove a stumbling-block to the negativistic interpretation of early Buddhism.¹ I think that this is a very intriguing passage and it definitely sanctions the notion of a psychic entity. But perhaps it is alone in so categorical an assertion with regard to the *pudgala*. It might be taken as a later interpolation in view of its incongruence with the vast majority of other passages which sanction *anātmavāda*.

(v) There is a further passage in the *Samyutta Nikaya* which reads : "Then the wandering monk Vachchagotta spake to the Exalted one, saying, 'How does the matter stand, venerable Gautama, is there the ego ?' When he said this, the exalted one was silent 'How then, venerable Gautama, is there not the ego ?' And still the Exalted one maintained silence. Then the wandering monk Vachchagotta rose from his seat and went away. But the venerable Ananda said to the Exalted one : 'Wherefore sire has the Exalted one not given an answer to the questions put by the wandering monk Vachchagotta ?' 'If I, Ananda, when the wandering monk Vachchagotta asked me : 'Is there the ego ?' had answered, 'The ego is', then that Ananda would have confirmed the doctrine of the Sramanas and Brahmanas who believe in permanence. If I, Ananda, when the wandering monk Vachcha-

1 Th. Stcherbatsky, *The Central Conception of Buddhism*, p. 22. Buddhism never denied the existence of a personality, or a soul, in the empirical sense, it only maintained that it was no ultimate reality (not a *dharma*). The Buddhist term for an individual, a term which is intended to suggest the difference between the Buddhist view and other theories, is *santana*, i. e., a 'stream', viz. of interconnected facts. It includes the mental elements and the physical ones as well, the elements of one's own body and the external objects as far as they constitute the experience of a given personality. The representatives of eighteen classes (*dhatu*) of elements combine together to produce this interconnected stream. There is a special force, called *prāpti*, which holds these elements combined. It operates only within the limits of a single stream and not beyond. This stream of elements kept together, and not limited to present life, but having its roots in past existences and its continuation in future ones—is the Buddhist counterpart of the Soul or the Self of other systems.

gotta asked me, 'Is there not the ego ?' had answered, 'The ego is not', then that Ananda would have confirmed the doctrine of the Sramanas and Brahmanas who believe in annihilation." Oldenberg draws a negativistic conclusion from this dialogue and says that this passage leads to the Buddhist teaching 'the ego is not'.¹ But this means that Oldenberg is committing the fallacy of annihilationism which Buddha was anxious to avoid. Buddha inculcates the middle path between eternalism and annihilationism and as in his conception of *anichchavāda* so also in his conception of *anattāvāda* he steers a middle path; but Oldenberg puts an extreme view in his mouth. But although I agree that generally Buddha had a negativistic approach to the concept of the *attā*, I differ from Oldenberg since I think that this particular passage does not sanction *anattāvāda*.

V. Indirect Evidence and Implications in Support of Buddhist *Attāvāda*

(1) Although the general impression that has been left on my mind from a study of the Tripitaka literature is that Buddha did not believe in any self-subsistent human self or in any non-corporeal soul-entity, there are some literary references as well some indirect arguments to show that Buddha might have had belief in some kind of a spiritual entity that dwelt in the human body and which was an eternal immutable self.² In the *Samyutta Nikaya* occurs : "When one says 'I' what he does is that he refers either to all the *skandhas* combined or any one of them and deludes himself that that was 'I'."³ Here the empirical psycho-physical complex (*skandhas*) is denied the character

1. H. Oldenberg, *Buddha*, pp 272-273.

2. Poussin, "Attā in the Pali Canon", *Indian Culture*, Vol. II, 1935-36, does recognize that in the Pali literature there are many passages supporting *anatman* but few passages which support *attā*.

3. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 80 says . "It is no fit question to ask, who experiences contact ? Who is it that feels ? This is the right way to question . Conditioned by what is there contact ? Conditioned by what is there feeling ?"

of a permanent spiritual self but some positivistic interpreters of Buddhism argue that by denying the character of self to empirical categories, Buddha is indirectly arguing for a meta-empirical self.¹ In the famous *Dharma-chakra-pravartana Sutra* delivered at Sarnath, everything, subjective and objective, is denied the character of a self. Buddha says that what is evil and painful cannot be the *atman*. With reference to this passage also advocates of a spiritual self have put forward the interpretation that Buddha is only repudiating the character of selfhood to the empirical and phenomenal categories but is indirectly sponsoring his belief in a meta-empirical self. But I think that the question is still problematic and it is difficult to argue categorically that the denial of selfhood to the phenomenal modes implies the indirect positing of the reality of a transcendent superior 'I'.

(ii) The Buddhist monk is advised to view the objects of the world as 'This is not mine, I am not this' This statement may imply that the denial here refers only to the empirical elements and there is still a transcendent self which remains when the worldly entities pass away

(iii) One of the grounds in support of *atma-vāda* is the belief in heavens and hells. If after death the soul goes to heaven or hell in accordance with its merit or demerit then it necessarily follows that there must first be a soul. If there is first such a substance as the soul, only then does the question of its final destiny come up.² If a system believes in heavens and hells, then to be consistent it must adhere to the belief in the existence of a soul. The mythology of the Tripitakas is full of the mention of heavens and hells. Various gods, Yakshas and *gandharvas*³ are

1. Locke argued that there must be an enduring soul or self wherein the various mental operations of thinking, feeling and willing have their substratum

2. The Egyptian mythology was built upon the peculiar conception of the soul prevalent there

3. A peculiar significance is attached to 'gandharva' in some parts of Buddhist literature. According to the *Majjhima Nikaya* I, 265 and the *Anguttara Nikaya* I, 176 the *namarupa* can only develop if the *gandharva* descends in the womb.

also referred to. According to the *Dhammapada*, Buddha condemns a liar to hell. Buddha himself refers to his visits to the various *lokas*. Such an enormous mythology looks meaningless if there is no substantialistic soul. There is radical incongruity in believing in different kinds of heavens and hells and at the same time denying any entity as the self or the soul. If it were to be said that the 'character' or 'impressions' of a man transmigrate, then the stay of such shapeless subtle essences in heavens and hells is calculated neither to satisfy the critic nor to offer solace to the multitude.

(iv) Another indirect argument to substantiate a positive interpretation of Buddhist *attī* is the emphasis on *dhyāna*.¹ Without positing a spiritual principle it is impossible to explain the ascending scales of mystical consciousness. The adherence to the canons of *śīla* prepares an aspirant for *saṃādhi* and *saṃādhi* results in the attainment of *prajñā* or discriminative vision. This *prajñā* is the great attribute of the *samyak sambudha* and gives to him *dharma vipasyanā*. Commenting on the fourfold *dhyāna* of early Buddhism C. A. R. Rhys Davids has stated : "First, the attention by way of sense-cognition is hypnotically stimulated and concentrated, till mind working through sense is arrested. Then intellectual zest or keen interest dies away; and then mind as happy, easeful emotion ceases, and a sort of zero-point is attained, leaving the vaguer consciousness of wide abstraction : infinity of space; next, infinity of receptive consciousness, a potentiality of sensation and emotion, but with no actuality; then as it were a negative consciousness or awareness that the preceding stage so far from revealing any persistent entity, was 'nothing whatever'. Finally, a stage is reached, described as neither conscious nor unconscious, faint and delicate mentality fading into complete trance. And the expert Jhanist could so predetermine this self-hypnosis as to induce it and emerge

¹ H. Beckh, *Buddhismus*, Dr Heiler, *Die Buddhistische Versekung*; C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "Dhyāna in Early Buddhism", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. III, 1927.

from it when he chose.”¹ These grades of superior mystical illumination receive their ontological significance only if a positive interpretation is put on *attā* and belief in an ultimate spiritual reality, of which the human soul is a particularization, is attributed to Buddha.

(v) There are some references in the Buddhist scriptures to a blissful *nirvāna*. In the *Dhammapada*, *nirvāna* is regarded as the state of highest happiness. In the *Theragatha* and the *Therīgatha* one finds poetic descriptions of the rapturous and ecstatic state of nirvanic bliss. In the *Mahavagga* it is said that after enlightenment, Buddha enjoyed the bliss of that exalted state for a long time. These statements do not fit in with a negativistic notion of the final destiny of man. It is to be emphasized that if moral life has a purpose,² if mystical realization is not a myth and if the funeral pyre is not the final platform of the human personality then there must be an infinite spiritual principle in the cosmos and human life. Without ardent belief in the reality of the self as a substance, a man may become a giant hero and a gigantic intellectual, but spiritual life seems difficult and even meaningless and purposeless. The deep serenity and contemplative life of Buddha, his stress on the attainment of super-rational truth, which was the sure means to the cessation of suffering, and his perfect peace in the face of his approaching end do not receive their satisfying meaning in the context of a philosophy of non-soul. If only the gospels of soullessness and annihilationistic *nirvāna* are the final consequences of the most rigorous ascetic and ethical discipline, then early Buddhism would appear to be most unsatisfying both as a popular religion and as a true metaphysic. The dissatisfying character of early Buddhist negativism led, as a reaction, to the growth of popular ceremonialism and

2 C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 214-15. See also Suttas numbers 43 and 44 of the *Majjhima Nikaya*.

1. In the *Samyutta Nikaya* it is stated, however, that *brahmacharyavasa* is not possible on the supposition of the identity of the body and the soul, neither is it possible on the supposition of the difference of the body and the soul. (R. Samkrityayana, *Bauddha Darshana*, in Hindi, pp. 22-23).

idolatry and also to philosophic absolutism in the later developments of Mahayana religion and philosophy.

(vi) In the famous Buddhist formula of *trisharana* there is prescribed the surrender to Buddha, Dharma and Sangha. So far as surrender to Buddha is concerned, during his life time, it meant the acceptance of his spiritual leadership although he himself never made such a claim. Anyway, it can be argued that if Buddha was completely extinct after the *parinirvāṇa* then there was no sense in making a surrender to him. The element of surrender has a significance only if Buddha was subsisting as a spiritual being, may be, in some super-terrestrial regions.

These indirect evidences in support of *atmavāda* are indeed significant. A religion is a whole, and it has not to provide only certain abstract propositions of cosmology but has to give a philosophy of life to the people. Hence a number of compromises have to be made with popular views and prejudices and some of them are also incorporated in the religious system itself. Thus although I hold that at a philosophical plane Buddha expounded the notion of soullessness, I think that he was constrained, by the force of the environmental matrix wherein he operated as a religious leader, to include many notions and conceptions which appear crude from the standpoint of abstract soullessness. Unless we are prepared to regard the Tripitakas as a conglomeration of incongruent notions, we should say that although from the rigid canons of philosophical exposition Buddha adhered to soullessness, still, to provide energetic inspiration to the people, he had to speak at times in linguistic symbols which are more consonant with a positive belief in a soul.

VI. Western Interpreters of Buddhist Non-soul Doctrine

Western interpreters specially in the nineteenth century and the earlier part of the twentieth century put a negativistic interpretation on early Buddhism. Hegel regarded Buddhism as a creed of final negation. Edward Caird interpreted Buddhism as a doctrine of recoil upon the subjective and as a gospel of nirvanic extinction. Streeter in his *Buddha and Christ* and Mela-

med in his *Spinoza and Buddha* interpret Buddhism as a negative creed which denied the soul and the world. It is true that the Christian interpreters feel glory in contrasting the affirmative stress on the blessedness of the soul in Christianity and the nihilistic extinction of the soul which is all that Buddhism has to offer to man. But if this rather extreme interpretation has been put upon Buddhism, the early Buddhist scriptures, which are the sole sources for knowing what Gautama Buddha taught, and which have been so regarded by Buddhists for over two thousand years, are themselves to blame for that. There is no clear linguistic evidence to indicate that Buddha ever adhered to the notion of a transcendent self as the inmost essence of a man. The attempt to attribute a positive belief in some kind of a spiritual self to Buddha on logical and philosophical grounds of consistency, is always problematic. For making early Buddhism look like a positive creed of spiritual fulfilment, I would not sanction an interpretation which clearly goes against the letter of the Tripitakas. The Tripitakas, I would regard, as far more authentic for knowing the inner meaning of the gospel of Buddha than any modern attempts at "Vedantification" of Buddhism.

VII. Change in the view of C. A. F. Rhys Davids Regarding the Interpretation of Anatman

Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids has perhaps made the most widespread contributions in the field of early Buddhism. In her earlier publications like *Buddhism* and *Buddhist Psychology* she put a negativist interpretation on Buddhist *anattā* and wrote : "The anti-atta argument of Buddhism is mainly and consistently directed against the notion of a soul which was not only a persistent, encouraging, blissful, transmigrating superphenomenal being, but was also a being wherein the supreme *Ātman* or world soul was immanent, one with it, in essence and as a bodily or mental factor issuing its fiat."¹

1. The fundamental basis of Buddhist *anatmaśāda* was to challenge the supposed exemption of the *ātman* from the universal laws of causa-

But in her later writings she almost absolutely changed her standpoint¹ and began to propound that *anatta* is a later accretion² of monastic origin and is an imposition on the original gospel of Sakya Buddha which (the original gospel) was more or less constructed on the Upanishadic pattern. Referring to the *Samyutta Nikaya* (Kosala: *Uddānam* 1.5.)³ which she compares with the *Bṛihadaranyaka* refrain *ātmanahstu kāmāya sarvam priyam bhavati* she says: "I believe it is far more likely, that the original speaker of the verse used *attā* in the sense in which the original speaker of the Upanishad utterance used *ātman*. I believe it is far less likely that the Sakyan used *attā* in the sense in which Pitaka compilers came to use it, much later. For those two older speakers, the *ātman*, *attā*, was that more in each man who was potentially the Most in him."⁴ According to the interpretation of C. A. F. Rhys Davids the insistence on "becoming" would mean not

tion and impermanence C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Buddhist Psychology*, p. 32.

1. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "A Vanished Sakyan Window", *Indian Culture*, 1935-36. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "Relation between Early Buddhism and Brahmanism", *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. X, says that the concept of immanence as taught in the Upanishads is never attacked by Buddha. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "The Unknown Co-founders of Buddhism", *Journal of Royal Asiatic Society*, 1927. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "A Dynamic Conception of Man", *Indian Culture*, Vol. VI, 1939-40, "Buddha and not Buddhists", *Indian Culture*, Vol. III, 1936-37.

2. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "History of the Doctrine of Skandhas", *Indian Culture* Vol. III, 1935-36, says that the doctrine of the five skandhas is an editorial increment quite out of date and unworthy of the first Buddhist missionaries.

3. "The whole wide world we traverse with our thought,
And nothing find to man more dear than self
Since eye so dear the self to others is
Let the self-lover harm no other man"

(Spoken by Buddha to Prasenjit)

This verse also occurs in the Tibetan *Dhammapada* translated by Rockhill (but not in the *Pali Dhammapada*).

4. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, "Amity", *K. B. Pathak Commemoration*

an ontological via media between being and non-being but an ethical discipline for the realisation of the "potential" in man. The change of stand of C. A. F. Rhys Davids who has spent fifty years of her life-time in the study of Buddhism, is significant. But my own impression about the researches of C. A. F. Rhys Davids is that they are full of hair-splitting verbal dialectics and rely on imagination. She is willing to stretch words and phrases to yield meanings at which the original speakers would be staggeringly surprised. Her fantastic thesis of an original positive Buddhism and a later monkish asceticism is ridiculous. Furthermore she has not brought forward any single authentic passage which would convincingly show that Buddha believed in the spiritual substantialistic character of the soul.

VIII. Conclusion

Buddhism is unique among the religious systems of the world in having denied the substantial character of the soul. No other religion, Aryan or Semitic, has dispensed with soul. If the Tripitakas have to be followed, there is no doubt that *anattā* means the radical denial of the soul. The psycho-physical empirical categories have been denied the character of soul, in early Buddhism. The overwhelming silence about and even the occasional denial of the Upanishadic conception of the soul are almost conclusive to prove that Buddha did not subscribe to any soul—empirical or transcendent. It is a surprising phenomenon as to how such a negativistic creed could attain so much vigour and vitality and spread in so many areas of the world.

But although Buddhism denies the perpetually abiding character of any ego or self it cannot be regarded as being a materialistic creed. Its essential conception is the conditioned or dependent character of all phenomena. What was called the self or the *ātman* in pre-Buddhist literature is stated by Buddhism to consist of sensations and confor-

Volume (pp. 57-67), pp. 60-61, *Sakya or Buddhist Origins* (London, Kegan Paul, 1931), pp. 235-256.

mations. Buddha is an *anātmavādi* but not a materialist. If Buddhism were corporeal materialism, it would have repudiated an enduring soul and preached the reality of the body. But according to early Buddhism the body is no abiding reality.¹ It is a cluster of certain elements of physical phenomena and nothing more. Hence what exists is a mere process, a complex manifold interdependent phenomenal aggregation subject to origination, maturation and eventual extinction. It can be said that the aim of Buddhism is to teach the contingent character of all physical and mental phenomena and to repudiate any permanent, abiding, eternal self or substance. In place of the self-determined and self-sufficient character of simple entities, *anātman* is a registration of the flowing, relative and 'devoid of any soul' character of the physical-psychical complex.² The detailed categorization of matter, perception, feeling, conformation and consciousness in the *namarūpa-skandha* has been done only with a view to preach the soullessness of any of the possible material and mental factors.

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1. According to the *Samyutta Nikaya*, III, 157, body and mind "are impermanent, are liable to suffering, and without soul."

2. Cf. The *Samyutta Nikaya*, V, 10, 6. The statement in the *Samyutta* has also been quoted in *The Questions of King Milinda*, II, I, 11.

THE DIALECTIC OF ATOMISM

WILLIAM S. WEEDON

It must be allowed at the outset that "atomism" in the Western tradition is not one idea, but many. It is hardly worth remarking that the "first beginnings" of which Lucretius speaks are very different from the chemical atoms of Dalton, and that both of these are radically distinct from the primate quasi-particles of contemporary physics. These items are rather loosely linked by the general notion of indivisibility, but the contexts in which this idea is interpreted are widely different in the three cases.

The task of this essay is not, however, that of trying to connect the different uses of the word 'atom' in Western thought, but, rather, that of tracing a certain cosmological theme which begins in classical Greek philosophy and finds its roughly present-day manifestation in the organic theory of A. N. Whitehead. I venture to call this development a "dialectic", since, like the so-called "early" dialogues of Plato, it issues in a kind of meta-stable cosmic insight in connection with which further dialectical development seems desirable.

In this brief discussion, it is necessary to omit consideration of the initial phases of the history of atomism. In spite of the small amount of material which is available concerning Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus, a great deal could profitably be said concerning these early speculators. Also, tempting though it is, at least for purposes of comparison, to consider such well-developed doctrines as the Vaisheshika theory of the atom,¹ these Eastern philosophies must be set aside as not being directly ingredient to the tradition which is under examination. So, it is with Lucretius' *De Rerum Natura* that we begin,

¹ See, for example, S. C. Chatterjee and D. M. Datta, *An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (3rd ed., Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1948), pp. 261 ff.

taking this as the initial definitive statement of atomic cosmology in Western thought. The text is now, after Bailey's monumental translation and commentary,¹ fairly well standardized and familiar to all

Lucretius asserts that all-that-is, is of two sorts. Being is divided into a kind which he calls "body" and a kind which he calls "void." To this statement, he adds his first "closure postulate": There is no third kind in "Nature." Of bodies, there are two sorts: Simple and Composite. The simplicity means, specifically, "non-divisibility by mechanical means"; and the non-divisible bodies are called "atoms". This is a curious kind of determination by negation, in respect of an operation which can be performed on all "bodies" except atoms. All atoms have "parts," since size and shape are properly predicable of them; but the parts are not capable of existing apart from the wholes, in contrast with the case of composite bodies. With regard to the "void" in respect of part and whole, Lucretius is curiously silent, save that the argument from the flying dart (*volatile telum*)² strongly suggests that it is an actual infinite, incapable of increment through addition.³ But, as regards the atoms, Lucretius holds that they endure everlastingly, that they move, and that they are themselves incapable of alteration. We have to ask what these statements, taken literally, may be thought to mean, and whether they are compatible.

1. That the atoms are everlastingly enduring presumably means that, for a given atom X , there was and will be no time, t_n , when X was not that self-same identical atom. Now, this can be intelligible, it seems, only if "self-identity" can be given some significance; and there are at least two difficulties which arise. (a) Lucretius insists, not merely that there are innumerable many atoms, but that within any one type there are an infinite number

1. *Titus Lucretius Carus De Rerum Natura*, edited with Prolegomena, Critical Apparatus, Translation and Commentary by Cyril Bailey 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon, 1947).

2. Bk. I, line 970

3. This is, by the way, one of the earliest *Gedankenexperimente* in the literature.

of atoms. The types are differentiated by size, shape, and weight. This is the second closure postulate; the atoms have no other qualities. Weight is not an independent variable, since each atom is "full" (i.e., there is no void within it) and all are made of the same stuff; hence, weight is a function of the absolute volume—which is, of course, determined by size and shape. It would follow, then, that, if two atoms belong to the same type and if type is determined only by size and shape, then two atoms of the same type are absolutely indistinguishable—unless, indeed, something has been left out of the picture. But what can have been left out? There is no theory of "space" to help at this juncture, for the "void" is simply the absence of atoms, and is structureless (in a sense which I shall try to make clear in a moment). Still less can Lucretius invoke any *qualitative* diversity among members of the same type. I venture to raise this old metaphysical chestnut because, first, it did get Leibniz started on a different, though closely related, train of thought, but, second and more particularly, the point has again been raised by Professor Max Black,¹ who has chosen to re-examine the principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles in his example of the "two spheres." Now, the point is simply this: If Black is right, then the basis of self-identity in a system such as Lucretius' becomes extremely problematical. There is every reason for saying that atom "X" at time " t_n " (which I call " X_{t_n} ") is not identical with " X_{t_m} ". Thus the diversity which Lucretius asserts for space holds for time as well, and the idea of "enduring everlastingly," or even of "enduring" at all, goes by the board. At the moment, I do not wish to be understood as agreeing or disagreeing with Black; his illustration is, I think, more complex than first appears, and I wish to return to it later. (b) The second difficulty relates to the way in which "time" stands to the atoms. Take the atom X, again. We have suggested that Lucretius affirms that there is no time, t_n , at which X was not. But we note that it does not follow from this that *to be*,

1. "The Identity of Indiscernibles", *Mind*, LXI, No. 242 (April, 1952), 153-164.

and to be at a given time t_n , are one and the same thing. The status of "was," "will be," and "is" are not clear, and certainly the statements, "The atom, X, is" and "The atom, X, is at time t_n ," are significantly distinguishable linguistic formulations. Time either makes a difference to the atoms, or it does not. If it does, then the atoms must be essentially in time in some sense, and this is difficult to understand. Lucretius' account of time is far from clear; he is evidently combating the Stoic doctrine, which makes time not merely a separate existent but a substance, which would then, in Lucretius' terms, be a "third" in Nature. It does seem reasonably evident that Lucretius¹ wants to make motion prior to time—so, it is to motion that we must next turn.

2. Most writings dealing with Lucretius state that his atoms are "capable of motion"—which is inaccurate. The atoms *are* in motion. Potentiality extends only to change of motion. Lucretius states that the atoms fall downward all of the time; and, unless they impinge on one another, or swerve, they fall at a constant rate. Now, without bothering to go into detail here, we may note that, since "motion" means change of place, we must have a notion of place; and, since the rate of fall is said to be constant (under conditions where neither the swerve nor inter-atomic bumping are occurring), we seem to need the notion of distance as associable with the void. With respect to the first of these, it is difficult to see how "place" can have any meaning at all unless some definite character is ascribed to the void. A body in motion must leave the place where it was (in some sense) "behind it." Aristotle's finite plenum permits of this idea's being made intelligible; but a complete void which is actually infinite would appear to make the notion meaningless.

With respect to the second requirement, namely, distance, we may approach the problem in a different way. Suppose we consider two atoms, say "X" and "Y," which, for purposes of simplicity, we will regard as of the same species, symmetrical, and devoid of "hooks." We suppose also an emptiness (a "lack" of atoms) which "extends"

1. Bk. I, lines 459-481.

from one side of the superface of X to one side of the superface of Y. Now, when we enquire concerning the magnitude of this "void," either "magnitude" has the same meaning as it has in connection with the 'size' of the atoms, or it has some other meaning. If the latter, then motion of an atom has no direct relation to impingement, and the system seems to fall asunder. If "magnitude" has the same meaning, then we may ask whether the size of the interval is greater or less than the diameter of either of the atoms in question. The only significant way of assuming this question to be answerable would appear to be in terms of the hypothetical operation of attempting to insert an atom of the same species as X and Y between X and Y. But, the very notion of between-ness assumes a topological character for the void, so that a form of definiteness is ascribed to it. And, even waiving this point, unless the significance of alignment is assumed, X and Y may each touch the third atom without a univocal relationship being established. Further still, suppose I assume the general topological and elementary projective order for the void; by what logic do I establish the maintenance of magnitude for the interval once the atom which mutually makes contact with the other two is removed? I simply note in conclusion that considerations of this sort make utter nonsense of the idea of a finite or infinite magnitude for the void.

3. We now turn briefly to the characters of the atoms themselves, which are said to be invariant under motion. Lucretius' doctrine, that there are only a finite number of atomic types, seems to be based on two main points. First, he wishes to distinguish his own theory from (what he thinks, probably quite incorrectly, to have been) that of Anaxagoras- for in Anaxagoras' theory, he believes, there is no gain in economy. Lucretius' point is that it is possible to account for the wealth of qualitative diversity by means of only a limited number of basic qualities. Second, he apparently wishes to distinguish his doctrine from a simple hypostatization of solid Euclidean geometry. Geometrically speaking, for a given shape, an infinite number of sizes is possible; and, for a given size, an infinite number of shapes is possible. But, in two curious

passages,¹ he seems to argue that all atomic volumes are multiples of "least building blocks." This quantum idea can be interpreted in somewhat the following way: A given atom may be, say, 13/27th the size of another atom of the same shape, but not 13/54ths its size. Of course, these parts of the atoms, these building blocks, cannot, according to his theory, be actually separated by any mechanical means, from their immediate neighbors, with which, of course, they are in direct contact without any intervening void. For example, if these least parts are thought of, say, as little cubes of the same size, each cube could have at most 26 immediate neighbors. If Lucretius had ever read Aristotle's *Categories* we might regard this curious doctrine as a weird sort of corruption of section 1a 22-23; these least building blocks are present in an atom both as parts in a whole and as incapable of existing apart from the atom. The model is a static one, of course. The atoms have no internal *kinesis*, they are fully concrete, not concrescent. The atom exists in "solid singleness" (*solida primordia simplicitate*), so that there are no boundaries to mark off these units of which each atom is composed. Indeed, how could such boundaries be conceived? To introduce any sort of notion of a "skin" or "cell wall" would be to violate the whole reduction by which atomism itself is reached. And to introduce any sort of internal rearrangement of these building blocks would be to jeopardize the atom's absolute indeformability—a doctrine which is most necessary if the size and shape of the atoms are to be the basis for the explanation of the properties of composite bodies.

Now, one could regard this whole doctrine as an isolated and unimportant detail of Lucretius' system² were it not for the fact that a closely related difficulty—which has attracted, as far as I know, no attention among commentators—arises in connection with inter atomic contact. Suppose that two atoms come into contact—i.e., they "bump"—and then rebound, or separate again. Now,

1. Bk. I, lines 604-614, and Bk. II, lines 478-499

2. It is also found, by the way, in Epicurus' writings, See Secs 5. 55-59 of the *Epistula ad Herodotum*.

at the moment of contact, there is an unbroken, continuous expanse of stuff extending from the outer extremity of the one atom, through the area of contact, on to the outer extremity of the other atom. The question is : How is it that the original atomic boundaries are exactly re-established when the atoms part company ? As we saw just a moment ago, the assumption of any sort of distinct dermal component, either for the building blocks of the atoms or for the atoms themselves, is contrary to the basic ideas of Lucretius' atomic system. To say that the atoms "do so" retain their pre-contact size and shape after they have rebounded is, of course, to beg the question.

I hardly think it necessary to labor this matter. A great deal more remains to be said concerning this appallingly difficult notion of "bumping" (which has been so cavalierly assumed, throughout much of the history of Western thought, as simple and obvious—which, to my mind, it most certainly is not); but I trust that enough has been said to indicate that there is a problem here, and a very serious one. There is just one other related item that I wish to note before proceeding. It does not require an F. H. Bradley to point out that the very ideas of "size" and "shape" as applied to the atoms of Lucretius' system are really, in the end, unintelligible. By what principle can a perfectly homogeneous stuff, no one part of which is distinguishable *per se* from any other part, be said really to have extensity, or so much of it, or in such and such a direction ? Lucretius' attempt to talk of "building blocks" may have been invoked, in this connection, to try to stave off the difficulty; but, if so, it is a flimsy and useless subterfuge.

Now, I have avoided a discussion of the more usual difficulties which are generally cited in connection with the Epicurean-Lucretian thesis because I have, quite frankly, got rather tired of them and, second, because those objections are primarily against "materialism" *per se* rather than against "atomism." We may note the following dialectical propositions as emergent from the antecedent discussion :

- (A) The atoms must be, yet cannot be, many.
- (B) The atoms must be, yet cannot be, extended.

- (C) The atoms must be, yet cannot be, self-identical.
- (D) The atoms must be, yet cannot be, in motion.
- (E) The atoms must, yet cannot, influence each other.

Of these difficulties, some are based on an interpretation of scattered remarks occurring in Leibniz's writings, and it is to Leibniz that I would now like to turn in connection with the next movement of the dialectic.¹ And Leibniz confesses that, at one time in his life, he subscribed to the atomic account :

In the beginning, when I had freed myself from the yoke of Aristotle, I had taken to the void and the atoms, for they best fill the imagination; *but on recovering from this*, after many reflections, I realized that it is impossible to find the principle of a *true unity* in matter alone or in that which is only passive.²

Note that Leibniz does say that the doctrine of atomism "best fills the imagination," a remarkable assertion which Spinoza comes close to duplicating (in a letter to Hugo Boxel of October, 1674) . Leibniz's repudiation of "passivity" coincides with his rejection of the imagination as the cognitive activity appropriate to form.

Therefore, to find these real unities, I was compelled to have recourse to a formal atom . . . I thence found that their true nature consists in force, and that there ensues something analogous to feeling and appetite; and that, accordingly, they must be conceived in limitation of the idea we have of Souls. . . . I call them. . . *primitive Forces* which do not contain only the *act* or complement of

1 I remark in passing that a good part of the relevant material is included in English translation, in Professor Leroy E. Loemker's most useful two-volume edition : *Gottfried Wilhelm Von Leibniz : Philosophical Papers and Letters* (Chicago . University of Chicago Press, 1956).

2. *Journal des Savans*, June 27, 1695 See Philip P. Wiener, ed., *Leibniz Selections*, (New York . Charles Scribner's Sons, 1951), p. 107. (Italics mine.)

3. *Epistola* 56.

possibility, but, further, an *origivative activity*.¹

Now, Leibniz's route through the matrix of dialectical propositions noted above can best be understood in relation to two other routes, namely, those followed by Newton, on the one hand, and by Spinoza, on the other. My contention is, very simply, that all three of these positions with respect to "atomism" present further dialectical difficulties, whose resolution is attempted in the cosmology of Whitehead. Within the limits of this brief paper, the positions of these three men (whose lives overlapped to a considerable extent)² must necessarily be highly simplified; but enough can be given to make the pattern reasonably clear.

I begin with Newton. In the Third Edition (1721) of the *Opticks*³ he writes :

It seems probable to me that God in the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, impenetrable, movable particles, of such sizes and figures, and with such other properties and in such proportion to space, as most conduced to the end for which He formed them; and that these primitive particles, being solids, are incomparably harder than any porous bodies compounded of them; even so very hard, as never to break in pieces : no ordinary power being able to divide what God himself made one in the first creation.

The firm assertion of "atomism" of a very Lucretian variety is evident, albeit the structure of his "Natural Philosophy and System of the World" does not, as such, depend directly upon it. The contrast between Newton's "primitive particles" and Leibniz's "primitive Forces" is, however, most revealing. Many of the dialectical difficulties remain rather obviously unresolved in Newton's account, for he is never one to dabble in metaphysical subtleties; for him, the principle, "*Natura enim simplex est*," is a true inscription over the Gates of Heaven, printed

1. *Op. cit.*, pp. 107-108.

2. Spinoza : 1632-1677; Newton : 1642-1727; Leibniz : 1646-1716.

3. pp. 375-376.

in a language readable by any 'Englishman. Newton's contribution to the dialectic consists essentially in the attempt to formulate the ideas of space and time in a way which obviates some of the difficulties of the semi-characterless void of classical atomism. He remarks in the Third Book of the *Principia*:

If all the solid particles of all bodies are of the same density, and cannot be ratified without pores, then a void, space, or vacuum must be granted.¹

This, stated in hypothetical form, is virtually a duplication of a Lucretian thesis, given in Book I of *De Rerum Natura*. Newton's theory of space, however, supplied the void with the properties of the particles which are "in" it, save for weight and solidity. It is noteworthy that the idea of "rigidity" is associated with the notion of "permeability," so that (in Newton's words) space remains "always similar and immovable." He continues: "That the primary places of things should be movable is absurd. . . . Now no other places are immovable but those that, from infinity to infinity, do retain all the same given position to one another; and upon this account must ever remain unmoved; and do thereby constitute immovable space." This "immovable space" is conceived by Newton as fully actual and as "absolute" in at least three senses. First, it is absolutely devoid of potentiality for change; the groupings and re-groupings of bits of material within it in no sense modify its character. It is thus completely external to another "absolute," i.e., time which occupies a co-ordinate status. ("Every particle of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is *everywhere*."²) Second, space is absolute in respect of its lack of impendence to material bodies, which move through it. And, third, it is absolute in respect of its metric, and can thus—horrible fiction!—be imagined as populated by innumerable rigid rods belonging to three families such that, through any point of space, three and only three such rods will pass, each rod

1. Prop. VI, Cor. 4.

2. Scholium to Def. VIII of the *Principia*.

3. General Scholium to Bk. III of the *Principia*. (Italics mine.)

being perpendicular to the other two.

This easy mathematization of Nature is, of course, wide open for sophisticated criticism of the sort later supplied by Whitehead under the rubric of "Misplaced Concreteness," the general components of which were anticipated by Leibniz. Quoting from his letter to De Volder of 19 January, 1706:¹

But we confuse ideal with real substances when we seek for actual parts in the order of possibilities, and indeterminate parts in the aggregate of actual things.

And, again, in his 5th communication to Clarke, somewhat peevishly :

There are imaginations of philosophers who have incomplete notions, who make space an absolute reality. Mere mathematicians who are only taken up with the conceits of imagination are apt to forge such notions, but they are destroyed by superior reasons.²

And, still again, in his letter to De Volder of 30 June, 1704 :

For as I have repeatedly reminded you—though you seem to have neglected my reminders—extension is an abstraction from the extended, and can no more be considered substance than can number or multitude.³

Leibniz's own view is given, in brief, in the third letter to Clarke :

As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is; that I hold it to be an order of coexistence as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time.⁴

In sum, for Leibniz neither atoms in the void (where both atoms and void are taken as real) nor particles in

1. Loemker, *Op. cit.*, Vol II, p. 879

2. *Ibid.*, p. 1141.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 874.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 1108.

space (where both particles and space are taken as real) will do. Leibniz holds that the only proper way to conceive an "atom" is as a non-extended spiritual "monad," a unit of "primitive Force," each differentiated from the other "monad" by either or both of the fundamental forms of activity appropriate to such unities, i.e., perception and appetite, and broadly classifiable into types in no other way. In a letter to Des Bosses, dated 26 May, 1712,¹ he states that "in themselves, monads have no situation (*situs*) with respect to each other"; thus Leibniz denies that the "true atoms of nature"² are in space at all. In place of Lucretius' variables of "size" and "shape" (each of which has a finite range of discrete values), Leibniz substitutes intrinsic forms of activity which are sufficient, in the first place, to satisfy the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles, and, second, to permit of such typification as may be required. If space can be said to be "anywhere," it must be said to be "in" the monads as a part of the phenomenal order. Leibniz would, I suspect, contest Black's example of the two spheres (previously referred to) as falling entirely within this imaginative domain, since "spheres" require a spatial order for their meaningfulness to be realized. Even within these limits, there are some difficulties with Black's example, since one sphere is "here" and the other "there". It is not clear to me whether the two spheres are to be understood as imbedded in a Newtonian or in a Leibnizian manifold.

Now, I do not wish to say that Leibniz himself is entirely clear on the relation of his atoms, the "monads," to space. The dominant tenor of his argument leads in the direction of assimilating space to the monads; yet, I feel that Ivor Leclerc³ puts the case too strongly when he holds that Leibniz completely identifies "phenomenality" and "ideality" in connection with "space." It appears to me, rather, that at times Leibniz is disquieted by the

1 *Ibid.*, p. 980.

2 *Ibid.*, p. 1044.

3. Ivor Leclerc "Whitehead and the Problem of Extension": *Journal of Philosophy*, LVIII, No. 19 (September 14, 1961), 559-565.

radical separation of the real from the phenomenal order, and suggests¹ that the monads have situation in space (and time) as point-elements, somehow of the nature of a "differential." On the whole, he seems to back away from this position just as it begins to crystalize in his writings—and perhaps for two reasons: first, because of a realization of the ancient difficulty originally raised by Zeno of Elea, that extended magnitude cannot be constituted of unextended elements; and, second, because of the vague apprehension of a difficulty arising from the relativity of space—namely, that, if the relativity of space be affirmed, a point can no longer be regarded as a simple entity.² There is a great deal more to be done here in the way of a close scrutiny of the Leibniz texts than has thus far been carried out, especially as regards his notion of "primitive Force."

But, quite aside from matters of historical scholarship, the question at issue is of high intrinsic interest in connection with the viewpoint of contemporary science, *vis-a-vis* its metaphysical foundations. There is no question that present-day physics is moving strongly away, in its account of the nature of primate particles, from any sort of spatial models; but the relationship of "formal" (i.e., mathematical) models to the experiential field is, at the moment, highly ambiguous. Where natural science claims to be founded on observation and experiment, there is a difficulty here whose resolution is urgently called for. I shall not here undertake a detailed discussion of this matter. I note, simply, that the problem emerges as a part of the dialectic of atomism. The temper of contemporary philosophy is to try to find a way to avoid it. Whitehead alone among recent writers seems to feel that it merits direct examination and resolution.

Now, Leibniz's general tendency in his writings seems to be to put space and time on the same footing. In his

1. Cf. Leibniz's essay "On Nature Itself" (1698), particularly Sec. 11, and the earlier portions of the De Volder correspondence. Translated by Loemker, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 808-872.

2. See A. N. Whitehead, *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge: at the University Press, 1920) p. 136.

9th letter to De Volder he writes :

For *space* is nothing but the order of existence of things possible at the same time, while *time* is the order of existence of things possible successively. As physical body is to space, so the status or series of things is to time.¹

Now, while this may be all very well for time so far as it is considered in connection with the phenomenal order, there is a grave difficulty so far as the units of "primitive Force" are regarded as fully concrete entities. If I read Professor Charles Hartshorne's article, "Strict and Genetic Identity" aright,² the difficulty is fatal for the simple-minded view of the monads as active, for then they must be, in some sense, "in" time. I see no evidence that Leibniz ever came to reckon with this problem; if he had, it might well have conduced him to direct his idea of "primitive Force" in a wholly different direction. The difficulty here is summarized from the other side in Whitehead's 1926 essay "Time": "If time be taken seriously, no concrete entity can change."³ Briefly, if all the *denominationes intrinsicas* belong to a given monad, and if activity involves difference, then diverse properties are ascribed to the self-same identical monad. To say that these differences are resolved if "time" is taken into account, is, first of all, to put the monads "in" time (which jeopardizes their substantiality), and, second, to say that the *denominationes intrinsicas* are not really intrinsic—which is nonsense. In brief, the atoms (i.e., Leibniz's "monads") must be, yet cannot be, in time. And, on this point, Spinoza seems to have seen more deeply—even though the writings in question in general antedate those of Leibniz.

It is perhaps unorthodox to regard Spinoza as an atomist, yet there is every reason so to consider him. Though "substance," for him, is both numerically one

1 Dated 30 June, 1704. Loemker, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 874.

2. See *Structure and Meaning* (New York : Liberal Arts Press, 1951).

3. *Proceedings of the 6th International Congress of Philosophy*, 1927, pp. 59-64.

and essentially one (i.e., "simple"), it is most emphatically indivisible. Prop. XII of Part I of the *Ethics* states: "No attribute of substance can be truly conceived from which it follows that substance can be divided," and the demonstration proceeds:

For the parts into which substance thus conceived would be divided will or will not retain the nature of substance. If they retain it, then (Prop. 8) each part will be infinite, and (Prop. 6) the cause of itself, and will consist of an attribute differing from any other part (Prop. 5), so that from one substance more substances could be formed, which (Prop. 6) is absurd. . . . But if the second case be supposed, namely, that the parts will not retain the nature of substance, then, since the whole substance might be divided into equal parts, it would lose the nature of substance and cease to be, which (Prop. 7) is absurd.¹

Spinoza continues in Prop. XIII: "Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible." And, of course, Spinoza has previously shown to his satisfaction in Prop. VII that "every substance is necessarily infinite." Nevertheless, he returns (in the long *Scholium* which follows Prop. XV) to the particular case of extended substance:

If . . . anyone should attempt to conclude that substance extended must be finite, he would, forsooth, be in the position of a man who supposes a circle to have the properties of a square, and then concludes that it has no center, such that all lines drawn from it to the circumference are equal.

Spinoza is here beginning to develop the distinction between "imagination" and "conception" which comes to a focus in the famous "Note 2" to Prop XL, Part II, of the *Ethics*; and he continues:

If, nevertheless, anyone should now ask why

1. All questions from the *Ethics* are taken from W. H. White, trans., *Ethics preceded by On the Improvement of the Understanding by Benedict de Spinoza*, ed., with an Introduction by James Gutmann. No. 11 (rev. ed., New York: The Hafner Library of Classics, No. 11, 1955).

there is a natural tendency to consider quantity capable of division, I reply that quantity is conceived by us in two ways : either abstractly or superficially, that is to say, as we *imagine* it, or else as substance, in which way it is *conceived* by the intellect alone. If, therefore, we regard quantity...as it exists in the *imagination*, we find it to be finite, divisible, and composed of parts; but if we regard it as it exists in the intellect, and *conceive* it in so far as it is substance...we find it to be infinite, one, and indivisible. (Italics mine.)

The same point is made in his letter to Ludovicus Meyer.

If we consider quantity as it is in the imagination, as happens most frequently and most easily, it will be found to be divisible, finite, and composed of parts...Hence one can see clearly that Measure, Time, and Number are nothing but Modes of thought, or rather, of the imagination.¹

Now, from this it follows that since man's mind, as well as his body, consists in a certain modification of an Attribute of Substance—that is to say, a “Mode”—time is, without equivocation, in Substance. So, too, as it turns out, is space. Spinoza is vastly more emphatic on this matter than is Leibniz, and, to my reading, far clearer. This does not mean that Spinoza's system is necessarily superior. But it is most necessary to take count of it, since, first of all, it represents a unique stage in the historical dialectic of atomism, and, second, because it was not without its influence on subsequent theories.

Spinoza's cosmological ideal carries with it certain drastic consequences. First, imagination and reason stand in radical opposition far more than in Leibniz's system. Second, there is absolutely no room for any real novelty; temporal process necessarily becomes, in Professor Bidney's words, “illusory and meaningless”.² And, third,

1. *Epistola* 50, dated 20 April, 1663 A. Wolf, ed. and trans., *The Correspondence of Spinoza*, (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1928).

2. See David Bidney, *The Psychology and Ethics of Spinoza* (New

the relation of finite truth to infinite being becomes an enigma, resolvable only on the doctrine that there is no such thing as 'finite truth' at all. A less resolute spirit than Spinoza's might have shuddered at these conclusions; but Spinoza has at least the virtue of standing fast. His position has the great merit of forcing the issue. Whitehead pays tribute to Spinoza when he says :

The philosophy of organism is closely allied to Spinoza's scheme of thought. But it differs by the abandonment of the subject-predicate forms of thought....(and by the fact that) morphological description is replaced by description of dynamic process. Also Spinoza's 'modes' now become the sheer actualities; so that, though analysis of them increases our understanding, it does not lead us to the discovery of any higher grade of reality.¹

Again, Whitehead remarks :

Spinoza bases his philosophy upon monistic substance, of which the actual occasions are inferior modes. The philosophy of organism inverts this point of view.²

What Whitehead has particularly in mind in describing this "inversion" is that each actual entity, in addition to being a product of the efficient past, is also "*causa sui*."³ In emphasizing the self-creativity of actual entities as against Spinoza's "Substance," Whitehead is introducing a principle of novelty which, if "Substance" is eternal and not temporal, is impossible for Spinoza. Quoting again from *Process and Reality* :

'Creativity' is the principle of novelty. An actual occasion is a novel entity diverse from any entity in the 'many' which it unifies. Thus "creativity" introduces novelty into the content of the many, which are the universe disjunctively. The 'creative advance' is the application of this ultimate principle

Haven . (Yale University Press, 1940), esp. pp. 370-371.

1. *Process and Reality* (New York : The Macmillan Company, 1929), p. 10.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 125.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 228.

of creativity to each novel situation which it originates.¹

This creativity involves a supersession of actual occasions which is of the very structure of time. Actual occasions cannot endure; each comes into being as precisely itself, not as a mere sum total of the immediate antecedent occasions nor as a mere causal product. Each is an atom, a concrescent unity, divisible only conceptually into a multiplicity of prehensions; it is not constituted by its prehensions as parts make up a whole². Each entity is also conceptually divisible into subject, object, and affective tone; but any attempt to deal with any of these as an independent entity ends in paradoxes. And one of the great contributions to the dialectic of atomism is Whitehead's notion that the actual atoms neither endure (as both Lucretius and Leibniz, though in widely different senses, would hold) nor are eternal (as Spinoza would maintain). Time is intimately linked with the becoming into being of actuality and is, in Whitehead's words, indeed the interplay of the three fundamental ideas of "Supersession, Prehension, and Incompleteness."³ The most persistent of the difficulties besetting atomism over its long history thus yields, in principle at least, to an insight which Whitehead himself derives from a range of sources—from Plato to John Locke, though it required his genius to make a successful application. The conception of actuality as "incurably atomic"⁴ leads also to Whitehead's solution to the problem of "space"—or, rather, of extension; but in this he had been anticipated, in the main, by Leibniz.

Recently, Professor Eslick has skillfully exhibited the morphological relationships between different species of pluralism,⁵ and has subsequently gone on to consider the Whiteheadian cosmology as presenting dialectical

1. *Ibid.*, p. 31-32.

2. "Prehensions are not atomic." *Ibid.*, p. 359.

3. See note 3 of p. 442 above.

4. See *Process and Reality*, pp. 95, 104, 441, 471, etc.

5. L. J. Eslick, "The Real Distinction: Reply to Professor Reese," *The Modern Schoolman*, XXXVIII, 2 January, 1961.

possibilities in relation to the pluralism of St. Thomas.¹ In this essay, I have endeavoured to show a dialectical linkage between the first two kinds of pluralism outlined by Eslick : Classical atomism and the philosophy of organism. Fundamentally, this has consisted in pointing out essential elements of instability in the earlier of these doctrines, and in remarking upon various movements in the history of Western thought in which aspects of this instability have been rectified, whether or not any "direct influence" may have been present. Details have been omitted in favour of stressing some of the central themes. But problems still remain.

While it does seem possible to say that Whitehead has shown a way in which atomic entities can reasonably be associated with temporal process and novelty, the old Platonic problem of the One and the Many is not, perhaps, so easily laid to rest. Put in the flattest possible terms : in what sense is it strictly necessary that there be a radical plurality of actual entities in Whitehead's cosmological theory ?

The requirements arising from the side of supersession seem clear enough, but I find less clarity from the side of the extensive continuum. I would urge, in short, that the basis of Whitehead's pluralism be subjected to critical re-examination in the light of an atomic monism—such as that presented in Spinoza's *Ethics*. Spinoza does present compelling reasons why there should be only one atomic entity; but his theory seems to require that the atom be altogether out of time. I am not myself convinced that this requirement is ultimate. Certainly "substance," in Spinoza's sense, cannot partake of the phenomenal order; but I am not sure that in a meaning of "time" more akin to the intersection of supersession, prehension, and incompleteness, Spinoza's "substance" necessarily excludes temporality. I have no desire to corrupt the magnificent integrity of Spinoza's metaphysics, but I have an idea that the monolithic character of his

1. In his "Existence and Creativity in Whitehead," *The Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 1961, pp 151-163.

monism has been over-emphasized, by Spinoza himself among others. There are suggestions in Spinoza's own writings of a duality between "substance and mode" which might present a way of meeting the Whiteheadian requirements of real novelty and process. From the other side, I suspect that some puzzling aspects of Whitehead's doctrine of the "ideal opposites" might receive considerable clarification in the light of Spinoza's account of the "Attributes."

I conclude, simply, by remarking that, as Eslick has indicated the desirability of a dialectical interplay between the systems of Whitehead and Thomas Aquinas, the dialectic of atomism might be further advanced by a similar interworking of the doctrines of Spinoza and Whitehead. And I would certainly not neglect the possibility that some of the philosophies of India and China might prove suggestive in this regard.

■ ■ ■

DR. DATTA AND THE COMPREHENSIVENESS AND PRACTICALITY OF PHILOSOPHY

W. H. WERKMEISTERS

In an age in which linguistic analysis and positivistic reductionism have tended to isolate philosophy from the momentous problems and decisions of the day, and in which existentialism emphasizes the irrationalities, if not absurdities, of human existence, it is refreshing to turn to the comprehensive, the balanced, and the integrative view of our human enterprise which is so clearly delineated and defended in the writings of Dharendra Mohan Datta. A few quotations may serve as an introduction to this "philosophy in the grand manner," which yet has its direct bearings upon problems of the day. It will then be apparent that, for Dr. Datta, the theoretical and practical interests are never separated.

"It is natural and reasonable," he says, "that man should try to form, in philosophy, as comprehensive and adequate (an) idea of the universe as is humanly possible and should also plan . . . his entire life in the light of this idea."¹ The basic orientation of Datta's position could not have been stated more clearly or more succinctly.

The opening phrase, "it is natural and reasonable that man should try"—reminiscent, as it is, of Aristotle's well-known proposition that "by nature all men desire to know"—is at one and the same time the expression of a deep faith in the rationality of human nature and a profound metaphysical commitment to an essential rationality of reality itself.

Upon these presuppositions Datta's whole philosophy rests, and from them the importance of philosophy itself is derived.

1. D. M. Datta, "Knowledge, Reality and the Unknown," in S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead, eds., *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* (2nd ed. London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1952), p. 291.

Differences among philosophers, Datta continues, are but "the necessary consequences of the great complexity and vastness of the subject-matter of philosophy." The "alternative doctrines do not necessarily falsify one another" but "may be regarded as supplementing one another."¹ This willingness to see at least partial truths in conflicting doctrines makes it possible for Datta to integrate vast areas of philosophic thought—both Eastern and Western. Although not a dialectician in the Hegelian manner, he, nevertheless, achieves a perspective and a comprehensiveness of point of view well calculated to bring together the great traditions in philosophy everywhere.

Still, Datta is not a mere eclectic. For him, "the acceptability of a philosophy . . . largely depends . . . on the practical lead it can give to life and the happiness it can cause to the individual and society in the circumstances in which they are at the particular time and place."² This passage, however, must not be understood to mean that that philosophy is best which most readily enables man to adapt himself to the circumstances as he finds them. Datta's position is much more activist than this; for "moral leadership," which is the task of philosophy, is "a process of reforming and guiding others unconsciously while one is consciously trying to reform oneself. . . . It is an eternal process of perfection which humanity has been carrying on through trials, errors, failures and victories from time immemorial."³

The basic principle as here enunciated is clear and unchallengeable. In other passages, however, Datta seems to waver at this crucial point. Thus, he says, "ordinarily all the activities of a person aim at the preservation and well-being of his own little isolated bodily existence. But experience teaches him that even the preservation of his limited existence is not possible without rationalizing and socializing his cravings and activities—that is, without sacrificing his narrow self for a wider one in which the

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 293-294.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 294.

3. Dharendra Mohan Datta, *The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi* (Madison : University of Wisconsin Press, 1953), p. 154.

interest of other persons is harmonized with his own.”¹

What seems to me to be not quite clear in this passage is Datta's conception of the person as the key to an integration of our world view. What he seems to be saying is that, as a person, man exists on two distinct levels. On one level, he is interested only in “the preservation and well-being of his own little isolated bodily existence.” On the other level, he strives to realize a “wider” self “in which the interest of other persons is harmonized with his own.” That these two levels are distinct and genuine cannot be denied. That they are interrelated in the lives of all of us from childhood on is also a fact. What seems not to be the case is that these two levels exhaust the whole range of possibilities and actualities of human existence. In fact, Datta himself might be the first to admit that such is not the case.

Consider for a moment his description of the “second level” in its entirety : “rationalizing and socializing his cravings and activities,” “sacrificing his narrow self for a wider one,” harmonizing “the interests of other persons . . . with his own.” Such statements may be read as implying simply that, beyond his limited bodily existence, the individual must adjust to the society of which he is a part. If this is the meaning here intended, then, it would seem, such adjustment to existing social conditions does not account for “the eternal process of perfection which humanity has been carrying on . . . from time immemorial” and to which Datta has called our attention. Progress assumes that existing social conditions be surpassed; that we rise above any present level of achievement; that we attempt to realize an ideal, no matter how vaguely this may as yet be defined. I am sure Datta would admit all of this. I am merely not sure that the passages quoted would allow for it.

But, if progress is possible only when individuals rise above given situations, then there must be a level of human existence beyond and above that of social adjustment. And such a level does indeed exist. It is the level of reason, of insight and valuation, of truth seeking

1. *Op. cit.*, p. 307.

and moral responsibility. This is a level from which the individual himself, as a reasonable, responsible, and creative person evaluates (approves or rejects) what is the case. The supremacy of the person is thus the key to the whole enterprise of a truly human existence.

It goes without saying, however, that, as the key concept in this sense, the nature of the person requires careful and adequate interpretation. But this is neither the time nor the place to go into details. I have dealt with the problem elsewhere;¹ and I am sure that, in the last analysis, Datta would probably agree on this point. In that case the question may well be asked, just what is in dispute here?

As I see it, the issue is, basically, one of emphasis, not one of substance; although, to be sure, the substance of the case may well be affected by the emphasis. What I mean to point up is the fact that, as an evaluating, morally responsible, and creative agent, the person himself is the key to any comprehensive and truly integrative view of reality. If we fully understand what it means to exist as a person in a world of things—acting upon and interacting with that world in a rational and creative manner—then we also understand that world itself. But any interpretation of reality which falls short of giving a full account of the person in his world is to that extent only a partial view of the whole. And any interpretation which attempts to understand the very essence of a person in terms of physics, chemistry, and biological interactions only is to that extent a falsifying reduction and need not concern us here.

It is my contention, furthermore, that the key concept "person" may well serve as an integrative basis for Eastern and Western philosophy. Or, put the other way around, unless we achieve agreement on what it means to exist as a person, and on the valuations which such existence entails, we have no way of bringing together the distinc-

1. See my paper, "Scientism and The Problem of Man" submitted at the Third East-West Philosophers' Conference held in Honolulu in 1959 and published in *Philosophy and Culture—East and West* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1962), pp. 135-155.

tive aspects of East and West in an all-comprehensive synthesis—a goal dear to Datta's heart, and one eminently worth pursuing.

To be sure, science and technology, and the control over nature which they entail, are universal. They are valid and useful everywhere. But they are concerned with means rather than with ends. And they are valuable only because they serve human ends. The philosophically significant and, for practical purposes, the ultimately crucial problem is, what does it mean to exist as a human being, as a person? We cannot escape this question, no matter how hard we try.

But at this point we may become guilty of an idealistic distortion of facts, seeing human existence in perspectives which reduce the physical and biological realities to mere illusion and let us see the "truly real" only as spirit. Indian philosophy, more so than Western thought, seems to have emphasized this approach. To be sure, the perspectives here involved are metaphysical and pertain to the ultimate nature of reality. It is true, however, that "spirit" itself is known only in human, i.e., in personal existence; and personal existence is a body-mind unity. We are not disembodied spirit any more than we are un minded bodies or things. If it is a distortion of fact to argue that we are nothing but physico-biological entities completely describable in terms of scientific laws, it is likewise a distortion of fact to maintain that physics and chemistry and the complex interaction of matter in the living organism throw no light whatsoever upon our existence as human beings. These extreme interpretations are both misleading—each, of course, in its own way. However, it does make sense to hold that, although the physico-biological levels of human existence are, in a sense, the more basic, the levels of intelligence, moral responsibility, and personal creativity are the higher ones. The basic levels must be assured before the higher ones can be realized at all. But it is only in the complete realization of the higher levels that even the basic levels find their fulfilment. Only the integrative interdependence of the various levels assures the existence of the human being as a person. At the same time, this

very existence casts light upon the whole of reality; for the world we live in is at least such that it has made possible, at the human level, the emergence of rational, morally responsible, and creative persons. Reality, therefore, can never be less than this totality of the self manifestations of its own potentialities.

It follows from these considerations—or so it seems to me—that a complete understanding of what it means to exist as a person entails also an understanding of that reality which has brought forth and sustains a person. In other words, we have here the key to an all comprehensive and integrative view of reality.

But since the reality which we thus comprehend is creative—in the sense, at least, of being unpredictably emergent, and since human beings themselves are also creative, the whole process of becoming, which seems to be of the essence of reality, appears to be an “open” process in the sense of revealing new potentialities at any level of actuality that has already been achieved—the potentialities, namely, which become actualities at the next higher level. It is impossible, however, to anticipate what actualities are entailed by present potentialities. Theoretically, it is possible that, with man, the total potentialities of reality itself have reached their highest level. But, theoretically, it is also possible that, in time, man himself will be surpassed and left behind in the process of cosmic evolution, just as man surpassed and left behind him in that process of emergent evolution the anthropoid apes. All that we can do to give direction and momentum to such a process is to project into the future the highest values we are capable of envisioning, and then to try to live up to these values.

When we approach the crucial problems of philosophy from this point of view, we discover at once that our key concept—that of the person—has the integrative power to bring together into interacting unity the diverse levels of reality (from the most basic to the highest), and serves well as the dynamic center of creative action. To live by such a philosophy, it seems to me, would fulfil Datta's requirements of comprehensiveness and practicability. Moreover, the approach itself seems to be sufficiently

broad to make possible far-reaching agreement in philosophical matters—an agreement which transcends the culture-conditioned particularities of East and West and which thus contributes to better mutual understanding—which is another goal close to Datta's heart.

■ ■ ■

SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE PROBLEM OF OMNISCIENCE¹ AND FREEDOM²

RAM JEE SINGH

[The Editor had no mind to contribute any paper to this Volume. He wanted to pay his homage in respectful silence. But being very much pressed by friends he has submitted this short "Reflections" on a topic which was suggested for his Ph.D thesis by Dr. Datta himself. Hence this essay is being presented in grateful remembrance.—Editor]

1. If X foreknows that Y will act in a manner known as Z, and if Y really acts in the same manner, there seems to be no choice for Y but rather fixed and inexorable necessity. If it is admitted that somebody is omniscient, no human action can be free or voluntary. So it may also be deduced that if the omniscience is a fact, morality becomes a delusion.³

2. In the case of God, omniscience is regarded as the very nature of God, because He is the maximum being and the only cause of the effected beings. As maximum being, He is the most perfect being, hence most conscious and absolute self-conscious.⁴ But being the only possible cause of beings, God is eminently whatever any effected being may be. Thus knowing himself perfectly and most directly, he knows himself as he is, hence as the only possible cause of all possible beings, and thus knows everything, real or mere possible, in the awareness of his own essence. One reason why God is omniscient is His *omnipotence*.⁵ Since He created all things He knew them

1. By 'omniscience' I mean knowledge of all things—actual or possible of all places and of all times

2. By 'freedom' I mean 'freedom of will'.

3. Cp 'Either freedom is a fact or morality is a delusion'.

4. Richard De. V. Smet, 'Omniscience in Christian Thought' an unpublished article written on my request, p. 1.

5. Paul Heinisch, Eng. Editor Rev. William Heidt, *Theology of the Old Testament*, p. 89, Cp P S, 33 : 15, 94 : 9; 15 : 24, Sir, 23 : 20.

before they existed, while they were still mere possibilities. He knows not only that which actually exists, but also that which could possibly exist, i.e., future realities and future possibilities, in a word, everything. The second reason for God's omniscience is His omnipresence from which no one can escape whether he ascended into heaven, lay down in sheol or sojourned at the furthest limits of the sea.⁶

3. Now, a serious consequence might follow from such a position, "when God created man, He foresaw what would happen concerning him,"⁷ for to confess that "God exists and at the same time to deny that He has foreknowledge of future things is the most manifest folly. . . . one who is not prescient of all future things is not God".⁸ If we say that God foreknows that a man will sin, he must necessarily sin. But "If there is necessity there is no voluntary choice of sinning but fixed and unavoidable necessity".⁹ So also Locke says, "If God exists and is (essentially) omniscient, no human action is voluntary".¹⁰ Boethius also says, "If God is omniscient, no human action is voluntary."¹¹

4. Now, one may say, if we apply the concept of omniscience to human beings, the results will be all the more devastating. But it may be pointed out that "God compels no man to sin, though He sees beforehand those who are going to sin by their own will."¹² Hence, it may be argued that divine omniscience cannot entail determinism. For instance, an intimate friend can have foreknowledge of another's voluntary actions but it does not in

6. Ibid 1, p. 89, Cp. Jer. 23 : 23-24, PS. 139 : 1-12; Samuel, 23 : 27-28, 23 : 9-13.

7. Calvin's statement · *Institutes of Christian Theology*, Book-III, Ch. XXI.

8. St. Augustine's Remarks · *City of God*, Book V, Sec. 9; See also W. Paley's *Natural Theology*, Ch. XXIV.

9. St. Augustine, *The City of God*, Book V, Sec. 9.

10. John Locke, *Essays concerning Human Understanding*, Book IV, Chap. XXI, Sec. 9-11.

11. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, Part V, Sec. III.

12. St. Augustine, *De Libero Arbitrio*, Cp. Friedrich Schleiermacher, *The Christian Faith*, Part I, Sec. 2, Para 55.

anyway affect his moral freedom.

5. But this does not seem to be a very good argument. A person's knowledge about the future action of an intimate friend of his is at most a good guess and not definite knowledge.¹³ Locke's argument that there may be a man who chooses to do something which without knowing that it is within his power to do otherwise (e.g., "If a man chooses to stay in the room without knowing that the room is locked.")¹⁴ seems to reconcile *necessity* with *freedom* but in fact it is a reconciliation of *ignorance* and *knowledge*, e.g., he thinks himself free only so long he does not know that he is not free.

6. If it is said that "It is not because God foreknows what He foreknows that men act as they do : it is because men act as they do that God foreknows what He foreknows",¹⁵ it will create a very awkward situation in which man's actions would determine God's knowledge. We can also apply this to human omniscience, where it is likely to create greater complications. It will mean that knowledge of the omniscient being is not unfettered but determined by the actions of other men. Different people perform different actions, often quite contrary to that of their fellows. This will create a difficult situation for the cognising mind if it is to be so determined.

7. To say that the omniscient being is one who is justified in believing an infinitely large number of true synthetic propositions is not only vague but also self-contradictory. For example, it all depends upon the belief in one proposition at least, "Nothing is unknown to him." But this is to admit his omniscience and hence it is like arguing in a circle. Thus, the concept of omniscience

13. See, Fred Newman's article on "Omniscience is Possible" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, Sydney, Vol. 42, No. 1, May, '64.

14. See Nelson Pike's article on "Divine Omniscience and Voluntary Action" in *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Cornell University, No 1, Jan., '65, p. 32.

15. Luis de Molina, *Concordia Liberi Arbitrii*, quoted from Nelson Pike's article, *Ibid* p. 38, Cp. Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae*, Book V, Sec. 3, Para. 2.

whether *logical or actual*¹⁶ does involve difficulties.

8. According to the early Pali sources,¹⁷ Buddha offered a qualified support for the doctrine of omniscience even with regard to himself, and he often criticised Nigantha Nattaputta¹⁸ claiming omniscience in the sense of *knowing and seeing*, all objects on all times,—past, present and even future.¹⁹ His reluctance in claiming unqualified omniscience is mainly concerned with knowledge pertaining to future possibly because it will lead to some sort of determinism in metaphysics and morals. “To speak of omniscience in relation to future is to maintain an impossible position,”²⁰ because the course of future events are partly determined by the past and present and partly undetermined. I think, Buddha’s hesitation in claiming unqualified omniscience was influenced mainly by moral considerations. If he knew the future acts of human beings, there was no meaning in voluntary action or freedom of will which forms the basis of ethics and morality. In fact, what is foreseen (i.e., known conclusively), is *necessary* and what is necessary is outside the scope of ethics.²¹

9. In view of these difficulties, I wonder why the belief in omniscience in some form or other has been a matter of

16. Cp Newman (Ibid) makes a distinction between two senses of omniscience, “necessary” and “actual” which has been criticised by R. Puccetti (See his article “Mr. Newman’s view of omniscience”, a discussion in *Journal of Australasian Philosophy*, Vol. 42, No 2, Aug. 1964, P. 261) A rough comparison may be made with Buddha’s distinction between *dispositional* and *unqualified* omniscience (See Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya’s Thesis, “A Comparative Study of the Bhagavadgita and Early Buddhism”, University of Ceylon, Pp 342-343.

17 Cp “Those who say that the recluse Gotama is omniscient and all-seeing . . . constantly and at all times. . . are not reporting me correctly”. *Majjhima-Nikaya*, I. 482, cp. *Digha-Nikaya*, I. 78-84, II. 82-83, III. 99-101, *Samyutta-Nikaya*, I. 191, *Majjhima-Nikaya*, II 127.

18 Vide, *Majjhima-Nikaya*, I 372-378; II. 214-223.

19 Vide, *Digha-Nikaya*, III 134, “The recluse Gotama speaks of an infinite knowledge with regard to the past but not to the future”

20 Dr. K. N. Upadhyaya, Ibid, Pp. 343-344.

21. Cp *Theodice*, Part I, Sec. 27.

faith, closely connected with the spiritual aspirations of the people. In India, it has been accepted sometimes as a religious dogma, sometimes as a philosophical doctrine and sometimes as both. Except the Charvakas, almost all the systems of Indian Philosophy,—both orthodox and heterodox accept it. Even to the Mimamskas, “All that is pertinent is the denial of knowledge of *dharmā* by man . . .” They do not intend to deny “the possibility of person knowing all other things.”²² Even the famous passage of Kumarila in question “does not set aside omniscience.”²³

10. To my mind, the reasons and motives in formulating the concept of omniscience are *extra-logical*, for it is always at the cost of freedom of will, the basis of our moral life.

■ ■ ■

22. Santaraksita, *Tattva-Sangraha*, Vol. II, K. 3128 (G. O. 1. 1 Baroda).

23. Kumarila, *Sloka-Vartika*, II. 110-111.

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Lectured at Columbia, University of Minnesota, Carleton College, Mount Holyoke, College of Wooster, University of Alabama, University of Louisville, Cooper Union, University of Pittsburgh, University of Pennsylvania, Smith College, University of Maine, University of New Hampshire, Naval War College, Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, Foreign Policy Association, etc

Travel : Europe, Pakistan, India, Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaya, the Philippines, Korea, Japan

Personal : Married Lei Wai-hing (A B), Lingnan, graduate, New England Conservatory), Fatsan, Canton, in Belmont, Mass Sept. 1, 1928. D. Jean Chi-yuen, 1931, S Lo-yi Chang-yuen, 1932; S Gordon Kun-yuan, 1943

C. T. K. CHARI

Chairman, Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Madras Christian College, Tambaram, Madras State, India. Author of notes and papers on Relativity, Quantum Theory, Space and Time in the *British Mathematical Gazette* (July, 1946, September, 1951), *Mind* (April and August, 1937, October, 1938, April, 1949), *British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* (August, 1957, 1958), *Philosophy East and West* (University of Hawaii, April, 1955) and in the *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* (Amalner) and the *Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress*. Articles on the foundations of mathematical logic and multi-valued logics in the *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress*, and on bio-physics, cybernetics and neuro-physiology in the *Journal of the Philosophical Association* (Madhya Pradesh) and the *Journal of Psychological Researches* (Madras Psychological Society and Madras University). Articles on mysticism and existentialism in *Philosophy East and West* (October, 1952, October 1953 and January, 1954), the *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* (Brussels), *Fascicule 3* (La Philosophie de l'Inde), 1956, and in *The Aryan Path*, the *Prabuddha Bharata*, the *Vedanta Kesari* and the *Mahabodhi*. Articles on various philosophical and scientific issues about parapsychology in *Philosophy* (January, 1953), the *Journal and Proceedings of the British Society for Psychical Research*, the *Journal of the American Society for Psychical Research*, the *Journal of Parapsychology* (Duke University, U.S.A) and the *International Journal of Parapsychology* (Parapsychology Foundation, New York City)

President of the Logic and Metaphysics Section of the Indian Philosophical Congress, 1956; Principal Miller Lecturer, Madras University, 1958; Sectional Chairman, Madras Psychology Conference, elected Corresponding Member of

the British Society for Psychical Research, Member of the Editorial Boards of the *Indian Journal of Parapsychology* (Seth Sohan Lal Memorial Institute of Parapsychology, Rajasthan, India) and the *Journal of Psychological Researches* (Madras Psychological Society)

Contributor on recent trends in Indian Philosophy to the four-volume survey (*Institut International de Philosophie, Paris*) *Philosophy in the Mid-Century* (Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1959), contributor to the *Professor Sundaram Pillai Memorial Volume* (The Saiva Siddhanta Works Publishing Society, Tirunelveli, Madras State) Editor-in-chief of the *Essays in Philosophy* presented to Prof. T. M. P. Mahadevan of Madras University on his fiftieth birthday

S. C. CHATTERJEE

S C Chatterjee, born in West Bengal on 3rd August, 1893 Graduated from Calcutta University with Honours in Philosophy in 1914, and obtained the M A degree in 1916 and Ph D Degree in 1934 from the same University. He was the Head of the Department of Philosophy, Calcutta University, and retired in 1958 He was visiting Professor of the University of Hawaii (U S A) during 1952-53 His main works are *The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge, An Introduction to Indian Philosophy* (with Dr. D M. Datta), *The Problems of Philosophy, The Fundamentals of Hinduism, Classical Indian Philosophies Their Synthesis in The Philosophy of Sri Ramakrishna, Bharatiya O Pascattya Darsan* (Indian and Western Philosophy, in Bengali)

J. N. CHUBB

Born (1910) in Hyderabad (Deccan), M A (Bombay) 1933, D Phil (Oxon) 1937 Retired from Maharashtra Education Service as Head of the Department of Philosophy in July 1965 On retirement appointed Honorary Professor of Philosophy by the University Grants Commission in the Scheme for "Utilization of the teaching/research experience of distinguished retired teachers"

Publications

Simant Pratap Seth Lecture *Vedanta: A Reformulation and Criticism*, Principal Miller Endowment Lectures *Progress, Time and Eternity*, Presidential Address to the 40th session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, *Philosophical Arguments and Disagreement*; other papers published mostly in the Proceedings of the Indian Philosophical Congress

RASVIHARY DAS

Rasvihary Das was born in an obscure village in the district of Sylhet (now in East Pakistan) in 1894 He received his primary education at his village school and later joined the High English School at Maulvibazar, from where he matriculated in 1914 with a general government scholarship, and was able to go over to Calcutta and manage his expenses there with the help of government scholarship and private tuition He joined the City College under Principal H C Maity, who was noted in his day for his strict adherence to high moral principles He graduated in 1918 from this college with Honours in Philosophy, having studied for some time at the Presidency College, in the 3rd year class He then joined the Post-Graduate class in Philosophy at the University of Calcutta, he was the only student to study 'Logic as Dialectic and Metaphysics' under Dr. B. N. Seal, Dr. H. Haldar and Prof. K. C. Bhattacharyya, all of whom were philosophers of established reputation and distinguished teachers He also studied 'Special Branches of Indian Philosophy' (Samkhya and Vedanta), with Dr. Seal and others Immediately on passing the M A Examination in 1920, he joined the Indian Institute of Philosophy at Amalner, where he stayed on for 26 years and came to the University

Who's Who

of Calcutta in 1946 as a lecturer in the Post-Graduate department of Philosophy from where he retired as Reader in Philosophy in 1962. In the meantime he was for two and half years Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Saugar. He presided over the annual session of the Indian Philosophical Congress, held at Annamalai University in 1956, and was a visiting professor in Philosophy at the universities of Harvard (in 1955) and Gottingen (in 1962). His published works include *The Self and the Ideal*, *The Essentials of Advaitism*, *The Philosophy of Whitehead*, *A Handbook to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason* and *Kanter Darshan* (in Bengali).

A. C. EWING

Born in Leicester, England May 11, 1899 Single Education : Wyggeston Grammar School, Leicester & University College, Oxford. B.A. 1st Class at Oxford (Philosophy, Classics & Orient History) 1920, M.A. (Oxford) 1926, D.Phil. Oxford 1923, D Litt Cambridge 1933 Assistant Lecturer, University of Wales 1927-31, Lecturer at Cambridge 1931-54 Reader at Cambridge 1954-66 (retired 1966) Fellow of British Academy 1941- , Fellow of Jesus College 1962-66 Treasurer of International Federation of Philosophical Societies 1953 Visiting Professor in India 1951 and 1959 and in U.S.A 1949, 1961 and 1963

Books Published *Kant's Treatment of Causality*, 1942, *The Morality of Punishment*, 1929, *Idealism*, 1934, *Short Commentary on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 1939 *The Individual, The State and World Government*, 1947, *The Definition of God*, 1947, *The Fundamental Question of Philosophy*, 1951, *Ethics* (Teach Yourself Series), 1953

WILLIAM K. FRANKENA

Born June 21, 1908

Degrees : A.B., Calvin College, 1930 M.A., University of Michigan, 1930-33, M.A., Harvard University, 1933-35 Studied in Cambridge, England and Freiburg, Germany, 1935-36. Ph.D Harvard, 1936-37.

Main Subject : Philosophy

Ph.D dissertation *Intuitionism in British Ethics*

Positions : Instructor, University of Michigan, 1937-40. Assistant Professor, University of Michigan, 1940-46 Associate Professor, University of Michigan, 1946-47 Professor of Philosophy, University of Michigan, 1947- Chairman of Department, University of Michigan, 1947-61.

Visiting Lecturer and Professor at : Columbia University, summer 1953, University of Tokyo, summer 1954; Harvard University, summer 1955, University of Washington, summer 1959

Published in *Mind*, *Philosophical Review*, *Philosophy*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, *The Harvard Educational Review*, *Review of Metaphysics*, etc

The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, ed by Schilpp, 1942 *Philosophical Analysis*, ed by Max Black, 1950 *Science, Language, and Human Rights*, Vol I, APA, 1952. *Philosophy in the Mid-Century*, ed Klibansky, 1958 *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, ed A. I. Welden, 1958. *Language, Thought and Culture*, ed P. Henle, 1958 *Religion and the State* University, ed E. Walters, 1958

For: ward to : *The Nature of True Virtue*, by Jonathan Edwards, 1960.

A. C. GARNETT

Professor Garnett was born in Australia in 1894 and obtained the Master's and Doctor's degrees from the University of Melbourne, subsequently studying also at the Universities of London and Edinburgh and at Yale. He taught at the University of Adelaide in Australia and at Butler University, Indianapolis,

U. S. A., before going to the University of Wisconsin, where he has served as Professor since 1937 and for a time as Chairman of the department. He was President of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association in 1960-61. He has published a number of books including *Reality and Value*, 1937, *A Realistic Philosophy of Religion*, 1942, *The Moral Nature of Man*, 1952, *Religion and the Moral Life*, 1955, and *Ethics: A Critical Introduction*, 1961.

N. K. DEVARAJA

Born 1917 in India. Educated at Varanasi and Allahabad. D.Phil. (Allahabad) on 'Criticism in Sankara'; D. Litt. (Lucknow) on 'Philosophy of Culture'. Served in two Colleges in Bihar, in Lucknow University and at present in the Department of Indian Philosophy and Religion, Benaras Hindu University. Sayaji Rao Gokhale Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture. Past President, *Akshil Bharatiya Darshan Parishad* (Lucknow, 1963), Sectional President (History & Philosophy Section), Indian Philosophical Congress (Delhi 1965), Regional Philosophy Congress (Jaipur, 1961). Visited United States in 1957-58 on receipt of UNESCO Grant for Cultural Studies and was associated with Harvard and Yale Universities. Prize winner of U. P. Government, *Hindustani Academy, Bangiya Parishad* etc.

Important Publications: *An Introduction to Sankara's Theory of Knowledge* (Motilal Banaridas, Delhi, 1962). *Philosophy of Culture, An Introduction to Creative Humanism* (Kitab Mahal, Allahabad, 1963) (Hindi Version also). *The Mind and Spirit of India* (To be published shortly). Papers published in various journals in India and abroad. He is a noted Hindi critic, novelist and poet also.

ALEXANDER BOYCE GIBSON

Born in London in 1900 and educated in Australia and at Balliol College, Oxford, has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Melbourne since 1935. His publications are *The Philosophy of Descartes* (Methuen 1932), *Should Philosophers be Kings?* (Melbourne U. P. 1939), and articles in Australian, American and British Journals and (with A. A. Phillips) *Thinkers at Work* (Longmans Green 1946). His present interests are in Greek Philosophy and the Philosophy of Religion. He was a member of the East-West Working Party of Indian and Australasian philosophers at Canberra in December 1957, and attended the meeting of the International Institute of Philosophy at Mysore in 1959. As a citizen of a country which is Western by history and tradition and Eastern by geography, he is particularly interested in East-West problems at the philosophical level, especially as regards India.

HUMAYUN KABIR

Humayun Kabir, an Honorary Fellow of Exeter College, Oxford, had a brilliant academic record at the Universities of Calcutta and Oxford. Has been Editor of *Presidency College Magazine*, Secretary, Oxford Union Society, President, Jewett Society, Oxford. He taught at Calcutta and Andhra Universities, Honorary Doctorates from Universities of Athens, Aligarh, Annamalai, Mysore etc.

Associated with the student movement and trade union activities; Leader of the Peasants Party in the Bengal Legislative Council, Secretary and Educational Adviser to the Ministry of Education, Chairman of the University Grants Commission; Chairman of the Executive Board of the Indian National Commission for UNESCO, President, the first All India Writers' Convention; President, first Asian Writers' Conference; President of Indian Council for Cultural Relations; President of the first Asian History Congress; In 1964, President simultaneously of the Indian Philosophical Congress, the

Indian Science Congress and the International Congress of Orientalists.

Author of books in English and Bengali, many of which have been translated into various Indian, European and Asian Languages. Some important publications : (In Bengali) : *Swapnasadh*, *Sathee*, *Dharabahik*, *Marksead and Banglar Kanya* etc. (In English) : *On Kant's Philosophy in General*; *Poetry, Monads and Society*; *Men and Rivers*; *Science, Democracy and Islam*; *Education in New India*; *Of Cabbages and Kings*; *The Indian Heritage*; *Mahatma and Other Poems*; *Britain and India*; *Indian Philosophy of Education* etc.

Has been Minister of Civil Aviation, Minister of Scientific Research and Cultural Affairs, Minister of Education and Minister of Petroleum and Chemicals, India.

CORNELIUS KRUSE

Professor Kruse was educated at Yale University, B.A., 1915, M.A., 1917, Ph.D., 1922. Visiting Lecturer in Ethics and Philosophy of Religion at Yale University, 1925, 1942-43. Foreign Service Secretary of American Friends Service Committee, 1946-47, Executive Director, American Council of Learned Societies, 1947-58; Chairman of the Board of Directors, 1949-53; Secretary-Treasurer, Eastern Division, American Philosophical Association, 1937-39; Acting Secretary-Treasurer, National Association, 1938; Secretary-Treasurer, 1939-46; President, Eastern Division, and Chairman of National Board of Officers, 1949; re-elected to Chairmanship, 1959-61, Chairman of Committee on International Co-operation, Member of North American delegation at International Congresses of Philosophy, Harvard, 1926, Oxford, 1930, Prague, 1934, Paris, 1937, Secretary-Treasurer, Organizing Committee of First Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, 1941-43, on cultural mission to Latin America under the auspices of American Philosophical Association and Co-ordinator's Office for Inter-American Affairs, June-November, 1943, U.S. specialist on mission to Latin America, Department of State, Program of International Educational Exchange, summers of 1956 and 1958. Vice-President of Congress International de Philosophie, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, September, 24-30, 1944, President, Second Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, New York, December, 30, 1947, Chairman of North American Delegation to Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, Mexico, January, 11-20, 1950, Vice-President, Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, San Paolo, 1954, also Vice-President Congress of Santiago, Chile, 1956; President of Inter-American Society of Philosophy, 1957, member, 2nd East-West Philosophers' Conference, Honolulu, June 20-July 29, 1949; member of Steering Committee and member 3rd East-West Philosophers' Conference, Honolulu, June 21-July 31, 1959. Member, Commission on the Occupied Areas, American Council on Education, member of the Advisory Board of the *Philosophical Review* and of Board of Editors of *Philosophy East and West*, member Editorial Board, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, member of Advisory Board of Handbook of Latin American Studies of Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress; member of Sociedad Chilena de Filosofia; also of Uruguay and Costa Rica; member of U.S. Advisory Selection Committee of fellows under Buenos Aires Fellowship Exchange Convention, member of the Pan American Committee on the History of Ideas, Mexico City. Co-author, *Essays in East-West Philosophy*, 1951; *The Nature of Man*, 1950; *The Nature of Religious Experience*, 1937. degree of L.H.D., Lawrence College, 1952, member of Executive Board of American Friends Service Committee, 1952-58, Director of Friends' Program at United Nations, 9, Assembly, 1954.

T. M. P. MAHADEVAN

T. M. P. Mahadevan, M.A., Ph.D., Professor-Director, Centre for Advanced Study in Philosophy, University of Madras, and author of many important books on Philosophy and Religion, grew up in a philosophico-religious

gious atmosphere. Since his graduation with First Class Honours in 1933, he has been devoting himself to intensive research and teaching. Several works of his have been published on Advaita Vedanta, Hindu Scriptures and Religion in general. One of his books, *Time and the Timeless*, makes a masterly survey of the problem of Time from the standpoint of Vedanta. He has contributed chapters and articles to such publications as *History of Philosophy—Eastern and Western* (Sponsored by the Ministry of Education, Government of India), *History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan), *Vedanta for Modern Man* (Harper and Brothers, New York), *Goethe and the Modern Age* (Henry Regnery Co., Chicago), *Essays in East-West Philosophy* (University of Hawaii), *Philosophy and Culture—East and West* (University of Hawaii); *Collier's Encyclopaedia*, U. S. A., and *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, U. K.

In 1948-49 Dr Mahadevan lectured at Cornell and other American Universities on Indian Philosophy and Vedanta, and he participated in the Goethe Bicentennial Convocation at Aspen, Colorado, and in the East-West Philosophers' Conference at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. He presided over the Indian Philosophical Congress held at Nagpur in December 1955. In 1959 he attended the Third East-West Philosophers' Conference at the University of Hawaii, Honolulu. He participated in the seminar conducted under the joint auspices of the UNESCO and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture at Calcutta in 1961. In 1962 he took part in the European Forum conducted in Austria. At the invitation of the West German Government he visited places of academic and cultural interest in West Germany in August 1963.

G. R. MALKANI

G. R. Malkani, M.A. (Bom.), M. Litt (Cantab.), Director, Indian Institute of Philosophy, Editor, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, Author of *The Metaphysics of Advaita Vedanta*, *Philosophy of the Self*, *Vedantic Epistemology* etc., President, Indian Philosophical Congress in Patna in 1949.

Y. MASHI

Y. Mashi was born on 1-3-1916 and was educated all through at Patna. He secured a first place both in B.A. Honours Philosophy (1935) and M.A. (1937) at Patna University. He has been teaching Philosophy since August 14, 1938 and he secured D. Litt (1953), Ph.D. (Edin.) in 1955.

His important publications are *Freudianism and Religion* (1964), *Freudvada Ki Ruprekha* (1954), and *A Critical History of Modern Philosophy* (1963). Main subject is the philosophy and psychology of religion. The next forthcoming booklet is *The Meaning of God and Evil*. Some thirty articles have been published in different journals of India.

CHARLES ALEXANDER MOORE

Born on March 11, 1901, in Chicago, Illinois. Received A.B. degree from Yale University in 1926, Ph.D., Yale, 1932. Did graduate study at Banaras Hindu University, 1947-48.

Instructor in Philosophy at Yale, 1933-1936, Department of Philosophy, University of Hawaii, 1936-- Senior Professor, 1955-- Visiting Professor at Duke, Cornell, Boston University, and University of Southern California. Has been Director of East-West Philosophers' Conferences in 1939, 1949, and 1959.

He is a member of the American Philosophical Association, the American Oriental Society, the Indian Philosophical Congress Association, and the Association for Asian Studies.

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He is the editor of the journal, *Philosophy East and West*; has written numerous articles for philosophical journals, has edited two outstanding volumes—*Philosophy East and West* and *Essays in East-West Philosophy*—and was co-editor, with Dr S. Radhakrishnan, of *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*

HAJIME NAKAMURA

Born in 1912. Graduated from the Imperial University of Tokyo in 1936. D. Lit. (University of Tokyo, 1943).

Present Position : Professor of Indian and Buddhist Philosophy, University of Tokyo. President of Japan-India Society. Director of the Japanese Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies. Director of the Japanese Association for Religious Studies. Honorary Member of the Association for Study of American Philosophy (in Japan). Life Member of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona. Member of the American Oriental Society. Honorary Member of the International Academy of the Jains, Agra, India.

Activities in Foreign Countries.

Visiting Professor of Philosophy, Stanford University (1951-52). Delegate to Congress on Cultural Freedom in Asia, Rangoon (1955). Delegate to the Buddhist Symposium held by the Government of India, New Delhi (1956). Lectured at University of Michigan, University of Delhi, Benaras Hindu University, etc.

FILMER STUART CUCKOW NORTHROP

Filmer S. C. Northrop, Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law at Yale, is one of the nation's best-known philosophers. His field covers more than philosophy in its usual meaning. His first speciality is the philosophy of natural science. To this he has added comparative political and cultural philosophy, in particular that of India and the Far East. This background in natural and cultural philosophy he is now bringing to bear on law and international relations.

He is a member of both the Philosophy Department and the Law School at Yale. The Yale Law School, in line with its policy to have a few top-ranking men in non-legal fields on its faculty, has Professor Northrop directing research seminars, composed of American and foreign students, on the relation between law and philosophy and on the problem of relating Western law to non-Western societies.

In the philosophy of science his two books are *Science and First Principles* (1931) and *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (1946). In September, 1953, he received the Wendell Wilkie Award from the American Political Science Association for his book, *Taming of the Nations* (1952). He is also the author of the widely-quoted book, *The Meeting of East and West*—first published in 1946 and now in its eighth printing. It has been translated into Japanese, German and Spanish. His most recent book, *European Union and United States Foreign Policy*, was published in the fall of 1954. His latest study—in the 1957 proceedings of the American Academy of Political and Social Science—is of *Neutrality and U. S. Foreign Policy*.

He was born in November 27, 1893, in Janesville, Wisconsin. He received his B. A. degree from Beloit College in 1915. After graduation, he did social work in New York City until his entrance into the Yale Graduate School in 1917. He left Yale to enter the U. S. Army in 1918 and was discharged in 1919 with the rank of Second Lieutenant. During that same year, he finished his graduate work at Yale and received an M. A. degree. He then served with the Y. M. C. A. in Hong Kong and in Canton, China.

He returned to the United States to do further graduate work at Harvard, receiving an M. A. degree in 1922 and a Ph. D. degree in 1924. In addition to his studies at Harvard, he studied abroad at the University of Freiburg,

Germany; at the Institute of Science and Technology, London; and at Trinity College, Cambridge University, England.

In 1923, he was appointed to the Yale faculty as an Instructor of Philosophy. He was appointed Professor of Philosophy in 1932, a position he held until his appointment as Sterling Professor of Philosophy and Law in 1947. He was Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Yale from 1938 to 1940.

Professor Northrop was Master of Silliman College—one of Yale's ten undergraduate residential colleges—from 1940 to 1947. He resigned this position to become a Sterling Professor of Law at the Yale School while continuing as a professor in the Department of Philosophy.

He has served as a Visiting Professor at the University of Iowa, the University of Michigan, the University of Virginia, the University of Hawaii, and the National University of Mexico, and as Dyason Lecturer at The University of Melbourne in Australia.

Academic honors conferred on Professor Northrop include a Litt.D. by Beloit College in 1945; an LL.D. by the University of Hawaii in 1949, and an appointment as Professor Extraordinario, La Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico in 1949.

For his writing on Mexico culture, he was decorated with the Order of the Astec Eagle by the Mexican Government in 1949.

He is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Science, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, the Connecticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, and is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Sigma Xi, the New York Philosophy Club, and the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences. He was President of the Society of the History and Philosophy of Science (1948), and of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division (1952). He has also served as the representative of the National Council of the American Philosophical Association, the National Council of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. He is a member of the Directing or Advisory Board of the Society for the Philosophy of Science, The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, Philosophy East and West, the Natural Law Forum, and the World Association of World Federalists.

He has contributed extensively to learned journals in science, philosophy, and law, and to such popular magazines as *The Saturday Review of Literature*, and *Life*. An article by Professor Northrop was featured in the December, 1951 special issue of *Life* on Asia and the Far East.

A popular lecturer, Professor Northrop has spoken before varied groups throughout the United States and abroad—including the Foreign Service Institute of the Department of State and the War Colleges of this country and Canada.

He has travelled extensively throughout the world and is presently doing groundwork which may provide a more effective basis for international law.

In 1919, he married the former Christine Johnston of Manchester, New Hampshire. The Northrops have two sons—Johnson Filmer and Stuart Johnston.

In January, 1958 he represented the United States at the third SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organization) Round Table Conference—held in Bangkok, Thailand.

KARL H. POTTER

Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Minnesota, received his M.A. and Ph.D. at Harvard University. He has twice visited India for year-long study tours on Fulbright grants, stationed in 1952-53 at Waltair, Andhra Pradesh, and in 1959-60 at Banaras, Uttar Pradesh. He is the author of *The Padarthatattva-nirupanam of Raghunatha Siromani* and of *The Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (forthcoming), as well as various journal articles.

RAJENDRA PRASAD

Born Jan. 1926 in Bihar. Educated at Patna and Michigan (U.S.A.),

served as Lecturer and Reader in Patna University, now Professor of Philosophy and Head of Humanities and Social Sciences Division, Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur: Special field of work—Logic, Ethics, and Philosophy of Language—articles published in various journals—Indian delegate in International Philosophical Congress (Mysore) and International Philosophical Colloquium (Delhi) etc.

P. NAGARAJA RAO

Dr. P. Nagaraja Rao, took his D Litt degree from the Banaras Hindu University under the guidance of Dr. S. Radhakrishnan in 1945 after a distinguished career at the Madras University. He taught Philosophy in Madras, Banaras, Ahmedabad, Dharwar, Mercora and at present Professor and Head of the Deptt. of Philosophy at Sri Venkateshwara University, Tirupali (Andhra State). Besides being the author of four books (1) *Vada-Vah* (text, English translation and notes), (2) *Bhagavadgita And The Changing World*, (3) *Introduction to Vedanta* and (4) *Epistemology of Sri Madhvan*, he is a gifted speaker. He has to his credit over fifty articles on Indian thought and culture. His exposition is impressive, refreshing and clear.

FRITZ-JOACHIM VON RINTELEN

Born on May 16, 1898 in Stettin, Germany. Professor of Philosophy, Psychology and Pedagogy, and Director of the Institute of Philosophy at the University of Mainz.

Lecturer at the University of Munich (1928), Professor at the University of Munich (1934), in 1941 suspended on political grounds and reinstated at Mainz in 1946.

Dr. Phil., Dr. en artes honoris causa, Dr. litterarum honoris causa. President of the General Philosophical Association of Germany 1949-51; President of the German Philosophical Congress, Mainz 1949; Comité directeur of Fédération Internationale de Societe de Philosophie. Vice-President of Institut International d'Etudes Europeenne A. Rosmini—Rome, member of the Directorate of Comunità Occidentale Scitori de Philosophie—Rome. Member of Institut International de Philosophie, Paris. Honorary member of the Academies in Louvain, Belgium, and Sao Paulo, Brazil, of the philosophical associations in Italy, Spain, Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Los Angeles, U. S. A.

Coditor, with Prof. P. T. Raju, of *Philosophical Bulletin*, Bharatiya Tatvavijnana Mandir, International Academy of Philosophy, Ahmedabad, India. *Kantstudien Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung*.

Publications: *Pessimistische Religionsphilosophie der Gegenwart* (1924). *Der Versuch einer Überwindung der Historismus bei Ernst Troeltsch* (1929). *Der Wertgedanke in der Europäischen Geistesentwicklung, I Altertum und Mittelalter* (1932). *Realismus—Idealismus*, together with Ottaviano, *Kritik des Idealismus* (1941), Second edition 1956. *Goethe als abendländischer Mensch* (1946)—1st and 2nd ed. *Dämonie des Willens Eine geistesgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (1947). *Von Dionysos zu Apollon Der Aufstieg im Geiste* (1948). *Philosophie der Endlichkeit als Spiegel der Gegenwart* (1951)—2nd edition 1960. *Goethe Espírito e Vida*, Sao Paulo (1953). *Der Rang des Geistes Goethes Weltverständnis* (1955). *Der europäische Mensch*, Vienna (1957). *La finitud en el pensamiento actual la infinitud agustiniana*, Madrid (1959). *European Man: A Cultural Philosophical Study*, Mysore, India (1961). *Beyond Existentialism*, London (1961).

DALE RIEPE

Born Tacoma, Washington 1918, educated Seattle Public Schools; B.A. in Philosophy University of Washington, M.A. in Philosophy University of Michigan, Ph.D. in Philosophy University of Michigan.

Who's Who

Professor of Philosophy and Associate Director of Humanities for Philosophy, C. W. Post College of Long Island University, 1962—attended Second East-West Philosophers' Conference 1949 Graduate Fulbright to Banaras Hindu University and Madras University 1951-52 Exchange Lecturer on the Campbell Foundation, University of Manitoba 1955 Secretary, Conference on Asian Affairs 1955 Fulbright Visiting Lecturer, University of Tokyo 1957-58 Fellow in Asian Studies Carnegie Corporation 1960-61. Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 1960. Has taught at the University of Michigan, Carleton College, University of South Dakota, University of North Dakota, University of Tokyo, and Western Washington College

Book : *The Naturalistic Tradition in Indian Thought* (Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1961) Pp 308

Articles in *Philosophy of Science*, *Journal of Philosophy*, *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, *Philosophical Quarterly* (Amarner), *Michigan Quarterly*, *North Dakota Quarterly*, *Partisan Review*, *Poetry Public*

Member of AAUP, American Philosophical Association, American Oriental Society, Association for the Advancement of Science, Japanese Philosophical Society, Japanese Society for the Philosophy of Science, Indian Philosophical Congress, Canadian Philosophical Association, Mid-West Conference for Asian Affairs etc.

A. K. SARKAR

Born in 1912, educated in Indian and European Philosophy from their sources by Indian and European scholars, carried on research in Vedanta Philosophy as a Fellow of the Indian Institute of Philosophy Amalner, and on Contemporary Western Philosophy as a Research Scholar of the Patna University, continued further research in comparative philosophy at the Universities of Ceylon and London, obtained the following degrees in Philosophy, M.A. (First Class First), Ph.D., and D.Litt., represented Indian Science Congress at the sessions of the Ceylon Science Association, a member of the American Philosophical Association, Head of the Department of Philosophy at the Rajendra College (Patna University) from 1940 to 1944, a member of the teaching staff of the University of Ceylon from 1944 to 1964, at present a full-time Visiting Professor of Philosophy at the University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, U.S.A., published two books *An Outline of Whitehead's Philosophy* (Arthur H. Stockwell, Ltd., London 1940) and *Moral Philosophy* (Kamala Book Depot, Patna, 1944), published also research papers in philosophical journals on contemporary western philosophers, Bergson, Alexander, Santayana and others, and on comparative philosophy, Buddhism and Vedanta in relation to western philosophy

HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER

Ph.D., Columbia, 1917, L.H.D. (Union College) 1947 Professor Emeritus of Philosophy and Religion, Columbia University. Visiting Professor University of Washington (1946), Emory University (1957); Colorado College (1958-59) On staff of UNESCO in Paris, 1953-56 Editor of the *Journal of Philosophy* Rockefeller Research Fellow in Italy, and Fulbright Fellow in France Organized for UNESCO a Symposium on International Obligations, held in Ceylon, 1954 Visited other countries of South East Asia on a UNESCO Mission, 1955 Now—Organizing Director, The Blaisdell Institute, Claremont, California, U.S.A.

Rev. Richard V. De Smet, S. J.

Born at Charleroi (Belgium) on the 14th of April 1916 Joined the religious order of the Jesuits on the 23rd of September 1934. Came to India on the 2nd of February 1946 Appointed Professor of Logic, Metaphysics,

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Interpretation of Indian Philosophic Texts, at De Nobili College, Poona, in 1954. Has obtained the following degrees : B.A. in Classical Philology (Namur); Lic. in Philosophy (Louvain); Lic. in Theology (Kurseong), Doctorate in Philosophy (Rome). His doctoral dissertation (unpublished, excepting abstracts) is entitled : *The Theological Method of Sankara*. Author of *Philosophical Activity in Pakistan*, Lahore, 1961. Contributor and editor of *Religious Hinduism*, Allahabad, 1964. Has also published many articles and philosophical papers in India and abroad in English, French, Portuguese and German. Contributor to the *Telugu Encyclopedia*, the *Marathi Encyclopedia of Philosophy* and the *Verbo Encyclopedia*. Life-member of the All India Philosophical Congress.

TAN YUN-SHAN

Born in China (Hunan Province), in a distinguished family of scholars—devoted several years of vigilant study on Chinese classical literature and Philosophy—spiritually a Buddhist, intellectually a Confucian, socially a Humanitarian and Gandhian in daily life—college mate and personal friend of Mao-Tse-Tung—brought to India in 1928 by Rabindra Nath Tagore who discovered him in Malaya in 1927—Founder Principal of Visva Bharti, Chitina Bhavan (Institute of Chinese) and Sino-Indian Cultural Society in 1933 (Nanking) in India (1934)—a calligraphist, poet, essayist, author, writer and linguist—well versed in the Jaina and Yoga Philosophy—a great champion of Sino-Indian friendship.

Publications (English) :

(1) *Cultural Interchange Between India and China*, (2) *Buddhism in China Today*, (3) *What Is Chinese Religion*, (4) *The Chinese Hall*, (5) *Modern Chinese History—Political, Economic and Social*, (6) *India's Contribution To Chinese Culture*, (7) *Chinese Studies in India*, (8) *My Dedication To Gurudeva Tagore*, (9) *My Devotion To Rabindranath Tagore*, (10) *Rabindranath The Gurudra*, (11) *An Intellectual's Responsibility To The World Calamity*, (12) *India And China*, (13) *The China Day Message*, (14) *Cultural Contact Between India And China*, (15) *Education In New China*, (16) *An Appeal To Conscience*, (17) *The Present War*, (18) *China And The War*, (19) *The Visva-Bharati Chetna-Bhavana*, (20) *The Sino-Indian Cultural Society*, (21) *Modern China*, (22) *China, India And The War*, (23) *Gandhi and China*, (24) *My First Visit To Gandhi*, (25) *Nehru And China*, (26) *China's Civilization*, (27) *The Spirit Of Indian And Chinese Cultures*, (28) *Inter-Asian Cultural Co-operation*, (29) *Great World Union And Union Of Asia*, (30) *Ahimsa In Sino-Indian Culture*, (31) *Sino-Indian Relationship*, (32) *Ways To Peace*, (33) *The History Of Chinese Language And Literature*, (34) *Awakening Of Consciousness—Sri Aurobindo's Message To The World*, (35) *The First Chinese Buddhist Scripture*, (36) *Introduction To Chinese Language*, (37) *Chinese Buddhism*, (38) *A General Introduction*, (38) *Chinese Philosophy*, (39) *Buddha Jayanti Lecture*.

Publications (Chinese)

(1) *Hai-P'an Shih-Chi*, (2) *In-Du Yang-Shang*, (3) *Shih-Chai Li-Fa Yu Li-Fa Ke-Ming*, (4) *In-Du Chow-Yu Chi*, (5) *In-Du Ts'ung-Tan*, (6) *In-Du Tzu-Chih*, (7) *In-Du Lu-Ta-Sheng-Ts Tu-Chih*, (8) *Sheng-Che Kan-Ts*, (9) *Shih-Sheng Tai-Ko-Erh Yu Chung-Jih Chan Chen*, (10) *In-Du Jen-Min Tu-H'o Kang-Chun Tung-Ching*, (11) *Hsien-Tai Chung-Kuo Chuang-Yen Chi*, (12) *Nan-Yang Hui-Yi*.

TANG CHUN

Professor Tang Chun was born in Szechuen, China, 1909. In his boyhood, he received good family education as his father was an outstanding scholar and Professor of Chinese Literature and Philosophy at Szechuen University. During the period of 1925-1932, he received college education from Sino-

Russian University, Peking University, and National Central University. In 1936, he taught the course, "The Problems of Chinese Philosophy" in the National Central University; thus it led him to the career of teaching.

When the Sino-Japanese War broke out in 1937, he served in the West China Union University as Lecturer of Philosophy. From 1942-1949, he was employed as Associate Professor and later on as full Professor in the National Central University. Upon the Communist occupation of the Chinese Mainland, he took refuge to Hong Kong and joined the work of establishing New Asia College in which he served as Dean from its first establishment up to date.

The following are his major publications : (1) *Reconstruction of Moral Self*, (2) *Spiritual Values of Chinese Culture*, (3) *Reconstruction of Humanistic Spirit*, (4) *Cultural Consciousness and Moral Reason*. Because his major publications which are mostly centered on the status of man in the universe and human culture, he has been generally regarded as Idealistic Humanist and Neo-Confucian Idealist among the contemporary Chinese Philosophers.

Dr. Tang is now Dean of New Asia College, Hong Kong.

VISHWANATH PRASAD VARMA

Born (1924), studied at Chapra, Madhubani, Patna, New York and Chicago. Passed the Visarada Examination in 1940 from Allahabad, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan. First Class First B.A. Honours in History in 1942, Patna University. First Class First M.A. in History in 1944, Patna University. Offered Ancient Indian History and Culture as special papers in M.A.

He was Lecturer in History at the H. D. Jain College, Arrah during 1944-45 and taught Modern European and Indian History.

From May 1945 to April 1947 he was a Research Scholar in History and carried on investigations for a thesis on *Origins of Buddhism*. His thesis guides were Dr. Dharendra Mohan Datta and Dr. Kali Kinkar Datta. He also received guidance from Prof. G. N. Bhattacharya and Dr. F. Choudhary.

While a student he came under the influence of the Arya Samaj and Vivekanand movement and lectured under their auspices. He was specially influenced by contacts with Swami Abhedananda Saraswati and Swami Satyadeva Paribrajak.

Got first class Master's degree in Political Science at the Columbia University in the city of New York (U.S.A.) in 1948. As part of the requirement for the M.A. degree in Political Science wrote a thesis on *Dialectical Materialism* under Prof. R. M. MacIver and made a special study of the Political Philosophy of Hegel and Marx. At Columbia he came in contact with Professors Schneider, F. Nygel and Franz Neumann.

Was awarded the Ph.D. degree in Political Science at the University of Chicago in 1950. He studied Political Science with Professors Quincy Wright, Leonard White and C. H. Pritchett. As part of the requirements for the Ph.D. degree wrote a thesis on "Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations". His thesis committee consisted of Professors Strauss, Morgenthau, Easton, Herman Finer and G. Bobrinskoy. At Chicago he also came in contact with Professors Carnap and Morris.

On return to India he was appointed Assistant Professor of Political Science at Patna College in September, 1950. In August, 1961 he was promoted as Reader in Political Science. In June, 1962 he was appointed the Head of the University Department of Political Science, Patna University. In September, 1962 he was also appointed the Director of the Institute of Public Administration, Patna University. In July 1963 he was appointed University Professor of Political Science, Patna University.

From 1952 he has been intimately associated with the All-India Political Science Association and for several years has been a member of its Executive Committee and in 1963 and 1966 he was elected Vice-President of the All-India Political Science Association. In 1967 he was elected President of the All-India Political Science Association.

Nine books by him have been published so far. Their names are : (1)

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Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvodaya (2nd ed Laxmi Narayan Agrawal, Agra, 1961); (2) *Political Philosophy of Sri Aurobindo* (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1960); (3) *Hindu Political Thought and its Metaphysical Foundations* (Motilal Banarsidas, 1959); (4) *Modern Indian Political Thought* (2nd ed Laxmi Narayan Agrawal, 1964); (5) *Studies in Philosophy of Education* (Laxmi Narayan Agrawal, 1964); (6) *Rajni Aur Darshana* (in Hindi—Bihar Rashtrabhasa Parishad, Patna, 1956); (7) *Paschatya Rajnitika Vichardhara Ka Itihasa* (U. P. Government Hindi Committee, Lucknow, 1964); (8) *Visvarajni* (Patna, Gyanpeeth P. Ltd., 1960); (9) *Bhartiya Darshana* (Agra, L. N. Agrawal, 1967).

He has made a study of Indian Philosophy and specially of Buddhism under late Pandit Ayodhya Prasad and Pandits Brahamananda, Namonarayan Jha and Dr. D. M. Datta. Also had chance of discussing problems of Indian Philosophy with Dr. S. N. Dasgupta.

He has guided researches for the Ph D degree in Indian Philosophy, Western Sociological Theory, Western and Indian Political Theory, Public Administration and Municipal Self-Government. He has also directed seven empirical research projects on various aspects of Applied Politics and Comparative Public Administration.

His research papers numbering over hundred have been published in *Philosophy East and West*, *Diogenes*, *The Calcutta Review*, *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, *The Journal of the Administrative Sciences*, *Vedanta Kesari*, *Journal of Bihar Research Society*, *Prabuddha Bharata*, *Indian Review*, *Modern Review*, *Patna University Journal*, etc.

WILLIAM S. WEEDON

Educated at Tower Hill School, Harvard, and University of Virginia. Taught at University of Virginia, 1929-1961 (Chairman of Corcoran Department of Philosophy, 1954-1961), and at Wesleyan University (William Griffin Professor of Philosophy and Chairman Department of Philosophy 1961—). Member of Senate of University of Virginia, 1955-1958, 1959-1961. Chairman Board of *Virginia Quarterly Review*, 1959-1961. Member of Board of Editors, *Philosophy East and West*. Former President, Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology, and Virginia Philosophical Association, Member, Executive Committee, American Philosophical Association (Eastern Division), 1959—.

W H WERKMEISTER

William Henry Werkmeister, born August 10, 1901 in Germany. American citizen since 1926. Married. Studied at the University of Munster and Frankfurt (Germany) and the University of Nebraska. Ph D 1927. Member of the faculty of the University of Nebraska 1926-53. Chairman of the Department of Philosophy 1945-53. Professor of Philosophy, University of Southern California since 1953. Director of the School of Philosophy since 1954. American Exchange Professor, University of Berlin (Germany) 1936-37; Knoles Lecturer at the University of the Pacific 1950, Visiting Professor, Harvard University 1950-51. Panel member of the East-West Philosophy Conference, Hawaii 1959, and again 1964. Past President, American Philosophical Association (Pacific Coast Division) 1964-65. Major publications: *A Philosophy of Science* (1940), paperback edition 1965, *The Basis and Structure of Knowledge* (1948), *A History of Philosophical Ideas in America* (1948); *An Introduction to Critical Thinking* (1949), revised edition 1957, *Outlines of a Value Theory* (1959); *Theories of Ethics* (1961). Numerous articles contributed to various journals. Editor of *The Personalist*, a philosophical quarterly, since 1959.

RAM JEE SINGH

Born (1931) and educated in Bihar, M A (Patna University), Ph D (Bhagalpur University); Specialisation in Jainism and Gandhian thought.

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Positions held: Taught philosophy for 15 years, was Principal of a Degree College for 4 years, Joint-Secretary, Akhil Bhartiya Darsana Parishad (All India Philosophical Association), Secretary, Bihar Darsana Parishad, Joint Secretary, Indian Institute of Tantrik Research and Yoga; Life-Member, Indian Philosophical Congress, Akhil Bharatiya Darsana Parishad, Member, Royal Institute of Philosophy (London), Mind Association (Oxford), Australian Philosophical Association (Sydney), Philosophical Association (Nagpur), etc.

Publications: *Jaina Concept of Omniscience* (In press), *Some Materials for the Study of Omniscience in Ancient Hindu Thought* (In press), *Ideology of Mahatma Gandhi* (In press), *Studies in Jainism* (In press); *World Perspectives in Philosophy, Religion and Culture* (Editor), *Lohia Commemoration Volume* (Hindi)

Research Articles published in the *Proceedings of International Philosophical Congress* (Rome), *Proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress* (Ceylon), *Proceedings of Akhil Bharatiya Darsana Parishad*, *Proceedings, Bihar Darsana Parishad*, *Philosophical Quarterly*, *Jaina Antiquary*, *Darsnika Traismatik*, *Proceedings of the Advanced Centres of Philosophy*, Benaras Hindu University (Varanasi), Madras University, etc.

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